By  J. R. Mailey   

Over the past decade, Iran has turned to criminal markets as a strategic tool to pursue its geopolitical goals. Isolated by international sanctions, Iran has forged extensive ties with criminal networks across the globe to fund armed groups, procure materials for its nuclear program, and evade sanctions. This report uncovers how Iran’s proxies, such as Hezbollah and militias in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and Palestine are critical to Tehran’s influence. Iran supplies these groups with weapons, training, and funds, while criminal networks help smuggle oil, launder money, and move illicit goods across borders. This strategy has enabled Iran to weaken its adversaries without engaging in direct military confrontation. One of the most striking findings of the report is how Iran’s use of criminal proxies allows it to maintain plausible deniability. Tehran’s regime has relied on these illicit actors to conduct operations ranging from assassinations and abductions of critics to sabotage and terror attacks—all while skirting direct accountability. The report also highlights how criminal networks have been key to helping Iran circumvent widespread sanctions. By collaborating with middlemen and transnational crime organizations, Iran has continued to smuggle its oil and accumulate foreign currency. These criminal partnerships have enabled Tehran to access global markets, finance proxy wars, and strengthen its military capabilities through illicit means. The study provides detailed case studies on Iran’s operations and offers a range of recommendations to counter Tehran’s criminal statecraft. By identifying pressure points and vulnerabilities within these illicit networks, the report outlines steps that can be taken to expose and disrupt Iran’s activities.

GENEVA:  GLOBAL INITIATIVE AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME. 2024. 59P.

By Juan José Palacios Vega, Manuel Martín Brañas, Sydney Silverstein, Ricardo Zárate Gómez, Nicholas Kawa, Margarita del Águila Villacorta

In recent decades, drug crop eradication and drug trafficking interdiction have pushed drug crop cultivation into new areas of the Amazonian rainforest. The presence of the drug industries in these regions—followed by alternative development programs that aim to substitute illicit drug crops with commodity crops like cacao—has transformed forest ecologies, risking loss to both biodiversity and cultural ecosystem services (CES) for surrounding communities. In the last ten years, forest loss linked to the increase in cultivation of commodity crops—both licit and illicit—has been monitored, generating extensive geospatial data. However, the spatiotemporal impacts on key plant species utilized by indigenous communities who have recently shifted to drug crop and commodity agricultural production remain poorly understood. In this paper, we use geospatial modeling to explore the potential impacts of drug crop cultivation and alternative development programs on the CES of Ticuna indigenous communities of the Peruvian Amazon. We analyze the spatiotemporal impact of drug and commodity crop cultivation on three culturally significant species of the genus Ischnosiphon, known locally as dexpe or huarumá, by generating a model of the potential distribution of the three species. The rate of increase of legal and illegal crops was also calculated and the spatiotemporal impact was measured and represented using spatial analysis techniques. Our analysis finds that, between 2010 and 2020, the increase in both illicit and licit commodity crop cultivation is correlated with changes in the distribution of huarumá species, which in turn affects the cultural ecosystem services of Ticuna communities.

Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 6(1): pp. 93–111. 

By Thiago Canettieri

This paper presents an analysis of the relationship between peripheral urbanization, informal real estate markets, and criminal activities in Belo Horizonte, Brazil. The study, based on ethnographic research conducted in two different peripheral areas of the city, reveals a clear connection between crime and the land market in these areas. The paper highlights how criminal agents exploit land properties to promote their illicit economic activities in peripheral contexts of the city. The unique pattern of peripheral urbanization creates opportunities for illicit agents to manage, control, and commodify spaces of informality, thereby facilitating their illegal activities. The main findings of the study underscore the significant impact of criminal activities on land markets, particularly the role of violence, coercion, and social legitimacy in the actions of criminals in real estate markets. The study also sheds light on the impact of informal real estate markets on the lives of people living in peripheral areas. By revealing the connections between crime, land market dynamics, and urbanization processes, this study significantly contributes to a deeper understanding of the complexities at play in peripheral areas of Belo Horizonte.

Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 6(1): pp. 129–144. DOI: 

By Adrian Robert Bazbauers and Anthea McCarthy-Jones

 The spread of illicit activity across the global economy presents significant challenges to international development. Despite the well-recognized global incidence of corruption, fraud, and money laundering in development-focused investment projects, the responses of the multilateral development banks (MDBs) to these threats remain understudied. Our article offers the first comprehensive study into the comparative historical emergence and evolution of MDB responses to illicit activity. By identifying and analyzing critical junctures in this history, we argue that the MDBs have tended to approach illicit activity as prohibited practices rather than criminal acts. We contend that this is an intentional choice made by the MDBs that absolves these organizations from any real responsibility in minimizing illicit activity, finding their concern to be ensuring contractual compliance in their lending operations rather than curtailing criminal behavior and their preference to be resolving contractual deviations in-house as opposed to coordinating with local jurisdictions and law enforcement agencies.

Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 6(1): pp. 112–128.

By Albin Stenström, Felipe Estrada, Henrik Tham

Drug use was criminalized in Sweden in 1988 with the aim of reducing the number of consumers and drug-related risks and harms. Imprisonment was introduced into the penalty scale in 1993 to improve the legislation’s effectiveness. The criminalization has never been evaluated. Method: Goal-attainment evaluation based on a range of indicators from surveys, case-finding estimates, healthcare and cause-of-death data, and crime statistics. Comparative drug policy analysis is conducted with other Nordic countries. Results: The criminalization is not followed by a reduced or more expensive drug supply, reduced consumption levels, problematic drug use or healthcare needs, or fewer drug-related deaths. Most of the indicators instead show the opposite. Control costs are high, and trends are no better than those of other Nordic countries, despite Sweden’s more repressive drug policy. Conclusion: Criminalization emerges as an ineffective, expensive, and harmful means of dealing with the drug problem.

International Journal of Drug Policy Volume 133, November 2024, 104573

By Tatiana Zárate-Barrera

This paper estimates the non-monotonic effects of air pollution on criminal activity in a developing country setting and provides empirical evidence on the potential behavioral responses mediating this relationship. To do so, I combine daily administrative data on crime, air pollution, and sentiment polarity from millions of social media posts in Mexico City between January 2017 and March 2020. The identification strategy relies on highly dimensional fixed-effect models, non-parametric estimations of dose-response functions, and an instrumental variable approach that employs wind speed and wind direction as instruments for air pollution. My results suggest a causal and inverted U-shape relationship between air pollution and crime. Specifically, there is an inflection point after which marginal increases in air pollution negatively affect criminal activity. Exploring the mechanisms behind this relationship, I find that air pollution has the power to shape people’s emotional states and mobility patterns. These results provide important insights for developing countries where pollution levels are dangerously high, and crime is still one of the most pressing issues. In particular, under certain circumstances, environmental regulation tailored to reduce air pollution must consider the presence of behavioral responses and these non-linear interactions with criminal activity in their design. 

Unpublished paper, 2021. 48p.

By Kei Sakata, Rebecca Jenkinson, Brian Vandenberg

This summary explores a study of the social contexts, harms and predictors of co-consumption of gambling and alcohol in youths and young adults (aged 16–35 years) living in Australia.

Findings

• Around half of survey participants said they ‘often’, ‘very often/almost always’ or ‘always’ consumed alcohol when gambling.

• Licensed venues create an environment where gambling and alcohol are co-consumed.

• Socialising with friends or with a spouse/partner and other family member was often the motivation for the co-consumption of gambling and alcohol among youths and young adults.

• Initiation to gambling and alcohol use at the age of 18, or before reaching the age of 18, was often seen as a rite of passage for young people in Australia.

• Underage gambling and/or alcohol use was associated with greater gambling and/or alcohol related harms in the participant’s adult life.

• Despite the majority of the sample being at risk of gambling harm, most respondents did not seek help because they did not believe they needed help.

• For the small proportion who wanted to seek help but did not, the most common reason was embarrassment.

Recommendations

• Tougher compliance with laws around underage drinking and gambling in land-based facilities with improved identification processes prior to venue entry.

• Promoting awareness and education on the co-consumption of gambling and alcohol and possible related harms, which may be protective for young people, particularly as they approach the legal age in Australia.

• Gender-responsive gambling prevention and treatment approaches (e.g. messaging and taglines).

• Approaches aimed at de-stigmatising public discourse and awareness on harmful gambling to promote help-seeking behaviour by young people

Australian Institute of Family Studies, 2024.

