By Melissa Farley & M. Alexis Kennedy

Background: Extreme violence and psychological abuse have been extensively documented and are pervasive in prostitution. Survivors of prostitution report high levels of posttraumatic stress disorder, dissociation, depression, and self-loathing. These are the same sequelae reported by torture survivors. Objective: Severe forms of violence have been categorized as torture by experts. The authors note that torture is commonly suffered during prostitution and should be appropriately named. Method: Using standardized measures and including a new measure of torture, we interviewed 45 women in the United States about their torture experiences in prostitution and their symptoms of PTSD, dissociation, childhood trauma, health status and somatic symptoms. The interviewees had exited prostitution and were in supportive programmes. Results: Formerly prostituted interviewees reported acts of physical, sexual, and psychological torture, including strangulation, rape, beatings, restriction of movement, denial of privacy, sleep, or food, and being forced to witness the torture of others. The 45 women had high levels of PTSD and dissociation. They endorsed needs for individual counselling, substance abuse treatment, and other medical care. Conclusions: A recognition of the physical, sexual, and psychological torture experienced in prostitution would strengthen psychological and medical interventions for survivors. Naming specific acts of prostitution as torture will reduce the survivor’s shame and selfblame. Holistic treatment includes medical and psychological interventions and peer support, as seen in torture rehabilitation programmes for survivors of state-sponsored torture. This research supports the perspective that private or non-state-sponsored torture against women and marginalized populations should be clinically and legally understood in the same way as state-sponsored torture.   

European Journal of Psychotraumatology, 15:1, 2404307, DOI: 10.1080/20008066.2024.2404307 To link to this article:

By Shana Conroy and Danielle Sutton

"This Juristat article relies on multiple data sources to examine the nature and prevalence of violent victimization of seniors. In addition, the article presents the various factors associated with perceptions of crime and safety among seniors. Self-reported data from the 2019 General Social Survey on Canadians’ Safety (Victimization) are presented first, detailing seniors’ experiences of violent victimization and their perceptions of safety. The sections that follow present police-reported data from the Uniform Crime Reporting Survey and the Homicide Survey, providing detail on annual trends, accused-victim relationships and incident characteristics. While 2020 was an unusual year due to the COVID-19 pandemic, police-reported incident data were similar for 2019 and 2020. As such, this article reports the latest police-reported data from 2020"

Ottawa] : Statistics Canada = Statistique Canada, 2022. 35p.

