By Marta-Marika Urbanik & Robert A. Roks

Recent research on street-involved populations has documented their online presence and has highlighted the effects of their online presentations on their lives in the real world. Given the increasing conflation between the online and offline world, contemporary urban ethnographers should pay increased attention to their participants’ online presence and interactions. However, methodological training of this sort is still in its infancy stages and has not yet evolved to guide the growing number of researchers undertaking this form of research. This article draws from our experiences using social media in our urban ethnographies with criminally involved groups, to examine the benefits, risks, and challenges of drawing on social media in urban ethnography. It is intended to serve as a foundational piece that will hopefully ignite scholarly dialogue, debate, and methodological training relating to deploying social media in urban—and specifically—gang ethnography.

Qualitative Sociology 43(6) 2020.

By Bàrbara Molas and Heron Lopes

This research report illustrates how far-right users have accelerated the spread of harmful content by successfully exploiting AI tools and platforms. In doing so, it contributes to improving our understanding of the misuse of AI through new data and evidence-based insights that may inform action against the dissemination of hate culture through the latest technologies.  

  The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), 2024. 27p.

By Roderic Broadhurst, Katie Skinner, Nicholas Sifniotis, Bryan Matamoros-Macias and Yuguang Ipsen

In an exploratory quasi-experimental study, 138 students recruited during a university orientation week were exposed to social engineering directives in the form of fake emails, or phishing, over several months in 2017. The study assessed the risks of cybercrime for students by observing their responses. Three types of scam emails were distributed that varied in the degree of individualisation: generic, tailored, and targeted or ‘spear’. The study explored the influence of scam type, cybercrime awareness, gender, IT competence and perceived internet safety on susceptibility to email scams.Although tailored and individually crafted email scams were more likely to induce engagement than generic scams, differences were not significant. Analysis of the variables showed that international students and first year students were deceived by significantly more scams than domestic students and later year students.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 587. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2020. 16p.

By Europol 

Intellectual property (IP) crime refers to the theft, infringement and unauthorised use of intellectual property ( 1 ) such as copyrights, designs, trademarks, patents, and geographical indications of origin, and crimes related to trade secrets. Common types of IP crime include counterfeiting (the manufacture, importation, distribution, storage and sale of goods that falsely carry the trademark of a genuine brand without permission) and piracy (the unauthorised copying, use, reproduction, and distribution of materials protected by intellectual property rights). IP crime continues to pose a threat to the EU’s internal security ( 2 ). The harm produced by IP crime is more significant than it appears at first sight. Not only because of its adverse economic effects, but especially in terms of impact on consumers’ health and safety, and on the EU’s natural environment. Criminal actors operating in IP crime are very adept at exploiting opportunities and loopholes, posing challenges to right holders, law enforcement and other relevant authorities. The scale of crime remains considerable. In 2022, approximately 86 million fake items were seized in the EU, with an estimated value exceeding EUR 2 billion. The most common products seized were games ( 3 ), packaging materials, toys, cigarettes, and recorded CDs/DVDs. 60 % of the goods were detained within the EU, and 40 % at the EU’s borders ( 4 ). The illegal trade in counterfeit goods was estimated to represent 5.8% of imports to the EU( 5 ). IP crime thrives because it fulfils a worldwide demand for low-priced goods, which is satisfied by criminal actors and networks operating across continents. Despite prevention campaigns to expose the health and safety dangers of purchasing and consuming counterfeit goods, besides the severe consequences for the industries and companies targeted, counterfeiting keeps appealing to or misleading consumers. IP crime entails a complex criminal process involving multiple steps and various actors. The infringement of intellectual property rights is only the initial stage of IP crime, as the final objective of counterfeiters is to profit as much as possible from the subsequent illicit sale of the fake goods introduced into the consumers’ market. IP crime relies on a multitude of enablers that make this criminal activity particularly successful and at the same time difficult to tackle. These enabling factors can be crimes in themselves, but can also be lawful activities misused for facilitating IP crime. This report explores the ecosystem of IP crime and its interactions with developments in our society. At the core of the report is a description of the criminal process by which the various types of IP crime are committed and the steps it entails. It assesses which key catalysts in today’s EU and global society drive IP crime, making it an area of opportunity for criminal actors. It zooms in on those factors – be they criminal acts or lawful activity misused for criminal purposes – that enable IP crime. At the same time, it considers how IP crime can function as an enabler of other serious and organised crimes. Ultimately, it describes IP crime’s harmful impact on EU citizens and  This report uses operational data from investigations contributed to Europol. The EUIPO has also collected contributions by the private sector. Case examples are used throughout the report as illustrations. Where relevant, open-source intelligence has been used to corroborate analytical findings. The focus on enablers invites law enforcement authorities (LEAs), legislators, relevant stakeholders and the public to work even more closely to reduce the harm of IP crime and identify the criminals behind it. A cohesive response by all stakeholders, both within and outside the EU, is a prerequisite toward the detection and dismantling of the criminal networks involved

