By Joseph E. Schumacher, Abdullah Ahsan, Amber H. Simpler, Adam P. Natoli & Bradley J. Cain

Conducting research within a carceral health care context offers a unique view into the nature of drug use among arrestees with potential to identify and prevent drug use consequences. The purpose of this study was to characterize the nature and extent of drug use among first-time jail arrestees to inform detection and treatment.

Methods

This study utilized a naturalistic research design to collect de-identified urine drug screens (UDS), jail characteristics, and arrestee demographic variables among arrestees indicating drug use from 25 jails across the United States in 2023 through a confidential data sharing agreement with NaphCare, Inc. using its proprietary electronic health record operating system. Descriptive statistics were used to detail the features of the dataset, Pearson’s chi-square tests of independence were performed to statistically analyze associations between UDS results and jail characteristics and arrestee demographics, and significant chi-square test results were further investigated by examining standardized residuals to clarify the nature and significance of within-group differences in proportions.

Results

Of the 43,553 UDS cases comprising the final sample (28.8% of total arrestees), 74.8% (32,561) were positive for one or more drugs, and 25.2% of UDS cases were negative for all drugs. Among those who tested positive, 69.0% were positive for cannabis, 54.8% for stimulants, 29.6% for opioids, and 12.4% for sedatives. Arrestees were positive for multiple drugs half the time, with combinations of cannabis, stimulants, and opioids most common. Significant associations between drug use and both jail characteristics and arrestee demographics were found.

Conclusions

Though drug use is not a recent phenomenon, the lethality potential of the drugs being used today is relatively new. Arrestees with positive urine drug screens are at heightened risk of adverse outcome due to sudden cessation of substance use. Findings highlight the need for objective clinical data to guide acute treatment of individuals at risk of withdrawing while detained. A

ddiction Science & Clinical Practice (2025), 15p.

By The International Drug Policy Consortium

In 2024, the World Drug Report broke its historical silence on the human rights dimension of drug policy with a special chapter on “Drug Use and the Right to Health.” The present analysis compares this chapter with the April 2024 report on “Drug Use, Harm Reduction, and the Right to Health” by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, Dr. Tlaleng Mofokeng, to assess whether the 2024 edition of the World Drug Report constitutes a genuine move towards integrating a human rights perspective into the global drug control regime.

The answer is negative. The World Drug Report chapter suffers from a critical and unjustifiable methodological flaw: it has been developed without any reference to the standards and recommendations on drugs and the right to health developed over the last 15 years by UN human rights mechanisms. These standards were created precisely to provide Member States with guidance on their human rights obligations. Instead, the chapter is often guided by the UNODC’s own policy preferences and its desire to manage political tensions at the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND).

The result is a flawed rendering of the right to health that omits essential elements such as a robust interpretation of harm reduction and support for the decriminalisation of people who use drugs. It also glosses over the undeniable tension between the drug control regime and the right to health, and introduces problematic concepts such as “the right to health of communities affected by drug use.” This notion is not grounded in human rights standards and risks decentring people who use drugs.

Although the special chapter pitches itself as the basis for a new framework to evaluate States’ performance with regards to the right to health, Member States should withhold support for this flawed initiative until it fully integrates the guidance developed by the UN human rights system.

London: International Drug Policy Consortium, 2025. 23p.

By Anneli Botha

Transnational organised crime is at the heart of the illicit extraction and smuggling of natural resources in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province. Is there evidence that insurgents are capitalising on the extraction of natural resources to radicalise and recruit new members, legitimise and justify their existence and attacks, or finance their activities? In the absence of interviews with militants, this study reflects on the views of community members living in areas where natural resources are extracted, and insurgents operate. Key points • Mozambique’s government needs to consider a more effective information campaign to get ahead of incorrect perceptions insurgents could capitalise on. • Words should be followed by action addressing the disparity between expected financial growth following the discovery of natural resources and the reality on the ground. • Despite efforts from extraction companies to build community relations, more is needed to address negative perceptions and strengthen community resilience through efforts to make locals more employable. Piecemeal efforts are not going to be enough

Research Paper  Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, 2025. 26p.

