By Observatory of Illicit Markets and the Conflict in Ukraine.

This report assesses the organized crime risks associated with veterans in Ukraine. It is a complicated, sensitive subject: while the hot state of the conflict means that very few military personnel are being demobilized at present, there is also concern that discussing veterans in such a context may stigmatize them. But, as this report highlights, such risks cannot be ignored and preparations for demobilization now may help prevent negative outcomes in future. Our research identifies the following as key organized crime risks: the incidence of drug use among service personnel, the profusion of weapons in the country and the possibility of veterans being recruited into or forming organized crime groups or joining private security firms as muscle. More tangentially, a sense of disaffection among veterans – rooted in a perception that the state is not keeping its promises to provide individual support or reform society as a whole – may also drive a wedge between veterans and society, generating friction and increasing the risk of confrontation, perhaps with violence. Veterans policy in Ukraine is a fast-moving field. The Ministry for Veteran Affairs is spearheading the new veterans law – a crucial development to ensure that Ukraine’s legislation is fit for the new realities of a post-conflict period that will see a million or more veterans in society. Work is also underway on draft laws governing the legal ownership of weapons, which will bring much-needed clarity and control to the millions of trophy weapons in the country.1 With a new demobilization law yet to be submitted to parliament (at the time of writing) and relatively few veterans in Ukraine today, 2024 is a critical window of opportunity. Ukraine should use this time to determine and implement a comprehensive veterans policy before the wave of demobilizing veterans arrives. Although there was no upsurge in veteran-related organized crime in the 2014–2022 period, the size of the veteran population will be much larger. Even a fraction of these veterans falling into crime will have a significant impact on Ukrainian society. At present, there is little sign of institutional readiness. Implementation of the initiatives announced to date has been patchy and slow, and the Ministry for Veterans Affairs has lacked a permanent head for much of the first half of 2024. Demobilization, for those who are eligible, is a frustrating and even humiliating process. Our interviews with veterans revealed scarce access to information about benefits, with many unaware of what was available to them. In terms of rehabilitation, there is a lack of effective psychological, physiological, legal and social support for veterans. Some of this is explainable by the very real strictures the war has imposed on Ukraine: training that usually takes years must be completed in a matter of weeks.

But the need remains. Since the full-scale invasion, civil society organizations, many of which have worked in veterans affairs since 2014, have been making strenuous and effective efforts to cover the gaps in care and provision for veterans, from physiological and psychological support to forming business collectives and designing a ‘whole-life’ veterans policy. Yet many feel they are working in isolation, with the state resisting their attempts to work collaboratively and introduce strategic and innovative thinking to veterans affairs.2 Only the state can deliver a veterans policy with the scope and resources needed, but NGOs have much to offer, not least their agility and ability to deliver help where it is most needed. Both the state and civil society will be needed if Ukraine is to deliver a programme of ‘deep prevention’ – a strategy that addresses veterans’ needs at the level of contributing social factors rather than the individual level – which will reap the most dividends in reducing exposure to organized crime risks. The hard reality is that, as Ukraine dedicates as many resources as it can to the day-to-day conflict, it must also begin planning for the decades-long aftermath.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , 2024 48p.

By Simon A. Cole Maurice Possley Ken Otterbourg Jessica Weinstock Paredes , Barbara O’Brien, Meghan Cousino, & Samuel R. Gross,

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. THE CASES

• This report analyzes 151 cases in which defendants were exonerated between 1989 and 2023 in the United States and medicolegal death investigation (“death investigation” for short) contributed to the false conviction.

• The 151 exonerees lost a total of 1,837 years in prison, an average of 12.2 years per exoneree. That is less than the average of 14.6 years for exonerees convicted of comparable crimes but for whom death investigation did not contribute to the false conviction.

B. CASE CHARACTERISTICS

• Not surprisingly, 140 (93%) of the 151 cases in which death investigation contributed to the false conviction were homicides. However, death investigators did contribute to eleven non-homicide cases, all involving abuse of vulnerable people: children or dependent adults. Eight of these eleven were cases involving the Shaken Baby Syndrome (SBS) diagnosis, in which the top charge was child abuse.

