By Aili Malm, Nicholas Perez, Michael D. White

This publication represents the final research report of California State University, Long Beach’s (CSULB) evaluation of an intelligence-led problem-oriented policing (POP) project to better understand and address illicit fentanyl distribution networks in Long Beach, CA. The goals of this study were to: (1) employ problem-oriented policing to drive efforts to identify and disrupt fentanyl distribution networks in Long Beach, CA, and (2) use intelligence analysis to identify high-level distributors for investigation. To achieve these goals, researchers worked with a newly hired intelligence analyst and Long Beach Police Department (LBPD) Drug Investigation Section (DIS) detectives to improve their fentanyl distribution network investigations. The intervention included POP training, intelligence analyst support [cellular phone extractions, open-source intelligence (OSINT), social network analysis (SNA), etc.], and weekly interactions between the analyst and the research team. To assess the effectiveness of the project, we conducted both process and outcome evaluations. Primary data sources include: (1) interviews of detectives and the analyst; (2) DIS administrative data; (3) network data from three fentanyl distribution cases; and (4) fentanyl-related overdose data from the LBPD and the California Overdose Surveillance Dashboard. We identified findings across multiple analyses that, when taken together, represent a persuasive collection of circumstantial evidence regarding the positive effects of the project on two important outcomes: increased DIS activity and efficiency and effective fentanyl distribution network disruption. While fentanyl-related overdose rates did decrease substantially over the course of the project, there is no conclusive evidence that the project led to the reduction. The effects of COVID-19, the defund movement following George Floyd’s death, and the Los Angeles County District Attorney policy limiting the prosecution of drug offenses confounded our ability to draw a stronger connection between the project and enhanced DIS activity and efficiency, fentanyl distribution network disruption, and overdose rates.   

California State University, Long Beach; School of Criminology, Criminal Justice, and Emergency Management; 2024 77p. 

By Shamus Khan, Joss Greene, Claude Ann Mellins, and Jennifer S. Hirsch

In this review, we provide an overview of the literature on sexual assault. First, we define sexual assault, noting its multiple dimensions and the consequences for operationalization—including reviewing strategies for such operationalization. Second, we outline different approaches to sexual assault, critically assessing those frameworks that rely upon a model of sociopathy; instead, we propose focusing on more sociological and ecological understandings that push beyond the single dimension of gender and the framework of gender and power. Third, we outline the range of data sources that have been used to generate insights into sexual assault. Fourth, we provide the core research findings of the field, which at times are contradictory, mapping them to our ecological model of individual, relational, organizational, and cultural levels. We then review the evidence around those interventions that have been successful in addressing sexual assault (and those that have been unsuccessful) before concluding with suggestions for further research directions.

Annual Review of Criminology, Vol. 3 (2020), pp. 139–163

By John M. MacDonald, and Robert J. Stokes

Over the past twenty years, many US cities have seen urban revitalization and population changes associated with an increased desire for urban living among the affluent. As inner-city neighborhoods become gentrified, they are more likely to witness the construction of new buildings and homes, the conversion of industrial spaces to mixed-used developments, expanded access to mass transit, and the arrival of coffee shops and other urban amenities. In this review, we take stock of what is known about the impact of gentrification and land-use changes on neighborhood crime. We summarize research conducted since the period of urban revitalization that started in the 1990s as well as studies that have a quasi-experimental design. We find that gentrification and associated changes to land use tend to reduce crime in neighborhoods. Our findings are tempered by the need for greater conceptual clarity on how to measure when a neighborhood has gentrified and a clearer examination of the spatial displacement of crime. We conclude with a discussion on the need for criminologists to partner with urban planners to study how changes in the land use of cities can be made to generate crime reductions that benefit all places and, finally, detail some promising directions for future research.

Annual Review of Criminology, Vol. 3:121-138, 2020.

By United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime - UNODC

Fraud has evolved significantly over the years, adapting to technological advancements and changes in society. It has become increasingly sophisticated, often using psychological manipulation, enabled by information and communications technologies (ICTs). The high volume and severity of fraud pose a significant risk to people, economies and prosperity worldwide, and have a negative impact on the public’s confidence in the rule of law. However, developing an accurate understanding of fraud presents several challenges. Victims often underreport fraud due to feelings of shame, self blame or embarrassment, as well as a lack of recognition that a crime has occurred. Moreover, a significant portion of fraud targets businesses, many of which choose not to report these crimes to avoid damaging their reputation. The anonymity and remoteness often associated with fraud perpetration conceal the identities of offenders from both victims and authorities, hindering efforts to assess underlying patterns, factors of vulnerability and associated risks. Furthermore, the dynamic nature of fraud — which is constantly being adapted to changes in legal, social, commercial and technological systems — means that new and innovative methods of the offence may go unnoticed within static official data. In many cases, domestic law enforcement entities do not have the capacity to investigate and uncover the offenders and the organized criminal groups behind the crime: international cooperation is required, suggesting the need to give greater prominence to fraud in the policy framework and legislation against organized crime.