By Ndubuisi Christian Ani, Feyi Ogunade and John Kamma 

Gangsterism in Liberia lies at the intersection of a society ravaged by civil war, a declining economy, social exclusion of a bulging underclass, collusion between state officials and illicit markets, and inefficient law enforcement. For youths, gang involvement offers a sense of belonging, a surrogate family structure, and a means of protection and economic benefits. Gangs are also available for hire by politicians, criminal networks and business people seeking to intimidate their opponents or protect properties. Key recommendations • A policy against gangsterism and criminal groupings is urgently needed in Liberia. A comprehensive policy would offer opportunities for a holistic response that involves the improved provision of public services, including enhanced law enforcement, in communities. • Youth-focused development is a critical priority for addressing the causes of gang violence and drug abuse in Liberia. Without discounting the importance of quick-impact youth empowerment initiatives, development programmes need to be long-term. • Schools should have drug prevention programmes. • International support could help Liberia establish treatment and rehabilitation centres to address substance abuse and criminality. • The Economic Community of West African States and African Union should establish a joint task force with Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea to disrupt kush production points Research Paper and supply chains  

ENACT Africa, 2025. 28p.

By Matthew Chidozie Ogwu, MalikMatěj Malík, Pavel Tlustoš, Jiří Patočka

Fenethylline (street name, captagon) is a synthetic amphetamine-type stimulant that is emerging as a significant public health and security concern, particularly in the Middle East. This systematic review synthesizes original research articles, epidemiological studies, systematic reviews, policy analyses, and case reports to provide a comprehensive analysis of fenethylline’s health impacts, addiction potential, and dynamics of illicit trade. Initially developed for therapeutic use, fenethylline illicit production and use have escalated, raising concern about its physiological, psychological, and socio-economic impacts. This stimulant profoundly affects the central nervous system, enhancing wakefulness, concentration, and physical stamina while inducing euphoria. These effects come at the cost of serious adverse health outcomes, particularly with prolonged or heavy use, including cardiovascular complications, neurological damage, and addiction. The dependence-forming nature of captagon contributes to escalating substance use disorders, placing a burden on healthcare systems. Beyond its biomedical implications, fenethylline trafficking has become a global issue, with supply chains deeply intertwined with politically unstable regions where illicit economies thrive. The geopolitical dimensions of captagon’s trade amplify its global security threat, influencing international relations and regional stability. This paper underscores the urgent need for systematic data collection and coordinated efforts to regulate illicit fenethylline production and distribution. Strategies such as improved surveillance, public health interventions, and international cooperation are essential to mitigate its escalating risks. Addressing this issue requires a multidisciplinary approach, integrating public health, law enforcement, and policy development to curb its impact on global health and security.

Drug and Alcohol Dependence Reports, March 2025, 39 p.

By Matthew F. Garnett and Arialdi M. Miniño

Drug overdoses are one of the leading causes of injury death in adults and have risen over the past several decades in the United States (1–3). Overdoses involving synthetic opioids (fentanyl, for example) and stimulants (cocaine and methamphetamine, for example) have also risen in the past few years (1). This report presents rates of drug overdose deaths from the National Vital Statistics System over a 20-year period by demographic group and by the type of drugs involved, specifically, opioids and stimulants, with a focus on changes from 2022 to 2023. Key findings Data from the National Vital Statistics System ● The age-adjusted rate of drug overdose deaths increased from 8.9deaths per 100,000 standard population in 2003 to 32.6 in 2022; however, the rate decreased to 31.3 in 2023. ● Rates decreased between 2022 and 2023 for people ages 15–54 and increased for adults age 55 and older. ● From 2022 to 2023, rates decreased for White non-Hispanic people, while rates for other race and Hispanic-origin groups generally stayed the same or increased. ● Between 2022 and 2023, rates declined for deaths involving synthetic opioids other than methadone, heroin, and natural and semisynthetic opioids, while the rate for methadone remained the same. ● From 2022 to 2023, rates increased for deaths involving cocaine by 4.9% (from 8.2 to 8.6) and psychostimulants with abuse potential by 1.9% (10.4 to 10.6)

NCHS Data Brief No. 522, December 2024. 12p.
Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics. 2024. DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.15620/cdc/170565.