• In more than one-third of the cases, the death investigation evidence consisted of a claim that the medical evidence was consistent with the prosecution’s theory of the crime, e.g., that the victim’s wounds were consistent with a weapon linked to the defendant.

• In another third of the cases the death investigation evidence concerned the cause of death.

• Manner of death and time of death evidence contributed to fewer cases.

C. DEMOGRAPHICS

• Women were overrepresented among the defendants for whom the death investigation contributed to their false conviction. Thirty-nine (26%) of the defendants in the 151 cases were female, more than three times the 8% of all exonerees who were female. Only around 5% of exonerees convicted of comparable crimes were female.-

• Relatedly, cases involving child victims were particularly vulnerable to contributions by death investigation. Nearly half (47%) of the 151 cases involved child victims. That compares to only 19% of all non-death-investigation exonerations and 34% of non-death-investigation exonerations for comparable crimes.

• Although concerns have been raised about racial bias in death investigation, the exonerees in death investigation exoneration cases were whiter than exonerees in general. One third of death investigation exonerees were Black compared to 53% of all exonerees. Similarly, 8% of death investigation exonerees were Hispanic, compared to 12% of all exonerees. The higher representation of whites diminishes somewhat if women are removed from the analysis.

D. DEATH INVESTIGATION SYSTEMS

• The United States has a patchwork death investigation system with variations among and within states. The two primary types are medical examiner and coroner systems. Most, but not all, experts perceive medical examiner systems to be superior and call for them to replace coroner systems. We did not find that more false convictions occurred under coroner systems. Instead, false convictions generally occurred in proportion to where more people live: their occurrence correlated with those counties’ and states’ proportions of the US population.

• Nor did we find that more false convictions occurred in systems with elected (rather than appointed) coroners and death investigators.

• In 22% of cases, the death investigation office that contributed to the false conviction was accredited by the National Association of Medical Examiners (NAME). Only 17% of US death investigation facilities are accredited.

E. QUALIFICATIONS OF DEATH INVESTIGATORS

• The highest qualification for death investigators in the US is generally considered to be board certification in the subspecialty of forensic pathology by the American Board of Pathology. However, for decades there have not been enough board-certified pathologists in the US to meet the need for death investigation services and autopsies. Therefore, many death investigations and autopsies are performed by less qualified personnel, such as pathologists without board certification, physicians with specialties other than pathology, and even, in some cases, non-physicians such as funeral directors. We did not find that most false convictions occurred in cases with underqualified death investigators. In fact, board-certified forensic pathologists contributed to 61% (92) of the 151 cases in this study.

National Registry of Exonerations (2024), 90p

By John P. Sullivan, Nathan P. Jones 

This chapter covers the early history of bandits including the role of bandits in revolution (e.g., Pancho Villa), the rise of urban guerrillas (e.g., Che Guevara and the Cuban Revolution, Carlos Marighella (the Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla)) in Brazil and the Tupamaros in Uruguay, and the transition from ideological revolt to the criminal insurgency. The later transition will focus on the transition to crime by the FARC and ELN in Colombia succeeded by Bacrim in Colombia, mega-gangs in Venezuela, and Brazilian gangs (i.e., The Commando Vermelho and Primeiro Comando da Capital), followed by the rise of a criminal insurgency waged by territorial (third-generation) gangs (including maras such as MS-13 and Barrio 18 in Central America) and criminal cartels. The nexus between prison gangs and criminal gangs and the emergence of criminal enclaves (such as the Triple Frontier and Ciudad del Este) will be explored. A common thread will be a discussion of crime and social banditry (Hobsbawm) as mechanisms of revolt. Urban crime and instability and the emergence of crime wars and criminal insurgency will be discussed in context of state transition, globalization, and the rise of transnational organized crime.

London; New York: Routledge, 2021, 28p.