The international community has recognized the worrying scale of fraud and the need for joint efforts in preventing and combating it. The General Assembly, in its resolution 78/229, reaffirmed the importance of the work of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in the fulfilment of its mandate in crime prevention and criminal justice, including providing to Member States, upon request and as a matter of high priority, technical cooperation, advisory services and other forms of assistance, and coordinating with and complementing the work of all relevant and competent United Nations bodies and offices in respect to all forms of organized crime, including fraud. Nevertheless, the intersection between fraud and organized crime is not well understood and is further complicated by overlaps with other key areas, including cybercrime, white-collar crime, money-laundering and corruption. An understanding of organized fraud is necessary to inform the decisions of policymakers and other stakeholders and drive effective responses. The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the main global legally binding instrument to prevent and fight all forms and manifestations of transnational organized crime and protect the victims thereof, provides a framework to understand the nature of organized fraud and how the response to it can be integrated into the response to the different threats presented by transnational organized crime.

Scope of the issue paper

Fraud is an expansive category of crime. One of the greatest challenges to understanding it is its scope. It encompasses a range of criminal behaviours that are bound together by the common principle of dishonesty. The opportunities to employ dishonesty for the purposes of fraud span the full range of social, commercial, financial and technological settings, which can vary in different regions of the world. These opportunities are exploited by criminals from highly diverse backgrounds, ranging from professionals exploiting a legitimate corporate position to cybercriminals from within deprived communities. In this way, fraud is distinct from many other criminal categories that cover more discrete criminal behaviours occurring in specific settings (e.g. burglary). This diversity creates challenges in terms of developing a single, cohesive and comprehensive picture of fraud. The present issue paper covers fraud perpetrated by organized criminal groups (i.e. organized fraud). The role of organized crime can vary depending on the type of fraud, although, to a greater or lesser extent, it has a footprint in nearly all types of fraud. For the purposes of containing the scope of the issue paper, the following elements are not included:

• Other crimes in which fraud plays an enabling role, including the fraudulent use of identity to prevent a perpetrator from being traced, such as opening financial accounts to launder the proceeds of crime; fraudulent communications to enter into a relationship with a victim for the purpose of blackmailing or extorting money from them;1 and fraudulent job advertisements for recruiting and trafficking victims into forced labour and servitude.

• Fraud targeting the financial interests of the State (e.g. tax regimes), such as missing trader intra-community fraud (otherwise known as MTIC or VAT fraud); excise fraud, in which duties on imported products are not paid (e.g. fuel); public procurement fraud; and fraudulent applications for government grants and subsidies. The policy and response landscape for addressing these types of fraud can be distinct, being made up of various agencies and regulatory powers beyond law enforcement (e.g. the tax authority). The links between these types of fraud and organized crime are more well established in the literature.

The focus of the issue paper is organized fraud that targets individual members of the public or private institutions for the purposes of obtaining a financial or other material benefit.

Vienna: UNODC< 2024. 82p.

By Christopher Blattman, Benjamin Lessing, and Santiago Tobón

Organised crime poses one of the greatest threats to national security and development in the 21st century. Despite this, most policy, data collection, and scholarly research focuses on individuals and disorganised violence. Our work addresses several critical gaps in knowledge:

• What are the incentives for gangs to engage in violence and socially costly behaviour?

• Which are the trade-offs that practitioners face when deciding how to engage with organised violence?

• What type of information do relevant decision-makers need to inform their policies?

• Which are the most relevant tools for tracking down gang behaviour and use of violence?

We address these questions in the context of Medellín, Colombia’s second largest and most important city. Over the past six years, our work has covered a broad methodological spectrum, including:

• qualitative data collection through interviews with dozens of criminals and criminal justice experts;

• quantitative data collection from thousands of citizens in surveys representative at highly localised levels;

• active collaboration with local relevant stakeholders such as the city administration and the local police department;

• quasi-experimental evaluations of long-running policies dating back to the 1980s; and

• experimental evaluations of marginal improvements in state presence in violent and gang controlled areas.

Our preliminary findings point to terrible trade-offs, where authorities face plausibly impossible questions when balancing short-term gains in violence reduction and sacrifices in state legitimacy, with long-term uncertainty concerning both violence and state legitimacy. We highlight preliminary recommendations for guiding policy decisions.

Birmingham, UK: The Serious Organised Crime & Anti-Corruption Evidence (SOC ACE) 2022. 9p.

