By Chicago Appleseed Center for Fair Courts & Chicago Council of Lawyers

  Police who lie, perjure themselves in court, and/or file false reports are pervasive throughout the United States. Perjury and false reporting prevents courts from operating as designed and poses enormous barriers to justice. While the issue of police perjury – or “testilying” – has been discussed as a broad phenomenon and in relation to specific cases, there have been few attempts to examine the issue within a single court system. For this report, Chicago Appleseed Center for Fair Courts and the Chicago Council of Lawyers interviewed attorneys, researchers, journalists, community organizers, and directly impacted people to identify how false reports and police perjury impact the Circuit Court of Cook County and the people it serves. We have reviewed secondary data in order to understand the  scope and impact of police perjury and false reporting on Cook County community members, while paying particular attention to issues relating directly to the Chicago Police Department. Through this research, we have identified several themes that indicate that systemic factors allow police to lie, submit false reports, and perjure themselves. We have also identified the roles of court actors – including law enforcement, prosecutors, and judges – in allowing or encouraging false reporting to exist and go unaddressed in the Circuit Court of Cook County. Based on our findings, we provide nine recommendations to limit opportunities and enforce consequences for lying, better monitor officers in the field, improve transparency, and create long-term cultural change in an attempt to limit the police perjury and false reporting that harms communities.  

Chicago: Chicago Appleseed, 2023. 45p.

By Matt Herbert and Max Gallien

This report offers a sizing and analysis of the developing trends around drugs in the Maghreb. It begins by detailing the production of narcotics in the Maghreb, including both cannabis and poppies. Next, it focuses on the trafficking of these products, exploring the types of drugs that transit the region, the routes they take and the groups involved in their movement.

The report then looks at drug consumption trends in the Maghreb, before detailing the impacts of narcotics on state capacity, security and public health and ending with brief recommendations.

Geneva: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2020. 65p

By Tien-Li Kuo  

  Environmental criminology concerns the role of opportunities (both people and objects) existing in the environment that make crimes more likely to occur. Research consistently shows that opportunity perspectives (particularly with regard to individuals’ lifestyles and routines) help in explaining the prevalence and concentration of crimes. However, there is a paucity of studies investigating crime patterns from an opportunity perspective both outside western countries and in relation to cybercrimes. Hence, it is not clear whether non-Western and online contexts exhibit similar patterns of crime as would be predicted by an opportunity perspective. This thesis is concerned with criminal victimisation in Taiwan – a less researched setting in the field of environmental criminology. It covers both offline victimisation (with a focus on burglary) and online victimisation from the aforementioned opportunity perspective. The goal of this thesis is to identify individual- and area-level characteristics that affect the patterns of victimisation in Taiwan. To achieve this, the thesis draws on a range of secondary datasets, including police recorded crime statistics, the Taiwan Area Victimisation Survey, and the Digital Opportunity Survey for Individuals and Households. With the application of quantitative modelling, the thesis suggests that the generalisability the lifestyle-routine activity approach in explaining crime patterns in Taiwan should be taken with caution. The findings provide partial support for its applicability in relation to burglary and cybercrime in Taiwan. Furthermore, the findings reported here in relation to patterns of repeat and near repeat victimisation depart from those observed in the western literature. The thesis concludes by discussing the implications of the findings for academic research and practice in crime prevention.  

London: University College London. UCL Department of Security and Crime Science, 2021. 400p.

By Vanda Felbab-Brown 

This report analyses the landscape of anti-crime militias and vigilante forces in Nigeria’s south over the past 20 years. It focuses on two vigilante groups, tracing their evolution and the anti-crime, security, and political impacts, before providing policy recommendations. The report explains the context of vigilante and anti-crime militia group formation in Nigeria, including the struggles, challenges, and deficiencies of the Nigeria Federal Police. It discusses the evolution of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), its own role in criminality, and the anti-SARS protests. It also provides a historic background of vigilantism in Nigeria and lays out the various sources from which vigilantism in Nigeria stems. It goes on to review the landscape of militia groups in southern Nigeria and outlines their different types, including in terms of formalization and official recognition. It then details the formation, effectiveness, evolution, and anticrime, security, and policy effects of the Bakassi Boys in Nigeria’s South East. It also analyzes 20 years of federal and state policy responses toward them. The following section provides the same analysis for the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) in the South West.