By Angélica Durán-Martínez

Objective/context: After the paramilitary demobilization in Colombia, Cali and Medellín—major cities with a long history of political and criminal violence—saw a decline in violence despite the continuing operation of criminal groups. Yet, while Cali remained more violent than the national average, with criminal groups displaying less ability to regulate local affairs and security, Medellín became less violent than the national average and criminal groups engaged in more intensive governance. Methodology: I compare these cities using case studies constructed through fieldwork and interviews with security officials, NGO and social leaders, and former members of groups, drawing on my long-term, ongoing research engagement in both locations. Conclusions: The contrast between these cities exemplifies varied manifestations of post-conflict criminality. I argue that this variation in criminal governance is connected to the wartime balance of power, specifically, the level of territorial control and political connections armed groups had before the demobilization. Where control and political connections of paramilitary before demobilization were high, post-conflict crime groups were more likely to engage in governance behaviors. By contrast, disputed territories during wartime were likely to experience less criminal governance. Drawing on path dependence ideas, I introduce an overlooked mechanism through which wartime orders affect criminal behavior: learning processes inside and outside criminal groups. Originality: I show that to fully understand post-conflict criminality, it is crucial to consider armed actors peripherally involved in the war but essential for territorial control, whereas to understand criminal governance, the mid-ranks of armed groups and learning processes are crucial.

Revista Colombia Internacional ,2024. 35p.

By Benjamin Artz and  David M. Welsch:

We employ a unique 10-year panel dataset from California to examine both the effect crime has on homelessness as well as the effect homelessness has on crime. Our main estimator accounts for endogeneity by incorporating dynamics, controlling for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, and relaxing the strict homogeneity assumption for our key variables of interest. We find strong evidence that regions experiencing increases in property crime, but not violent crime, should expect a practically significant, 2024. 69p..in homelessness, whereas increases in homelessness increase the number of violent crimes, but not property crimes. Robustness and falsification checks confirm the results.

Bonn:  Institute of Labor Economics - IZA, 2024. 49p.

By Iffat Idris GSDRC, University of Birmingham 28 February 2019

This review presents findings on the prevalence and nature of serious and organized crime1: in Jordan, and efforts to combat this. The extremely limited literature on the topic indicates that Jordan has low levels of serious and organized crime: the main forms are smuggling of goods and drugs, and human trafficking. The influx of large numbers of Syrian refugees has promoted crime within refugee camps, but the impact on crime in Jordan overall appears limited.

The review drew on academic and grey literature, as well as media reports. It found very little literature on the topics covered in the query, and nothing on the links between tribal groups and organized crime or on specific drivers of crime. The dearth in literature is perhaps a reflection of low levels of organized and serious crime in Jordan – though, without data on this, it is impossible to assert this definitively. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2016: 13) highlights the problem of lack of data on serious and organized crime across the Middle East:

• In general, data on drugs, drug use, HIV, people living in closed settings, crime, corruption and terrorism in the region are scarce. Analytical studies on the profile of organized criminal groups involved in illicit trafficking, their modus operandi and the routes used are very limited, as is information on the relationship between organized crime and terrorism. This can be the result of a lack of capacity and/or infrastructure to generate, manage, analyse and report data, or the lack of or poor coordination amongst the relevant institutions.

Key findings of the review are as follows:

• Crime statistics – There is a dearth of crime statistics for Jordan, but available figures point to a rise in crime in recent years, notably murder, aggravated assault and kidnapping. A total of 24,000 crimes were recorded in 2016 (OASC, 2018). 

• Smuggling – Jordan’s long and remote desert borders with neighbouring countries make it susceptible to smuggling of cash, gold, fuel, narcotics, cigarettes and other contraband. Smuggling into Jordan tends to be small-scale, largely fuel and cigarettes. With regard to drugs, Jordan is more a corridor country than a destination point: the main drugs being captagon, heroin, hashish and marijuana. Large quantities of narcotics were seized by the authorities in 2017: increased seizures point to a rise in narcotics smuggling. 

• Money laundering and corruption – Jordan is not considered a hub for money laundering. Corruption is a bigger problem: Jordan ranked 52nd (out of 140 countries) for incidence of corruption (WEF, 2018: 313). Government efforts to contain and prosecute corruption have not been effective. 

