By Letizia Paoli , Victoria A. Greenfield , Peter Reuter

Heroin is universally considered the world's most harmful illegal drug. This is due not only to the damaging effects of the drug itself, but also to the spread of AIDS tied to its use. Burgeoning illegal mass consumption in the 1960s and 1970s has given rise to a global market for heroin and other opiates of nearly 16 million users. The production and trafficking of opiates have caused crime, disease, and social distress throughout the world, leading many nations to invest billions of dollars trying to suppress the industry. The failure of their efforts has become a central policy concern. Can the world heroin supply actually be cut, and with what consequences? The result of a five-year-long research project involving extensive fieldwork in six Asian countries, Colombia, and Turkey, this book is the first systematic analysis of the contemporary world heroin market, delving into its development and structure, its participants, and its socio-economic impact. It provides a sound and comprehensive empirical base for concluding that there is little opportunity to shrink the global supply of heroin in the long term, and explains why production is concentrated in a handful of countries--and is likely to remain that way. On the basis of these findings, the authors identify a key set of policy opportunities, largely local, and make suggestions for leveraging them. This book also offers new insights into market conditions in India, Tajikistan, and other countries that have been greatly harmed by the production and trafficking of illegal opiates. A deft integration of economics, sociology, history, and policy analysis, The World Heroin Market provides a rigorous and vital look into the complex--and resilient--global heroin trade.

New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. 388p.

By Michael Lohmuller, Nicole Cook, and Logan Pauley

The illicit synthetic drug networks that fuel the ongoing opioid epidemic in the United States continue to evolve and adapt to changing incentives and pressures, finding innovative ways to exploit technology and increased global interconnectivity. C4ADS investigated these drug supply chains, conducting extensive multilingual analysis of Chinese corporate entities, the clear web, and social media, in order to better understand the methods by which they operate.   

Washington, DC: C4ADS 2020, 45p.

By Lauren Greenwood and Kevin Fashola

The issue brief examines the evolution of China’s role in global illicit fentanyl trade. China placed all forms of fentanyl and its analogues on a regulatory schedule in 2019, but the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) assesses China remains the primary country of origin for illicit fentanyl and fentanyl-related substances trafficked in the United States. While Mexican drug cartels have always been a critical node for smuggling illicit fentanyl into the United States, this brief finds that the links between Chinese and Mexican actors in the fentanyl trade has grown in complexity, including the development of sophisticated money laundering operations. Finally, the brief concludes that while cooperation between the United States and China remains limited, there are opportunities for the United States to work with other countries on counter-narcotic enforcement.
 Washington, EC:  U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,   

By Roderic Broadhurst, Matthew Ball and Harshit Trivedi

A snapshot of the sale of fentanyl and its analogues across several popular darknet markets between 2 January and 27 March 2019 reveals the amount, types and physical forms available. Of the 127,541 unique drug listings identified, 13,135 were opioids (10.3% of all drugs), of which 1,118 (0.876% of all drugs) were fentanyl or its analogues. Between 27.3 and 39.3 kilograms of fentanyl and its derivatives were available over the period. The average price of fentanyl was A$99 per gram, while carfentanil was A$26.8 per gram. The shipping methods, cross-market operations and product specialisation of the 303 active fentanyl vendors on these darknet markets are also described.

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2020. 14p.

By United States and Rand Corporation

The Commission on Combating Synthetic Opioid Trafficking, established under Section 7221 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, was charged with examining aspects of the synthetic opioid threat to the United States—specifically, with developing a consensus on a strategic approach to combating the illegal flow of synthetic opioids into the United States. This final report describes items involving the illegal manufacturing and trafficking of synthetic opioids, as well as the deficiencies in countering their production and distribution, and includes action items directed to appropriate executive branch agencies and congressional committees and leadership. Get appendices to the report.

Rand, 2022. 148p.