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union , 2024. 45p.

By Elaine Hennig and Benjamin Greaves

Since Harris County’s misdemeanor bond system was first declared unconstitutional by a federal district court in 2017, the county has implemented several reforms as part of the resulting settlement. Before the resolution of the lawsuit, indigent defendants were detained pretrial solely based on their inability to pay bond, while their wealthier counterparts could post bond and expect prompt release. The county corrected this wealth-based discrimination by requiring the majority of misdemeanor defendants to be released on personal recognizance (PR) bonds, which do not require an upfront cash payment. By providing defendants with a new system for bonding out of jail that does not discriminate based on income, the implemented reforms ensure that defendants are not prematurely punished with jail time— upholding the principle of a ‘presumption of innocence’ for the criminally accused, and preventing taxpayers from footing the bill for unnecessary weeks or months of incarceration. Though these changes have only been applied to misdemeanor cases, several ongoing lawsuits have set the stage for reforms that could similarly improve the felony bond system. While these two systems are legally different, the rationale for reform remains the same: protecting constitutionally guaranteed rights and preventing wealth-based discrimination. Despite the more equitable reforms to Harris County’s misdemeanor system, opponents of bond reform frequently criticize the changes. Though many opponents still claim to support the principles of reform, they regularly scapegoat bond reform for the various failures of the criminal legal system. Through the use of misinformation, propagation of false narratives, and exploitation of race-based disparities, they portray bond reform as a threat to public safety. Unfortunately, this disinformation effort is facilitated by local media outlets, who amplify the voices of opponents and disseminate the narratives they promote. This report aims to examine media coverage of bond in Harris County, and to better understand the media’s role in shaping the narrative of bond reform. It draws on a content analysis of 226 news articles run by six Houston-area television stations between January 2015 and June 2021. Stories qualified for selection if they discussed bond reform, bond debates, and/or people who allegedly committed crimes while out on bond. While bias in coverage was the primary focus of this analysis, we also reviewed 15 other key variables, such as referenced ‘experts’ and the defendant’s race or ethnicity. This analysis reveals that many local media stations disproportionately publish biased articles in their reporting on bond. The media consistently provide a platform for opponents of bond reform to represent bond release as a threat to public safety, while frequently failing to contextualize opponents’ claims or feature an alternative view. In cherry-picking and sensationalizing stories about defendants who are arrested while out on bond, media outlets construct a distorted narrative of dangerous releasees, in effect exaggerating the risks of bond reform and minimizing its positive impact. These efforts continually undermine bond reform, serving only to generate fear of people released on bond pretrial. The shift in news coverage of bond is perhaps best seen through a comparison of coverage prior to and following the implementation of Harris County’s proposed settlement in 2019. Over the 48-month period from January 1, 2015, to December 31, 2018, 42 total articles focused on bond in relation to  reform or released defendants. Of those articles, only 33 percent were found to be negatively biased. In contrast, over a shorter 30-month period from January 1, 2019, to June 30, 2021, not only did the number of bond-focused articles more than quadruple to 184, but the percentage of negatively biased articles nearly doubled to 61. Although bias in media coverage is one of the most—if not the most—alarming variables analyzed in this report, several other variables have revealed similarly concerning trends. With ongoing attacks against bond reform efforts in Texas and in Houston specifically, recognizing and correcting these trends in media coverage is critical to ensuring that Harris County residents have a more informed perspective of both misdemeanor bond reform and bond reform more generally.   