By Clare Ribando Seelke

An upsurge in lethal attacks against journalists in Mexico since the start of 2022 has renewed interest in Congress about violence against journalists and the state of media freedoms in Mexico. Since 2000, more than 150 journalists and media workers have been killed in Mexico, including seven in 2021 and eight in the first few months of 2022. Violence against journalists is occurring within the context of a broader security crisis in Mexico fueled by organized crime-related violence. Nevertheless, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) have asserted that “impunity in attacks against [or murders of] journalists fosters further violence against reporters and may inhibit the exercise of freedom of expression.”  In February 2022, Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated that he joined “those calling for greater accountability and protections for Mexican journalists.”  Some congressional concerns about the killings of journalists in Mexico have prompted letters to the Biden Administration and hearing questions to Administration officials regarding the extent to which the U.S. government is urging Mexico to better prevent, investigate, and prosecute cases of violence against journalists. Congress has appropriated foreign assistance to help the Mexican government and civil society better protect journalists and reduce impunity in cases of crimes committed against them. An oversight issue for the 117th Congress may be the extent to which the protection of journalists and other vulnerable groups is prioritized under the new U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework for Security Cooperation signed in October 2021. Congress also may examine whether other tools, such as conditions on foreign assistance, sanctions, or legislation, could be used to improve the situation.  

Washington, DC:  Congressional Research Service , 2022. 15p.

By Ginevra Le Moli

In legal discourse, ‘torture’ is a term used to describe the deliberate infliction of severe physical or mental pain and suffering upon a person. One controversial aspect of the legal definition of torture has been the status of the perpetrator, whose acts are relevant for the torture definition under international law. This ambiguity came to the forefront in the judgment of the United Kingdom (UK) Supreme Court in R v. Reeves Taylor, where the Court ruled that the category of persons ‘acting in an official capacity’ (under section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which implements the United Nations Convention against Torture) included members of armed groups if those groups exercise governmental authority over a civilian population in a territory under their control. This article relies on R v. Reeves Taylor as a gateway for a wider analysis of four fundamental inquiries into the definition and operation of the crime of torture: (i) the rationales underlying the international criminal repression of torture; (ii) the rules (including the UN Convention as well as other rules) which give expression to different rationales; (iii) the spectrum of actors whose acts can constitute torture under different rationales and rules; and (iv) the wider implications of expanding the spectrum of possible perpetrators.

Journal of International Criminal Justice, Volume 19, Issue 2, May 2021, Pages 363–391,

By The  CSA -  Centre The Centre of expertise on child sexual abuse

In 2021, the CSA Centre was commissioned by the London Safeguarding Children Partnership (LSCP) to design and deliver a holistic package of support to improve the identification and response to child sexual abuse in three London boroughs: Barking & Dagenham, Ealing, and Hackney). The CSA Centre–LSCP programme consisted of three main strands of work, delivered virtually because of the restrictions imposed in response to the Covid-19 pandemic: 1. An in-depth training programme on child sexual abuse, delivered over a five-month period to train 60 social workers from the three boroughs as Child Sexual Abuse Practice Leads. 2. A one-day course on intra-familial child sexual abuse for multi-agency professionals across the three boroughs, delivered twice in each borough with a total of 256 professionals attending. 3. Individual support to help each of the boroughs improve their data collection in relation to child sexual abuse. Feedback from participants in either type of training revealed that it had increased their knowledge of child sexual abuse and their understanding of responsibilities and actions to support and protect children. In addition, most of those taking part in the Practice Leads Programme felt it had equipped them to take on their role as Child Sexual Abuse Practice Leads, although some still felt they needed more support before they would feel confident in this role. Furthermore, the vast majority of those who provided feedback after attending the one-day course on intra-familial child sexual abuse felt they would be able to apply their learning to their practice and many gave examples of how they would do this. On the whole, the support with data improvement was less effective, mainly owing to a lack of ownership of the work and difficulties maintaining contact with relevant stakeholders locally. In addition, Hackney Council was subject to a serious data breach, involving a cyber-attack on their data systems which left them unable to participate fully in this element of the programme. Nonetheless, Barking & Dagenham completed a multi-agency data audit, and used the results to explore the development of a multi-agency dataset on child sexual abuse. In Ealing, staff reported that the support had enabled them to scrutinise the data currently collected in their local authority, and had encouraged them to ask questions concerning governance; in Hackney, the CSA Centre’s data improvement tool was used to identify how child sexual abuse data collection could be improved in a new children’s services data system which is being developed. While there is little data available to evidence the overall impact of delivering this holistic package of support across the three boroughs, work is ongoing to develop the role of the Practice Leads who, in some areas, are now offering regular case consultation to support colleagues within children’s social care in dealing with cases of child sexual abuse. As a result, senior leadership have highlighted the benefits of having a group of staff who can provide expert advice on complex cases, as well as the financial savings to be made from the reduced need for external expert advice. Key learning from the CSA Centre–LSCP programme includes the importance of: • identifying lead people at different levels in the local authority to support programme set-up and implementation; to allow sufficient time for set up and planning; to consider offering a bespoke package of support; and to run a Theory of Change session with senior leads and relevant parties at the start of the programme, in order to engage their support and buy-in • considering how best to structure the delivery of the Practice Leads Programme, in terms of its delivery (e.g. online versus face-to-face) and remit (e.g. social work teams or multi-agency programme), and how to ensure that Child Sexual Abuse Practice Leads have sufficient capacity and support to fulfil their new roles once the programme has finished • offering the one-day multi-agency training course virtually, as this enables large numbers of people to attend, and looking at how the course can be rolled out to spread the learning across a broader pool of professionals • ensuring that sufficient capacity is available to support in-depth work on data recording and analysis, and that senior managers appreciate the value of having more accurate data on child sexual abuse cases. The programme has also generated learning for the CSA Centre in taking forward this kind of initiative elsewhere, and we are currently piloting a different regional approach in delivering our Practice Leads programme across nine local authorities in the Cheshire & Merseyside Social Work Teaching Partnership. We will be producing a learning report from this work, and sharing it in 2023.   