By Ella Cockbain, Patricio Estévez-Soto, and Felia Allum

Organised crime – and the people, processes and structures involved – do not exist in a geographical vacuum. They have an inherent spatiality: shaped by and shaping the places they occupy in physical, virtual and hybrid spaces. Although the ‘social embeddedness’ of organised crime is relatively well-recognised, its spatiality – or ‘spatial embeddedness’ – has been neglected. This article contextualises and introduces our special issue on the new geographies of organised crime. We put forward a central argument that geographical lenses can advance and enrich understanding of organised crime, briefly review relevant literature and explain some of the foundational concepts in geographical thinking. We discuss the rationale for this special issue and highlight its papers’ main contributions. Since the geographies of the illicit are full of complexities, heterogeneities and subjectivities, we do not propose any singular approach, but rather see a plurality of possibilities for better incorporating geography into organised crime scholarship. Accordingly, the papers are theoretically and methodologically diverse, as well as covering varied topics and locations

Criminology & Criminal Justice, 25(1). 2025, 3-20 pages

By The Transnational Alliance to Combat Illicit Trade (TRACIT)

The report, Confronting the Threat of Illicit Trade: Spotlight on the Dominican Republic, assesses the nature and extent of illicit trade in the Dominican Republic. It examines the impact of illicit trade on the economy and society, analyzes the government's ongoing efforts to address the issue, and presents practical recommendations for effective solutions. This report aims to empower stakeholders in their fight against illicit trade, ultimately contributing to a more secure and prosperous Dominican Republic

New York: Transnational Alliance to Combat Illicit Trade (TRACIT), 2024. 12p.

By The World Trade Organization

International trade in food has helped to reduce global poverty and hunger. However, illicit trade in food and food fraud undermine the global food system and endanger public health. This publication looks into the challenges of combating illicit practices, such as smuggling and counterfeiting, and the role the WTO could play

The publication draws on the expertise of the WTO Secretariat, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the International Seed Federation, SSAFE — a non-profit organization for food safety, the Transnational Alliance to Combat Illicit Trade and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute.

Contributors examine the topic from their particular area of expertise, discussing how best to address illegal food trade and how the WTO agreements could contribute to tackling illegal practices.

  International trade has helped to reduce global hunger, but food fraud is a growing problem Access to healthy, affordable food is a prerequisite for improving the lives of the poorest. International trade has helped to reduce both global poverty and hunger. However, the resulting complexity of food supply chains makes combating illicit trade in food and food fraud much harder. Increased interconnectivity of supply chains and greater distances between where food is grown and where it is consumed provide more opportunities for illegal activities. Illicit trade in food and food fraud inflict considerable damage to international trade and public health The illicit trade in food and food fraud includes the buying and selling of products to be eaten, drunk or grown that are not what they are claimed to be, that fail to comply with health and other regulations (e.g. on quality) and that are smuggled or otherwise produced or traded outside the legitimate market framework. Illicit trade in food and food fraud inflict considerable damage to international trade and public health. Illicit trade in food undermines international trade by distorting markets, eroding consumer confidence and triggering the imposition of trade barriers due to safety concerns. Simultaneously, it poses significant public health risks through the distribution of counterfeit or substandard products, contributing to the spread of diseases and creating challenges for regulatory enforcement on a global scale. The consumption of contaminated, counterfeited or adulterated food products can result in malnutrition and even death. Illicit trade in food undermines global food security and agri-food value chains Illicit trade in food disrupts legitimate supply chains and limits access to foods by reducing availability and increasing prices. It undermines fair markets and reduces income for legitimate producers, with the most vulnerable communities affected the greatest. The impact of illicit trade in seeds and seed fraud can be significant for farmers, the agri-food value chain and hence global food security. Illegal seed practices also discourage innovation. The integrity of the seed sector can be strengthened through the protection of intellectual property rights and enhancing enforcement to ensure that farmers have access to reliable, high-quality seeds. The WTO rulebook brings a legal framework to international trade in food, helping to combat illicit trade The WTO agreements can be used in the fight against illicit trade in food and food fraud, in particular the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. The WTO rulebook brings a legal framework to the international trade in food, helping to combat illicit trade. The WTO has a unique role in promoting open and legal trade. WTO rules enable members to exercise control over their borders and enforce their trade laws, leaving less room for illegal trade.  

Geneva, SWIT: World Trade Organization 2024. 92p.

By Russell G. Smith

This report estimates the cost of serious and organised crime in Australia in 2022–23 to be between $30.4b and $68.7b. This is the fourth in a series of reports undertaken for the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission estimating the cost of serious and organised crime. It updates and improves on the methodology used in the previous report, which estimated the cost of serious and organised crime in 2020–21 to be between $24.8b and $60.1b. As with the previous research, this report considers the direct and consequential costs of serious and organised crime in Australia, as well as the costs to government entities, businesses and individuals associated with preventing and responding to serious and organised crime. The current estimate includes the cost of some additional crime types, not previously included, but even accounting for these additions it is clear that serious and organised crime continues to impose a substantial burden on the Australian economy.