By Payal Shah , Physicians for Human Rights

The escalating conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has caused a “massive influx” of widespread sexual violence perpetrated by the DRC military, armed groups associated with neighboring countries, United Nations (UN) peacekeepers, and community members, according to a new report published today by Physicians for Human Rights (PHR). This widespread and severe sexual violence – at least 113,000 cases reported by the UN in 2023 alone – demands immediate action by the DRC government, neighboring countries, and the global community to support survivors and end the violence, PHR said. “Our report establishes a staggering influx of people who have suffered conflict-related sexual violence – including rape and sexual slavery – being treated in health facilities across eastern DRC, said Payal Shah, JD, report co-author and director of research, legal, and advocacy at PHR. “Survivors are facing sexual violence due to increasing insecurity and insufficient food and cooking wood in Internally Displacement Persons (IDP) camps. Yet clinicians lack the resources to treat this growing number of survivors and ensure forensic documentation for accountability.” “Massive Influx of Cases”: Health Worker Perspectives on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo documents clinicians’ testimonies about patients who faced violent encounters with armed forces, which included armed sexual assault by multiple perpetrators, penetration with foreign objects, and forced captivity. The health workers reported that the sexual violence resulted in a wide range of medical and psychological harms, including lacerations, paralysis, sexually transmitted infections, unwanted pregnancies, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The resurgence of violence and related displacement has led to staggering levels of sexual violence, with the UN reporting more than 113,000 cases registered in 2023. Documented cases of conflict-related sexual violence more than doubled in the first half of 2024, compared to the same period in 2023. These figures are likely underestimates due to the challenges of reporting. Medicines San Frontiers (MSF) reports that the organization treated more than 17,000 cases of sexual violence in only five provinces of DRC in the first five months of 2024. The United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR) also reports 940,000 people displaced in 2024 alone, bringing the total to 6.4 million people displaced in DRC. PHR’s new report is among the first studies to date to document the perspectives and accounts of health workers who have cared for child and adult survivors of conflict-related sexual violence in eastern DRC. “The world must not look away from these violations of international law,” said Shah. “The DRC government, other parties to the conflict, and regional and international actors must act now to prevent conflict-related sexual violence by improving security in eastern DRC, including around IDP camps, and addressing food and fuel shortages. Clinicians tell us they urgently need resources for better medical care, psychosocial support, and forensic documentation to prevent long-term suffering by survivors of sexual violence and to ensure survivors can pursue justice.”PHR’s findings are based on semi-structured interviews with 16 health care professionals and humanitarian workers in conflict-affected areas of North and South Kivu, DRC. PHR’s survivor-centered research methodology mitigates the risk of retraumatizing survivors and captures the perspectives of clinicians, who are witnesses to the physical and psychological trauma endured by survivors. The clinicians interviewed by PHR report: Survivors of conflict-related sexual violence are as young as three years old.A stark increase in sexual violence cases in Minova, Kirotche, and Goma health zones as violence has “increased dramatically” in North Kivu and South Kivu since 2022.Survivors experienced violence at the hands of multiple perpetrator groups, including various governmental military forces, rebel, and militia groups active in the conflict:Members of multiple armed groups, including those supported by the DRC’s neighbors(such as March 23 Movement or M23) and the DRC military itself, were identified by survivors as perpetrators who used sexual violence to instill fear, intimidate, and displace affected communities.Community members, family members, peers, and employers were also identified as perpetrators of sexual violence, as well as staff affiliated with the United Nations.One health care worker below described the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (UN MONUSCO) forces giving “favors” to families in exchange for sexual relations with their children.Sexual violence was perpetrated by Swahili, Lingala, and Kinyarwanda speaking perpetrators.Survivors also report multiple forms of sexual violence, including rape in captivity as well as penetration with foreign objects.In one case, a survivor reported to a health worker being held for five days and in another case a survivor reported being held in captivity for one month before escaping.Survivors reported rapes after leaving IDP camps or their communities to look for food or firewood for cooking in insecure areas nearby the displacement camps.Survivors presented at health facilities with a range of medical and psychological needs, including lacerations, sexually transmitted infections, unwanted pregnancies, incontinence, paralysis, post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, and developmental delays.Survivors reported multiple drivers of sexual violence, including being forced from their homes by armed actors, experiencing sexual violence while fleeing along dangerous routes, and being attacked while searching for food or firewood, as resource shortages forced them into unsafe areas.Health care providers struggle to cope with the crisis as they lack adequate supplies, staffing, training, or compensation to manage the acute influx of survivors.Significant barriers for survivors to access care include limited forensic documentation capacity in the health sector, a lack of resources, fear and stigma, and inadequate access to health services, including contraception and abortion care. Eastern DRC’s decades-long conflict escalated in North and South Kivu in 2021 with the reemergence of the M23 rebel group, which UN experts have identified as being controlled by Rwanda. The conflict’s escalation has led to widespread attacks against civilians, mass displacement, a weakened health system, and food insecurity. The ongoing conflict has also increased the incidence of communicable diseases, including mpox. The capacity of the DRC health system to respond to sexual and gender-based violence, already weak, has been further weakened, with many survivors unable or unwilling to seek care due to stigma, facility closures, and fear of further violence. The planned withdrawal of international peacekeeping forces by the end of 2024, including the MONUSCO and the East African Community Regional Force (EAC-RF), has raised concerns about the potential for further escalation. PHR’s report calls on all parties to the conflict to abide by international human rights law and to take immediate steps to end conflict-related sexual violence. It urges the international community to strengthen monitoring, investigation, and documentation of conflict-related sexual violence, and to promote accountability and justice for violations by all parties. PHR also calls on the international community to ensure the withdrawal of MONUSCO is managed and monitored to ensure that prevention and accountability for sexual violence is not hindered and that knowledge and capacity is transferred to local actors. The DRC health workers interviewed by PHR identify a range of practical recommendations to policymakers and donors to improve the response to the crisis, as well as emerging good practices to support child survivors of sexual violence in DRC, notably child-friendly spaces and child-focused programming.

 New York: Physicians for Human Rights, 2024. 46p.  

