By Bradley Read

This article suggests that the parole dossier may be working to damage prisoners' sense of their identity. Through the creation of a carceral script which describes a person whom they do not recognise as themselves and which leads to an increased narrative labour. Prisoners' struggle therefore to form a post offence identity with which to navigate a complex process. As identity and its repair, appear instrumental to desistance, elements of the process, such as the dossier, could be putting hopes of rehabilitation at risk. Using the analysis of fifteen prisoner interviews, this article explores a parole process described as undermining agency. A process where risk assessment is perceived poorly and where ultimately the experience can lead to negative impacts on an already fragile self-identity. In conclusion, this article attempts to offer some solutions, to mitigate the negative effects, to maximise the potential impact of the dossier process on future desistance, through the more meaningful involvement of the prisoner at its centre.

Criminology & Criminal Justice, 2024. Online First.

By  Maree Crabbe, Michael Flood,,  Kelsey Adams

This article aims to explore the extent and nature of Australian young people’s pornography exposure and access.

Methods

Cross-sectional online survey of 1,985 young Australians aged 15–20 years, nationally representative of a range of demographics.

Results

Exposure to pornography was reported by 86% of male and 69% of female participants. Most exposure occurred when participants were alone and at home, regardless of gender. Young men were more likely than young women to seek pornography out and to view it frequently, with over half (54%) of male participants reporting weekly use compared with 14% of female participants. On average, boys and young men saw pornography 3.2 years before their first partnered sexual experience, and girls and young women saw it 2.0 years before theirs.

Conclusions

It is common for young people to see pornography years before their first partnered sexual experience.

Implications for public health

Unintentional and deliberate exposure to pornography is common and frequent among young people. Public health strategies among young people are necessary to address the potential harms associated with pornography use, including gender-based violence and risky sexual practices.

Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health Volume 48, Issue 3, June 2024, 100135

By Stefano De Luca with Tristan Marcelin; Graphics: Samy Chahr

By the 2030s, quantum computers might compromise traditional cryptography, putting digital infrastructure at high risk in the European Union (EU) and around the world. Specifically, it is expected that quantum computers' unique capabilities will allow them to solve complex mathematical problems, such as breaking the traditional cryptographic systems used universally. The confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of sensitive data – including health, financial, security and defence information – will be exposed to threats from any actor possessing a sufficiently powerful quantum computer. There is a pressing need for the EU to start preparing its digital assets to face this risk. Post-quantum cryptography (which uses classical computer properties) and quantum cryptography (which uses quantum mechanical properties) are the two types of critical technology able to protect digital infrastructure from quantum computer attacks. Robust post-quantum cryptography algorithms have been identified, but swift and efficient implementation is crucial before malicious actors exploit the power of quantum computers. Experts stress the need for quantum preparedness to be put in place now, with some of them even warning of a 'quantum cybersecurity Armageddon'. Several countries are adopting strategies to address post-quantum cryptography. The EU is working with Member States and the United States to speed up the transition to post-quantum cryptography, and is also exploring long-term quantum cryptography initiatives.

Brussels: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, 2024. 8p.

By Jo‑Anne Kramer, Arjan A. J. Blokland·, Edward R. Kleemans, Melvin R. J. Soudijn

In order to launder large amounts of money, (drug) criminals can seek help from financial facilitators. According to the FATF, these facilitators are operating increasingly business-like and even participate in professional money laundering networks. This study examines the extent to which financial facilitators in the Netherlands exhibit business-like characteristics and the extent to which they organize themselves in money laundering networks. We further examine the relationship between business-like behavior and individual money launderers’ position in the social network. Using police intelligence data, we were able to analyze the contacts of 198 financial facilitators who were active in the Netherlands in the period 2016–2020, all having worked for drug criminals. Based on social network analysis, this research shows that financial facilitators in the Netherlands can be linked in extensive money laundering networks. Based on the facilitators’ area of expertise, roughly two main types of professional money laundering networks can be discerned. Some subnetworks operate in the real estate sector, while others primarily engage in underground banking. Furthermore, the application of regression models to predict business-like behavior using individual network measures shows that facilitators with more central positions in the net work and those who collaborate with financial facilitators from varying expertise groups tend to behave more business-like than other financial facilitators.

