By Kyle Johnson

  Tumaco is a municipality in south-west Colombia, close to the border with Ecuador. The city, on Colombia’s Pacific coast, has become a vital hub for non-state armed groups, including transnational drug trafficking networks and former guerrillas, owing to its port and location. Several armed groups, including ex-FARC dissidents,1 have established a permanent presence in several low-income neighbourhoods, with significant consequences for the inhabitants and local governance. This case study examines criminal governance during the pandemic of three groups based in Tumaco: the Alfonso Cano Western Bloc (BOAC), the United Guerrillas of the Pacific (GUP) and the Contadores (Accountants). The BOAC actively adopted measures to respond to the pandemic, imposing curfews, restricting people’s movements and banning outsiders from entering areas under its control. Despite claims that it had yielded its role in governance issues to local community boards, the group continued to wield influence over the local population and provide services such as dispute resolution. By contrast, the GUP did not impose any pandemic-related restrictions, and some members expressed views that the virus was not real, directly contradicting the Colombian government’s stance. This resonated with many in Tumaco, who also believed the pandemic was not a serious threat. This lack of action may, however, also have been tied to leadership and discipline issues. The release of two prominent commanders from prison destabilized the group’s hierarchy, impacting governance patterns and gang organization. Members started to charge the community high prices for services such as dispute resolution, which the population could not afford, and were reported as being unpredictably violent. These two commanders then defected to the BOAC and the Contadores, along with their fighters. The Contadores then ‘inherited’ the GUP areas. Criminal governance also impacted people’s adherence to COVID-related restrictions. In the few areas where restrictions were imposed by crime groups, these rules were more widely respected than those imposed by the local or national governments, mainly due to the implied and sometimes explicit threats accompanying armed groups’ regulation and the authorities’ inability to enforce restrictions.   

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2021. 18p.

By Camilo Nieto-Matiz

  Modern states are selective and calculating in their decision to establish their rule throughout the territory. Within the same country, state officials may be willing and capable of making major efforts to deliver public goods and provide security to the population in some areas, while choosing to neglect others and delegate their control to different actors. This dissertation studies why and how political elites differentially build state capacity in peripheral and marginalized areas of a country and in the midst of violent conflicts. What drives incumbents to increase state capacity in peripheral and marginalized areas within a country? What type of state expansion is likely to take place in such areas? My central argument is that exogenous shocks that suddenly increase the political and economic value of peripheral areas may prompt incumbents to invest in state capacity, but whether this capacity increases or not depends on the preexisting configuration of violent actors and local rural elites. On the one hand, the type of violent actor—threatening and non-threatening—exerts a differential effect on state capacity by (i) shaping subnational politicians’ incentives to cooperate with the central state and (ii) establishing collusive agreements with violent actors. In addition, because greater state capacity tends to undermine rural elites’ economic and political power, they will have incentives to oppose greater state presence and—in contexts  of insecurity and violence—establish alliances with non-threatening groups. In short, state capacity is likely to be higher in municipalities with weak rural elites and facing threatening violent groups. In contrast, state capacity will be more difficult to attain in areas with stronger rural elites and where violent groups do not pose a major threat to state authority....

Notre Dame, Indiana : University of Notre Dame, 2020. 231p.

By Andres I Vecino-Ortiza & Deivis N Guzman-Tordecilla  

Objective: To assess the effect of a permanent gun-carrying restriction on gun-related mortality in Colombia between 2008 and 2014, and determine differences in the effect of the restriction by place of death and sex. Methods: In 2012, Bogotá and Medellín introduced a permanent gun-carrying restriction. We compared gun-related mortality rates in these cities (intervention cities) with the rates in all other Colombian cities with more than 500 000 inhabitants (control cities). We used data from the Colombian National Department of Statistics to calculate monthly gun-related mortality rates between 2008 and 2014 for intervention and control cities. We used a differences-in-differences method with fixed effects to assess differences in gun-related mortality in intervention and control cities before and after the introduction of the gun-carrying restriction. We stratified effects by place of death (public area or residence) and sex. We made robustness checks to test the assumptions of the models. Findings: Gun-related deaths in the control and intervention cities decreased between 2008 and 2014; however, the decrease was greater in the intervention cities (from 20.29 to 14.93 per 100 000 population; 26.4%) than in the control cities (from 37.88 to 34.56 per 100 000 population; 8.8%). The restriction led to a 22.3% reduction in the monthly gun-related mortality rate in Bogotá and Medellín. The reduction was greater in public areas and for males. Robustness checks supported the assumptions of the models. Conclusion_ The permanent restriction on carrying guns reduced gun-related deaths. This policy could be used to reduce gun-related injuries in urban centres of other countries with large numbers of gun-related deaths.

Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 98 (‎3)‎: 170 - 176

By Carolina Velez Ospina

The provision effects of local public goods on crime and education are not clear in the literature. While some argue that provision does not affect these outcomes, other find that effects depend on the benefits it offers to the community. This paper studies the effect of the construction of cultural centers in Medellín, Colombia on crime and test scores in mathematics and language. This policy is interesting since the communities participated in the design of these cultural centers. Using a dynamic difference-in-differences strategy, I find that schools near centers improve their test performance, especially for younger children. Regarding crime, I find that in neighborhoods near centers, there is a reduction in motorcycle and car theft crimes.

  Universidad del Rosario, Facultad de Economía, 2020. 51p.