Austin: TEXAS CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUITY, 2021. 34p.

By Michael Salter, WK Tim Wong, Jan Breckenridge, Sue Scott, Sharon Cooper and Noam Peleg

Child sexual abuse material (CSAM) is widely available online. Existing research indicates that the parents and parental figures of victims are notably represented in offender populations. However, there is limited research in this area. Drawing on Australian media and legal databases, this study created a database of 82 cases of CSAM production and distribution perpetrated by parents and/or parental figures from 2009 to 2019. The study found that perpetrators are most often the male parental figures of the victims, and victims are predominately girls under nine years of age. The findings reveal distinct patterns and scenarios of parental CSAM offending that may inform prevention, early intervention and improved responses to victims. The study documented the significant impact of parental CSAM offending on victims and the need for specialist victim support.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 616.  Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2021. 17p.

By Christopher Dowling and Anthony Morgan

The criminal mobility of outlaw motorcycle gang (OMCG) members presents a significant challenge to Australian governments and police. Examining patterns of mobility can help to better understand the opportunity structures that underpin offending by OMCGs and to drive national collaborative responses to these gangs. This study examines the prevalence and patterns of criminal mobility in a sample of almost 4,000 OMCG members in more than 400 chapters. Around one in 10 members showed evidence of criminal mobility over the long term, while more than one-third of chapters comprised criminally mobile members. Criminally mobile gang members were heavily concentrated in a small number of chapters. Patterns of criminal mobility primarily involve movements into east coast jurisdictions. New South Wales and Queensland emerged as the most common destinations for criminally mobile OMCG members  

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 619. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2021. 16p

By Rasmus Munksgaard and James Martin

Cryptomarkets represent a growing component of the global illicit drugs trade. Australia is over-represented in the proportion of online vendors who use these platforms to reach drug consumers. Despite the growth in online drug trading, relatively little is known about people who use cryptomarkets to sell drugs. This study addresses the knowledge gap and provides qualitative insights into this new, and little understood, cohort of offenders. The study found that vendors perceive less risk of violence and police intervention when selling drugs online and that the potential for profit exceeds that available when selling drugs offline.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 608. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2020. 12p.

By Cassandra Cross, Thomas Holt, Anastasia Powell and Michael Wilson 

Advancements in information technology are sources of both opportunity and vulnerability for citizens. Previous research indicates that there are significant challenges for police in investigating cybercrime, that community expectations about police responses are based largely on media representations, and that victims experience high levels of frustration and stigmatisation. This paper examines the views of the Australian community and law enforcement officers about the policing of cybercrime. Results suggest that police personnel are more likely to view cybercrime as serious, and community members are more likely to ascribe blame to victims. Results also indicate a discrepancy between police and community members in their views of the efficacy of police responses. These discrepancies contribute to public dissatisfaction. Therefore, the paper covers some general strategies for short- and long-term cybercrime prevention.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 635. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2021. 20p.

By Megan Wyre, David Lacey and Kathy Allan

Identity theft continues to grow in prevalence and complexity. Despite this growth, little is known about the identity theft response system and how it assists victims to recover. This study examines the response system by analysing 211 identity theft cases reported to IDCARE, a national identity and cybercrime victim support service. The study applies a sociotechnical systems methodology to establish the social, task and information processes of the Australian identity theft response system. The study also examines identity theft victims’ response activities and needs over a 12-month period. The identity theft response system is almost entirely dependent on the victim to respond to and limit the harm caused by identity theft. Overall, the response system is disjointed and lacking in coordination. 

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 592.  Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2020. 18p.