By Matt Herbert and Emadeddin Badi

On 15 April 2023, Sudan erupted into war, pitting the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Over the last year and a half, the fighting has proven to be tremendously destructive, devastating large swathes of Khartoum and other key economic hubs, displacing nearly 2 million refugees into neighbouring countries, displacing more than 2.2 million refugees into neighbouring countries, and leaving over 8 million people internally displaced within Sudan as of September 2024. There has been little pause in the destruction, and the conflict shows no signs of ending. The war has also started to shape broader patterns of human smuggling and mobility. Along the northern border, the Egyptian imposition of visa requirements on Sudanese refugees has driven a growing reliance on smuggling networks. This in turn has led to an expansion of smuggling operations, particularly through the Halayeb Triangle area. Along the border with Libya, there has been a gradual increase in arrivals over the past eight months. While control of the border area has shifted from the RSF to the SAF, this has not had a significant impact on smuggling dynamics, which remain robust. In western Sudan, the RSF’s seizure of large areas of territory has been accompanied by violent attacks on the civilian population, resulting in mass displacement into Chad. Most refugees travel autonomously, but smuggling networks along the Chad–Sudan border are becoming increasingly important, either to facilitate safe passage through RSF territory or as part of the long-distance movement of Sudanese refugees to northern Niger and southern Libya. Finally, there has been a limited resurgence of migrant and refugee arrivals from Ethiopia and Eritrea along Sudan’s south-eastern border. If these movements continue and expand, they could further shape human smuggling systems through eastern Sudan to Egypt. RSF advances in the south-east – such as the capture of the city of Wad Madani – may have an impact on smuggling networks, but are unlikely to disrupt their operations significantly  

Geneva:  Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime., 2024... 34p.

By Aili Malm, Nicholas Perez, Michael D. White

This publication represents the final research report of California State University, Long Beach’s (CSULB) evaluation of an intelligence-led problem-oriented policing (POP) project to better understand and address illicit fentanyl distribution networks in Long Beach, CA. The goals of this study were to: (1) employ problem-oriented policing to drive efforts to identify and disrupt fentanyl distribution networks in Long Beach, CA, and (2) use intelligence analysis to identify high-level distributors for investigation. To achieve these goals, researchers worked with a newly hired intelligence analyst and Long Beach Police Department (LBPD) Drug Investigation Section (DIS) detectives to improve their fentanyl distribution network investigations. The intervention included POP training, intelligence analyst support [cellular phone extractions, open-source intelligence (OSINT), social network analysis (SNA), etc.], and weekly interactions between the analyst and the research team. To assess the effectiveness of the project, we conducted both process and outcome evaluations. Primary data sources include: (1) interviews of detectives and the analyst; (2) DIS administrative data; (3) network data from three fentanyl distribution cases; and (4) fentanyl-related overdose data from the LBPD and the California Overdose Surveillance Dashboard. We identified findings across multiple analyses that, when taken together, represent a persuasive collection of circumstantial evidence regarding the positive effects of the project on two important outcomes: increased DIS activity and efficiency and effective fentanyl distribution network disruption. While fentanyl-related overdose rates did decrease substantially over the course of the project, there is no conclusive evidence that the project led to the reduction. The effects of COVID-19, the defund movement following George Floyd’s death, and the Los Angeles County District Attorney policy limiting the prosecution of drug offenses confounded our ability to draw a stronger connection between the project and enhanced DIS activity and efficiency, fentanyl distribution network disruption, and overdose rates.   

California State University, Long Beach; School of Criminology, Criminal Justice, and Emergency Management; 2024 77p. 

By Bridget Freisthler, ; Rouba A. Chahine, ; Jennifer Villani,; et al

Importance: The HEALing Communities Study (HCS) evaluated the effectiveness of the Communities That HEAL (CTH) intervention in preventing fatal overdoses amidst the US opioid epidemic.

Objective: To evaluate the impact of the CTH intervention on total drug overdose deaths and overdose deaths involving combinations of opioids with psychostimulants or benzodiazepines.

Design, Setting, and Participants: This randomized clinical trial was a parallel-arm, multisite, community-randomized, open, and waitlisted controlled comparison trial of communities in 4 US states between 2020 and 2023. Eligible communities were those reporting high opioid overdose fatality rates in Kentucky, Massachusetts, New York, and Ohio. Covariate-constrained randomization stratified by state-allocated communities to the intervention or control group. Trial groups were balanced by urban or rural classification, 2016-2017 fatal opioid overdose rate, and community population. Data analysis was completed by December 2023.