Trends in Organized Crime (2024) 27:314–341

By Paolo Campana, Cecilia Meneghini

This paper explores the structure of organised crime movement across local communities and the drivers underpinning such movement. Firstly, it builds on network analysis to offer a novel methodological approach to empirically and quantitatively study the movement of organised crime offenders across geographical areas. The paper then applies this approach to evidence from Cambridgeshire in the United Kingdom. It reconstructs the movement of organised crime members across local areas based on a large-scale police dataset that includes 41 months of recorded crime events. It identifies organised crime “turf” and “target” areas and then explores the drivers of movement from the former to the latter using Exponential Random Graph Models. Findings confirm that geographical distance matters; however, socio-demographic, urban, economic and crime-related characteristics of communities play a key role. Organised crime group members target urban communities with higher than average illegal market opportunities (proxied by drug-related activity). The work also finds the effect of socio-demographic homophily between turf and target communities, suggesting that organised crime group members might target territories that are similar to their own. While a high level of deprivation makes a community more likely to send organised crime members, its impact on a community’s probability of being a receiver is less clear. Finally, the paper offers a way to identify communities (local areas) at risk of being targeted by criminal organisations, thus providing practitioners with a tool for early interventions

Trends in Organized Crime (2024) 27:286–313

By David Bright, Giovanni Sadewo, Timothy I. C. Cubitt, Christopher Dowling, Anthony Morgan

Outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMCGs) have become synonymous with organised crime through engagement in criminal activities including illicit drug production and distribution, firearms trafficking, and serious violent crime. These crimes contribute significant social and economic harms in countries that feature a presence from these groups. The current paper uses network analytics to analyse the extent of co-offending within and across established clubs in Australia, including the relative involvement of senior, or office-bearing, members. The majority of affiliates in this sample co-offended with another OMCG affiliate within the sample period, with office bearers, members, nominees and associates represented proportionally among co-offending networks to in the sample at large. However, within these clubs, criminal activities were conducted in small cliques or components of affiliates. This research supports the role of OMCGs as important facilitators of crime, and the role of co-offending in the criminal offending of affiliates. The findings hold important implications for understanding how offending is organised among OMCGs, differences between groups, differing levels of engagement from the club hierarchy

Trends in Organized Crime (2024) 27:263–285

By Samantha Bricknell, Hannah Miles

This study uses 34 years of data from the National Homicide Monitoring Program to describe the prevalence and characteristics of homicide of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women, finding Indigenous women experienced a homicide victimisation rate up to seven times the national average.

These data complement the findings from the currently small number of studies about the homicide of Indigenous women and contribute long-term data with which to measure national targets to reduce rates of victimisation and eliminate the circumstances that initiate lethal violence.

Key findings

• Between 1 July 1989 and 30 June 2023, 476 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women were victims of homicide.

• 96% of the 473 homicide incidents involving an Indigenous woman were cleared by police.

• 97% of victims from cleared incidents were killed by someone they knew.

• 72% of Indigenous women were killed by a current or former male intimate partner, with smaller proportions killed by another family member or a friend or acquaintance (13% each).

• 92% percent of the male intimate partner offenders were also Indigenous.

• The homicide of Indigenous women mostly occurred in a private residence, although over a third took place in a community setting, specifically an open area or streetscape. This pattern differs from homicide generally, which less commonly occur in public locations.

• Around half of the homicides were immediately preceded by some form of domestic conflict or enmity.

Statistical Bulletin 46 Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2024. 17p.