By Europol 

Intellectual property (IP) crime refers to the theft, infringement and unauthorised use of intellectual property ( 1 ) such as copyrights, designs, trademarks, patents, and geographical indications of origin, and crimes related to trade secrets. Common types of IP crime include counterfeiting (the manufacture, importation, distribution, storage and sale of goods that falsely carry the trademark of a genuine brand without permission) and piracy (the unauthorised copying, use, reproduction, and distribution of materials protected by intellectual property rights). IP crime continues to pose a threat to the EU’s internal security ( 2 ). The harm produced by IP crime is more significant than it appears at first sight. Not only because of its adverse economic effects, but especially in terms of impact on consumers’ health and safety, and on the EU’s natural environment. Criminal actors operating in IP crime are very adept at exploiting opportunities and loopholes, posing challenges to right holders, law enforcement and other relevant authorities. The scale of crime remains considerable. In 2022, approximately 86 million fake items were seized in the EU, with an estimated value exceeding EUR 2 billion. The most common products seized were games ( 3 ), packaging materials, toys, cigarettes, and recorded CDs/DVDs. 60 % of the goods were detained within the EU, and 40 % at the EU’s borders ( 4 ). The illegal trade in counterfeit goods was estimated to represent 5.8% of imports to the EU( 5 ). IP crime thrives because it fulfils a worldwide demand for low-priced goods, which is satisfied by criminal actors and networks operating across continents. Despite prevention campaigns to expose the health and safety dangers of purchasing and consuming counterfeit goods, besides the severe consequences for the industries and companies targeted, counterfeiting keeps appealing to or misleading consumers. IP crime entails a complex criminal process involving multiple steps and various actors. The infringement of intellectual property rights is only the initial stage of IP crime, as the final objective of counterfeiters is to profit as much as possible from the subsequent illicit sale of the fake goods introduced into the consumers’ market. IP crime relies on a multitude of enablers that make this criminal activity particularly successful and at the same time difficult to tackle. These enabling factors can be crimes in themselves, but can also be lawful activities misused for facilitating IP crime. This report explores the ecosystem of IP crime and its interactions with developments in our society. At the core of the report is a description of the criminal process by which the various types of IP crime are committed and the steps it entails. It assesses which key catalysts in today’s EU and global society drive IP crime, making it an area of opportunity for criminal actors. It zooms in on those factors – be they criminal acts or lawful activity misused for criminal purposes – that enable IP crime. At the same time, it considers how IP crime can function as an enabler of other serious and organised crimes. Ultimately, it describes IP crime’s harmful impact on EU citizens and  This report uses operational data from investigations contributed to Europol. The EUIPO has also collected contributions by the private sector. Case examples are used throughout the report as illustrations. Where relevant, open-source intelligence has been used to corroborate analytical findings. The focus on enablers invites law enforcement authorities (LEAs), legislators, relevant stakeholders and the public to work even more closely to reduce the harm of IP crime and identify the criminals behind it. A cohesive response by all stakeholders, both within and outside the EU, is a prerequisite toward the detection and dismantling of the criminal networks involved

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union , 2024. 45p.