Intervention: Increased overdose education and naloxone distribution, treatment with medications for opioid use disorder, safer opioid prescribing practices, and communication campaigns to mitigate stigma and drive demand for evidence-based interventions.

The primary outcome was the number of drug overdose deaths among adults (aged 18 years or older), with secondary outcomes of overdose deaths involving specific opioid-involved drug combinations from death certificates. Rates of overdose deaths per 100,000 adult community residents in intervention and control communities from July 2021 to June 2022 were compared with analyses performed in 2023. RESULTS In 67 participating communities (34 in the intervention group, 33 in the control group) and including 8 211 506 participants (4 251 903 female [51.8%]; 1 273 394 Black [15.5%], 603 983 Hispanic [7.4%], 5 979 602 White [72.8%], 354 527 other [4.3%]), the average rate of overdose deaths involving all substances was 57.6 per 100 000 population in the intervention group and 61.2 per 100 000 population in the control group. This was not a statistically significant difference (adjusted rate ratio [aRR], 0.92; 95% CI, 0.78-1.07; P = .26). There was a statistically significant 37% reduction (aRR, 0.63; 95% CI, 0.44-0.91; P = .02) in death rates involving an opioid and psychostimulants (other than cocaine), and nonsignificant reductions in overdose deaths for an opioid with cocaine (6%) and an opioid with benzodiazepine (1%). CONCLUSION AND RELEVANCE In this clinical trial of the CTH intervention, death rates involving an opioid and noncocaine psychostimulant were reduced; total deaths did not differ statistically. Community-focused data-driven interventions that scale up evidence-based practices with communications campaigns may effectively reduce some opioid-involved polysubstance overdose deaths 

JAMA Netw Open. 2024;7(10):e2440006. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2024.40006

By Heather Wardle, Louisa Degenhardt, Virve Marionneau, Gerda Reith, Charles Livingstone, Malcolm Sparrow

The global gambling industry The global gambling industry is rapidly expanding, with net losses by consumers projected to reach nearly US$700 billion by 2028. Industry growth is fuelled by the rise of online gambling, widespread accessibility of gambling opportunities through mobile phones, increased legalization, and the introduction of commercial gambling to new areas. Recent expansion is most notable in low-income and middle-income countries, where regulatory infrastructure is often weak. Gambling, in some form at least, is now legally permitted in more than 80% of countries worldwide. Online gambling, given its borderless accessibility, is available everywhere via the internet. Digitalization has transformed the production and operation of commercial gambling, but the consequences of this shift and its effects on consumers have not yet been fully recognized. The production of online gambling is interconnected with an ecosystem of software, information technology infrastructure, and financial technology services. The commercial gambling industry has also developed strong partnerships in media and social media. Sponsoring and partnering with professional sports organizations provides gambling operators with marketing opportunities with huge new audiences. This far-reaching and interdependent corporate ecosystem collectively wields substantial influence over policy and has multiple points of contact through which to leverage the behavior of consumers. Online gambling products are designed to be rapid and intensive, characteristics that are associated with a higher risk of harm for consumers. The introduction of in-game betting during live matches has made online sports betting instantaneous and increased both its frequency and prevalence. Traditional gambling products, such as lotteries and bingo, now have faster cycles and are continuously accessible through smartphone apps. The boundaries between digital gaming and gambling are becoming blurred, with gaming increasingly acting as a conduit to gambling. Leveraging online digital infrastructures and surveillance data, gambling companies now have unparalleled capabilities to target consumers, including through the use of social media and influencers to engage individuals and online user data to tailor marketing to individuals, cross-sell products, and prolong user engagement. To safeguard their interests, stakeholders in the commercial gambling ecosystem deploy a range of strategies, many of which are similar to those used by other industries selling potentially addictive or health-harming products. To shape public and policy perceptions, and as they lobby policymakers directly to further their commercial interests, the industry portrays gambling as harmless entertainment and stresses the economic benefits (including tax revenues) and employment opportunities that the industry provides. The gambling industry particularly stresses the social benefits that accrue when some portion of gambling profits are used to fund education, health services, or other worthwhile social causes. According to industry narratives, responsibility for gambling harm is attributed to individuals, particularly those deemed as engaging in problematic gambling, which deflects attention from corporate conduct. The gambling industry also exerts considerable influence over research into gambling and gambling harms, which helps it retain control of the framing and messaging surrounding these issues. Industry messaging has substantially influenced gambling policy and regulation. Most policy solutions to gambling harms rest on the notion of individual responsibility. Providing support services, treatments, and protections for at-risk individuals is, of course, important. Improving these remedies further and making protective supports broadly available remains a priority. However, framing the problem in this way and narrowly focusing policy attention on a small subset of the people who gamble draws attention away from industry practices and Key messages • Commercial gambling is a rapidly growing global industry and is becoming increasingly digital. • The harms to health and wellbeing that result from gambling are more substantial than previously understood, extending beyond gambling disorder to include a wide range of gambling harms, which affect many people in addition to individuals who gamble. • The evolution of the gambling industry is at a crucial juncture; decisive action now can prevent or mitigate widespread harm to population health and wellbeing in the future. Thus far, globally, governments have paid too little attention to gambling harms and have not done enough to prevent or mitigate them. • Stronger policy and regulatory controls focused on harm prevention and the protection of public health and wellbeing, independent of industry or other competing influences, are now needed. Given the increasingly global and boundary-spanning nature of the industry, international coordination on regulatory approaches will be necessary for corporate behavior. We must also seriously examine the structures and systems that govern the design, provision, and promotion of gambling products. 