• Trafficking – Jordan is a source, transit, and destination country for adults and children subjected to forced labour, domestic servitude, and sex trafficking. Trafficking victims in Jordan are primarily from South and Southeast Asia, East Africa, Egypt, and Syria; refugees from Syria, the Palestinian Territories, and Iraq are especially vulnerable to trafficking. Forced labour victims in Jordan experience withheld or non-payment of wages, confiscation of identity documents, restricted freedom of movement, unsafe living conditions, long hours without rest, isolation, and verbal and physical abuse. Diverse migrant women can be forced into prostitution: those who migrated to Jordan to work in restaurants and nightclubs; Egyptian women married to Jordanian husbands; out-of status domestic workers from Indonesia, the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka who have fled their employers; Iraqi refugee women who have to provide for their families. 

• Crime in Syrian refugee camps – the literature indicates that, while crime is prevalent in Syrian refugee camps, it is not serious in nature: largely smuggling of camp vouchers and goods, though one report notes that the camps’ proximity to border areas of conflict makes them susceptible to smuggling and drug trafficking. While there are reports of a rise in crime in Jordan overall, this is attributed to economic pressures rather than the influx of Syrian refugees into the country. 

• Regional findings – A brief examination of serious and organized crime in the wider Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region points to a post-Arab Spring rise in transnational organized crime – facilitated by public disorder, deterioration in capacity of state law enforcement agencies, and economic hardship. Jordan is not explicitly mentioned, but given its geographic location, would likely be a target for such transnational crime networks.

Key findings of the review with regard to efforts to combat serious and organized crime in Jordan are as follows: 

• Agencies - A number of government agencies are involved in combating serious and organized crime, including trafficking. Key among these is the Public Security Directorate (PSD), which includes the Anti-Narcotics Department. The PSD and Ministry of Labour have a joint Anti-Trafficking Unit. 

• Legislation – The Anti-Human Trafficking Law was passed in 2009 but there are shortcomings with regard to meeting international standards in both the legal provisions and, even more, in enforcement. Challenges with the latter include victims being too afraid to file complaints, repatriation of victims, non-availability of evidence, and perpetrators being located out of the jurisdiction/reach of the country or hidden from the police. Jordan's Penal Code criminalizes corruption, including abuse of office, bribery, money laundering and extortion, but again the law is not implemented effectively. 

• Support from international partners – The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is the main international development organization supporting the Govt. of Jordan to combat serious and organized crime. Its interventions are often part of wider regional programmes, notably the Airport Communication Project (AIRCOP) which strengthening the capacities of international airports to detect and intercept drugs, other illicit goods and high-risk passengers (including foreign terrorist fighters), and the Container Control Programme (CCP) which helps member states strengthen their border control capacity and detect illicit goods in cargo containers. Interventions by other development partners include an EU project to combat human trafficking (JEMPAS) and the UK Jordan Security Sector Programme, aimed at reducing internal security threats in Jordan. etc.

K4D Helpdesk Report 537. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2019. 13p.

By Andrés Cajiao | Paula Tobo | Mariana Botero Restrepo

Just how organized is organized crime? This report on the relationship between migration and organized crime along the Colombia–Panama border explores this recurring question in research on organized crime with the aim of demystifying two underexplored phenomena in Colombia. The first is the Gulf Clan (Spanish: Clan del Golfo), which calls itself the Gaitanist Self-Defence Forces of Colombia, a group that continues to control the region despite being the object of one of the most intensive intelligence and judicial operations in the country’s recent history. While the specifics of how the Clan operates are unknown, this report demonstrates that criminal governance always depends on a complex set of relationships between organized crime, local communities and the state. Violence and the threat of violence are not enough to govern. In fact, one of the main findings of this study is that the influence of organized crime means that irregular migration and the economy that arises around it do not operate through violence. The second phenomenon explored here is migrant smuggling, which is widespread in border areas. The actions taken by states and international organizations have not curbed this highly complex illicit economy. Although irregular migration is stigmatized and presents a serious humanitarian problem in the region, it has been key in reviving the economies of Urabá and the Darién Gap, along the Colombian border, which should play a central role in public policy discussions. Without a better understanding of migratory phenomena and the key players involved, there is little the state can do to guarantee people’s safety or recover territorial control where it has lost it.