By Elaine Hennig and Benjamin Greaves

Since Harris County’s misdemeanor bond system was first declared unconstitutional by a federal district court in 2017, the county has implemented several reforms as part of the resulting settlement. Before the resolution of the lawsuit, indigent defendants were detained pretrial solely based on their inability to pay bond, while their wealthier counterparts could post bond and expect prompt release. The county corrected this wealth-based discrimination by requiring the majority of misdemeanor defendants to be released on personal recognizance (PR) bonds, which do not require an upfront cash payment. By providing defendants with a new system for bonding out of jail that does not discriminate based on income, the implemented reforms ensure that defendants are not prematurely punished with jail time— upholding the principle of a ‘presumption of innocence’ for the criminally accused, and preventing taxpayers from footing the bill for unnecessary weeks or months of incarceration. Though these changes have only been applied to misdemeanor cases, several ongoing lawsuits have set the stage for reforms that could similarly improve the felony bond system. While these two systems are legally different, the rationale for reform remains the same: protecting constitutionally guaranteed rights and preventing wealth-based discrimination. Despite the more equitable reforms to Harris County’s misdemeanor system, opponents of bond reform frequently criticize the changes. Though many opponents still claim to support the principles of reform, they regularly scapegoat bond reform for the various failures of the criminal legal system. Through the use of misinformation, propagation of false narratives, and exploitation of race-based disparities, they portray bond reform as a threat to public safety. Unfortunately, this disinformation effort is facilitated by local media outlets, who amplify the voices of opponents and disseminate the narratives they promote. This report aims to examine media coverage of bond in Harris County, and to better understand the media’s role in shaping the narrative of bond reform. It draws on a content analysis of 226 news articles run by six Houston-area television stations between January 2015 and June 2021. Stories qualified for selection if they discussed bond reform, bond debates, and/or people who allegedly committed crimes while out on bond. While bias in coverage was the primary focus of this analysis, we also reviewed 15 other key variables, such as referenced ‘experts’ and the defendant’s race or ethnicity. This analysis reveals that many local media stations disproportionately publish biased articles in their reporting on bond. The media consistently provide a platform for opponents of bond reform to represent bond release as a threat to public safety, while frequently failing to contextualize opponents’ claims or feature an alternative view. In cherry-picking and sensationalizing stories about defendants who are arrested while out on bond, media outlets construct a distorted narrative of dangerous releasees, in effect exaggerating the risks of bond reform and minimizing its positive impact. These efforts continually undermine bond reform, serving only to generate fear of people released on bond pretrial. The shift in news coverage of bond is perhaps best seen through a comparison of coverage prior to and following the implementation of Harris County’s proposed settlement in 2019. Over the 48-month period from January 1, 2015, to December 31, 2018, 42 total articles focused on bond in relation to  reform or released defendants. Of those articles, only 33 percent were found to be negatively biased. In contrast, over a shorter 30-month period from January 1, 2019, to June 30, 2021, not only did the number of bond-focused articles more than quadruple to 184, but the percentage of negatively biased articles nearly doubled to 61. Although bias in media coverage is one of the most—if not the most—alarming variables analyzed in this report, several other variables have revealed similarly concerning trends. With ongoing attacks against bond reform efforts in Texas and in Houston specifically, recognizing and correcting these trends in media coverage is critical to ensuring that Harris County residents have a more informed perspective of both misdemeanor bond reform and bond reform more generally.   

Austin: TEXAS CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUITY, 2021. 34p.

By Michael Salter, WK Tim Wong, Jan Breckenridge, Sue Scott, Sharon Cooper and Noam Peleg

Child sexual abuse material (CSAM) is widely available online. Existing research indicates that the parents and parental figures of victims are notably represented in offender populations. However, there is limited research in this area. Drawing on Australian media and legal databases, this study created a database of 82 cases of CSAM production and distribution perpetrated by parents and/or parental figures from 2009 to 2019. The study found that perpetrators are most often the male parental figures of the victims, and victims are predominately girls under nine years of age. The findings reveal distinct patterns and scenarios of parental CSAM offending that may inform prevention, early intervention and improved responses to victims. The study documented the significant impact of parental CSAM offending on victims and the need for specialist victim support.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 616.  Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2021. 17p.

By Christopher Dowling and Anthony Morgan

The criminal mobility of outlaw motorcycle gang (OMCG) members presents a significant challenge to Australian governments and police. Examining patterns of mobility can help to better understand the opportunity structures that underpin offending by OMCGs and to drive national collaborative responses to these gangs. This study examines the prevalence and patterns of criminal mobility in a sample of almost 4,000 OMCG members in more than 400 chapters. Around one in 10 members showed evidence of criminal mobility over the long term, while more than one-third of chapters comprised criminally mobile members. Criminally mobile gang members were heavily concentrated in a small number of chapters. Patterns of criminal mobility primarily involve movements into east coast jurisdictions. New South Wales and Queensland emerged as the most common destinations for criminally mobile OMCG members  

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 619. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2021. 16p

By Anthony Morgan and Hayley Boxall

In this study we use data from a large online survey of Australian women to examine whether the increased time spent at home, social isolation and financial stress resulting from COVID-19 containment measures were associated with a higher likelihood of physical and sexual violence among women in current cohabiting relationships with and without a history of violence. An increase in the amount of time spent at home with a partner did not in itself increase the likelihood of violence among either group. However, the probability of repeat or first-time violence was between 1.3 and 1.4 times higher for women who had less frequent contact with family and friends outside of the household during the pandemic. While financial stress prior to the pandemic was a strong predictor of violence for both groups, the probability of first-time violence was 1.8 times higher among women who experienced an increase in financial stress. We conclude that the pandemic was associated with an increased risk of violence against women in current cohabiting relationships, most likely from a combination of economic stress and social isolation.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 609. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2020. 18p.