By Ariel G. Ruiz Soto

Immigrants in the United States commit crimes at lower rates than the U.S.-born population, notwithstanding the assertion by critics that immigration is linked to higher rates of criminal activity. This reality of reduced criminality, which holds across immigrant groups including unauthorized immigrants, has been demonstrated through research as well as findings for the one state in the United States—Texas—that tracks criminal arrests and convictions by immigration status. A growing volume of research demonstrates that not only do immigrants commit fewer crimes, but they also do not raise crime rates in the U.S. communities where they settle. In fact, some studies indicate that immigration can lower criminal activity, especially violent crime, in places with inclusive policies and social environments where immigrant populations are well established. A Look at the Overall Immigrant Population National studies have examined incarceration rates and prosecutions of immigrants in the country, overwhelmingly finding that immigrants of all legal statuses commit crimes at lower rates than those who were born in the United States. Immigrants Are Prosecuted and Imprisoned at Lower Rates than the U.S. Born Immigrants in the United States have had lower incarceration rates than the native-born population since at least 1870 (when such data were first recorded). In 2020, immigrants were 60 percent less likely to be incarcerated than the U.S. born, according to a study by the National Bureau of Economic Research. And though a 2021 Justice Department study points out prosecutions of immigrants increased between 1990 and 2018, nearly 90 percent were for violations of immigration-related laws. Notably, U.S. born citizens were ten times more likely than immigrants to be incarcerated for committing weapons- related offenses, five times more likely for violent offenses, more than twice as likely for property crimes, and nearly twice as likely for drug offenses.  At the state level, multiple studies have found there is no clear relationship between violent crime and immigration. And research at the city level suggests that increases in immigration can be associated with declining homicide rates, with the largest effect on municipalities with long histories of immigration, as well as reductions in property crimes and robbery. This makes immigrants  less likely to be either offenders or victims of crime at the local level compared to the U.S.-born population

Washington, DC: Immigration Policy Institute, 2024. 5p.   

By Oliver Bennett MBE, Ali Shalchi

The precise scale of economic crime in the UK is unknown, but it could run to tens or hundreds of billions of pounds per year. The extent of these crimes – which include money laundering, fraud, and corruption – led the Intelligence and Security Select Committee in its July 2020 report on Russia to note that London is considered a ‘laundromat’ for corrupt money. In December 2019 the Treasury Committee found various regulatory and legislative failings in the way in which these crimes are being tackled. It urged the Government to make improvements to the supervisory system and to introduce new powers to combat economic crime. A February 2022 Treasury Committee follow-up report concluded that the Government was still not prioritizing economic crime sufficiently. In 2019 The Financial Action Task Force (the global money laundering and terrorist financing watchdog) praised the UK’s efforts on the issue, but also found failings and identified a lack of resources for investigating these crimes. The Economic Crime Plan The Government agrees about the need to tackle economic crime, which it says causes “much harm to individuals and communities and damage to legitimate business and the UK’s reputation.” It set out its overall approach to tackling the issue in its July 2019 Economic Crime Plan. The Plan covers the years 2019-2022 and draws together all the work being conducted by the public and private sector. A number of the 52 actions contained in the plan may involve future legislative reforms, including changes to: • the Proceeds of Crime Act to improve how the proceeds of crime can be confiscated; • corporate criminal liability, to punish and prevent economic crimes when committed on behalf of or in the name of companies; • block company stock exchange listings on national security grounds; • improve transparency over UK property ownership; • Companies House powers to enable it strike off from its register dissolved or inactive limited partnerships. Progress with the Plan In February 2022, the Royal United Services Institute said that 40% of actions in the Plan had been completed, 17% were in progress, 23% were overdue, and 19% of actions had no due date. The Government says it is “on course to deliver 49 of the 52 actions” in the Plan. The Treasury Committee has recommended that the Plan be adapted and renewed for a further three years.   

London: UK Parliament, House of Commons Library, 2022. 22p.