Geneva: Global Initiative AGainst Transnational Organized Crime, 2022.

By Iffat Idris

Conflict in eastern Ukraine has been underway since 2014: the February 2014 ouster of pro-Russia President Yanukovych was followed in March by Russian annexation of Crimea, and its support for insurgency in the Donetz Basin (Donbas) – the latter is ongoing. This paper is a rapid literature review of the links between corruption, crime and conflict in eastern Ukraine. While Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea was rooted both in Moscow’s historic claims to the peninsula, as well as moves by Kiev to move closer to the European Union, the ongoing insurgency in the Donetz Basin (Donbas) stems from structural factors such as industrial decline. Russian support for the Donbas insurgents, alongside its failure to recognise the republics that they announced (Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic), suggests that Moscow’s real goal is to put pressure on the Ukrainian government and prevent its integration into Western structures. The paper assesses the impact of the conflict on the economy of Crimea and Donbas. Russia has tried to demonstrate the benefits to Crimea of annexation by pumping vast resources into the region, but this resource injection has been unable to overcome the effects of wide-ranging Western sanctions. Donbas’ economy has been even more badly affected by ongoing conflict, with thousands displaced and an economic blockade imposed by Kiev greatly limiting trade. Here too, Moscow has had to step in with subsidies and humanitarian assistance. The paper also looks at the involvement of organised criminal groups (OCGs) in the conflict, and the impact of the conflict on organised crime in the region. With regard to the former it finds that OCGs played a big role in Russia’s annexation of Crimea, fighting alongside Russian forces (without their insignia) and other volunteers. This highlights the complementary and symbiotic nature of the connection between criminal groups and the Russian state. OCGs in the Donbas region had strong links with the Yanukovych government in Ukraine, ousted in 2014 – hence it is no surprise that these groups were heavily involved in the Donbas insurgency. With regard to how organised crime has been affected by conflict, the paper finds that corruption was a massive problem in Ukraine long before the conflict in the east. Moreover, it involved all levels of the government system and was strongly linked to organised crime. OCGs were especially prevalent in Crimea, while Donbas was even more notorious for criminality. Post-Crimea’s annexation, links between OCGs in Crimea and in Russia became even stronger. Ironically, due to the vast influx of Russian development funds, Crimea represented an opportunity for embezzlement and corruption for Russian and Crimean OCGs. Closer ties were even forged between Russian OCGs and those in Ukraine. Since the conflict in Donbas began – and given the economic blockade, and falling Russian funding support - the region has become heavily dependent on organised crime. The paper also finds that oligarchs, with close ties to organised crime, have benefited hugely from Crimea becoming part of Russia, e.g. seizing property belonging to pro Ukraine business elites. Ties with political elites are equally strong: gangs gain protection from political patronage, in turn giving kickbacks to politicians. One final aspect explored in the paper is transnational crime. It finds that this has risen since the annexation of Crimea and conflict in Donbas, including a rise in smuggling of illicit goods into Europe, and a rise in organised crime in Ukraine. Sevastopol could potentially take over as a smuggling hub from Odesa, while Crimea and Ukraine could become a global money laundering centre. Criminality in Russia has also increased, seen in rises in drug and arms trafficking and criminal cases. The drop in cross-border cooperation to combat crime has contributed to greater criminality. The paper concludes that corruption, crime and conflict are heavily intermeshed in eastern Ukraine, with each reinforcing the other in what appears to be a downward spiral of escalation.

SOC ACE Evidence Review Paper No. 2. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. 2022. 26p/

What’s new? Each year, hundreds of thousands of migrants cross the Darién Gap, a strip of jungle between Central and South America, on their way to the U.S. With little state presence in the area, Colombia’s Gaitanista drug syndicate is overseeing human smuggling rackets while gangs in Panama perpetrate assaults on migrants. Why does it matter? Illicit profits are soaring as the flow of migrants swells, with much of the money going to organised crime. Efforts by Colombia and Pan ama to impede the movement of people or weaken the criminal groups’ hold have so far failed to curb murder, rape and other attacks on migrants. What should be done? The days when the Darién Gap was a meaningful bar rier to mass migration are over. Enhanced law enforcement, redoubled efforts to quell crises in the main countries of departure and reinforced humanitarian assistance in the Darién could form part of regional efforts to manage irregular migration and protect the vulnerable.