By Elmarije K. van Straalena, Christianne J. de Poota, Marijke Malschd , Henk Elffers

Forensic reports use various types of conclusions, such as a categorical (CAT) conclusion or a likelihood ratio (LR). In order to correctly assess the evidence, users of forensic reports need to understand the conclusion and its evidential strength. The aim of this paper is to study the interpretation of the evidential strength of forensic conclusions by criminal justice professionals. In an online questionnaire 269 professionals assessed 768 reports on fingerprint examination and answered questions that measured self-proclaimed and actual understanding of the reports and conclusions. The reports entailed CAT, verbal LR and numerical LR conclusions with low or high evidential strength and were assessed by crime scene investigators, police detectives, public prosecutors, criminal lawyers, and judges. The results show that about a quarter of all questions measuring actual understanding of the reports were answered incorrectly. The CAT conclusion was best understood for the weak conclusions, the three strong conclusions were all assessed similarly. The weak CATconclusion correctly emphasizes the uncertainty of any conclusion type used. However, most participants underestimated the strength of this weak CAT conclusion compared to the other weak conclusion types. Looking at the self-proclaimed understanding of all professionals, they in general overestimated their actual understanding of all conclusion types.

Forensic Science International, Volume 313, August 2020, 110331

By Maggie Dent

In Much of The Research and reporting on sexual abuse in schools, attention has focussed on teachers as the perpetrators. More recently, attention has turned to the rising tide of harmful sexual behaviours with students sexually harassing and abusing teachers and their fellow students. However, teacher-targeted sexual harassment is often overlooked or underinvestigated. Teacher-targeted sexual harassment has been documented sporadically for decades (Coulter, 1995; Jones, 1989; Robinson, 2000). However, a growing body of contemporary research, media reports and firsthand accounts suggest that the behaviour is intensifying, and it is mainly carried out by male students (Adams, 2021; Hiatt, 2022; Variyan and Wilkinson, 2022; Wescott & Roberts, 2023; Sparrow, 2024; Ketchell, 2024). It is difficult to ascertain the true extent of teacher-targeted sexual harassment. There is a general underreporting of incidents (NASUWT, 2019; Robinson, 2000). Studies that do explicitly explore teacher-targeted sexual harassment tend to group sexual harassment with other forms of harmful behaviour, including bullying and physical violence. This disguises the magnitude of the issue (for example, see Astor et al., 2023; Li et al., 2023; Santor et al., 2021). The Sexual Harassment of Teachers in Schools Survey was initiated to bridge this gap in the research. The idea for the survey grew out of conversations between Collective Shout Campaign Strategy Team members and author and educator Maggie Dent. These discussions were sparked by shared concerns over anecdotal accounts from teachers that suggested an intensification of sexual harassment and sexualised behaviours exhibited by students in Australian classrooms. Designed collaboratively by Maggie Dent and the Collective Shout team, the survey was distributed widely through networks, social media posts, email campaigns, and news outlets. The survey went live in November 2022, and responses were collected until the survey closed in June 2023. The purpose of the survey was to gain a general indication of the pervasiveness of sexual harassment by students, the kinds of behaviours displayed, and how sexual harassment is being dealt with by schools. The survey aimed to catalyse serious discussions on the necessary measures to address this growing problem. It was envisaged that responses might be useful in guiding schools to improve policies and processes for the prevention of and response to sexual harassment in schools. A total of 1,012 teachers responded to our survey. What they have to say is compelling. Survey respondents reinforce what has been identified in research and reported by mainstream media. Their invaluable suggestions based on their expertise and direct experience inform the recommendations we provide in this Report.   