By Gareth Mott, James Shires, Jen Ellis, James Sullivan and Jamie MacColl

Commercial cyber tools and services have many legitimate applications, from corporate penetration testing (an authorised simulated cyber attack on an IT system) to law enforcement and national security operations. But they are also subject to misuse and abuse, when they are used in ways that are contrary to national or international law, violate the human rights of their targets, or pose risks to international security. Some states are currently grappling with this policy challenge. Meanwhile, collective international initiatives for action are underway. For example, there is the US’s 2023 Joint Statement on Efforts to Counter the Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware and the UK- and France-led Pall Mall Process of 2024. Ultimately, one aim of these initiatives is to enable states to harmonise their policy interventions where possible. To inform principles and policies for intervention at national and international levels, it is necessary to understand the dynamics that encourage or facilitate offensive-cyber proliferation. This paper identifies a range of ‘non-state proliferating factors’ (NPFs) and ‘state permissive behaviours’ (SPBs), and its findings draw on desk-based research on the international commercial offensive-cyber market. These findings were supplemented by a data validation and consultative workshop with industry stakeholders held in person at Chatham House in March 2024. This half-day validation workshop drew on the expertise and insights of 44 participants predominantly based in the UK, the US and Western Europe. To facilitate candid discussion, remarks made at the workshop are not attributable, and the identities of participants are not referenced here.

In this paper, NPFs and SPBs are categorised into five areas:

1. Regulation of corporate structure and governance.

2. Legal frameworks for product development, sale and transfer.

3. Diplomatic support and engagement.

4. Development of cyber-security ecosystem and workforce.

5. Integration with defence and security industrial base.

Using these categories, this research analyses the roles of both state and non-state actors. It identifies critical inter-relationships between different SPBs and NPFs that serve to facilitate or enable potentially irresponsible offensive-cyber proliferation. This is one of two papers. A second paper, authored by the researchers and published by Chatham House in October 2024, draws on the findings in this paper and identifies a range of ‘principles’ that could be used to build a code of conduct to counter irresponsible offensive-cyber proliferation.

London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies - RUSI and The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2024. 39p.

By Magnus Lofstrom and Brandon Martin

California’s violent crime rate rose somewhat in 2023 and remains above its pre-pandemic level; the statewide property crime rate fell slightly. Both rates vary widely across crime categories and regions.

Public Policy Institute of Californiam 2024, 2p.

By Paul Jeffrey Brantingham, George E. Tita,  and George Mohler 

The onset of extreme social distancing measures is expected to have a dramatic impact on crime. Here, we examine the impact of mandated, city-wide social distancing orders aimed at limiting the spread of COVID-19 on gang-related crime in Los Angeles. We hypothesize that the unique subcultural processes surrounding gangs may supersede calls to shelter in place and allow gang-related crime to persist. If the normal guardianship of people and property is also disrupted by social distancing, then we expect gang violence to increase. Using autoregressive time series models, we show that gang-related crime remained stable and crime hot spots largely stationary following the onset of shelter-in-place. Policy Implications: In responding to disruptions to social and economic life on the scale of the present pandemic, both police and civilian organizations need to anticipate continued demand, all while managing potential reductions to the workforce. Police are faced with this challenge across a wide array of crime types. Civilian interventionists tasked with responding to gang-related crime need to be prepared for continued peacekeeping and violence interruption activities, but also an expansion of responsibilities to deal with “frontline” or “street level” management of public health needs. 

Criminology & Public Policy. 2021;20:423–436. 

By Mario Peucker, Thomas J Fisher, Jacob Davey

The media does not enjoy a high level of trust among Australians, as many people question the commitment of mainstream media to objective and nonpartisan reporting. While this mistrust is widespread, it manifests in particularly antagonistic ways within far-right milieus, where mainstream media is often seen through a conspiratorial lens as the ‘enemy of the people’ who actively conspire against the wellbeing of ‘ordinary’ or ‘white’ people. This almost unanimously hostile perception, however, does not stop people within far-right online spaces from posting mainstream media outputs to convey ideological messages in their online communities. Context This research report presents key findings from an analysis of far-right online communities on Facebook and the alt-tech fringe platform Gab, which has been described as a ‘right-leaning echo chamber’ (Lima et al. 2018:1). The study was conducted by researchers at the Institute for Sustainable Industries & Liveable Cities at Victoria University (VU), in collaboration with the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), within the research stream ‘Dynamics of Violent Extremism’ at the Centre for Resilient and Inclusive Societies (CRIS). What we did The research combines quantitative and qualitative methods. We analyzed around 11,000 Facebook posts and 45,000 Gab posts by Australian-based accounts and users who meet our working definition of far-right (see section 2). This quantitative analysis offers insights into the prevalence of mainstream media sources in their far-right online messaging and which outlets are particularly frequently shared. In addition, we conducted a qualitative multimodal in-depth analysis of a quasi-random sample of 224 Facebook and 298 Gab posts that contained an outbound link to a URL domain associated with a mainstream media outlet. This qualitative analysis allowed us to identify how mainstream media are (re)framed and (mis)appropriated within these far-right online space to deliver certain ideological messages.    