Barkingside Ilford:  The Centre of expertise on child sexual abuse (CSA Centre), 2022.   19p.

By Bridget Freisthler, ; Rouba A. Chahine, ; Jennifer Villani,; et al

Importance: The HEALing Communities Study (HCS) evaluated the effectiveness of the Communities That HEAL (CTH) intervention in preventing fatal overdoses amidst the US opioid epidemic.

Objective: To evaluate the impact of the CTH intervention on total drug overdose deaths and overdose deaths involving combinations of opioids with psychostimulants or benzodiazepines.

Design, Setting, and Participants: This randomized clinical trial was a parallel-arm, multisite, community-randomized, open, and waitlisted controlled comparison trial of communities in 4 US states between 2020 and 2023. Eligible communities were those reporting high opioid overdose fatality rates in Kentucky, Massachusetts, New York, and Ohio. Covariate-constrained randomization stratified by state-allocated communities to the intervention or control group. Trial groups were balanced by urban or rural classification, 2016-2017 fatal opioid overdose rate, and community population. Data analysis was completed by December 2023.

Intervention: Increased overdose education and naloxone distribution, treatment with medications for opioid use disorder, safer opioid prescribing practices, and communication campaigns to mitigate stigma and drive demand for evidence-based interventions.

The primary outcome was the number of drug overdose deaths among adults (aged 18 years or older), with secondary outcomes of overdose deaths involving specific opioid-involved drug combinations from death certificates. Rates of overdose deaths per 100,000 adult community residents in intervention and control communities from July 2021 to June 2022 were compared with analyses performed in 2023. RESULTS In 67 participating communities (34 in the intervention group, 33 in the control group) and including 8 211 506 participants (4 251 903 female [51.8%]; 1 273 394 Black [15.5%], 603 983 Hispanic [7.4%], 5 979 602 White [72.8%], 354 527 other [4.3%]), the average rate of overdose deaths involving all substances was 57.6 per 100 000 population in the intervention group and 61.2 per 100 000 population in the control group. This was not a statistically significant difference (adjusted rate ratio [aRR], 0.92; 95% CI, 0.78-1.07; P = .26). There was a statistically significant 37% reduction (aRR, 0.63; 95% CI, 0.44-0.91; P = .02) in death rates involving an opioid and psychostimulants (other than cocaine), and nonsignificant reductions in overdose deaths for an opioid with cocaine (6%) and an opioid with benzodiazepine (1%). CONCLUSION AND RELEVANCE In this clinical trial of the CTH intervention, death rates involving an opioid and noncocaine psychostimulant were reduced; total deaths did not differ statistically. Community-focused data-driven interventions that scale up evidence-based practices with communications campaigns may effectively reduce some opioid-involved polysubstance overdose deaths 

JAMA Netw Open. 2024;7(10):e2440006. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2024.40006

By Jacqueline Allen, Ross Homel, Daniela Vasco, Kate Freiberg

  In this report, we investigate the effects of the Pathways to Prevention Project on the onset of youth offending. We find persuasive evidence for the impact of an enriched preschool program, the communication program, in reducing by more than 50 percent the number of young people becoming involved in court-adjudicated youth crime by age 17. We find equally strong evidence that comprehensive family support increased the efficacy and sense of empowerment of parents receiving family support. No children offended in the communication program if their parents also received family support, but family support on its own did not reduce youth crime. The rate of youth offending between 2008 and 2016 in the Pathways region was at least 20 percent lower than in other Queensland regions at the same low socio‑economic level, consistent with (but not proving) the hypothesis that the Pathways Project reduced youth crime at the aggregate community level.

 Report to the Criminology Research Advisory Council Canberra:  Australian Institute of Criminology 2024 , 86p.

By Bàrbara Molas and Heron Lopes

This research report illustrates how far-right users have accelerated the spread of harmful content by successfully exploiting AI tools and platforms. In doing so, it contributes to improving our understanding of the misuse of AI through new data and evidence-based insights that may inform action against the dissemination of hate culture through the latest technologies.  

  The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), 2024. 27p.