By Bryce Pardo, Lois M. Davis, Melinda Moore

The opioid overdose crisis has continued to accelerate in recent years because of the arrival of potent synthetic opioids, such as fentanyl and related substances. Although several synthetic opioids have legitimate medical applications, the majority of overdoses are due to illicitly manufactured imports. Researchers from the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center evaluated publicly available data to better understand the dimensions of the consumption and supply of these substances. They performed four tasks designed to gain insight into this new and quickly evolving phenomenon: (1) They evaluated trends in overdoses across regions and over time. Understanding where overdoses due to synthetic opioids occur provides a rough proxy for where law enforcement should prioritize screening efforts for packages that enter the country destined for such markets. (2) They evaluated the supply of fentanyl and related substances using public data from state and local forensic laboratories that report to national systems. The authors note a relationship between lab exhibits and fatal overdoses across regions and over time. (3) They examined the online markets for synthetic opioids. The team collected quantitative and qualitative data from online marketplaces and vendors to better understand what supply and concealment mechanisms vendors use when shipping product to the United States. (4) They evaluated the adulterants and other bulking agents used in retail distribution. There are limitations to each of these approaches, and the authors provide caveats to interpreting their findings.

Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2019. 91p.

By Bryce Pardo and Peter Reuter

  The synthetic opioid crisis in North America has increased fatal overdose rates to unprecedented levels within a matter of a few years. It involves new technologies, a new source of supply (the chemical industry in China), and new forms of distribution (the internet and mail). These elements are perhaps even more difficult to suppress than other supply sources from foreign countries. This has led to an assumption that nothing can be learned from prior experience in trying to control drug markets. In this paper, we first explore what might be learned from some notable past successes. We begin by examining a set of episodes in which enforcement against a specific illegal drug market had more than a brief impact on supply, though the enforcement may have caused other harms. Examples include the near-elimination of the quaaludes market in the 1980s and the “heroin drought” in Australia in the early 2000s. Exploring common features of these past successes reveals insights that may reduce the risk of fatal overdose. We then examine the characteristics of fentanyl distribution in detail, noting that taken individually, the

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  differences (such as the low costs of fentanyl production and its distribution by mail) are in fact not so distinctive: it is the combination of many differences that creates the unique threat. In response, authorities need to change priorities in supply control domestically. Prior to the arrival of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids, it was reasonable for police and prosecutors to focus on (1) raising prices and restricting availability to reduce consumption and (2) minimizing the violence and disorder around street markets. Yet today, a more important goal may be to reduce the toxicity of the supply and thus the number of drug overdoses. This paper applies the insights of the “focused deterrence” approach developed by David Kennedy and Mark Kleiman, which involves using multiple levers to attain a specific policy goal. We conclude with some specific suggestions for local and national supply-control agencies— including the need to focus more on regulating rather than reducing markets to minimize harm, and to distinguish between markets not yet swamped by fentanyl or in transition and those where the drug is entrenched. Strategies appropriate in one context may not serve well in another.

Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2020. 21p.

By Julie O’Donnell, Lauren J. Tanz, R. Matt Gladden, Nicole L. Davis, Jessica Bitting

During May 2020–April 2021, the estimated number of drug overdose deaths in the United States exceeded 100,000 over a 12-month period for the first time, with 64.0% of deaths involving synthetic opioids other than methadone (mainly illicitly manufactured fentanyls [IMFs], which include both fentanyl and illicit fentanyl analogs).* Introduced primarily as adulterants in or replacements for white powder heroin east of the Mississippi River (1), IMFs are now widespread in white powder heroin markets, increasingly pressed into counterfeit pills resembling oxycodone, alprazolam, or other prescription drugs, and are expanding into new markets, including in the western United States† (2). This report describes trends in overdose deaths involving IMFs (IMF-involved deaths) during July 2019–December 2020 (29 states and the District of Columbia [DC]), and characteristics of IMF-involved deaths during 2020 (39 states and DC) using data from CDC’s State Unintentional Drug Overdose Reporting System (SUDORS).

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  During July 2019–December 2020, IMF-involved deaths increased sharply in midwestern (33.1%), southern (64.7%), and western (93.9%) jurisdictions participating in SUDORS. Approximately four in 10 IMF-involved deaths also involved a stimulant. Highlighting the need for timely overdose response, 56.1% of decedents had no pulse when first responders arrived. Injection drug use was the most frequently reported individual route of drug use (24.5%), but evidence of snorting, smoking, or ingestion, but not injection drug use was found among 27.1% of decedents. Adapting and expanding overdose prevention, harm reduction, and response efforts is urgently needed to address the high potency (3), and various routes of use for IMFs. Enhanced treatment for substance use disorders is also needed to address the increased risk for overdose (4) and treatment complications (5) associated with using IMFs with stimulants.

MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2021;70:1740-1746.

By The Scottish Drug Deaths Taskforce

This, the final report of the Scottish Drug Deaths Taskforce, sets out a suite of evidence-based recommendations and actions that will reduce drug-related deaths and harms and improve and save the lives of people who use drugs. Our final report has four substantive chapters. 1. Context: explores where we are now, gives an overview of the work of the Taskforce to date and discusses the legal context in which Scotland operates. 2. Culture: sets out what the ethos of the system should be and the changes that are needed to achieve this. It calls for broad culture change from stigma, discrimination, politicisation and punishment towards care, compassion and human rights. 3. Care: investigates what is needed to deliver an effective, consistent, personcentred, whole-systems approach that delivers high-quality care. It builds on the principle that drug dependency should receive parity with any other health conditions, with people getting the care they need when they need it. 4. Co-ordination: sets out the foundations of the changes that are required, including targeted resource and decisive leadership. Twenty overarching recommendations are provided at the beginning of the report. Each chapter then includes evidence-based actions that are summarised in a table at the end of the report.

Edinburgh: The Scottish Drug Deaths Taskforce, 2022. 135p.

By Chloe Gilroy

The nexus between illicit drug economies and great power competition is a critical, yet understudied, dimension of counternarcotics. If policy experts and academics understood how great power competition intersects with illicit drug economies, then counternarcotics experts would have yet another incisive theoretical lens through which to understand drug flows. This paper contends that China is unwilling to crack down on chemical precursor flows that feed the Western Hemisphere’s synthetic drug trade due to its broader geopolitical imperatives, which are shaped by great power competition. Chinese pharmaceutical and chemical producers are taking advantage of un-checked drug demand in the United States by selling chemical precursors to Mexican drug trafficking organizations that manufacture and smuggle synthetic drugs across the U.S.-Mexico border. Their involvement in the Western Hemisphere drug trade has expanded the market for synthetic drugs and has destabilized Mexico’s criminal landscape. The Chinese government’s response to the export of massive quantities of illegal drugs and precursor chemicals is largely driven by external pressure and characterized by a lack of credible commitment to reduce the flow of illegal drugs and precursor chemicals. This paper will start by delving into the existing literature on great power competition and illicit drug economies before exploring China’s approach to drug control. It will then dissect trafficking patterns in two synthetic drugs, methamphetamine and fentanyl. After that, it will explain how Beijing’s incentives in the pharmaceutical and chemical sectors impact methamphetamine and fentanyl export volumes. This paper will conclude by comparing time series data on methamphetamine and fentanyl seizures at the U.S.-Mexico border with the progression of China’s enforcement efforts.  

Washington, DC: William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, 2020. 28p.

By Vanda Felbab-Brown

Synthetic opioids remain the source of the deadliest U.S. drug epidemic ever. Since 1999, drug overdoses have killed approximately 1 million Americans,[1] an overdose lethality that has increased significantly since 2012 when synthetic opioids from China began supplying the U.S. demand for illicit opioids. Even though China placed the entire class of fentanyl-type drugs and two key fentanyl precursors under a controlled regulatory regime in May 2019, it remains the principal (if indirect) source of U.S. fentanyl. Fentanyl scheduling and China’s adoption of stricter mail monitoring has created some deterrence effects. Instead of finished fentanyl being shipped directly to the United States, most smuggling now takes place via Mexico. Mexican criminal groups source fentanyl precursors — and increasingly pre-precursors — from China, and then traffic finished fentanyl from Mexico to the United States. Scheduling of fentanyl and its precursors in China is not sufficient to stem flows to the United States.

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  There is little visibility into China’s enforcement of its fentanyl regulations, but it clearly remains limited. U.S.-China counternarcotics cooperation remains fraught, and from the U.S. perspective inadequate. Rejecting U.S. blame of China for the opioid epidemic and emphasizing U.S. responsibilities for that calamity, Beijing points to its benevolence in anti-drug cooperation. But China’s cooperation with the U.S. in the global counternarcotics campaign has been subordinated to the overall deteriorated geostrategic relationship between the two superpowers. There is little prospect that in the absence of significant warming of the overall U.S.-China bilateral relationship, China would significantly intensify its anti-drug cooperation with the United States. U.S. punitive measures, such as sanctions and drug indictments, are unlikely to change that. Structural characteristics of synthetic drugs, including the ease of developing similar, but not scheduled synthetic drugs and their new precursors — increasingly a wide array of dual-use chemicals — pose immense structural obstacles to controlling supply, irrespective of political will to prohibit and regulate their use and enforce the regulations.