By Rasmus Munksgaard and James Martin

Cryptomarkets represent a growing component of the global illicit drugs trade. Australia is over-represented in the proportion of online vendors who use these platforms to reach drug consumers. Despite the growth in online drug trading, relatively little is known about people who use cryptomarkets to sell drugs. This study addresses the knowledge gap and provides qualitative insights into this new, and little understood, cohort of offenders. The study found that vendors perceive less risk of violence and police intervention when selling drugs online and that the potential for profit exceeds that available when selling drugs offline.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 608. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2020. 12p.

By Rick Brown, Sarah Napier and Russell G Smith  

In recent years, there has been growing evidence of live streaming technologies being used to facilitate child sexual abuse (CSA). This study examined a sample of financial transactions made by a cohort of Australians who provided funds to known facilitators of CSA live streaming in the Philippines. The results showed that these individuals were likely to be aged in their 50s or 60s and the majority (55%) had no criminal record. Ten percent had a sexual offence recorded in their criminal history. Most CSA live streaming transactions involved a small proportion of individuals. Just three percent accounted for half of all transactions. In contrast, 25 percent of individuals made just three percent of transactions. As individuals purchased more CSA live streaming transactions, the median amounts they paid increased and the transactions became more frequent. These two variables were significantly correlated. This may reflect an escalation in the frequency and severity of offending.  

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 589. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2020. 16p.

By Cassandra Cross, Thomas Holt, Anastasia Powell and Michael Wilson 

Advancements in information technology are sources of both opportunity and vulnerability for citizens. Previous research indicates that there are significant challenges for police in investigating cybercrime, that community expectations about police responses are based largely on media representations, and that victims experience high levels of frustration and stigmatisation. This paper examines the views of the Australian community and law enforcement officers about the policing of cybercrime. Results suggest that police personnel are more likely to view cybercrime as serious, and community members are more likely to ascribe blame to victims. Results also indicate a discrepancy between police and community members in their views of the efficacy of police responses. These discrepancies contribute to public dissatisfaction. Therefore, the paper covers some general strategies for short- and long-term cybercrime prevention.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 635. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2021. 20p.

By Megan Wyre, David Lacey and Kathy Allan

Identity theft continues to grow in prevalence and complexity. Despite this growth, little is known about the identity theft response system and how it assists victims to recover. This study examines the response system by analysing 211 identity theft cases reported to IDCARE, a national identity and cybercrime victim support service. The study applies a sociotechnical systems methodology to establish the social, task and information processes of the Australian identity theft response system. The study also examines identity theft victims’ response activities and needs over a 12-month period. The identity theft response system is almost entirely dependent on the victim to respond to and limit the harm caused by identity theft. Overall, the response system is disjointed and lacking in coordination. 

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 592.  Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2020. 18p.

By: Helen Toner, John Bansemer, Kyle Crichton, Matthew Burtell, Thomas Woodside, Anat Lior, Andrew Lohn, Ashwin Acharya, Beba Cibralic, Chris Painter, Cullen O’Keefe, Iason Gabriel, Kathleen Fisher, Ketan Ramakrishnan, Krystal Jackson, Noam Kolt, Rebecca Crootof, and Samrat Chatterjee

The concept of artificial intelligence systems that actively pursue goals—known as AI “agents”—is not new. But over the last year or two, progress in large language models (LLMs) has sparked a wave of excitement among AI developers about the possibility of creating sophisticated, general-purpose AI agents in the near future. Startups and major technology companies have announced their intent to build and sell AI agents that can act as personal assistants, virtual employees, software engineers, and more. While current systems remain somewhat rudimentary, they are improving quickly. Widespread deployment of highly capable AI agents could have transformative effects on society and the economy. This workshop report describes findings from a recent CSET-led workshop on the policy implications of increasingly “agentic” AI systems.