Environmental crime is a serious and growing international issue, which takes many different forms and impacts origin, source, transit and consumer countries. Broadly speaking, environmental crime is a collective term for “illegal activities harming the environment and aimed at benefiting certain individuals, groups or companies through the exploitation and theft of, or trade in natural resources”. This crime area includes corporate crime in the forestry sector, illegal exploitation and sale of gold and minerals, illegal fishing and associated criminal activities in the fisheries’ sector, trafficking in hazardous waste and chemicals, the illegal exploitation of the world’s wild flora and fauna, and wealth generated illegally from natural resources being used to support non-state armed groups and terrorism. Environmental crime is low-risk and high profit for criminals. This crime area has been recently defined as the third largest criminal sector worldwide, after drugs, counterfeit goods and trafficking. In terms of economic loss, just illegal logging, fishing and wildlife trade have an estimated value of $1 trillion or more per year.  Although “illegal mining” has no universal definition, INTERPOL defines it as an umbrella term covering both illegal extraction and trade of minerals, including the illegal use of toxic chemicals (such as cyanide and mercury) in mining activities. Illegal mining has evolved into an endemic and lucrative enterprise in several regions across the globe, with seriously damaging consequences in terms of: • Socio-economic development, due to the high profits generated from illicit assets of approximately 12-48 billion USD per year,5 undermining government revenues; • Peace and stability, as terrorist organizations, armed rebel groups and drug cartels use the sector as both a funding source and a money laundering enabler. In conflict regions, the mining sites are controlled by Organized Crime Groups and have become hotspots for widespread violence; • Human rights in vulnerable communities, who are exposed to i) human trafficking, forced labor, child and women abuse/ exploitation and pervasive (sexual) violence; ii) health issues for local miners and adjacent communities - caused by the chemical substances and environmental-; and iii) human displacements to facilitate the business; and • The environment. Illegal mining causes water and land poisoning via the release of toxic chemicals (e.g. mercury, arsenic, and cyanide), as well illegal deforestation, biodiversity and habitat loss, erosion, sinkholes, and atmospheric carbon emissions. The subsequent illegal trade of gems and precious metals, coupled with corruption and money laundering, is often perpetrated by organized crime. The criminal groups operating in the illegal mining sector are also often involved in other crime areas. These criminal activities pose major threats to global supply chains, the rule of law and sustainable development. Tackling criminal activities in the mining sector requires an international and coordinated policing response  

Paria: INTERPOL, 2022.   20p.

By Noor Huda Ismail

Online radicalization is a complex issue characterized by the different roles of digital propagandists and potential perpetrators, as highlighted by the recent security threats surrounding the Pope's visit to Indonesia. To combat this threat effectively, we need to prioritize real-time monitoring and interdisciplinary collaboration, utilizing AI tools to analyze and mitigate extremist content while advocating targeted interventions instead of punitive measures. Addressing radicalization necessitates collective societal action and a significant investment of relevant resources.

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore, 2024. 4p.

By Heather Wardle, Louisa Degenhardt, Virve Marionneau, Gerda Reith, Charles Livingstone, Malcolm Sparrow

The global gambling industry The global gambling industry is rapidly expanding, with net losses by consumers projected to reach nearly US$700 billion by 2028. Industry growth is fuelled by the rise of online gambling, widespread accessibility of gambling opportunities through mobile phones, increased legalization, and the introduction of commercial gambling to new areas. Recent expansion is most notable in low-income and middle-income countries, where regulatory infrastructure is often weak. Gambling, in some form at least, is now legally permitted in more than 80% of countries worldwide. Online gambling, given its borderless accessibility, is available everywhere via the internet. Digitalization has transformed the production and operation of commercial gambling, but the consequences of this shift and its effects on consumers have not yet been fully recognized. The production of online gambling is interconnected with an ecosystem of software, information technology infrastructure, and financial technology services. The commercial gambling industry has also developed strong partnerships in media and social media. Sponsoring and partnering with professional sports organizations provides gambling operators with marketing opportunities with huge new audiences. This far-reaching and interdependent corporate ecosystem collectively wields substantial influence over policy and has multiple points of contact through which to leverage the behavior of consumers. Online gambling products are designed to be rapid and intensive, characteristics that are associated with a higher risk of harm for consumers. The introduction of in-game betting during live matches has made online sports betting instantaneous and increased both its frequency and prevalence. Traditional gambling products, such as lotteries and bingo, now have faster cycles and are continuously accessible through smartphone apps. The boundaries between digital gaming and gambling are becoming blurred, with gaming increasingly acting as a conduit to gambling. Leveraging online digital infrastructures and surveillance data, gambling companies now have unparalleled capabilities to target consumers, including through the use of social media and influencers to engage individuals and online user data to tailor marketing to individuals, cross-sell products, and prolong user engagement. To safeguard their interests, stakeholders in the commercial gambling ecosystem deploy a range of strategies, many of which are similar to those used by other industries selling potentially addictive or health-harming products. To shape public and policy perceptions, and as they lobby policymakers directly to further their commercial interests, the industry portrays gambling as harmless entertainment and stresses the economic benefits (including tax revenues) and employment opportunities that the industry provides. The gambling industry particularly stresses the social benefits that accrue when some portion of gambling profits are used to fund education, health services, or other worthwhile social causes. According to industry narratives, responsibility for gambling harm is attributed to individuals, particularly those deemed as engaging in problematic gambling, which deflects attention from corporate conduct. The gambling industry also exerts considerable influence over research into gambling and gambling harms, which helps it retain control of the framing and messaging surrounding these issues. Industry messaging has substantially influenced gambling policy and regulation. Most policy solutions to gambling harms rest on the notion of individual responsibility. Providing support services, treatments, and protections for at-risk individuals is, of course, important. Improving these remedies further and making protective supports broadly available remains a priority. However, framing the problem in this way and narrowly focusing policy attention on a small subset of the people who gamble draws attention away from industry practices and Key messages • Commercial gambling is a rapidly growing global industry and is becoming increasingly digital. • The harms to health and wellbeing that result from gambling are more substantial than previously understood, extending beyond gambling disorder to include a wide range of gambling harms, which affect many people in addition to individuals who gamble. • The evolution of the gambling industry is at a crucial juncture; decisive action now can prevent or mitigate widespread harm to population health and wellbeing in the future. Thus far, globally, governments have paid too little attention to gambling harms and have not done enough to prevent or mitigate them. • Stronger policy and regulatory controls focused on harm prevention and the protection of public health and wellbeing, independent of industry or other competing influences, are now needed. Given the increasingly global and boundary-spanning nature of the industry, international coordination on regulatory approaches will be necessary for corporate behavior. We must also seriously examine the structures and systems that govern the design, provision, and promotion of gambling products. 