Bogota; New York: Latin America Report N°102 | 3 November 2023

International Crisis Group, 2023. 46p.

By Rachel Burgin and Jacqui Tassone

This report presents the findings of a a study that aimed to understand the reasons for the high rate of attrition of reported sexual offences in the Australian Capital Territory. Through analysis of 389 police case reports, interviews with 33 victim-survivors and a review of Australian Federal Police and ACT Policing policy and procedural documents, the review found that not only are sexual offences rarely charged in the ACT, sexual offences are rarely investigated.

Failure to investigate sexual offences was driven by two key factors:

• impact of rape myths on police decision-making

• lack of understanding of the laws relating to sexual offences and the test to charge.

The report makes 17 recommendations to improve responses to sexual offences in the ACT and improve the experiences of victim-survivors in reporting to police. The findings provide insight for police forces across Australia to move towards a trauma-informed approach to policing sexual offences.

Hawthorn, VIC: Swinburne University of Technology, 2024. 129p.

By Laura Hidderley, Marni Manning, Elena Marchetti, Anne Edwards

Public opinion about sentencing is notoriously difficult to assess. In 2017, the Queensland Sentencing Advisory Council was asked to do just that in relation to sentencing for child homicide offences. Building on the existing literature on public attitudes to the criminal justice system, this study aimed to explore community views on this issue using a focus group methodology. A group of 103 participants was recruited by a market research company from a mix of urban and rural locations in Queensland. After completing a series of questionnaires, participants were assigned a ‘punitiveness score’ and assessed the seriousness of three separate child homicide vignettes. The study found that participants viewed the sentences as inadequate and not sufficiently reflective of the vulnerability and defencelessness of the child. These findings contributed to the Council’s recommendations to the Attorney-General and have since led to legislative change.

Research Report no. 21.

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2021. 58p.

Edited by Diana Maltz

In 1896, author Arthur Morrison gained notoriety for his bleak and violent ‘A Child of the Jago’, a slum novel that captured the desperate struggle to survive among London’s poorest. When a reviewer accused Morrison of exaggerating the depravity of the neighborhood on which the Jago was based, he incited the era’s most contentious public debate about the purpose of realism and the responsibilities of the novelist. In his self-defense and his wider body of work, Morrison demonstrated not only his investments as a formal artist but also his awareness of social questions. As the first critical essay collection on Arthur Morrison and the East End, this book assesses Morrison’s contributions to late-Victorian culture, especially discourses around English working-class life. Chapters evaluate Morrison in the context of Victorian criminality, child welfare, disability, housing, professionalism, and slum photography. Morrison’s works are also reexamined in the light of writings by Sir Walter Besant, Clementina Black, Charles Booth, Charles Dickens, George Gissing, and Margaret Harkness. This volume features an introduction and 11 chapters by preeminent and emerging scholars of the East End. They employ a variety of critical methodologies, drawing on their respective expertise in literature, history, art history, sociology, and geography. Critical Essays on Arthur Morrison and the East End throws fresh new light on this innovative novelist of poverty and urban life.

Abingdon, Oxon, UK: New York: Routledge, 2022.

By Annette Idler | Frederik Florenz | Ajmal Burhanzoi John Collins | Marcena Hunter | Antônio Sampai

This paper contributes to research on the relationship between conflict and organized crime (the crime–conflict nexus), using Afghanistan as a case study. For the past four decades, Afghanistan has been plagued by internal armed conflict, influenced by local, national, regional, and international external actors, and the intricate relationships among them. To varying degrees, power, politics, and criminality informed these relationships. Organized crime provides actors in Afghanistan with significant political power, while powerful political actors are uniquely positioned to reap the profits of the country’s criminal markets. This paper gives an account of the existing literature on Afghanistan’s crime–conflict nexus, identifying some of the key insights that this literature has revealed. To do so, it uses a four-pronged framework, exploring how conflict has fuelled organized crime in Afghanistan; how organized crime has fuelled conflict; how conflict over the control of illicit markets has resulted; and how organized crime has contributed to the erosion of the state. By assessing the literature on Afghanistan’s crime–conflict nexus, the paper identifies knowledge gaps and suggests areas for future research.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. 36p.