Melbourne; The Centre for Resilient and Inclusive Societies. August 2022. 26p.

By Leke de Vries

The association between crime and place is one of the most empirically supported notions in criminology. However, less is known about whether the internet has impacted the environmental conditions that contribute to crime in physical space. To address this gap, this dissertation examines the intersection of crime, place, and networks in the context of online promoted illicit massage businesses (IMBs). IMBs are establishments that host a wide variety of crimes and deviancies, and have recently gained attention due to their connection to human trafficking operations. While commercial sex and sex trafficking in IMBs are promoted through online classifieds and review boards, the illicit behaviors still require an offline act or transaction in stationary locations such as storefronts. Therefore, IMBs offer a compelling case to understand whether a criminology of place perspective applies to online-promoted crimes. Using innovative data and robust, quantitative and computational methods, this study shows that the geography and use of IMBs are driven by environmental conditions that are central to criminological theory about crime and place. However, the findings also suggest subtle changes to the geography of online-promoted crimes. In particular, IMBs and clientele demand were identified in neighborhoods that on the one hand feature aspects of social disorganization and crime opportunity theories, and on the other hand were theoretically unanticipated (e.g. in advantaged areas). Moreover, many clientele traversed neighborhood boundaries to frequent IMBs, connecting both spatially proximate and distant neighborhoods in patterns of crime. Lastly, the findings show the limitations of current policing models that are challenged by the locational flexibility of IMBs. Overall, these findings raise questions about a criminology of place in the digital age, call for theoretical integration, and a response model that engages online and offline domains and involves partnerships within and outside of the criminal justice system. 

 Boston: College of Social Sciences and Humanities of Northeastern University  202o. 124p

By Ciarán O’Connor

This report investigates the activities of the Irish Channel, a website, and associated social media accounts that have emerged as a highly active hub of misinformation in Ireland. The website gained notoriety in June 2024 following its publication of an article containing fabricated quotes and false claims alleging election interference during the local elections.1 This ‘election interference’ narrative reflected other baseless conspiracies alleging voter fraud was a threat to election integrity in the country. The Irish Channel website is part of the Premier Content Network which is run by the Digital Publishing Company. Its primary form of content across its range of websites is embedded YouTube videos, likely with the aim of driving traffic to its site and boosting ad revenue. Yet, as this analysis details, this may violate YouTube’s terms of service. This report profiles how original content produced by the Irish Channel contains inaccuracies and falsehoods, as well as content that is supportive of far-right ideologies including hateful anti-immigrant rhetoric. Analysis by ISD also indicates some of this content appears to have been generated using AI, with basic factual errors and non-existent citations being found on more than one article on the Irish Channel website. Accounts on social media and messaging platforms linked to the Irish Channel were found to feature white supremacist conspiracy theories, antisemitic hate, and support for Adolf Hitler. Additionally, the report highlights how the Irish Channel has forged close ties with the Irish Freedom Party and has, over time, become a key media distribution and broadcasting arm for the party. Many of the most egregious instances of false, misleading, and inflammatory claims found in this analysis originated from content published in conjunction with Irish Freedom Party-linked entities and hosted and promoted by the Irish Channel. This Irish Channel case study illustrates how small, far-right political parties can use digital media platforms and social media accounts to develop alternative media networks, promote their ideology, and grow their.

London :  Institute for Strategic Dialogue 2024. 18p.

By Lucy Cooper and Kevin D. Reyes

Once considered a mere novelty app, TikTok is now a certified force in the information ecosystem.  