In the absence of a consensus definition of an “agent,” we describe four characteristics of increasingly agentic AI systems: they pursue more complex goals in more complex environments, exhibiting independent planning and adaptation to directly take actions in virtual or real-world environments. These characteristics help to establish how, for example, a cyber-offense agent that could autonomously carry out a cyber intrusion would be more agentic than a chatbot advising a human hacker. A “CEO-AI” that could run a company without human intervention would likewise be more agentic than an AI acting as a personal assistant.

At present, general-purpose LLM-based agents are the subject of significant interest among AI developers and investors. These agents consist of an advanced LLM (or multimodal model) that uses “scaffolding” software to interface with external environments and tools such as a browser or code interpreter. Proof-of-concept products that can, for example, write code, order food deliveries, and help manage customer relationships are already on the market, and many relevant players believe that the coming years will see rapid progress.

In addition to the many potential benefits that AI agents will likely bring, they may also exacerbate a range of existing AI-related issues and even create new challenges. The ability of agents to pursue complex goals without human intervention could lead to more serious accidents; facilitate misuse by scammers, cybercriminals, and others; and create new challenges in allocating responsibility when harms materialize. Existing data governance and privacy issues may be heightened by developers’ interest in using data to create agents that can be tailored to a specific user or context. If highly capable agents reach widespread use, users may become vulnerable to skill fade and dependency, agents may collude with one another in undesirable ways, and significant labor impacts could materialize as an increasing range of currently human-performed tasks become automated.

To manage these challenges, our workshop participants discussed three categories of interventions:

• Measurement and evaluation: At present, our ability to assess the capabilities and real-world impacts of AI agents is very limited. Developing better methodologies to track improvements in the capabilities of AI agents themselves, and to collect ecological data about their impacts on the world, would make it more feasible to anticipate and adapt to future progress.

• Technical guardrails: Governance objectives such as visibility, control, trustworthiness, as well as security and privacy can be supported by the thoughtful design of AI agents and the technical ecosystems around them. However, there may be trade-offs between different objectives. For example, many mechanisms that would promote visibility into and control over the operations of AI agents may be in tension with design choices that would prioritize privacy and security.

• Legal guardrails: Many existing areas of law—including agency law, corporate law, contract law, criminal law, tort law, property law, and insurance law—will play a role in how the impacts of AI agents are managed. Areas where contention may arise when attempting to apply existing legal doctrines include questions about the “state of mind” of AI agents, the legal personhood of AI agents, how industry standards could be used to evaluate negligence, and how existing principal-agent frameworks should apply in situations involving AI agents.

While it is far from clear how AI agents will develop, the level of interest and investment in this technology from AI developers means that policymakers should understand the potential implications and intervention points. For now, valuable steps could include improving measurement and evaluation of AI agents’ capabilities and impacts, deeper consideration of how technical guardrails can support multiple governance objectives, and analysis of how existing legal doctrines may need to be adjusted or updated to handle more sophisticated AI agents.

Center for Security and Emerging Technology, October 2024

By: Yasmin Afina and Sarah Grand-Clément

Data plays a critical role in the training, testing and use of artificial intelligence (AI), including in the military domain. Research and development for AI-enabled military solutions is proceeding at breakneck speed, and the important role data plays in shaping these technologies has implications and, at times, raises concerns. These issues are increasingly subject to scrutiny and range from difficulty in finding or creating training and testing data relevant to the military domain, to (harmful) biases in training data sets, as well as their susceptibility to cyberattacks and interference (for example, data poisoning). Yet pathways and governance solutions to address these issues remain scarce and very much underexplored.

This paper aims to fill this gap by first providing a comprehensive overview on data issues surrounding the development, deployment and use of AI. It then explores data governance practices from civilian applications to identify lessons for military applications, as well as highlight any limitations to such an approach. The paper concludes with an overview of possible policy and governance approaches to data practices surrounding military AI to foster the responsible development, testing, deployment and use of AI in the military domain.

CIGI Papers No. 308 — October 2024

By: US Election Assistance Commission

The security of voting systems is essential to a trustworthy election. Every state and local jurisdiction utilizes common-sense procedures and tools to safeguard the voting process. Common best practices include using locks, tamper-evident seals, security cameras, system testing before and after elections, audits, and physical and cybersecurity access controls. This guide outlines some of the many best practices local election officials follow to secure voting systems through an election cycle. It's important to note this is a broad list of common security measures and procedures to protect the integrity of an election. The types of security measures may vary based on the voting systems in use in state and local jurisdictions.

