By Mary Holper

This article examines evidence that the government presents in deportation proceedings against young men of color to prove that they are gang members. The gang evidence results in detention, deportation, adverse credibility decisions, and denial of discretionary relief. This article examines the gang evidence through the lens of the law’s use of presumptions and the corresponding burdens of proof at play in immigration proceedings. The immigration burden allocations allow adjudicators to readily accept the harmful presumption contained in the gang evidence—that urban youth of color are criminals and likely to engage in violent crime associated with gangs. The article seeks to explain how this racist assumption led to the creation of a gang database and proposes an evidentiary presumption that the gang evidence is not reliable, in order to specifically instruct the immigration adjudicator to reject the presumption society has put in place about urban youth of color and criminality. In this way, the article tracks common interests of critical race theory, by explaining how US society has subordinated people of color in the creation of gang databases, and seeking not only to understand, but to change this bond between law and racial power.

9 Brook. L. Rev. 119 (2023).

 By David C. Pyrooz, John Leverso, Jose Antonio Sanchez, and James A. Densley

For more than three decades, developmental and life-course criminology has been a source of theoretical advancement, methodological innovation, and policy and practice guidance, bringing breadth and depth even to well-established areas of study, such as gangs. This review demonstrates how the developmental and life-course perspective on gangs can be further extended and better integrated within broader developments in criminology. Accordingly, we structure this review within the fourfold paradigm on human development that unites seemingly disparate areas in the study of gangs: (a) historical time and place, or the foregrounding of when and where you are; (b) linked lives, or the importance of dynamic multiplex relationships; (c) timing, or the age-grading of trajectories and transitions; and (d) human agency, or taking choice seriously. We conclude by outlining a vision that charts new directions to be addressed by the next generation of scholarship on gangs.

Annual Review of Criminology, Volume 7, Page 105 - 127

By International Crisis Group

What’s new? The COVID-19 pandemic had an immediate impact on organised crime across Mexico and Central America’s northern countries as lockdowns slowed movement of people and goods. But criminal groups swiftly adapted to the new normal, using it to tighten or expand their control over people and territory. Why does it matter? The region’s criminal groups, many acting in collusion with rogue state actors, are largely responsible for some of the world’s highest murder rates and wield asphyxiating power in an increasing number of communities. With state budgets under huge strain, official responses are set to remain lacklustre. What should be done? Governments should combine policing to contain and deter crime with increased support to the most insecure areas and vulnerable populations. Rather than reverting to heavy-handed tactics, they should invest in programs that reduce impunity and create economic alternatives for at-risk young people, potentially with the help of COVID-19 emergency funds.

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2020. 37p.

By International Crisis Group

What’s new? Crime and violence have simmered along the lengthy ColombianVenezuelan frontier for decades. But the regional spillover of Venezuela’s political conflict and economic collapse has caused ties between the two states to fray as well, amid border closures, a migrant exodus and rival military exercises. Why does it matter? Numerous armed groups clash with one another and harm citizens along a border marked by abundant coca crops and informal crossings. High bilateral tensions could spur escalating border hostilities while perpetuating the mistreatment of migrants and refugees whose movements have been restricted by COVID-19. What should be done? Colombian and Venezuelan authorities should urgently establish communication channels to resolve violent incidents along the border, possibly with international backing. They should reopen formal border crossings as planned, but also increase humanitarian aid to help ensure that migrants and refugees are healthy and can move safely.

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2020. 44p.

By International Crisis Group

What’s new? On 6 June, Mexico will stage its largest-ever election day, with 21,000 contests nationwide. Opposition forces accuse President Andrés Manuel López Obrador of planning to deepen authoritarian rule should his allies prevail in the polls. Meanwhile, criminal groups exploit electoral competition in their quest for impunity and power. Why does it matter? The country’s politics are highly polarised, and its parties are weak and opportunistic. Criminal groups can use favours and threats to gain influence over future elected officials. Entanglements between government and organised crime that have long undermined security policies help perpetuate Mexico’s high levels of violence. What should be done? Severing links between criminals and state officials will be challenging, especially given the government’s apparent reticence to act. Still, outside actors should encourage investment in independent election oversight bodies and local institutions, and a shift toward tailored and less militarised policies to curb insecurity in Mexico’s most conflict-ridden areas.

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2021. 33p.

By V. M. Masten.

If a thief will have it no other way than to be a thief, then control of him, and not his social rehabilitation, must be the desideratum.”

Boston Gorham Press (ca. 1922) 238 pages.

R. Pena Gonzalez.

This study explores contexts of disorder and crisis, in which criminal actors gain legitimacy. By affirming that criminal groups are already social agents, this research argues that they gain political legitimacy to the extent that criminal groups engage in an authority-building process. Thus, it focuses on two instances in which criminal groups launched campaigns— or at least engaged in planned activities— in order to gain political and social legitimacy. La Familia Michoacana (LFM) and Los Caballeros Templarios (LCT) de Michoacán in Mexico, on the one hand, and Cosa Nostra (CN) in Italy, on the other, offer rich and instructive cases to examine. Precisely, the research asks for how these groups seek to forge legitimacy, as well as for what are their strategies for that purpose. The research opens two avenues of conceptual discussion.

Leiden: Leiden University 2020. 265p.