The short form video giant is now being used by 14% of Americans as a news platform, according to a Pew Research Centre from 2023, an amount four times more than in 2020.  The impact of the platform, once best known for dance crazes and being a tastemaker for online trends, cannot be ignored. To better understand the impact that TikTok has, in 2023 ISD analysts gathered and analyzed data on trends in hate speech and extremist content on TikTok, and how effectively they were being moderated by the platform. The results, which center on a particular moment in time, have come to inform a series of studies – the first two of which focus on white supremacist content, and anti-migrant and -refugee content. While TikTok appears to have taken measures to improve content moderation practices since ISD’s 2021 study on extremism and hate speech on the platform, this new series demonstrates that TikTok is still ineffective in removing violative content. For example, data for the white supremacy content study was collected during one week in mid-August 2023 and indicates that such content was alive and well on the platform: 70 of the 108 video samples studied were uploaded to TikTok within the most recent three months at the time of collection. Of those 108 videos, the median number of views at the time of analysis was 6,097, a significant increase from ISD’s 2021 report where the median across 1,030 videos was 503 views. The last nine months have been tumultuous for TikTok as a company. In April 2024, President Joe Biden signed a bill that could result in a nationwide ban of the app should TikTok’s parent company, the Beijing-based ByteDance, not sell the platform within 12 months. As part of an ongoing legal fight over the possible ban, the Justice Department, according to the Associated Press, this summer alleged that TikTok was gathering bulk information on users’ “views on divisive social issues like gun control, abortion, and religion,” and harvesting data in violation of children’s online privacy law. As TikTok’s future remains undecided, content moderation issues on the platform persist. In July 2024, ISD published a report detailing the millions of views garnered by a network of neo-Nazi accounts on the platform. Just a month earlier, however, TikTok had published an updated transparency report in which they claimed that in the first four months of this year, moderators proactively removed 97.7% of violative content. Of that same sample, 89.8% were removed within 24 hours, down .1% from that same period in 2023. Despite TikTok’s statements, ISD and similar organizations consistently find content in clear violation of the platform’s policies

London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue 2024. 

By Ciarán O’Connor and Jared Holt

Once considered a mere novelty app, TikTok is now a certified force in the information ecosystem.  

The short-form video giant is now being used by 14% of Americans as a news platform, according to a Pew Research Centre from 2023, an amount four times more than in 2020.  The impact of the platform, once best known for dance crazes and being a tastemaker for online trends, cannot be ignored. To better understand the impact that TikTok has, in 2023 ISD analysts gathered and analyzed data on trends in hate speech and extremist content on TikTok, and how effectively they were being moderated by the platform. The results, which center on a particular moment in time, have come to inform a series of studies – the first two of which focus on white supremacist content, and anti-migrant and -refugee content. While TikTok appears to have taken measures to improve content moderation practices since ISD’s 2021 study on extremism and hate speech on the platform, this new series demonstrates that TikTok is still ineffective in removing violative content. For example, data for the white supremacy content study was collected during one week in mid-August 2023 and indicates that such content was alive and well on the platform: 70 of the 108 video samples studied were uploaded to TikTok within the most recent three months at the time of collection. Of those 108 videos, the median number of views at the time of analysis was 6,097, a significant increase from ISD’s 2021 report where the median across 1,030 videos was 503 views. The last nine months have been tumultuous for TikTok as a company. In April 2024, President Joe Biden signed a bill that could result in a nationwide ban of the app should TikTok’s parent company, the Beijing-based ByteDance, not sell the platform within 12 months. As part of an ongoing legal fight over the possible ban, the Justice Department, according to the Associated Press, this summer alleged that TikTok was gathering bulk information on users’ “views on divisive social issues like gun control, abortion, and religion,” and harvesting data in violation of children’s online privacy law. As TikTok’s future remains undecided, content moderation issues on the platform persist. In July 2024, ISD published a report detailing the millions of views garnered by a network of neo-Nazi accounts on the platform. Just a month earlier, however, TikTok had published an updated transparency report in which they claimed that in the first four months of this year, moderators proactively removed 97.7% of violative content. Of that same sample, 89.8% were removed within 24 hours, down .1% from that same period in 2023. Despite TikTok’s statements, ISD and similar organizations consistently find content in clear violation of the platform’s policies.  

London Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2024). . 15p.