Lancet Public Health, Oct. 2024.

By Tena Prelec

The research paper that this briefing note summarises introduces a new framework for assessing the relationship between information manipulation and organised crime. Through applied real-world case studies from Russia, Ukraine, Moldova (Transnistria), and Albania, the framework reveals diverse patterns in these relationships, and the varying intensity of the information manipulation employed at a granular level. An emerging hypothesis emerging from the research suggests that authoritarian states may wield greater freedom in misusing information when they have intermediate – rather than high – levels of integration with the organised crime groups (OCG’s) executing disinformation campaigns on their behalf. The paper also identifies several areas for further research, including public receptivity to information manipulation, the mercurial nature of ties between elite actors and the use of information manipulation by elites, to create confusion amongst the public rather than to change their minds.

SOC ACE Research Paper. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. 2024. 7p.

By Huma Haider

Organised criminal actors can extend their influence over security sector officials through corruption, paying them to selectively enforce the law. In some cases, the rise of organised crime (OC) has eroded the state’s capacity to deliver security and justice. In other contexts, criminality is associated with a strong state that can protect corrupt officials and criminal actors. Strengthening the capabilities of corrupt security institutions can, in turn, be counterproductive in the fight against OC. The linkages between corruption, OC, the functioning of security and justice institutions, and their reform processes, call for integrated analysis, planning and implementation of initiatives to achieve security sector reform and governance (SSR/G) and to counter OC. There is, however, a gap in scholarship analysing connections between SSR/G and OC. In seeking to address this gap, this paper adopts an inter-disciplinary approach, reviewing scholarly and practitioner literature across a wide range of research disciplines. Key findings from the evidence review include:

• Delayed or weak implementation of security sector reform (SSR) in transitional contexts can result in the entrenchment of corruption in security sectors, alongside new forms of corruption (for example, from privatisation processes), which in turn risks the rise of illicit activities.

• OC can thrive where state institutions are absent or weak and where they are present or strong. A binary focus on strong versus weak states, with inadequate attention to context, has led at times to counterproductive interventions aimed at strengthening state institutions and the capabilities of security forces.

• The political context in which SSR and initiatives to counter OC take place can have a significant influence on outcomes. Such reforms and initiatives require political will and support. Elites in authoritarian contexts may block reforms that could hold them accountable and undermine their ability to profit from OC.

• Many SSR studies indicate that programming often prioritises less politically sensitive capacity building interventions. Yet, reforms that increase deterrent capacity can reinforce militarisation and increase violent crime by OC actors.

• Higher levels of popular trust in the military have often been accompanied by greater state reliance on the military to perform civilian law enforcement and/or militarisation of the police to address OC and restore public order.

• The militarisation of law enforcement has typically failed to counter OC, producing greater violence and criminality in many fragile and violent contexts.

• Relying on armed forces to counter OC has often reduced incentives and resources for strengthening police institutions

• Community-oriented policing is often employed to improve public trust in the police, yet there is limited systematic or comparative evidence that this is achieved.

• Mass incarceration, from law and order approaches, has frequently strengthened the cohesion of organised crime groups (OCG), giving them a territorial base for power projection.

• Overcrowded prison facilities and insufficient state staffing levels have often resulted in the rise of criminal governance and prisoner syndicates as parallel powers.

• Inadequate reintegration of ex-combatants, or gang members in situations of urban violence, can encourage their involvement in criminal activities.

• Conventional approaches to investigating and prosecuting criminal activity can be ineffective against complex OC networks. A proactive approach is required that seeks to disrupt and dismantle such networks, beyond arresting individual criminals.

• Criminal justice actors need to recognise that women can be both victims and perpetrators in the context of OC, possibly allowing for legal leniency.

• Judicial reforms tend to be more effective when they produce institutional change and empower new personnel to push through reforms.