Taylors Lakes, Victoria: Collective Shout, 2024. 56p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

Now entering its second year of enforcement, the ban continues to hold. In 2024, the area under cultivation was estimated at 12,800 ha, or 19% more than in 2023 (10,800 ha)1 . Despite the increase, opium poppy cultivation is still far below the priorban levels. In 2022 an estimated 232,000 ha were cultivated.2 The increase in cultivation came with a geographical shift. The South-western provinces of the country were long the center of cultivation up to and including 2023. In 2024, this changed and now 59% of all cultivation took place in the North-east, particularly in Badakhshan. The rapid and currently sustained decline in poppy cultivation and opium production has important and wide-ranging implications for the country and opiate markets long supplied by product from Afghanistan. Questions remain as to how the country will cope with the continued reduction in opiate income and how opiate markets downstream will react. Farmers that lack sustainable alternatives face a more precarious financial and economic situation and need alternative economic opportunities to become resilient against picking up poppy cultivation in the future. Distributors and dealers closer to destination markets, as well as consumers, are likely to experience supply constraints in the coming years, should the ban remain in place. Following a major hike in 2022 and 2023, dry opium prices stabilized slightly in the first half of 2024 to around US$730. These prices are several times higher than the long-running pre-ban average of US$100 per kilogram. Extremely high farmgate prices and questions about dwindling opium stocks may encourage a resumption in poppy cultivation, especially in places outside of traditional cultivation centers, including neighboring countries.  

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; 2024. 20p.

By Kate McGoldrick , SallyAnne Collis , Linda Mulligan

Introduction: Femicide represents the dramatic end-point on a spectrum of violence against women and is an increasingly prevalent medico-legal issue. Whilst there is no definition of femicide in the Irish legal system, femicide can be understood as the gender-based killing of women or girls The pervasiveness of gender-based violence against women is a growing cause for concern with 2018 estimates by the World Health Organisation (WHO) revealing that 1 in 3 women have experienced Intimate Partner Violence (IPV). Femicide remains poorly defined and underreported worldwide due to enduring stigmatization, shame, and a lack of official statistics addressing national femicide rates. Aim: The aim of this study was to explore Irish cases of femicide, quantify the prevalence of femicide in Ireland, and identify any emerging trends over 12 years. Methods: All homicides referred to the Office of the State Pathologist (OSP) from 2012 to 2023 were reviewed and a total of 97 cases of femicide were identified and included in this study. Results: Femicide rates increased from 1 in 5 (19 %) homicides referred to the OSP in 2012–2020 to 3 in 10 from 2021 to 2023 (29 %). Domestic femicides accounted for 74 % of cases, with 41 % of women murdered in the home they shared with their killer. 56 % of women were killed by a current or former intimate partner and 20 % by a family member. Sharp force injuries were present in 75 % of femicides associated with a history of sexual violence. These cases had the highest average number of injuries per case (n = 30) and a significantly lower average age than that of the entire cohort (19 years versus 41 years). Conclusion: The true scale of gender-based violence against women remains largely hidden due to a lack of focused official statistics and a clear definition of femicide. As populations become more diverse, and displacement secondary to environmental, or humanitarian crises becomes more common, official data must be collected in order to understand and ultimately prevent gender-based violence in this vulnerable cohort.  