New York: United Nations University, 2021. 67p.

By Francesco Marelli  

The scope of this report is to understand how technology can help to limit the threats posed by organized crime involvement in counterfeiting and food fraud, in particular in relation to the infiltration of counterfeit and fraudulent food into the legitimate supply chain.

The report has been prepared by the UNICRI Knowledge Centre Security through Research, Technology and Innovation (SIRIO). The scope of SIRIO is to analyse and understand the global impacts, opportunities and challenges of technological change, including in the areas of augmented and virtual reality (AR, VR), big data analytics, digital biology and biotech, nanotech and digital printing, networks and computing systems, supply chain security and decentralized technologies such as blockchain.

Torino, Italy: United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), 202o.  195p.

By Sofie Kirt Strandbygaard

  The objective of this thesis is to explore passengers’ experience of fear of crime at S-train stations and the possible relation to the stations’ surrounding environments. The thesis consists of three articles each exploring different layers of the research with the aim of unfolding train passengers’ fear of crime in relation to the built environment. The analysis is based on case studies of 84 S-train stations and their neighbourhoods in the Copenhagen metropolitan area. The S-train is the local rail network in the regional development plan, the Finger Plan. The method of analysis is typomorphological, defining urban types based on their patterns and spatial characteristics. Because the focus is passengers’ experience of fear of crime in public space the spatial analysis is guided by Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design principles. The analysis outlines three main station neighbourhood types and several subcategories of combinations between the three. When compared with passenger surveys of fear of crime at the S-train train stations, the results exhibit a relationship between the types of station neighbourhood form and passengers’ fear of crime at the associated station. When comparing station neighbourhood form with income, the results show that fear of crime at stations is strongly correlated with low income in the station’s neighbourhood. However, a significant research result is that when adjusting for income, passengers’ experience of fear of crime still follows the same type of neighbourhood form. This result underlines the influence of urban spatial characteristics on passengers’ experience of fear of crime. An analysis of thirteen representative S-train stations and their vicinities according to international design guidelines for transit-oriented development (TOD) is performed to look at the urban space surrounding the stations. The analysis reveals that the Finger Plan is a regional public transport-oriented development, however, several of the stations’ surrounding urban areas show a prevailing tendency to neglect the pedestrian design scale and design dimensions related to safety. The thesis’ research results provide knowledge on passengers’ experience of stations. It contributes with perspectives on and insights into S-train stations and their neighbourhoods in Copenhagen and can assist the transport industry in improving passengers’ experience of train stations. Contributions from the research is a CPTED design analysis tool for public transport environments and recommendations for Danish TOD practice. The thesis contributes with novel research results to the existing international body of knowledge on passengers’ fear of crime at train stations.   

 Lyngby. Denmark: Department of Civil Engineering Technical University of Denmark. 2019. 206p.  

By Vania Ceccato · Nathan Gaudelet · Gabin Graf  

  This article reviews five decades of English and French literature on transit safety in several major databases, with the focus on Scopus and ScienceDirect. The review explores the nature and frequency of transit crime and passengers’ safety perceptions in transport nodes and along the trip using bibliometric analysis and a systematic review of the literature. The number of retrieved documents was 3137, and 245 were selected for in-depth analysis. Transit safety as a research area took off after the mid-1990s and peaked after the 2010s. The body of research is dominated by the English-language literature (mostly large cities), with a focus on the safety of rail-bound environments and examples of interventions to improve actual and perceived safety for public transportation (PT) users. Highlighting the importance of transit environments along the whole trip, the article also helps advocate for more inclusion of passengers’ safety needs and the involvement of multiple stakeholders in implementing PT policies.