• Special courts, established to tackle OC and corruption, may divert resources from elsewhere in the judicial sector. It can also be challenging to reconcile accountability for past gross human rights violations and the need to counter contemporary OC.

• Transitional trials, selective prosecutions and vetting, which remove officials guilty of corruption, OC and/or human rights violations from security and justice institutions, can help to reform abusive institutions and build trust.

• There is evidence that failure to properly vet military officials and ex-combatants prior to their entry into a civilian police force has resulted in corrupt police forces with links to criminality.

• There is debate as to whether transitional justice activities enable institutional reform and rule of law programming that can help to counter OC, or whether they are isolated from domestic capacity building.

• Developing accountability and oversight of security sector institutions (for example, anti-corruption mechanisms and civilian oversight) can help to reduce OC infiltration.

• Citizen security, a concept that extends to non-security sectors (for example, education, infrastructure and livelihoods), can be a helpful lens in designing more comprehensive interventions required to counter OC.

• Where gender-responsive SSR is advocated, it is often reduced to adding women to programming and institutions, without addressing the structural, institutional and cultural barriers to meaningful engagement.

• An effective system for combatting transnational OC requires the development of entities and mechanisms aimed at building operational cooperation and coordination among the security agencies of different states.

This Evidence Review Paper demonstrates the importance of adopting an OC-informed perspective in SSR/G and a SSR/G-informed perspective in addressing OC. By exploring the interlinkages, complementarities and trade-offs between security and justice sectors and their reforms, on the one hand, and countering OC, on the other, this paper seeks to provide insights into these perspectives.

SOC ACE Evidence Review Paper No. 05. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham 2024. 97p.

By Julia H. Littell, Therese D. Pigott, Karianne H. Nilsen, Stacy J. Green, Olga L. K. Montgomery

Background

Lack of access to and use of water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) cause 1.6 million deaths every year, of which 1.2 million are due to gastrointestinal illnesses like diarrhoea and acute respiratory infections like pneumonia. Poor WASH access and use also diminish nutrition and educational attainment, and cause danger and stress for vulnerable populations, especially for women and girls. The hardest hit regions are sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 6 calls for the end of open defecation, and universal access to safely managed water and sanitation facilities, and basic hand hygiene, by 2030. WASH access and use also underpin progress in other areas such as SDG1 poverty targets, SDG3 health and SDG4 education targets. Meeting the SDG equity agenda to “leave none behind” will require WASH providers prioritise the hardest to reach including those living remotely and people who are disadvantaged.

Objectives

Decision makers need access to high-quality evidence on what works in WASH promotion in different contexts, and for different groups of people, to reach the most disadvantaged populations and thereby achieve universal targets. The WASH evidence map is envisioned as a tool for commissioners and researchers to identify existing studies to fill synthesis gaps, as well as helping to prioritise new studies where there are gaps in knowledge. It also supports policymakers and practitioners to navigate the evidence base, including presenting critically appraised findings from existing systematic reviews.

Methods

This evidence map presents impact evaluations and systematic reviews from the WASH sector, organised according to the types of intervention mechanisms, WASH technologies promoted, and outcomes measured. It is based on a framework of intervention mechanisms (e.g., behaviour change triggering or microloans) and outcomes along the causal pathway, specifically behavioural outcomes (e.g., handwashing and food hygiene practices), ill-health outcomes (e.g., diarrhoeal morbidity and mortality), nutrition and socioeconomic outcomes (e.g., school absenteeism and household income). The map also provides filters to examine the evidence for a particular WASH technology (e.g., latrines), place of use (e.g., home, school or health facility), location (e.g., global region, country, rural and urban) and group (e.g., people living with disability). Systematic searches for published and unpublished literature and trial registries were conducted of studies in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). Searches were conducted in March 2018, and searches for completed trials were done in May 2020. Coding of information for the map was done by two authors working independently. Impact evaluations were critically appraised according to methods of conduct and reporting. Systematic reviews were critically appraised using a new approach to assess theory-based, mixed-methods evidence synthesis.

Results

There has been an enormous growth in impact evaluations and systematic reviews of WASH interventions since the International Year of Sanitation, 2008. There are now at least 367 completed or ongoing rigorous impact evaluations in LMICs, nearly three-quarters of which have been conducted since 2008, plus 43 systematic reviews. Studies have been done in 83 LMICs, with a high concentration in Bangladesh, India, and Kenya. WASH sector programming has increasingly shifted in focus from what technology to supply (e.g., a handwashing station or child's potty), to the best way in which to do so to promote demand. Research also covers a broader set of intervention mechanisms. For example, there has been increased interest in behaviour change communication using psychosocial “triggering”, such as social marketing and community-led total sanitation. These studies report primarily on behavioural outcomes. With the advent of large-scale funding, in particular by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, there has been a substantial increase in the number of studies on sanitation technologies, particularly latrines. Sustaining behaviour is fundamental for sustaining health and other quality of life improvements. However, few studies have been done of intervention mechanisms for, or measuring outcomes on sustained adoption of latrines to stop open defaecation. There has also been some increase in the number of studies looking at outcomes and interventions that disproportionately affect women and girls, who quite literally carry most of the burden of poor water and sanitation access. However, most studies do not report sex disaggregated outcomes, let alone integrate gender analysis into their framework. Other vulnerable populations are even less addressed; no studies eligible for inclusion in the map were done of interventions targeting, or reporting on outcomes for, people living with disabilities. We were only able to find a single controlled evaluation of WASH interventions in a health care facility, in spite of the importance of WASH in health facilities in global policy debates. The quality of impact evaluations has improved, such as the use of controlled designs as standard, attention to addressing reporting biases, and adequate cluster sample size. However, there remain important concerns about quality of reporting. The quality and usefulness of systematic reviews for policy is also improving, which draw clearer distinctions between intervention mechanisms and synthesise the evidence on outcomes along the causal pathway. Adopting mixed-methods approaches also provides information for programmes on barriers and enablers affecting implementation.