By Luke Kelly

This annotated bibliography includes research and evidence on militarized approaches to combating serious and organized crime (SOC) in various contexts. Militarised approaches involve using military forces or methods to deter and disrupt SOC groups. These approaches have been employed in states facing high levels of violence, fragile and conflict-affected contexts, post-conflict settings, and against threats like piracy and wildlife crime. The research finds that the evidence on the effectiveness of militarised approaches is largely negative. While there are a range of militarised approaches, applied in a variety of contexts, most papers nevertheless agree that military force, or military techniques, can only address one facet of SOC at best, and need to be linked with a range of other measures such as policing, rule of law interventions and economic interventions, to effectively combat SOC. As well as drawing resources away from these other measures, militarised approaches have also been found to have a number of direct and indirect negative effects, such as human rights abuses, increases in violence, and undermining the rule of law.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2023. 44p.SOC ACE Evidence Review Paper 4.   

By Eunsik Chang, Sandra Orozco-Aleman, María Padilla-Romo:

This paper studies the effects of mothers' long-term pre-conception exposure to local violence on birth outcomes. Using administrative data from Mexico and two different empirical strategies, our results indicate that mothers' long-term exposure to local violence prior to conception has detrimental effects on infant health at birth. The results suggest that loss of women's human capital and deterioration of mental health are potential underlying mechanisms behind the adverse effects, highlighting intergenerational consequences of exposure to local violence. Our findings shed light on the welfare implications of local violence that are not captured in in-utero exposure to violence.

Bonn: Institute of Labor Economics, 2024. 

By Krstić, Igor

From Jacob Riis’ How The Other Half Lives (1890) to Danny Boyle’s Slumdog Millionaire (2008), Igor Krstić outlines a transnational history of films that either document or fictionalise the favelas, shantytowns, barrios poulares or chawls of our ‘planet of slums’.

Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016.

By Gisli Vogler

How should those profiting from injustice and violence respond to their complicity? And how can they remain responsive when faced with the many ways in which they are entangled in an unjust world? We are at a deciding moment in affluent (Western) societies when it comes to addressing these kinds of questions. On the one hand, there is cause for optimism: the last decade has seen a significant shift towards open discussion of patriarchal society, institutional racism, capitalist exploitation, and the destruction of the environment, amongst many other contemporary political problems. Social movements such as #MeToo, Black Lives Matter, Fridays for Future, and Occupy Wall Street have helped turn assuming responsibility for violence and injustice into a dominant political issue. As a consequence, unjust practices, as diverse as Amazon’s working conditions and the Oxfam sexual exploitation scandal, are met with global condemnation. Debates about how those benefiting from exploitation and expropriation can act more responsibly now pervade many aspects of everyday life, from what to eat and wear, to who has what kind of opportunities. On the other hand, societies continue to be characterized by a failure to act upon the omnipresent demands for facing up to one’s involvement in injustice. Racism, sexism and ableism, and the exploitation of minorities, poorer countries and people, and nature all remain integral parts of human existence. The re-emergence of reactionary populist forces and parties in the US and large parts of Europe, together with the consolidation of power by authoritarian leaders across the world, has exacerbated the problem. The enduring failures by complicit actors to address injustice are cause for much despair and frustration. However, they have also served as catalysts for a sustained scholarly reflection on the complexities of complicity and how to address them (Beausoleil, 2019;  Hayward, 2017; Mihai, 2022; Schaap, 2020). It is my intention in this book to contribute to this interrogation and to think further how people can appropriately respond to their complicity in injustice and violence. To this end, I begin with a constructive evaluation of recent scholarship on complicity.  

Edinburgh:  Edinburgh University Press, 2024. 194p.

Edited by Tony Roberts and Karekwaivanane, George Hamandishe

In an era when hashtag campaigns like #MeToo and #BlackLivesMatter capture global attention for victims of injustice, politicians and corporations are now spending billions employing Cambridge Analytica-type consultancies to manufacture disinformation - employing trolls, cyborgs and bots to disrupt dialogue and drown-out dissent. In the first study of its kind, this open-access book presents a range of case studies of these emerging dynamics across Africa, mapping and analyzing disinformation operations in ten different countries, and using innovative techniques to determine who is producing and coordinating these increasingly sophisticated disinformation machines. Drawing on scholars from across the continent, case studies document the actors and mechanisms used to profile citizens, manipulate beliefs and behaviour, and close the political space for democratic dialogue and policy debate. Chapters include examinations of how the Nigerian government deployed disinformation when the #EndSARS campaign focused attention on police brutality and corruption; insights into how pro-government actors responded to the viral #ZimbabweanLivesMatter campaign; and how misogynists mobilized against the #AmINext campaign against gender-based violence in South Africa. Through the documentation of episodes of unruly politics in digital spaces, these studies provide a valuable assessment of the implications of these dynamics for digital rights, moving beyond a focus on elaborations of the idea of ‘fake news’, and providing actionable recommendations in the areas of policy, legislation and practice. The ebook editions of this book are available open access under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence on bloomsburycollections.com.

London: Zed Books, 2024. 256p.

By Neil Websdale

This book explores dementia-related aggression, violence, and homicide through a detailed analysis of “gray mist killings.” The term gray mist killing refers to intimate partner homicides (IPHs) committed by spouses/partners suffering from dementia, homicides of dementia sufferers committed by their caregiving spouses/partners or other family members, and IPHs attributable to the complications of caring for a co-resident family member suffering from dementia. Killings by people with dementia raise questions about the role of biological, psychological, and sociological forces. This book therefore encourages discussions around the relative weighting of these interrelated forces, and why the criminal justice system and the courts have a hard time handling these killings. It also adds to our understanding of the social responses to people with dementia, the orchestration of services, the nature of caring, and the interaction between sufferers and those familial, community, and state actors who provide support and care. The vividly detailed case studies (from the US, UK, and Australia) uniquely inform criminological debates about violence, homicide, and the social responses to these complex phenomena. They are organized around the apparent motives for the killing, such as mercy, theft, prior intimate partner violence, mental illness, and exhaustion. The social responses of families, communities, and state actors are examined and contextualized against what researchers and dementia specialists suggest are promising or best practices for intervention. Apparent triggers or circumstantial precipitants for the killings invite discussion of signals, risks, and preventive interventions. The book culminates in an attempt to make sense of gray mist killings, as well as a discussion of broader implications and significance in relation to globalization, violence against women, the rising prevalence of the dementias, declining birthrates, climate change, and sustainable economic development. Drawing from a variety of disciplines, this book will be of great interest to students and scholars of criminology, sociology, psychology, psychiatry, anthropology, gender studies, social work, law, public policy, and gerontology. It should also appeal to judges, prosecutors, lawyers, social workers, gerontologists, law enforcement, adult protective services, physicians, psychologists, and psychiatrists.

Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, Routledge, 2024. 252p.

By Daniel O'Connell,  Christy Visher,  Lin Liu

This Article reviews what is known from the field of criminology about the nature of crime patterns in general, focusing particularly on violence, violent people, and how violence manifests in the lives of individuals who commit crime. Broad consensus exists in the research community that offending careers of individuals who commit crimes vary substantially from person to person. Most people tend to commit non-violent crimes and while many violent offenders recidivate after being released from prison, the majority do not. Moreover, the type of violent crime committed—expressive versus instrumental—may be an important distinction. We draw several conclusions from the research on violence and violent recidivism and what it can mean for policymakers and their decision-making. Armed with accurate information about violent offending, policymakers, and practitioners may be able to propose appropriate policy changes and make more informed decisions about the likelihood of violent offending and recidivism among persons who commit crimes.  

103 Marq. L. Rev. 983 (2020).