Lancet Public Health, Oct. 2024.

By Camilo Pardo-Herrera 

The environment is under increasing pressure from global economic dynamics and the constantly increasing demand for raw materials. In this context, environmental crimes in general, and illegal mining in particular, play a key role as they disregard any consideration for sustainable resource extraction. In the Amazon region, one of the most vital ecosystems around the world, illegal gold mining has been identified as the most critical threat to the sustainability of the life of its ecosystems. There is evidence of large quantities of illegal mining production both in Colombia (two-thirds of all production) and Peru (25 to 30 percent of all production). However, since gold is extremely valuable, and portable, it stores value —even under extreme market conditions—, it can be reshaped in any way thinkable, and is not intrinsically illegal, introducing illicitly extracted gold into official supply chains is fairly easy. Once introduced, it flows freely through national, regional, and global markets, and its proceeds do so through the international financial system. It is estimated that illegal mining accounts for up to USD 48 billion a year in criminal proceeds.1 In this context, organized crime associated with the illegal extraction of gold in the Amazon continues to grow in number, size, and scope in response to the insatiable global demand, and thanks to the possibility of laundering and reinvesting their proceeds through illicit financial flows. Thus, an efficient response to the challenges posed by illegal gold mining should be comprehensive and include not just efforts to curb illegal mining, but also, more importantly, efforts to address the illegal flows of money taking place through the gold trade. Although it only analyzes a small sample of the entire global gold market, this paper provides substantive evidence of the illegal flows of money through the gold trade from Peru and Colombia into the United States. While this report is in no position to assert the commission of crimes —since it is only analyzing data— it presents enough evidence to identify points of entry for further criminal investigations and potential judicial action. There is evidence of companies smuggling gold from Venezuela into Colombia, which is then exported to the United States. Between 2010 and 2021, a total of 68,2 tons of gold worth a total of 2.6 billion US dollars, were smuggled through the border in vicinities of Cucuta. Three companies, one in Colombia (CIJ Gutierrez) and two in the United States (Asahi Refining USA Inc., and Johnson Matthey Inc.) concentrate over 90 percent of this trade. Gold trade through this route stopped after 2018 when an Executive Order was signed targeting all parties involved in the trade of Venezuelan gold. There is also evidence of gold and mercury smuggling along the border between Peru and Bolivia and illegal gold production shifting geographies after policy decisions are made. Data show an inexplicable spike in Bolivian gold export in 2014 —with no increases in production— which coincides both, with a ban on mercury by Peru, and a decrease in Peruvian production and exports. This suggests the shifting of illegal mining from Peru into Bolivia, and also of gold smuggling in the same direction. There are clear indications of mis-invoicing of gold trade between these three countries. Peruvian data show significantly higher weight values than those reported at US destinations between 2016 and 2018. A very similar pattern can be seen in Peruvian total exports to the world. Concurrently, trade data show that 29 percent of all shipments from Peru to the US were priced at 70 percent or less than the actual international price during that same time. Although available data does not permit us to assert whether it is a case of overstating the weight of the gold or undervaluing its value, the temporal coincidence of weight and value discrepancies allows us to suggest a general case of mis-invoicing during this time. Colombian data also suggests potential cases of mis-invoicing. Between 2015 and 2016, US statistics reported weight about 50% above those reported by Colombian customs. Price data show that in nine percent of the shipments —approximately 16 tons— gold was paid at 70 percent or less of the global gold price at the time of the transaction. Only a handful of businesses on both sides of the transactions explain most of this trade and are identified — 85 percent of the undervalued shipments are executed by five Colombian firms, and six businesses on the US side concentrate 86 percent of undervalued purchases. Trade in overpriced gold is also identified. Data analysis suggests irregular patterns in the rate between net and gross weights, which could respond to fraudulent reporting and concurrent illicit flows of value. For example, while most shipments use 0.2 grams (or less) of packaging per every gram of gold sent, an important percentage report uses three and up to five times that weight. Of these irregular shipments, over 90 percent were sent by one company in Colombia —Metales Procesados Industriales— to two businesses in the US —Atomic Gold Inc., and United Precious Metal Refining Inc. The analysis also raises warnings as to how certain reports are made. This is the case of the volume of shipments reported by Colombian customs, which is not the result of a measurement, but of an estimation using the net weight of the shipment. Instead of measuring the volume of each shipment, this field is populated using the density of gold, which is a constant, derived from the net weight of the shipment. Although not the result of fraud, but a standard procedure, this hinders transparency and the possibility of monitoring the trade between Colombia and the US. There is evidence of a trend to create shell companies to engage in the trade in gold; presumably of illegal gold. Peruvian tax data shows large numbers of companies participating in the trade in a very sporadic fashion, which contradicts stable and long-lasting trade relationships usual in the international gold market. These companies have a very short legal life, and concentrate all of their commercial activity within a few months, only to cease to exist shortly after. Between 2016 and 2021, these companies traded gold for a total of 230 million USD. 

The Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center. George Mason University. Arlington, Va. 2022. 34p.

By Layla Hashemi, Edward Huang & Louise Shelley 

 Over 58 million counterfeit respirators of substandard quality unable to protect individuals from infection have been seized globally since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. These seizures have primarily occurred in urban warehouses and ports around the world according to analysis of public and corporate data shared with the authors. The presence of tens of millions of respirators in storage facilities prior to distribution demonstrates that urban areas are key elements of illicit supply chains. Data suggests that the concept of urban insecurity needs to be reconsidered in light of illicit supply chains for counterfeit respirators and their role in facilitating disease transmission in urban areas. The analysis presented in this article suggests that threats to human life should not be confined narrowly to violent acts or the consumption of drugs. Human life can also be threatened through the massive distribution of counterfeit N95 masks during a pandemic, a problem that has become more acute with more contagious mutations of COVID-19. 

Urban Crime - An International Journal Vol. 3-No 2-September 2022 

By Louise I. Shelley

In 1994, the second full year of Demokratizatsiya’s publication, I analyzed the impact of organized crime on the development of post-Soviet states in an article entitled “Post-Soviet Organized Crime: Implications for Economic, Social, and Political Development.”1 This article was written at a time when many in the West were sure that the future course of development for Russia and other post-Soviet states was one of free markets and democracy. Most research on organized crime and high-level corruption in Russia would not be published until much later.2 My article provided a very different and contrarian approach to this rosy scenario for Soviet successor states. In the article’s introduction, I asserted that the infiltration of organized crime into the state would ensure that organized crime would “play a significant role in determining the future course of developments in the Soviet successor states.” In my view, organized crime represented an amalgam of traditional criminals, members of the state security apparatus, former military personnel, and law enforcement officials. I did not associate post-Soviet organized crime exclusively with the very v zakone, the traditional thieves in law or professional criminals. I was especially concerned at the time that the rapid and non-transparent privatization of state property to the benefit of corrupt politicians, organized crime, and their business partners would have persistent and deleterious long-term consequences, leading to the monopolization of key sectors of post-Soviet economies rather than the competitive economies needed for growth.

Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Volume 30, Number 4, Fall 2022, pp. 411-419

By Spencer P. Chainey & Arantza Alonso Berbotto 

Crime script analysis is becoming an increasingly used approach for examining organized crime. Crime scripts can use data from multiple sources, including open sources of intelligence (OSINT). Limited guidance exists, however, on how to populate the content of a crime script with data, and validate these data. This results in crime scripts being generated intuitively, restricts them from being scrutinized for their quality and limits the opportunity to combine or compare crime scripts. We introduce a practical process for populating the content of a crime script that involves simple coding procedures and uses document analysis to quality assure data that are extracted from open sources. We illustrate the process with the example of the theft of oil from pipelines in Mexico committed by organized crime groups. The structured methodical process we introduce produces a crime script of high quality, helps to improve the systematic analysis of decision-making performed by members of organized crime groups, and can improve the identification of opportunities for crime control.

Published: 23 August 2021, Trends in Organized Crime, Volume 25, pages 272–300, (2022)

By Jonah Rexer

Multinationals in the extractive sectors of weak states may face resource theft by armed groups. This criminality is often abetted by state corruption, even though firms are willing to pay for protection. I study indigenization in Nigeria's oil sector, which increased participation by Nigerian firms substantially. Despite evidence that local firms are of lower quality, localization increases output and reduces oil theft. A bargaining model illustrates that political connections align law enforcement incentives, solving commitment problems. Data on raids by government forces show that local firms receive preferential law enforcement protection. I find that connections to military elites drive the local advantage.

.Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University, 2022. 113p  

By Christian Gunadi; Yuyan Shi,

Recreational cannabis legalization (RCL) has been advocated as a way to reduce the number of individuals interacting with the US criminal justice system; in theory, however, cannabis decriminalization can achieve this objective without generating the negative public health consequences associated with RCL. It is still unclear whether RCL can bring additional benefits in terms of reducing cannabis possession arrests in states that have already decriminalized cannabis. OBJECTIVE -  To examine whether RCL was associated with changes in cannabis possession arrests in US states that had already decriminalized cannabis during the study period and whether these changes differed across age and racial subgroups. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS - This repeated cross-sectional study used cannabis possession arrest data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reporting Program (UCRP) for US states from 2010 through 2019. Statistical analysis was conducted from October 6, 2021, to October 12, 2022. EXPOSURES -  Implementation of statewide RCL. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES - Cannabis possession arrest rates per 1000 population per year were assessed with a quasi-experimental difference-in-differences design and were used to estimate the association of RCL with arrest rates in RCL states that had or had not decriminalized cannabis before RCL. This association was also examined in subgroups for age (adults vs youths) and race (Black vs White). RESULTS - This study included UCRP data for 31 US states, including 9 states that implemented RCL during the study period (4 without and 5 with decriminalization) and 22 non-RCL states. In the 4 states that had not decriminalized cannabis before legalization, RCL was associated with a 76.3% decrease (95% CI, −81.2% to −69.9%) in arrest rates among adults. In the 5 states that had already decriminalized cannabis, RCL was still associated with a substantial decrease in adult arrest rates (−40.0%; 95% CI, −55.1% to −19.8%). There was no association of RCL with changes in arrest rates among youths. In addition, changes in arrest rates associated with RCL did not differ among Black and White individuals. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE -  In this repeated cross-sectional study, RCL was associated with a sizable reduction in cannabis possession arrests among adults in states that had already decriminalized cannabis during the study period (2010-2019), albeit the magnitude was smaller compared with states that had not decriminalized cannabis before RCL. In addition, RCL did not seem to be associated with changes in arrest rates among youths or disparities in arrest rates among Black and White individuals. 

JAMA Netw Open. 2022 Dec 5;5(12):e2244922

By Pryce S. Michener, Elyse Bianchet, Shannon Fox, Elizabeth A. Evans & Peter D. Friedmann 

Background

Opioid-related overdose is the leading cause of death for people recently released from incarceration, however treatment with medications for opioid use disorder (MOUD) during incarceration can reduce the mortality risk. This study seeks to qualitatively analyze perceptions of post-release overdose risk from the perspectives of people who received MOUD while incarcerated in one of eight Massachusetts jails during 2021–2022 using the Risk Environment Framework to guide analyses.

Methods

N = 38 participants with lived experience of MOUD treatment during incarceration who are now living in the community were interviewed on factors that may contribute to or protect against post-release overdose risk. Themes were identified inductively and deductively using the Risk Environment Framework and its domains, which organizes themes along physical, social, economic, and policy environments on both the micro- and macro- scales.