Journal of Forensic and Legal Medicine Volume 107, October 2024, 102754

By Laura Y. Calderón

Mexico had the most violent year in its history in 2019, reporting 29,406 intentional homicide cases, resulting in 34,588 individual victims.1 However, violence remains a highly focalized phenomenon in Mexico, with 23% of all intentional homicide cases concentrated in five municipalities and three major clusters of violence with homicide rates over 100 per 100,000 inhabitants. Following the national trend, the state of Guanajuato also had its most violent year in 2019, with one of its largest cities featured in the country’s top five most violent municipalities. This paper will analyze the surge in violence in Guanajuato in 2019, comparing the number of intentional homicide cases with the increasing problem of fuel theft in the state, and describing some of the state and federal government measures to address both issues. II. Background The central Mexican state of Guanajuato is a traditional agricultural-producing region, a major manufacturing hub, and a popular vacation and retirement destination for foreigners. Considered a relatively wealthy state and constituting 4.4% of the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Guanajuato boasts the sixth-largest economy in Mexico. The state also holds second place in terms of growth in the manufacturing sector, which makes up 26% of the state’s GDP. Guanajuato is home to economically important industries that attract considerable foreign direct investment to Mexico, including the automobile and chemical industries, among others.2 However, over the last several years, Guanajuato has been one of Mexico’s top 10 most violent states, and two of its largest cities —León and Irapuato— were among Mexico’s top 10 most violent municipalities in 2018 and 2019. The state of Guanajuato also had the highest number of organized crime-related homicides in 2019 with 2,673 cases,  according to Reforma. 3 Additionally, Guanajuato was featured in Milenio’s top five states with the highest number of murders every month in 2019, calculating 2,934 organized crime-related deaths. 4 Furthermore, Guanajuato was tied with Estado de México as the second most dangerous place for elected officials in 2019, according to Justice in Mexico’s Memoria dataset. 5 Guanajuato attracted media attention especially in 2019 because of a dramatic increase in violence. While few available studies are exploring the origins and source of increased violence in Guanajuato, there seems to be one factor that has not been fully studied in terms of violence trends: fuel theft. III. Huachicoleo and Organized Crime Groups Fuel theft is one of the most recent developments in Mexico’s violent crime spectrum, gaining nationwide notoriety in early 2017. Gasoline truck drivers, or chupaductos (pipeline suckers), were the first to adopt the name huachicol to refer to stolen hydrocarbons in Mexico.6 It is still complicated to track the origin of the word, as technically, it refers to an adulterated alcoholic beverage derived from cane alcohol. However, huachicol is also believed to come from the Mayan culture, where the word “huach” or “waach” means “foreigner,” and in some Mayan regions, “thief.”7 This term lead to the colloquial name huachicolero to refer to petroleum thieves. 8 The practice of huachicoleo has been an increasing problem in Mexico, with organized crime groups (OCGs) competing to control its revenues in a manner similar to the way in which they compete over drug-trafficking territories or plazas. Huachicoleo takes place in two different forms: through puncturing gas pipelines, which carry 20% of the country’s supply, or by stealing it on the go from the fuel distribution gas trucks on Mexico’s main highways.9 In socio-economic terms, the increase of fuel theft is partially attributable to the rise of oil prices in Mexico over the last few years, when gas went from an average of 5.00 Mexican pesos per liter (roughly 0.27 USD) in 2000, to 19.40 Mexican pesos per liter (roughly 1.03 USD) by December 2019 as shown in the chart below. 10 The population’s alleged inability or unwillingness to pay such high prices is believed to have created a greater demand for lower-cost gas—a demand that OCGs were willing to fulfill. Highway-side vendors started selling stolen gasoline from 5 to 10 Mexican pesos per liter (roughly 0.27 to 0.54 USD), depending on the distance from actual pipelines. 11 Networks of huachicoleros have established their vending points along major highways throughout Mexico, especially in central Mexico, where some of these vending points are disguised as legal commercial establishments such as tire shops, car repair workshops, coffee shops, restaurants, and other informal businesses.   

San Diego:  Justice in Mexico Department of Political Science & International Relations University of San Diego, 2020. 28p,

By Marta-Marika Urbanik & Robert A. Roks

Recent research on street-involved populations has documented their online presence and has highlighted the effects of their online presentations on their lives in the real world. Given the increasing conflation between the online and offline world, contemporary urban ethnographers should pay increased attention to their participants’ online presence and interactions. However, methodological training of this sort is still in its infancy stages and has not yet evolved to guide the growing number of researchers undertaking this form of research. This article draws from our experiences using social media in our urban ethnographies with criminally involved groups, to examine the benefits, risks, and challenges of drawing on social media in urban ethnography. It is intended to serve as a foundational piece that will hopefully ignite scholarly dialogue, debate, and methodological training relating to deploying social media in urban—and specifically—gang ethnography.

Qualitative Sociology 43(6) 2020.

By Aili Malm, Nicholas Perez, Michael D. White

This publication represents the final research report of California State University, Long Beach’s (CSULB) evaluation of an intelligence-led problem-oriented policing (POP) project to better understand and address illicit fentanyl distribution networks in Long Beach, CA. The goals of this study were to: (1) employ problem-oriented policing to drive efforts to identify and disrupt fentanyl distribution networks in Long Beach, CA, and (2) use intelligence analysis to identify high-level distributors for investigation. To achieve these goals, researchers worked with a newly hired intelligence analyst and Long Beach Police Department (LBPD) Drug Investigation Section (DIS) detectives to improve their fentanyl distribution network investigations. The intervention included POP training, intelligence analyst support [cellular phone extractions, open-source intelligence (OSINT), social network analysis (SNA), etc.], and weekly interactions between the analyst and the research team. To assess the effectiveness of the project, we conducted both process and outcome evaluations. Primary data sources include: (1) interviews of detectives and the analyst; (2) DIS administrative data; (3) network data from three fentanyl distribution cases; and (4) fentanyl-related overdose data from the LBPD and the California Overdose Surveillance Dashboard. We identified findings across multiple analyses that, when taken together, represent a persuasive collection of circumstantial evidence regarding the positive effects of the project on two important outcomes: increased DIS activity and efficiency and effective fentanyl distribution network disruption. While fentanyl-related overdose rates did decrease substantially over the course of the project, there is no conclusive evidence that the project led to the reduction. The effects of COVID-19, the defund movement following George Floyd’s death, and the Los Angeles County District Attorney policy limiting the prosecution of drug offenses confounded our ability to draw a stronger connection between the project and enhanced DIS activity and efficiency, fentanyl distribution network disruption, and overdose rates.   

California State University, Long Beach; School of Criminology, Criminal Justice, and Emergency Management; 2024 77p. 

By Shamus Khan, Joss Greene, Claude Ann Mellins, and Jennifer S. Hirsch

In this review, we provide an overview of the literature on sexual assault. First, we define sexual assault, noting its multiple dimensions and the consequences for operationalization—including reviewing strategies for such operationalization. Second, we outline different approaches to sexual assault, critically assessing those frameworks that rely upon a model of sociopathy; instead, we propose focusing on more sociological and ecological understandings that push beyond the single dimension of gender and the framework of gender and power. Third, we outline the range of data sources that have been used to generate insights into sexual assault. Fourth, we provide the core research findings of the field, which at times are contradictory, mapping them to our ecological model of individual, relational, organizational, and cultural levels. We then review the evidence around those interventions that have been successful in addressing sexual assault (and those that have been unsuccessful) before concluding with suggestions for further research directions.

Annual Review of Criminology, Vol. 3 (2020), pp. 139–163

By John M. MacDonald, and Robert J. Stokes

Over the past twenty years, many US cities have seen urban revitalization and population changes associated with an increased desire for urban living among the affluent. As inner-city neighborhoods become gentrified, they are more likely to witness the construction of new buildings and homes, the conversion of industrial spaces to mixed-used developments, expanded access to mass transit, and the arrival of coffee shops and other urban amenities. In this review, we take stock of what is known about the impact of gentrification and land-use changes on neighborhood crime. We summarize research conducted since the period of urban revitalization that started in the 1990s as well as studies that have a quasi-experimental design. We find that gentrification and associated changes to land use tend to reduce crime in neighborhoods. Our findings are tempered by the need for greater conceptual clarity on how to measure when a neighborhood has gentrified and a clearer examination of the spatial displacement of crime. We conclude with a discussion on the need for criminologists to partner with urban planners to study how changes in the land use of cities can be made to generate crime reductions that benefit all places and, finally, detail some promising directions for future research.

Annual Review of Criminology, Vol. 3:121-138, 2020.

By United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime - UNODC

Fraud has evolved significantly over the years, adapting to technological advancements and changes in society. It has become increasingly sophisticated, often using psychological manipulation, enabled by information and communications technologies (ICTs). The high volume and severity of fraud pose a significant risk to people, economies and prosperity worldwide, and have a negative impact on the public’s confidence in the rule of law. However, developing an accurate understanding of fraud presents several challenges. Victims often underreport fraud due to feelings of shame, self blame or embarrassment, as well as a lack of recognition that a crime has occurred. Moreover, a significant portion of fraud targets businesses, many of which choose not to report these crimes to avoid damaging their reputation. The anonymity and remoteness often associated with fraud perpetration conceal the identities of offenders from both victims and authorities, hindering efforts to assess underlying patterns, factors of vulnerability and associated risks. Furthermore, the dynamic nature of fraud — which is constantly being adapted to changes in legal, social, commercial and technological systems — means that new and innovative methods of the offence may go unnoticed within static official data. In many cases, domestic law enforcement entities do not have the capacity to investigate and uncover the offenders and the organized criminal groups behind the crime: international cooperation is required, suggesting the need to give greater prominence to fraud in the policy framework and legislation against organized crime.

The international community has recognized the worrying scale of fraud and the need for joint efforts in preventing and combating it. The General Assembly, in its resolution 78/229, reaffirmed the importance of the work of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in the fulfilment of its mandate in crime prevention and criminal justice, including providing to Member States, upon request and as a matter of high priority, technical cooperation, advisory services and other forms of assistance, and coordinating with and complementing the work of all relevant and competent United Nations bodies and offices in respect to all forms of organized crime, including fraud. Nevertheless, the intersection between fraud and organized crime is not well understood and is further complicated by overlaps with other key areas, including cybercrime, white-collar crime, money-laundering and corruption. An understanding of organized fraud is necessary to inform the decisions of policymakers and other stakeholders and drive effective responses. The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the main global legally binding instrument to prevent and fight all forms and manifestations of transnational organized crime and protect the victims thereof, provides a framework to understand the nature of organized fraud and how the response to it can be integrated into the response to the different threats presented by transnational organized crime.

Scope of the issue paper

Fraud is an expansive category of crime. One of the greatest challenges to understanding it is its scope. It encompasses a range of criminal behaviours that are bound together by the common principle of dishonesty. The opportunities to employ dishonesty for the purposes of fraud span the full range of social, commercial, financial and technological settings, which can vary in different regions of the world. These opportunities are exploited by criminals from highly diverse backgrounds, ranging from professionals exploiting a legitimate corporate position to cybercriminals from within deprived communities. In this way, fraud is distinct from many other criminal categories that cover more discrete criminal behaviours occurring in specific settings (e.g. burglary). This diversity creates challenges in terms of developing a single, cohesive and comprehensive picture of fraud. The present issue paper covers fraud perpetrated by organized criminal groups (i.e. organized fraud). The role of organized crime can vary depending on the type of fraud, although, to a greater or lesser extent, it has a footprint in nearly all types of fraud. For the purposes of containing the scope of the issue paper, the following elements are not included:

• Other crimes in which fraud plays an enabling role, including the fraudulent use of identity to prevent a perpetrator from being traced, such as opening financial accounts to launder the proceeds of crime; fraudulent communications to enter into a relationship with a victim for the purpose of blackmailing or extorting money from them;1 and fraudulent job advertisements for recruiting and trafficking victims into forced labour and servitude.

• Fraud targeting the financial interests of the State (e.g. tax regimes), such as missing trader intra-community fraud (otherwise known as MTIC or VAT fraud); excise fraud, in which duties on imported products are not paid (e.g. fuel); public procurement fraud; and fraudulent applications for government grants and subsidies. The policy and response landscape for addressing these types of fraud can be distinct, being made up of various agencies and regulatory powers beyond law enforcement (e.g. the tax authority). The links between these types of fraud and organized crime are more well established in the literature.

The focus of the issue paper is organized fraud that targets individual members of the public or private institutions for the purposes of obtaining a financial or other material benefit.

Vienna: UNODC< 2024. 82p.