Statistical Report no. 50. 

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2024. 87p.

By Leila Pereira, Rafael Pucci, Rodrigo R. Soares

We study a Force-down/Shoot-down intervention in Brazil that led cocaine traffickers to shift from air to river routes. Using data on cocaine production, homicides, and the network of rivers in the Amazon, we provide evidence that violence increased in municipalities along river routes originating from Andean producing countries after the policy. We also show that, during the same period, violence in these municipalities became more responsive to cocaine production in origin countries. We document an instance of crime displacement over the three-dimensional space, involving sophisticated adaptations from criminals regarding transportation technologies, with dramatic side-effects for local populations.

Bonn: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2024. 55p.

Europol; European Union. Publications Office

From the document: "This edition marks 10 years since the release of Europol's first IOCTA [Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment]. Throughout this time, the threats posed by cybercrime have evolved dynamically in terms of volume, intensity and harm potential. The number of cybercriminals entering the market continued to grow steadily, thanks to the adoption of new technologies as well as the increasing complexity of digital infrastructures, which expands the potential attack surface. In 2023, millions of victims across the EU were attacked and exploited online on a daily basis. Small and medium businesses were increasingly popular targets for cyber-attacks, while e-merchants experienced the most digital skimming attacks. Adults were victimised through phishing, investment and romance frauds, and more and more minors were targeted by child sexual exploitation offenders and online sexual extorters. In parallel, a number of worldwide law enforcement actions shook the cybercriminal underground through continued arrests of ransomware affiliates and operators. Law enforcement also carried out coordinated disruption operations against cybercriminals' digital infrastructures. Notwithstanding the growing presence of law enforcement in the dark web, this environment continues to function as an enabler for cybercrime, allowing offenders to share knowledge, tools and services in a more concealed way. In addition, the use of cryptocurrencies in a wider variety of crime areas has become more noticeable in 2023, alongside the growing number of requests for investigative support in cryptocurrency tracing received by Europol. Cybercriminals are keen to leverage Artificial Intelligence, which is already becoming a common component in their toolbox and is very likely to see even wider application. Law enforcement agencies are expected to build a robust capacity to counter the growing threats stemming from this, both in terms of human resources and technical skills."

Europol; European Union. Publications Office . 2024. 38p.

Bennett, Phil; Cucos, Radu; Winch, Ryan

From the document: "The intersection of AI and transnational crime, particularly its application in human trafficking, represents an emerging and critically important area of study. This brief has been developed with a clear objective: to equip policymakers, law enforcement agencies, and the technology sector with the insights needed to anticipate and pre-emptively address the potential implications of AI on trafficking in persons. While we respond to the early instances of the use of AI by transnational criminal organisations, such as within Southeast Asia's cyber-scam centres, a more systemic approach is required. The potential for transnational criminal organisations to significantly expand their operations using AI technologies is considerable, and with it comes the risk of exponentially increasing harm to individuals and communities worldwide. It is imperative that we act now, before the most severe impacts of AI-enabled trafficking are realised. We have a unique time-limited opportunity--and indeed, a responsibility--to plan, train, and develop policies that can mitigate these emerging threats. This report aims to concretise this discussion by outlining specific scenarios where AI and trafficking could intersect, and to initiate a dialogue on how we can prepare and respond effectively. This document is not intended to be definitive, but rather to serve as a foundation for a broader, ongoing discussion. The ideas presented here are initial steps, and it will require innovative thinking, adequate resourcing, and sustained engagement from all sectors to build upon them effectively."

Organization For Security And Co-Operation In Europe. Office Of The Special Representative And Co-Ordinator For Combating Trafficking In Human Beings; Bali Process (Forum). Regional Support Office .NOV, 2024

RAND CORPORATION

From the document: "Global catastrophic and existential risks hold the potential to threaten human civilization. Addressing these risks is crucial for ensuring the long-term survival and flourishing of humanity. Motivated by the gravity of these risks, Congress passed the Global Catastrophic Risk Management Act in 2022, which requires the Secretary of Homeland Security and the administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency to coordinate an assessment of global catastrophic risk related to a set of threats and hazards. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate and the Federal Emergency Management Agency requested the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center's support in meeting this requirement. This report documents findings from our analysis." Authors include: Henry H. Willis, Anu Narayanan, Benjamin Boudreaux, Bianca Espinosa, Edward Geist, Daniel M. Gerstein, Dahlia Anne Goldfeld, Nidhi Kalra, Tom LaTourrette, Emily Lathrop, Alvin Moon, Jan Osburg, Benjamin Lee Preston, Kristin Van Abel, Emmi Yonekura, Robert J. Lempert, Sunny D. Bhatt, Chandra Garber, and Emily Lawson.