Results

The physical risk environment included loss of opioid tolerance during incarceration, polysubstance use, and the toxicity of the regional drug supply as key producers of increased risk for post-release overdose. Social drivers of risk included peer group risk norms—including peer-driven harm reduction practices and interpersonal relationships between drug sellers and buyers—as well as macro-level social determinants of health such as housing insecurity and availability of mental health services. Economic drivers of post-release overdose risk included lack of income generation during incarceration and employment challenges. Participants discussed several aspects of policy that contribute to post-release overdose risk, including availability of harm reduction supplies, public health services, and broader policy around MOUD.

Conclusions

The perspectives of people with lived experience are vital to understanding the disproportionate risks of overdose for those recently released from incarceration. Our results highlight the intersectional factors that produce and reproduce the post-release overdose risk environment, providing support for interventions across each domain of the Risk Environment Framework. By capturing perspectives from people with lived experience of OUD and incarceration during this critical period of risk, we can better identify interventions that target and mitigate overdose-related harm in this population.

Harm Reduction Journal (2024) 21:138

By Adam Teperski, Stewart Boiteux, and Callan Brown

Aim: To examine trends in drug driving charges, roadside drug testing, and population drug use in New South Wales (NSW) between 2008 and 2023. METHOD Data on drug driving proceedings and roadside drug testing were obtained from the NSW Police Force. Focusing on the period between 2008 and 2023, we describe trends in the number of drug driving charges laid by police, as well as changes in the volume of roadside drug tests undertaken by police and the detection rate over time. We also examine the profile of drivers who are proceeded against after testing positive and any differences in key characteristics over time. Finally, to support the interpretation of these results, we assess changes in drug use from two population drug use monitoring systems and consider associated trends in self-reported drug driving behaviours. RESULTS Between 2008 and 2023, the number of drug driving charges rose from an average of 102 per quarter in 2008 to 3,296 in 2023. This significant growth in charges followed the announcement of two expansions of the NSW Mobile Drug Testing (MDT) program, which resulted in a rapid increase in testing volumes from around 20,000 to 156,000 tests per year in 2008 and 2019 respectively. While the MDT expansions aimed to increase police capacity to detect and deter drug driving behaviours, we found a weak relationship between total testing volumes and subsequent detection rates, with the average detection rate varying between 2% and 18%. This suggests that the number of drug driving charges over this 15-year period was not simply a function of the number of tests conducted, but also related to when, where, and for whom tests were used. When we compared drug driving offenders charged in 2019 with those charged in 2023, we found that the 2023 cohort were more likely to be older, test positive for methamphetamine, reside in regional areas and have a prior drug driving charge. During the period we study, population-level drug use has remained relatively consistent. Meanwhile, the self-reported prevalence of drug driving has decreased at a steady rate, with this downward trend commencing prior to the start of the MDT program in NSW. CONCLUSION Sequential expansions of the MDT program have led to a considerable increase in the number of offenders charged with drug driving offences in NSW between 2008 and 2023. Recent growth in the roadside drug test detection rate and subsequent charges may be driven by police targeting of repeat drug driving offenders, and motorists who offend in regional areas. 

Bureau Brief, No. 172 Sydney, NSW: NSW Bureau of Crime  Statistics and Research. ....2024. 23p.

By Maurice Ogbonnaya 

What began as a struggle for the political and economic autonomy of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria has morphed into organised crime of transnational dimensions that has turned the West African coast and the Gulf of Guinea into one of the most unsafe maritime zones in the world and is decimating Nigeria’s economy. The crimes include kidnapping for ransom, maritime piracy, armed robbery at sea, the theft and smuggling of oil and other contraband products, illegal oil refining and bunkering. This report analyses the current drivers of organised crime in the region, arguing that crime has become a fundamental element of the struggle. Key findings • The Niger Delta region accounts for most of Nigeria’s estimated daily oil production of 2.5 million barrels, which makes the country Africa’s largest producer of oil and the sixthlargest oil-producing country in the world. • State repression, poverty and widespread inequality, politics, greed and institutional corruption in the oil and maritime sectors have shaped the evolution of the struggle from a nationalist movement to an organised criminal enterprise. • The Nigerian government must tackle issues of environmental degradation, infrastructural underdevelopment, poverty, the lack of job- and income-generating opportunities, especially for the youth, and institutionalised corruption in the oil and maritime sectors.  

ENACT Africa, 2020. 22p.