By Christopher Blattman, Benjamin Lessing, and Santiago Tobón

Organised crime poses one of the greatest threats to national security and development in the 21st century. Despite this, most policy, data collection, and scholarly research focuses on individuals and disorganised violence. Our work addresses several critical gaps in knowledge:

• What are the incentives for gangs to engage in violence and socially costly behaviour?

• Which are the trade-offs that practitioners face when deciding how to engage with organised violence?

• What type of information do relevant decision-makers need to inform their policies?

• Which are the most relevant tools for tracking down gang behaviour and use of violence?

We address these questions in the context of Medellín, Colombia’s second largest and most important city. Over the past six years, our work has covered a broad methodological spectrum, including:

• qualitative data collection through interviews with dozens of criminals and criminal justice experts;

• quantitative data collection from thousands of citizens in surveys representative at highly localised levels;

• active collaboration with local relevant stakeholders such as the city administration and the local police department;

• quasi-experimental evaluations of long-running policies dating back to the 1980s; and

• experimental evaluations of marginal improvements in state presence in violent and gang controlled areas.

Our preliminary findings point to terrible trade-offs, where authorities face plausibly impossible questions when balancing short-term gains in violence reduction and sacrifices in state legitimacy, with long-term uncertainty concerning both violence and state legitimacy. We highlight preliminary recommendations for guiding policy decisions.

Birmingham, UK: The Serious Organised Crime & Anti-Corruption Evidence (SOC ACE) 2022. 9p.

By Clare Ribando Seelke

An upsurge in lethal attacks against journalists in Mexico since the start of 2022 has renewed interest in Congress about violence against journalists and the state of media freedoms in Mexico. Since 2000, more than 150 journalists and media workers have been killed in Mexico, including seven in 2021 and eight in the first few months of 2022. Violence against journalists is occurring within the context of a broader security crisis in Mexico fueled by organized crime-related violence. Nevertheless, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) have asserted that “impunity in attacks against [or murders of] journalists fosters further violence against reporters and may inhibit the exercise of freedom of expression.”  In February 2022, Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated that he joined “those calling for greater accountability and protections for Mexican journalists.”  Some congressional concerns about the killings of journalists in Mexico have prompted letters to the Biden Administration and hearing questions to Administration officials regarding the extent to which the U.S. government is urging Mexico to better prevent, investigate, and prosecute cases of violence against journalists. Congress has appropriated foreign assistance to help the Mexican government and civil society better protect journalists and reduce impunity in cases of crimes committed against them. An oversight issue for the 117th Congress may be the extent to which the protection of journalists and other vulnerable groups is prioritized under the new U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework for Security Cooperation signed in October 2021. Congress also may examine whether other tools, such as conditions on foreign assistance, sanctions, or legislation, could be used to improve the situation.  

Washington, DC:  Congressional Research Service , 2022. 15p.

By Ginevra Le Moli

In legal discourse, ‘torture’ is a term used to describe the deliberate infliction of severe physical or mental pain and suffering upon a person. One controversial aspect of the legal definition of torture has been the status of the perpetrator, whose acts are relevant for the torture definition under international law. This ambiguity came to the forefront in the judgment of the United Kingdom (UK) Supreme Court in R v. Reeves Taylor, where the Court ruled that the category of persons ‘acting in an official capacity’ (under section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which implements the United Nations Convention against Torture) included members of armed groups if those groups exercise governmental authority over a civilian population in a territory under their control. This article relies on R v. Reeves Taylor as a gateway for a wider analysis of four fundamental inquiries into the definition and operation of the crime of torture: (i) the rationales underlying the international criminal repression of torture; (ii) the rules (including the UN Convention as well as other rules) which give expression to different rationales; (iii) the spectrum of actors whose acts can constitute torture under different rationales and rules; and (iv) the wider implications of expanding the spectrum of possible perpetrators.

Journal of International Criminal Justice, Volume 19, Issue 2, May 2021, Pages 363–391,