Public Transport,  2022. Vol. 14, no 1, p. 105-153

By Daniel J. Flannery

In response to an extended, alarming increase in heroin-involved overdose deaths in the county, in 2013 the Cuyahoga County Medical Examiner’s Office (CCMEO) and Regional Forensic Science Laboratory developed the Heroin Involved Death Investigation (HIDI) alert system and protocol. The HIDI protocol initiates and governs Heroin Early Alert (HEAT) emails sent by the CCMEO. These alerts give notice that the CCMEO has learned of 1) an active suspected opioid overdose via a death scene presenting physical evidence of opioid misuse or through evidence provided by family/friends or medical personnel regarding the victim’s history of drug misuse or a suspected opioid overdose death occurring at a hospital (what the alert identifies as “not an active scene”). Alerts are provided to professionals in the region’s public health and hospital systems and agencies that include the Cleveland Division of Police (CPD), County Sheriff’s Department, and other county and federal agencies that investigate and prosecute major drug traffickers. The HIDI protocol governs chain of custody and laboratory testing submissions of evidence items found on the body at the scene. The HIDI protocol is designed to support a safe, coordinated, and rapid response to an active scene by alerting investigators to potential dangers (lethal drugs) and facilitating the timely protection of the scene and collection of evidence. The primary goal of this protocol is to connect the victim (drug buyer) to the seller, with a focus on mid-level dealers and major traffickers. This report concludes with a discussion of the implications of this protocol for criminal justice practice and policy in investigative drug law enforcement, as well as the use of investigative evidence in the building of a case for prosecution.

Cleveland, OH: Begun Center for Violence Prevention Research and Education.  2022. 222p.

By Kyle Johnson

  Tumaco is a municipality in south-west Colombia, close to the border with Ecuador. The city, on Colombia’s Pacific coast, has become a vital hub for non-state armed groups, including transnational drug trafficking networks and former guerrillas, owing to its port and location. Several armed groups, including ex-FARC dissidents,1 have established a permanent presence in several low-income neighbourhoods, with significant consequences for the inhabitants and local governance. This case study examines criminal governance during the pandemic of three groups based in Tumaco: the Alfonso Cano Western Bloc (BOAC), the United Guerrillas of the Pacific (GUP) and the Contadores (Accountants). The BOAC actively adopted measures to respond to the pandemic, imposing curfews, restricting people’s movements and banning outsiders from entering areas under its control. Despite claims that it had yielded its role in governance issues to local community boards, the group continued to wield influence over the local population and provide services such as dispute resolution. By contrast, the GUP did not impose any pandemic-related restrictions, and some members expressed views that the virus was not real, directly contradicting the Colombian government’s stance. This resonated with many in Tumaco, who also believed the pandemic was not a serious threat. This lack of action may, however, also have been tied to leadership and discipline issues. The release of two prominent commanders from prison destabilized the group’s hierarchy, impacting governance patterns and gang organization. Members started to charge the community high prices for services such as dispute resolution, which the population could not afford, and were reported as being unpredictably violent. These two commanders then defected to the BOAC and the Contadores, along with their fighters. The Contadores then ‘inherited’ the GUP areas. Criminal governance also impacted people’s adherence to COVID-related restrictions. In the few areas where restrictions were imposed by crime groups, these rules were more widely respected than those imposed by the local or national governments, mainly due to the implied and sometimes explicit threats accompanying armed groups’ regulation and the authorities’ inability to enforce restrictions.   

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2021. 18p.

By Camilo Nieto-Matiz

  Modern states are selective and calculating in their decision to establish their rule throughout the territory. Within the same country, state officials may be willing and capable of making major efforts to deliver public goods and provide security to the population in some areas, while choosing to neglect others and delegate their control to different actors. This dissertation studies why and how political elites differentially build state capacity in peripheral and marginalized areas of a country and in the midst of violent conflicts. What drives incumbents to increase state capacity in peripheral and marginalized areas within a country? What type of state expansion is likely to take place in such areas? My central argument is that exogenous shocks that suddenly increase the political and economic value of peripheral areas may prompt incumbents to invest in state capacity, but whether this capacity increases or not depends on the preexisting configuration of violent actors and local rural elites. On the one hand, the type of violent actor—threatening and non-threatening—exerts a differential effect on state capacity by (i) shaping subnational politicians’ incentives to cooperate with the central state and (ii) establishing collusive agreements with violent actors. In addition, because greater state capacity tends to undermine rural elites’ economic and political power, they will have incentives to oppose greater state presence and—in contexts  of insecurity and violence—establish alliances with non-threatening groups. In short, state capacity is likely to be higher in municipalities with weak rural elites and facing threatening violent groups. In contrast, state capacity will be more difficult to attain in areas with stronger rural elites and where violent groups do not pose a major threat to state authority....