New York: Brennan Center for Justice, 2022. 84p.

By The IUCN National Committee of The Netherlands

On behalf of the IUCN National Committee of the Netherlands (IUCN NL), Earth League International (ELI) conducted undercover investigations on jaguar poaching and trafficking in Bolivia. ELI investigated the criminal networks behind this illegal wildlife trade from 2018 to 2020 and unveiled the traffickers’ modus operandi and transport methods, routes and geographical hotspots. The investigations showed that the demand for jaguar parts comes from Asia and the trade is generally run by Chinese residents in Bolivia. The jaguar is the only member of the panthera family in the Americas and is by far the biggest cat on the continent. Scientists estimate there are between 130,000 and 208,000 jaguars left in the wild, mostly concentrated in the Amazon basin. The jaguar is classified by IUCN as ‘near threatened’. According to local experts, today there are an estimated 2,000-3,000 jaguars left in the wild in Bolivia.

Amsterdam: IUCN National Committee of The Netherlands, 2021. 24p.

By Andrea Crosta, Chiara Talerico, Allison Joseph, Liliana Jauregui, Marc Hoogeslag

  The jaguar (Panthera onca) is listed on CITES Appendix I and is classified on the IUCN Red List as ‘near threatened.’ Scientists estimate that the size of the global jaguar population varies greatly. A study by De la Torre et al (2018) estimated the global population of jaguars to be 64,000 individuals, while Jędrzejewski et al (2018) estimate that there are 173,000 (138,000±208,000) jaguars left in the wild, mostly concentrated in the Amazon basin. To tackle jaguar trafficking, more information on the trade's scale, nature and dynamics is needed. One of the objectives of ‘Operation Jaguar’ was exactly that. Operation Jaguar is a joint project between IUCN NL, International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW), and Earth League International (ELI) and is made possible by the Dutch Postcode Lottery. ELI has conducted undercover investigations on jaguar trafficking in Latin America as part of Operation Jaguar. Multiple missions have been undertaken to four Latin American countries: Bolivia, Suriname, Peru, and Ecuador. The focus of the intelligence-led operation was to unveil the central nodes, mechanisms, and structure of the entire criminal supply chain, with a bottom-up – top-down approach focusing on the illegal wildlife goods providers, the traders, the transporters, and the sellers in China. Through Operation Jaguar we have identified and investigated the most important jaguar trafficking networks in these four South American countries. ELI has researched the illegal wildlife supply chain to unveil the dynamics underneath jaguar trafficking in the region and identify the main players, trafficking routes, and destinations. Over the years more than a dozen trafficking networks operating regionally and internationally have been unveiled. Confidential Intelligence Briefs (CIBs) regarding these jaguar trafficking networks have been shared with several governmental and intergovernmental agencies.   

San Francisco: Earth League International, 2022. 19p.

By Stephen Kastoryano, Ben Vollaard

We uncover a hidden illegal fishing practice: the use of fishing nets with illegally small mesh size. The small mesh prevents nearly all fish of saleable size from escaping the net, but also traps a large number of fish which are too small to be sold on the market and are therefore discarded at sea. Our approach relies on readily available data on reported fish landings rather than on data from inspections, which are rare, and which tend to be anticipated by fishermen. We focus on bottom trawling, the world's most widely used fishing method. We exploit the fact that using illegally small mesh size strongly increases the share of small fish in the catch. Using quasi-random variation in nautical patrol as a source of variation in the incentive to comply, we show that in weeks without patrol the share of small fish in the landed catch is systematically larger than in adjacent weeks with patrol. Our results are in line with widespread use of illegally small mesh.

Bonn: The IZA Institute of Labor Economics, 2022. 53p.

By Ramacandra Wong, Kanitha Krishnasamy

Overall, whole tigers, dead and live, as well as a variety of tiger parts equal to a conservative estimate of 3,377 tigers were confiscated between January 2000 and June 2022 across 50 countries and territories, with data showing an increasing trend. According to Skin and Bones: Tiger Trafficking Analysis from January 2000–June 2022, the tigers and their parts were seized in 2,205 incidents, mostly in the 13 Tiger Range Countries (TRCs). India, home to more than half of the global wild tiger population, remains the top-ranked country with the most incidents and number of tigers confiscated. Data from the first half of 2022, the Year of the Tiger, stood out for several reasons: Indonesia, Thailand, and Russia recorded significant increases in the number of seizure incidents compared to the January-to-June period of the previous two decades.  This recent period was also particularly significant for Indonesia, home to the Critically Endangered Sumatran Tiger. It has already seized more tigers in the first half of 2022 (18 tigers) compared to all confiscations in 2021 (totalling 16 tigers). 

Selangor, Malaysia: TRAFFIC, Southeast Asia Regional Office, 2022. 52p.

By Emerson Y. Sy, Josef Job G. Raymundo, Serene C.L. Chng

A new TRAFFIC study recorded more than 800 Indonesian birds¹ for sale online in the Philippines between January 2018 and December 2019. Since the survey, all 20 of the original groups have been deactivated by Facebook, but surveillance by the authors in January 2022 found 144 new active groups offering various Indonesian species for sale, which continues to date. Almost 1,300 Indonesian birds of at least 28 species were also confiscated from illegal trade in the Philippines between 2010 and 2020, according to the report Farmed or Poached? The trade of live Indonesian Bird Species in the Philippines. Scrutiny of international trade records uncovered discrepancies: a majority of the Indonesian bird species listed on CITES² exported from the Philippines had questionable or no records of legal import into the Philippines. The records show that the Philippines had severely underreported their imports of Indonesian bird species compared to the numbers reported by exporters. In some cases, the export of Indonesian birds from the Philippines took place before the first reported legal importation.

Selangor, Malaysia , TRAFFIC Southeast Asia Regional Office, 2022. 55p.

By Mary Utermohlen and Patrick Baine

The report, In Plane Sight: Wildlife Trafficking in the Air Transport Sector, produced by C4ADS as part of the USAID Reducing Opportunities for Unlawful Transport of Endangered Species (ROUTES) Partnership, analyses global airport seizures of illegal wildlife and wildlife products from 2009 to 2017, finding trafficking instances in at least 136 countries worldwide. New data from 2017 shows a massive spike in rhino horn seizures, which nearly tripled from 2016 numbers. The seizure data indicate that wildlife traffickers moving ivory, rhino horn, reptiles, birds, pangolins, marine products, and mammals by air tend to rely on large hub airports all over the world. Collectively, these categories account for about 81 percent of all trafficked wildlife, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and serve as indicators for broader trends within illicit wildlife trafficking. According to the In Plane Sight report, routes of wildlife products such as ivory, rhino horn and pangolin tend to flow from Africa to Asia, often transiting first through the Middle East and Europe. Wildlife traffickers carrying live animals, such as live birds and reptiles, generally rely on direct flights worldwide with different hotspots for wildlife trafficking in every region. China was by far the most common destination for all seized wildlife products between 2009 and 2017.

Washington, DC: C4ADS and The USAID Reducing Opportunities for Unlawful Transport of Endangered Species (ROUTES), 2018. 214p.

By Anne-Lise Chaber, Philippe Gaubert, Claude Saegerman, Valéria Busoni, Mélodie Dieudonné, Harriet Green

The hunting for and consumption of bushmeat is traditional and vital for many communities around the world; it provides food and income as well as holding traditional value. Historically subsistence hunting was sustainable, however increased demand, improved access to forests and more efficient methods of hunting are resulting in unsustainable offtakes of wildlife. The growth in human population and ease with which people can move around the globe are causing an increase in demand, within range countries and internationally. Hunting unsustainably has the potential to cause a species to go extinct, locally or globally. The decrease or complete loss of a population has wider impacts on the ecosystem and so the people who depend on it. The international bushmeat trade is not fully understood and as such, it is unknown what impact this may be having on wildlife populations. This study aimed to gain a better understanding of the international bushmeat trade by estimating an average monthly weight of bushmeat being imported and determining which species are predominantly involved. Working with customs officers at Brussels airport, flights from Sub-Saharan Africa were targeted and all passengers’ luggage searched for both bushmeat and domestic meat (livestock). Visual identification, radiographs and genetic analysis were conducted to determine the species involved and any further information such as the age of the animal and hunting method used. Using the information of bushmeat seized and an estimate of the number of people entering Brussels from West and Central Africa each month, it was estimated that an average of 3.7 tonnes of bushmeat was being brought through Brussels airport each month. A range of species were identified, some of which were CITES listed. Some suggestions are made in order to reduce this importation by raising awareness on penalties and better enforcing those penalties. Besides, reinforcement of routine customs controls and more random schedules for specific actions of reinforced controls should be favoured by adequate budgets, allowing also a good, reiterated information and sensitization of custom’s officers. It would be justified that European budgets should be accorded for customs controls to Member States that are main and specific entry gates on the EU and its market. This would also allow the raising and presence of sniffling dogs to detect meat and other illegal products in passengers’ luggage, and the use of mini-technical devices to analyse DNA sequences on the spot.

Brussels: Federal Public Service Health, Food Chain Safety and Environment, 2018. 58p.

By Wildlife Justice Commission

The report aims to bring to light key aspects of the criminal dynamics of ivory and rhino horn trafficking in Vietnam and the efforts of Vietnamese law enforcement authorities in bringing Ah Nam to justice. The Wildlife Justice Commission initiated an investigation in 2016 to delve into the illegal ivory and rhino horn trade in Vietnam and gain a deeper insight into the Africa-Asia supply chain. By January 2017, Ah Nam had become the main focus of the investigation due to his growing role. By 2019 he had asserted his position as one of Vietnam’s top wildlife criminals, acting as lead broker for a sophisticated criminal network responsible for trafficking vast quantities of elephant ivory and rhino horn from Africa to China via Vietnam. The Wildlife Justice Commission’s investigations into Ah Nam and his network resulted in the collection of a wealth of intelligence and evidence. This information on Ah Nam and his key associate Duong Van Phong was compiled in a detailed Case File and provided to the Vietnam Environmental Crime Police and the Anti-Smuggling Bureau of China Customs in December 2017. The two men were partners in crime for the entire period of the investigation and were eventually arrested and convicted together. Over the course of the three-year investigation, the Wildlife Justice Commission documented Ah Nam’s access to a minimum of 17.6 tonnes of raw ivory (valued at more than USD 9 million), and 477 kg of rhino horn (valued at more than USD 8 million). This quantity of product is estimated to equate to the killing of approximately 1,760 elephants and more than 106 rhinos, and still represents only a fraction of what Ah Nam’s network is likely to have trafficked. The Wildlife Justice Commission’s efforts directly contributed to the arrest of 12 other individuals in Vietnam – 10 of whom were imprisoned and two were released without charges – and the seizure of 1,428 kg of ivory and 18 rhino horns. Ah Nam’s conviction and heavy penalty also send an important message: the risk-reward ratio for wildlife crime is changing in Vietnam. Analysis of published court judgements in China shows that additional cases linked to Ah Nam have continued to be prosecuted and convicted, while the Wildlife Justice Commission’s investigations have found many Vietnamese traders are no longer operating due to the increased fear of arrest and difficulties in smuggling products across the border into China.

The Hague: Wildlife Justice Commission, 2022,. 59p.

By Felipe Thomas

This brief gives an overview of the online illicit wildlife trade (IWT), and analyzes the current state of this market, and speculates on its likely developments. Although there is currently very little IWT activity on the dark web, we expect this to change as enforcement steps up, and this brief explores how that process might evolve.The online market for illicit wildlife trade appears to be disaggregated and characterized by ‘blurred channels’, yet, at the same time, it is relatively ‘out in the open’, which points either to a lack of enforcement or challenges that stymie effective enforcement.However, as and when enforcement activities are stepped up, it is probable that the IWT will respond by moving along a specific pathway. This trajectory would first see a move to centralized dark-web markets, then to specialist, and smaller, dark-web ‘shops’. These market shifts would be followed by ‘markets by invitation’ and then distributed, peer-to-peer marketplaces. Under this scenario of a changing market, each step would be accompanied by a decline in market size caused by a decrease in potential consumers (and vendors), but this market loss would be counteracted by an increase in marketing efficiencies and organization on the part of the vendors.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2018. 15p.