United States. Election Assistance Commission, Oct 2024

By Ariel G. Ruiz Soto

Immigrants in the United States commit crimes at lower rates than the U.S.-born population, notwithstanding the assertion by critics that immigration is linked to higher rates of criminal activity. This reality of reduced criminality, which holds across immigrant groups including unauthorized immigrants, has been demonstrated through research as well as findings for the one state in the United States—Texas—that tracks criminal arrests and convictions by immigration status. A growing volume of research demonstrates that not only do immigrants commit fewer crimes, but they also do not raise crime rates in the U.S. communities where they settle. In fact, some studies indicate that immigration can lower criminal activity, especially violent crime, in places with inclusive policies and social environments where immigrant populations are well established. A Look at the Overall Immigrant Population National studies have examined incarceration rates and prosecutions of immigrants in the country, overwhelmingly finding that immigrants of all legal statuses commit crimes at lower rates than those who were born in the United States. Immigrants Are Prosecuted and Imprisoned at Lower Rates than the U.S. Born Immigrants in the United States have had lower incarceration rates than the native-born population since at least 1870 (when such data were first recorded). In 2020, immigrants were 60 percent less likely to be incarcerated than the U.S. born, according to a study by the National Bureau of Economic Research. And though a 2021 Justice Department study points out prosecutions of immigrants increased between 1990 and 2018, nearly 90 percent were for violations of immigration-related laws. Notably, U.S. born citizens were ten times more likely than immigrants to be incarcerated for committing weapons- related offenses, five times more likely for violent offenses, more than twice as likely for property crimes, and nearly twice as likely for drug offenses.  At the state level, multiple studies have found there is no clear relationship between violent crime and immigration. And research at the city level suggests that increases in immigration can be associated with declining homicide rates, with the largest effect on municipalities with long histories of immigration, as well as reductions in property crimes and robbery. This makes immigrants  less likely to be either offenders or victims of crime at the local level compared to the U.S.-born population

Washington, DC: Immigration Policy Institute, 2024. 5p.   

By Christopher Dowling, Siobhan Lawler, Laura Doherty, Heather Wolbers

This review was commissioned to support implementation of the Standing Council of Attorneys-General Work Plan to Strengthen Criminal Justice Responses to Sexual Assault 2022–2027, which emphasises the importance of strengthening legal frameworks where required to ensure victims and survivors have improved justice outcomes and protections. The review includes an analysis of Commonwealth, state and territory legislation, a review of national and international research, reviews and inquiries, and consultations with victims and survivors and expert stakeholders. It explores any gaps and inconsistencies in the legislative landscape and their implications for victims and survivors who have contact with the criminal justice system. It also investigates the barriers and challenges to achieving greater consistency in legislation. The review broadly addresses these research questions: 1. What is the nature and scope of sexual assault and child sexual abuse legislation in Australia? 2. What differences and similarities (if any) are there between sexual assault and child sexual abuse legislative frameworks in Australia? 3. What impact (if any) do legislative inconsistencies have on: a. the investigation and prosecution of sexual assault and child sexual abuse matters in the criminal justice system; and b. the ability of victims and survivors to receive the support they require? 4. What are the barriers/challenges to achieving consistency in child sexual abuse and sexual assault legislation in Australia? 5. What are the gaps in current legislation for responding to new and emerging trends in sexual violence? 6. What does ‘best practice’ in relation to sexual assault and child sexual abuse legislation look like?  

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology 2024. 375p.

By Pauline Moore, Melissa Kay Diliberti, Brian A. Jackson

Violent incidents, such as shootings, and threats of such violence, have become relatively common occurrences in kindergarten through grade 12 (K–12) schools across the United States. One common way that schools help their staff and students train for the possibility of an active shooter or other threats is by conducting practice drills. The prevalence of these drills — combined with the mixed results of how these drills affect staff and students' feelings of preparedness, safety, fear, and stress — highlights the need for more research. To better understand what teachers across the United States think about school safety generally and active shooter drills in particular, RAND researchers administered a survey to a randomly selected sample of 1,020 K–12 teachers using the American Teacher Panel. The survey focused on teachers' perceptions of school safety, including their main safety concerns and their experiences with incidents of gun violence, and with drills designed to prepare students and staff for school shootings and other violent incidents. The survey specifically asked whether such drills made teachers feel more or less safe and prepared to respond to active assailant events and teachers' perceptions of their students' feelings about such drills, as well as whether support was available to students and staff during and following drills. Survey results indicate that more work is needed to understand the impact of drills on staff and students and what schools can do to better support the well-being of students and staff who are required to participate in these activities.

Key Findings

• One in six K–12 teachers nationally works in a district that has been touched by gun violence since the 2019–2020 school year.

• Relative to the previous school year, teachers reported more concern in 2023–2024 about being victims of an attack at their schools and were even more concerned for their students.

• In the 2023–2024 school year, a greater share of female teachers than male teachers (27 percent versus 14 percent, respectively) reported fear of being harmed or attacked at school. In the previous year, female teachers were no more likely than male teachers to report such fears.

• Variability in the elements and response actions involved in drills highlights the need for more standardized implementation.

• Schools do not typically announce when an active shooter drill will occur to students and parents, and many schools are not providing support to help students and staff manage any stress or anxiety that such drills might cause.

• Teachers are split on whether participation in drills makes them feel more prepared to respond to active shooter incidents: Slightly less than half said that drills make them feel more prepared, and half perceived drills as having no impact on preparedness. A slight majority of teachers (54 percent) reported that drills make students feel more prepared to respond to such incidents.

• Most teachers (69 percent) indicated that participating in active shooter drills has no impact on their perceptions of safety at school, and only one-fifth said that drills make them feel safer.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2024. 36p.

By Oliver Bennett MBE, Ali Shalchi

The precise scale of economic crime in the UK is unknown, but it could run to tens or hundreds of billions of pounds per year. The extent of these crimes – which include money laundering, fraud, and corruption – led the Intelligence and Security Select Committee in its July 2020 report on Russia to note that London is considered a ‘laundromat’ for corrupt money. In December 2019 the Treasury Committee found various regulatory and legislative failings in the way in which these crimes are being tackled. It urged the Government to make improvements to the supervisory system and to introduce new powers to combat economic crime. A February 2022 Treasury Committee follow-up report concluded that the Government was still not prioritizing economic crime sufficiently. In 2019 The Financial Action Task Force (the global money laundering and terrorist financing watchdog) praised the UK’s efforts on the issue, but also found failings and identified a lack of resources for investigating these crimes. The Economic Crime Plan The Government agrees about the need to tackle economic crime, which it says causes “much harm to individuals and communities and damage to legitimate business and the UK’s reputation.” It set out its overall approach to tackling the issue in its July 2019 Economic Crime Plan. The Plan covers the years 2019-2022 and draws together all the work being conducted by the public and private sector. A number of the 52 actions contained in the plan may involve future legislative reforms, including changes to: • the Proceeds of Crime Act to improve how the proceeds of crime can be confiscated; • corporate criminal liability, to punish and prevent economic crimes when committed on behalf of or in the name of companies; • block company stock exchange listings on national security grounds; • improve transparency over UK property ownership; • Companies House powers to enable it strike off from its register dissolved or inactive limited partnerships. Progress with the Plan In February 2022, the Royal United Services Institute said that 40% of actions in the Plan had been completed, 17% were in progress, 23% were overdue, and 19% of actions had no due date. The Government says it is “on course to deliver 49 of the 52 actions” in the Plan. The Treasury Committee has recommended that the Plan be adapted and renewed for a further three years.   

London: UK Parliament, House of Commons Library, 2022. 22p.

By Dorothy Dillard, Howard Henderson,  Johnny Rice II, Amy D. Goldstein, Maurice Mangum,

In this article, we explore the responses of 357 African American men between 15- and 24 years old living in four high-crime violence cities to better understand their perception of their environment and its impact on community violence. We focus on study participants’ perceptions of their cities, explanations of violence, and their perceived contribution to the level of violence. Respondents describe their cities in grim terms with few opportunities. And, from their perspective, the dangerous environment in which they live necessitates gun possession, potentially perpetuating community violence. Our findings affirm that as with any other public health issue, the perception of place matters in understanding community violence. Further, our findings underscore the importance of seeking and responding to the lived experience of those most likely to be victims and perpetrators of community violence in crafting and implementing interventions 

Delaware Journal of Public Health, 2024.