Conclusion

Ensuring everyone has access to appropriate water, sanitation, and hygiene facilities is one of the most fundamental of challenges for poverty elimination. Researchers and funders need to consider carefully where there is the need for new primary evidence, and new syntheses of that evidence. This study suggests the following priority areas:

Impact evaluations incorporating understudied outcomes, such as sustainability and slippage, of WASH provision in understudied places of use, such as health care facilities, and of interventions targeting, or presenting disaggregated data for, vulnerable populations, particularly over the life-course and for people living with a disability;

Improved reporting in impact evaluations, including presentation of participant flow diagrams; and

Synthesis studies and updates in areas with sufficient existing and planned impact evaluations, such as for diarrhoea mortality, ARIs, WASH in schools and decentralisation. These studies will preferably be conducted as mixed-methods systematic reviews that are able to answer questions about programme targeting, implementation, effectiveness and cost-effectiveness, and compare alternative intervention mechanisms to achieve and sustain outcomes in particular contexts, preferably using network meta-analysis.

Campbell Systematic Reviews, 17(4) 2021.

By CARLY GARCIA

As the world regains normalcy following a global pandemic, intercountry adoption has taken a hit. Intercountry adoption within the United States reached its peak in 2004, with 22,988 children placed with families. Since 2004, the United States has seen a drastic decrease in intercountry adoption rates. In 2020, only 1,622 international adoptions took place in the United States; slightly increasing in 2021, with 1,785 children adopted. There are multiple causes for the decline in adoptions. For example, origin countries, such as Russia and Guatemala, have terminated their international adoption programs with the United States. More recently, the leading cause of this decrease is the COVID-19 pandemic. Many countries, including China, placed adoptions on hold as the coronavirus took over the world. In contrast, other countries such as Colombia and Bulgaria, relaxed their visitation rules to allow international adoptions to continue.

The current intercountry adoption laws and treaties protect children’s rights and prevent illicit adoption practices. The Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (“Hague Convention”) and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (“UNCRC”) established safeguards to ensure that intercountry adoptions occur in the “best interest of the child.” However, protection for adoptive parents and birth parents is left to the laws of the country in which they reside. For example, in the United States, the federal statute governing intercountry adoption is the Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000 (“IAA”). Unfortunately, despite the multiple treaties and statutes implemented to prevent illicit adoption practices, fraud still occurs

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 53, No. 2 [2023], Art. 11

By Maurice Vanstone and Anne Worrall

There has not been a specific history of supervising women in the community. This article, therefore,describes the early neglect of work with women and the period of change from the 1970s when women became more visible and the criminal justice system’ sresponse to them began to face scrutiny. It posits the story against the background of increased awareness of gender discrimination and efforts to reduce the use of imprisonment by addressing women’s criminogenic and social needs through community-based supervision.It juxtaposes innovative work initiated by practitioners and managers to years of unfulfilled policy promises.An essential part of the story is the attempt to integrate feminist perspectives into policy and practice at a time of organisational and political turbulence. It con-cludes that our increased understanding of criminalised women presents the opportunity of breaking the frustrating cycle of governmental ‘enthusiasm-disillusion-indifference’ and making a genuine contribution to equality and social justice.

Howard J. Crim. Justice. 2024;1–15.

By Alana M. Vivolo-Kantor; Christine L. Mattson, Maria Zlotorzynska,

Ketamine, a Schedule III controlled substance* that is Food and Drug Administration (FDA)–approved for general anesthesia, can produce mild hallucinogenic effects and cause respiratory, cardiovascular, and neuropsychiatric adverse events (1). In 2019, a form of ketamine (esketamine) was approved by FDA for use in treatment-resistant depression among adults† (2). Ketamine use, poison center calls for ketamine exposure, and ketamine drug reports from law enforcement have increased through 2019 (3), but recent trends in ketamine involvement in fatal overdoses are unknown. Data from CDC’s State Unintentional Drug Overdose Reporting System (SUDORS) were analyzed to describe characteristics of and trends in overdose deaths with ketamine detected or involved during July 2019–June 2023.

MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2024;73:1010–1012