RAND CORPORATION. HOMELAND SECURITY OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS CENTER. 30 OCT, 2024.237p.

By Drug Policy Alliance

We all want people living with addiction to get the help they need. At the Drug Policy Alliance, we believe that everyone should have access to the substance use disorder (SUD) supports that they choose to improve their physical and mental health — and that effective services should be available when and where people are ready for them, without hurdles like cost or preconditions to get help. In short, SUD support should be voluntary, effective, affordable, accessible, and appealing. Unfortunately, the United States has neither prioritized on-demand care nor ensured that available SUD supports are effective or beneficial. Having failed to provide even remotely sufficient access to the kinds of health-centered approaches that research shows are most effective (e.g., medications for opioid use disorder, or MOUD, and contingency management for stimulant use disorder, or CM), some ill-informed policymakers are advocating for expanding the power of courts to force people into existing SUD services, against their will and not of their choosing. This is not entirely new. Forced treatment has been a familiar practice in criminal courts for decades — where criminal defendants have had the “choice” to opt for court-ordered SUD services or face traditional sentencing, often including incarceration   

New York: Drug Policy Alliance, 2024. 32p.

By Tse Yang Lim , Huiru Dong , Erin Stringfellow , Zeynep Hasgul , Ju Park , Lukas Glos , Reza Kazemi , Mohammad S Jalali 

Fentanyl and its analogs contribute substantially to drug overdose deaths in the United States. There is concern that people using drugs are being unknowingly exposed to fentanyl, increasing their risk of overdose death. This study examines temporal trends and spatial variations in the co-occurrence of fentanyl with other seized drugs.

Methods

We identified fentanyl co-occurrence (the proportion of samples of non-fentanyl substances that also contain fentanyl) among 9 substances or substance classes of interest: methamphetamine, cannabis, cocaine, heroin, club drugs, hallucinogens, and prescription opioids, stimulants, and benzodiazepines. We used serial cross-sectional data on drug reports across 50 states and the District of Columbia from the National Forensic Laboratory Information System, the largest available database on the U.S. illicit drug supply, from January 2013 to December 2023.

Findings

We analyzed data from 11,940,207 samples. Fentanyl co-occurrence with all examined substances increased monotonically over time (Mann-Kendall p < 0.0001). Nationally, fentanyl co-occurrence was highest among heroin samples (approx. 50%), but relatively low among methamphetamine (≤1%), cocaine (≤4%), and other drug samples. However, co-occurrence rates have grown to over 10% for cocaine and methamphetamine in several Northeast states in 2017–2023.

Interpretation: 

Fentanyl co-occurs most commonly with heroin, but its presence in stimulant supplies is increasing in some areas, where it may pose a disproportionately high risk of overdose.

Lancet Reg Health Amicas, 2024 Sep 27;39:100898. doi: 10.1016/j.lana.2024.100898

By Dardan Kocani

Despite efforts to prevent illicit finance – such as the adoption of international frameworks, Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards, and the EU’s anti-money laundering (AML) directives – financial institutions in the Western Balkans remain highly vulnerable to sophisticated criminals and the inherent risks in the formal financial system. Financial institutions such as banks, microfinance institutions, cryptocurrency services, and money transfer services are frequently exploited by criminals to move illicit money across borders. This report delves into the structural weaknesses and vulnerabilities that facilitate money laundering in the Western Balkans. One major insight is the impact of cryptocurrency, where regulatory shortcomings enable anonymous, cross-border transactions that are hard to trace. Financial technology, while promising innovation, also introduces fresh risks, especially where compliance and monitoring frameworks have yet to catch up. With no centralized registry for politically exposed persons (PEPs) or beneficial owners, financial institutions often lack critical information, inadvertently providing cover for criminal actors. The study identifies specific methods used to launder money, such as smurfing through bank accounts, taking out suspicious bank loans, engaging in real estate purchases, and employing frontmen. Notable cases in the region expose systemic vulnerabilities in banks, where criminal actors leverage insider support or regulatory gaps to move substantial amounts undetected. Furthermore, public-private partnerships in AML enforcement remain insufficient, creating weak links that are frequently exploited. This report provides strategic recommendations for governments, financial institutions, and non-state actors in the region to address these gaps, emphasizing the need for robust inter-agency collaboration, stronger regulatory frameworks, and consistent training for AML officers. The region needs a heightened, collaborative effort to prevent local financial institutions from becoming conduits for transnational organized crime and dirty money laundering.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC)’s Observatory of Illicit Economies in South Eastern Europe.  2024. 40p.

