By Matt Herbert and Emadeddin Badi

On 15 April 2023, Sudan erupted into war, pitting the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Over the last year and a half, the fighting has proven to be tremendously destructive, devastating large swathes of Khartoum and other key economic hubs, displacing nearly 2 million refugees into neighbouring countries, displacing more than 2.2 million refugees into neighbouring countries, and leaving over 8 million people internally displaced within Sudan as of September 2024. There has been little pause in the destruction, and the conflict shows no signs of ending. The war has also started to shape broader patterns of human smuggling and mobility. Along the northern border, the Egyptian imposition of visa requirements on Sudanese refugees has driven a growing reliance on smuggling networks. This in turn has led to an expansion of smuggling operations, particularly through the Halayeb Triangle area. Along the border with Libya, there has been a gradual increase in arrivals over the past eight months. While control of the border area has shifted from the RSF to the SAF, this has not had a significant impact on smuggling dynamics, which remain robust. In western Sudan, the RSF’s seizure of large areas of territory has been accompanied by violent attacks on the civilian population, resulting in mass displacement into Chad. Most refugees travel autonomously, but smuggling networks along the Chad–Sudan border are becoming increasingly important, either to facilitate safe passage through RSF territory or as part of the long-distance movement of Sudanese refugees to northern Niger and southern Libya. Finally, there has been a limited resurgence of migrant and refugee arrivals from Ethiopia and Eritrea along Sudan’s south-eastern border. If these movements continue and expand, they could further shape human smuggling systems through eastern Sudan to Egypt. RSF advances in the south-east – such as the capture of the city of Wad Madani – may have an impact on smuggling networks, but are unlikely to disrupt their operations significantly  

Geneva:  Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime., 2024... 34p.