Notre Dame, Indiana : University of Notre Dame, 2020. 231p.

By 

• Elaine Okanyene Nsoesie, 

• Antonio S. Lima Neto, 

• Jonathan Jay, 

• Hailun Wang, 

• Kate Zinszer, 

• Sudipta Saha, 

• Adyasha Maharana, 

• Fatima Marinho & 

• Adauto Martins Soares Filho 

Homicides are a major problem in Brazil. Drugs and arms trafficking, and land conflicts are three of the many factors driving homicide rates in Brazil. Understanding long-term spatiotemporal trends and social structural factors associated with homicides in Brazil would be useful for designing policies aimed at reducing homicide rates.

Methods

We obtained data from 2000 to 2014 from the Brazil Ministry of Health (MOH) Mortality Information System and sociodemographic data from the Brazil Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). First, we quantified the rate of change in homicides at the municipality and state levels. Second, we used principal component regression and k-medoids clustering to examine differences in temporal trends across municipalities. Lastly, we used Bayesian hierarchical space-time models to describe spatio-temporal patterns and to assess the contribution of structural factors.

Results

There were significant variations in homicide rates across states and municipalities. We noted the largest decrease in homicide rates in the western and southeastern states of Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Espirito Santo, which coincided with an increase in homicide rates in the northeastern states of Ceará, Alagoas, Paraiba, Rio Grande Norte, Sergipe and Bahia during the fifteen-year period. The decrease in homicides in municipalities with populations of at least 250,000 coincided with an increase in municipalities with 25,000 people or less. Structural factors that predicted municipality-level homicide rates included crude domestic product, urbanization, border with neighboring countries and proportion of population aged fifteen to twenty-nine.

Conclusions

Our findings support both a dissemination hypothesis and an interiorization hypothesis. These findings should be considered when designing interventions to curb homicide rates

By Andre Mancha

I describe how monitoring and harsher law enforcement reduce the expected economic benefits of crime. I investigate the effect of shifts in legal authorities’ surveillance by focusing on junkyards, firms often associated with illegal markets and auto theft. Starting in 2014, many municipalities in Brazil increased the monitoring of spare parts sold by junkyards through new regulations at the state level.

I show that levels of auto theft dropped significantly after the introduction of the new law, and this decrease is more extensive in neighbourhoods containing junkyards. Municipalities that implemented the new regulation presented, on average, a 6.4 per cent drop in auto thefts by year compared to non-target ones. Other crimes do not show a similar decrease, and there is no evidence of a previous downward trend in vehicles stolen.

My results shed some light on the effect of harsher supervision over a market that criminals may exploit to convert stolen vehicles into cash.

Helsinki, Finland:  United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER), 2022. 27p.

By Felipe Puerta, Héctor Silva and Steven Dudley 

On November 2, 2013, the Day of the Dead, the mayor of Apopa, José Elías Hernández, called Carlos Axume Arroyo to his office for a meeting that was unusual for an elected politician in one of El Salvador’s most important municipalities. Axume Arroyo, alias “Humilde,” or “Humble,” was the leader of a local “clica,” or cell, of the MS13 gang in Apopa. He was also an employee at the mayor’s office, and had been ever since Hernández was elected in March 2012. That same year, the MS13 and their rival gang, the Barrio 18, had made a pact with each other and with the federal government in which they pledged to not commit certain crimes. At a March 2013 event in Apopa celebrating the first year of what became known as “the gang truce,” a Barrio 18 spokesperson said the proscribed crimes included “robberies, extortions, lootings and theft.” The truce had been in force in Apopa before it spread to other parts of the country. The truce, as would later be discovered, consisted of imprisoned leaders of the MS13 and Barrio 18 ordering their subordinates on the streets to lower homicide rates in exchange for economic benefits and the freedom to communicate and reestablish control over their underlings. The problem was that not everybody was obeying the promises made by the imprisoned gang leaders. It was for this reason that Hernández had summoned Humilde to his office on that Day of the Dead in 2013. For Hernández, it was essential to lower crime levels in the municipality. He and several other Salvadoran mayors were part of an initiative by then-President Mauricio Funes that would permit them to receive federal funds to implement social and economic programs in their municipalities. Those resources, the mayor calculated, would not arrive if he did not fulfill his part of the deal: lowering homicide rates in Apopa. Humilde, according to judicial documents accessed by InSight Crime, was one of a few local gang leaders who had refused to follow the order from the MS13 leadership in prison to reduce homicides.  

Washington, DC: InSight Crime, 2017. 16p.

By The International Crisis Group   

What’s new? Violent gangs have taken the opportunity presented by Haiti’s prolonged political crisis to seize control of much of the country, bringing its economy to a halt. With cholera resurgent, Haiti’s government has called on the UN and foreign partners to deploy a public security force to push the gangs back. Why does it matter? Decades of foreign interventions in Haiti have instilled reluctance in the country and abroad to contemplate a public security mission. Operational risks and the country’s political divide have also cooled foreigners on a possible deployment, but interviews suggest that popular support for it, especially in gang-controlled areas, is rising. What should be done? The collapsing Haitian state and the severity of the humanitarian emergency justify preparations for a mission. But its deployment should hinge on adequate planning to operate in urban areas and support from Haiti’s main political forces, including their firm commitment to work together in creating a legitimate transitional government.   

Port-au-Prince/New York/Washington/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2022. 20p.

By Simen Madslien

Has the increasing demand for Mexican avocados caused an escalation of violence between Mexican cartels? I theorize that the cartels enter growing licit industries to diversify their revenue stream from the drug trade. Increasing demand for legal commodities possibly leads to higher territorial competition between cartels and higher rates of violence. Recent media attention suggests that avocados are implicated in the bloody cartel business. However, earlier research found a negative relationship between cartel-related crimes and licit industries. Based on the negative relationship observed in recent studies, using an OLS and IV design, I test the hypothesis that the growth in the Mexican avocado industry leads to a decrease in cartel-related violence in Mexican municipalities. In contrast with earlier research, I find a significant increase in the total number of reported cartel-related crimes as a consequence of Mexican avocados' growing production rates. Given the growth rate of global avocado demand, leading to an explosion of Mexican avocado production in the last decade, I interpret the result as coming from intensified territorial competition between Mexican drug trafficking organizations' splintered landscape. With the necessity for cartels to diversify their revenue streams in the aftermath of the war on drugs initiated in 2006, the avocado industry's profitability is expected to draw numerous cartels to the business, increasing the likelihood of territorial contestation and rates of violence.

Bergen: Norwegian School of Economics, 2020. 77p.

By Megan Erickson and Lucas Owen

Has growing demand for licit goods caused an increase in violence among Mexican criminal organizations? We theorize that cartels enter licit markets to supplement and diversify revenues from the drug trade, and that the incentive to do so changes with revenues in licit markets. Given their comparative advantages in agricultural production and violence, we expect cartels to react to increasing demand in agricultural markets by fighting to maximize territorial control and monopolize production. Using a difference-in-differences design, we test the hypothesis that a positive shock in demand for avocados from municipalities in the states of Michoac´an and Jalisco led to an increase in cartel violence. We ultimately find the opposite of what we expect. The enactment of a U.S. phytosanitary policy in June of 2016, which extended U.S. demand for avocados to municipalities formerly unable to export to the United States, led to a significant decrease in cartel homicides compared to municipalities that were unaffected by this policy. Given that cartels were present in most areas of Michoac´an and Jalisco before the policy, we interpret this result as coming from cartels anticipating increased territorial contestation. Since cartels expect others to challenge their territory, they bolster their defenses, reducing incentives for territorial contestation.

Working Paper, Washington Political Economy Forum, 2020. 31p.

by Amanda R. Witwer, Lynn Langton, Michael J. D. Vermeer, Duren Banks, Dulani Woods, Brian A. Jackson

The proliferation of websites, social media platforms, and applications that enable users to interact virtually and often anonymously has given rise to new modes and methods of perpetrating harassment, abuse, and other criminal behaviors that compromise victims' privacy and safety. These types of acts, termed technology-facilitated abuse (TFA), can involve the use or distribution of the victim's personal information, which compromises the victim's privacy and poses a threat to their safety. Efforts to combat these profoundly harmful acts are limited by a lack of awareness among the general public and criminal justice practitioners, impediments to investigation and adjudication presented by digital spaces, and laws and policies that have not kept pace with advancements in digital technologies. To examine this issue, RTI International and the RAND Corporation convened an expert workshop. The participants discussed the challenges, opportunities, and complexities faced by law enforcement and criminal justice practitioners in TFA cases. Using these discussions, the panel members identified and ranked needs for the public, law enforcement, and criminal justice practitioners to successfully identify and prosecute TFA cases. This report provides the prioritized list of needs and accompanying context from the discussion that resulted from this effort.

Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2020.   25p.

By Alanna Fulk 

This thesis examines research from the disciplines of political science and criminal justice to develop a theory that explains geographic variation in violence related to organized crime. Large-scale organized crime violence exhibits characteristics of both ordinary crime violence and political violence, but these subjects are generally analyzed separately. However, as large-scale organized crime has become more prevalent and violent in recent years, most notably in Latin America, studies, including this one, have attempted to cross disciplinary boundaries in order to better explain trends in organized crime onset, termination and violence. This thesis argues that although the overall goal of organized crime groups is not to take control of a country, both organized crime groups and insurgent groups confront the state’s monopoly on violence, leading to evident similarities in the way they use violence to attain their goals. They both use violence to maintain control over resources, take control from other groups and retaliate against the government. Previous literature has demonstrated that control is directly linked to geographic variation in political violence and through case studies of organized crime violence in Honduras and Brazil, as well as negative binomial regression analysis of organized crime violence in Mexico, this thesis finds that control is also directly linked to geographic variation in organized crime violence.   

Orlando, FL: University of Central Florida, 2019. 111p.

By The Washington Office on Latin America, Latin America Working Group Education Fund, Due Process of Law Foundation, and Guatemala Human Rights Commission/USA

Guatemala’s justice system has been co-opted by a network of corrupt political, economic, and military elites seeking to advance their own interests and to ensure that their acts of corruption and grave human rights violations from the armed conflict remain in impunity, while silencing voices from civil society organizations and independent media. Honest judges and prosecutors have been criminalized, threatened, removed, or transferred from their posts by the very institutions supposed to be advancing the rule of law and justice. Twenty-five judges and prosecutors, including the nation’s lead anti-corruption prosecutor, have fled the country into exile. The impacts of the co-optation of Guatemala’s justice system will set the country back decades. 

This report, produced by Washington Office on Latin America, Latin America Working Group Education Fund, Due Process of Law Foundation, and Guatemala Human Rights Commission/USA, provides analysis on the steps taken to undermine Guatemala’s justice system from the stacking of its highest courts with corrupt judges to the co-opting and dismantling of the Attorney General’s Office and specialized prosecutors’ offices. It explains the longer-term implications of the ousting of honest judges and prosecutors and a broken justice system for the rule of law, transitional justice and protecting freedom of expression and the rights of marginalized communities in Guatemala.

Washington, DC: The Authors, 2022. 10p.

By The Washington Office on Latin America, Latin America Working Group Education Fund, and Guatemala Human Rights Commission/USA

In Guatemala, human rights defenders, independent judges and prosecutors, journalists, and Indigenous leaders are under assault as part of a broader attack on democracy and path towards a kleptocracy. The criminalization and closing of civic space is one of the strategies being used by corrupt networks, the Attorney General’s Office, private actors, members of the military, and political elites to quell disruptions to their power, avoid historic responsibility for crimes committed during the internal armed conflict, and silence voices exposing corruption. It has resulted in severe democratic backsliding, creating a dangerous terrain in which human rights defenders, journalists, Indigenous community leaders, and justice operators receive no State protection and are instead persecuted and criminalized by their own government in complicity with private actors, often to the point of having to flee the country for their lives. The current situation in Guatemala creates serious challenges for U.S. policy and assistance and means that civil society organizations, human rights defenders, Indigenous communities, and journalists are more in need of international protection than ever.

Washington, DC: The Authors, 2022. 8p.