By  J. R. Mailey   

Over the past decade, Iran has turned to criminal markets as a strategic tool to pursue its geopolitical goals. Isolated by international sanctions, Iran has forged extensive ties with criminal networks across the globe to fund armed groups, procure materials for its nuclear program, and evade sanctions. This report uncovers how Iran’s proxies, such as Hezbollah and militias in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and Palestine are critical to Tehran’s influence. Iran supplies these groups with weapons, training, and funds, while criminal networks help smuggle oil, launder money, and move illicit goods across borders. This strategy has enabled Iran to weaken its adversaries without engaging in direct military confrontation. One of the most striking findings of the report is how Iran’s use of criminal proxies allows it to maintain plausible deniability. Tehran’s regime has relied on these illicit actors to conduct operations ranging from assassinations and abductions of critics to sabotage and terror attacks—all while skirting direct accountability. The report also highlights how criminal networks have been key to helping Iran circumvent widespread sanctions. By collaborating with middlemen and transnational crime organizations, Iran has continued to smuggle its oil and accumulate foreign currency. These criminal partnerships have enabled Tehran to access global markets, finance proxy wars, and strengthen its military capabilities through illicit means. The study provides detailed case studies on Iran’s operations and offers a range of recommendations to counter Tehran’s criminal statecraft. By identifying pressure points and vulnerabilities within these illicit networks, the report outlines steps that can be taken to expose and disrupt Iran’s activities.

GENEVA:  GLOBAL INITIATIVE AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME. 2024. 59P.

By Juan José Palacios Vega, Manuel Martín Brañas, Sydney Silverstein, Ricardo Zárate Gómez, Nicholas Kawa, Margarita del Águila Villacorta

In recent decades, drug crop eradication and drug trafficking interdiction have pushed drug crop cultivation into new areas of the Amazonian rainforest. The presence of the drug industries in these regions—followed by alternative development programs that aim to substitute illicit drug crops with commodity crops like cacao—has transformed forest ecologies, risking loss to both biodiversity and cultural ecosystem services (CES) for surrounding communities. In the last ten years, forest loss linked to the increase in cultivation of commodity crops—both licit and illicit—has been monitored, generating extensive geospatial data. However, the spatiotemporal impacts on key plant species utilized by indigenous communities who have recently shifted to drug crop and commodity agricultural production remain poorly understood. In this paper, we use geospatial modeling to explore the potential impacts of drug crop cultivation and alternative development programs on the CES of Ticuna indigenous communities of the Peruvian Amazon. We analyze the spatiotemporal impact of drug and commodity crop cultivation on three culturally significant species of the genus Ischnosiphon, known locally as dexpe or huarumá, by generating a model of the potential distribution of the three species. The rate of increase of legal and illegal crops was also calculated and the spatiotemporal impact was measured and represented using spatial analysis techniques. Our analysis finds that, between 2010 and 2020, the increase in both illicit and licit commodity crop cultivation is correlated with changes in the distribution of huarumá species, which in turn affects the cultural ecosystem services of Ticuna communities.

Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 6(1): pp. 93–111. 

By Thiago Canettieri

This paper presents an analysis of the relationship between peripheral urbanization, informal real estate markets, and criminal activities in Belo Horizonte, Brazil. The study, based on ethnographic research conducted in two different peripheral areas of the city, reveals a clear connection between crime and the land market in these areas. The paper highlights how criminal agents exploit land properties to promote their illicit economic activities in peripheral contexts of the city. The unique pattern of peripheral urbanization creates opportunities for illicit agents to manage, control, and commodify spaces of informality, thereby facilitating their illegal activities. The main findings of the study underscore the significant impact of criminal activities on land markets, particularly the role of violence, coercion, and social legitimacy in the actions of criminals in real estate markets. The study also sheds light on the impact of informal real estate markets on the lives of people living in peripheral areas. By revealing the connections between crime, land market dynamics, and urbanization processes, this study significantly contributes to a deeper understanding of the complexities at play in peripheral areas of Belo Horizonte.

Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 6(1): pp. 129–144. DOI: