By Karolina Augustovaa, Helena Carrapicob, and Jelena Obradović-Wochnik

Migrants’ involvement in smuggling increases alongside restricted cross-border movement and violent borders, yet this dynamic is usually examined from migrants’ position as clients.In this article, we move away from migrants and smugglers as two separate roles and question migrants’ aspirations to and experiences of resorting to smuggling networks as workers in the context of EU land borders, where direct violence is used daily to fight cross-border crime. By doing so, we move furtherthe examination of fluid relations in smuggling provisions and the way they are intertwined with care and exploitation, asshaped and circumscribed by violent borders. The article illus-trates the intersections between border violence and migrants active involvement in smuggling by drawing on the case studyof an anonymised Border Town and multi-site, multi-author fieldwork from Serbia and Bosnia. By questioning migrants experiences of shifting roles from clients to service providers,and by taking into account their work in smuggling provision,we show that, in a situation of protracted vulnerability orche-strated by border violence, state and law enforcement, the categories – “migrant” and “smugglers” – can blur.Introduction I am a smuggler. Without smugglers, no people would reach Europe, not evenme’, said Mula, while sitting in a train station. Mula, like dozens of other people around him, travelled through the ‘Balkan Route’ to attempt hisjourney across the increasingly violent borders with the EU states, such asCroatia. However, Mula had no money, and the only way to pay for clandes-tine transport was using his own labour as a smuggler, as he called himself.A blurring of clients and perpetrators in organised crime is not a new phenomenon (Lo Iacono 2014). Same patterns of fluid relations also takeplace in smuggling, an activity recognised in policy terms as impersonal organised crime; a feature that, however, often lacks in human smuggling

GEOPOLITICS2023, VOL. 28, NO. 2, 619–640

By Jon Davies & Maryana Kachynska 

This paper critically examines the intricate relationship between approaches to modern slavery and immigration policy in the UK, particularly in relation to migrants from Romania, Albania, and Ukraine. It situates the discussion within the broader context of state policies and practices that perpetuate exploitation, thereby challenging the notion that the UK has a ‘world-leading’ approach towards addressing modern slavery. The discussion highlights how immigration controls often intertwine with crime control, thereby facilitating a hostile environment for migrants. By drawing on examples from Romania, Albania, and Ukraine, the paper illustrates the varied and detrimental impacts of UK immigration and modern slavery policies on these groups. Furthermore, the paper explores public and political perceptions of immigration, noting fluctuations in attitudes post-EU withdrawal and across groups of migrants. The discussion extends to hinting at policy shifts under the new Labour government, addressing systemic challenges in addressing labour exploitation and reforming immigration. Ultimately, the paper calls for a nuanced approach that prioritises humanitarian and labour/employment considerations alongside security concerns, acknowledging the persistent complexities with modern slavery and immigration issues.

Int Criminol 4, 396–407 (2024)

By Human Rights Watch

Over 4 million Myanmar nationals are currently in Thailand, nearly half of whom are undocumented, facing the constant threat of harassment, arrest, and deportation. Many have entered Thailand since the February 2021 military coup in Myanmar, amid surging abuses, including war crimes and crimes against humanity, by the military junta. “I’ll Never Feel Secure” examines the situation for Myanmar nationals in Thailand since the coup. While many are refugees under international law, Thailand has not recognized them as such, leaving limited ways in which they can regularize their status. Undocumented Myanmar nationals struggle to cope without legal security or permission to work and live in fear of being returned to repression, conflict, and a humanitarian crisis in Myanmar. Thailand not only does not recognize refugees as such, but the limited measures it has in place for “protected persons” are effectively closed to most Myanmar nationals. As a result, many Myanmar nationals in Thailand, including children, have no legal access to basic health care, education, or work. The reality for many is self-imposed house arrest to avoid the constant risk of extortion, not only from random encounters with Thai police, but also from the semi-formal systems Thai security personnel use to extract money from undocumented migrants. The report calls on the Thai government to introduce accessible legal residency and work authorization for Myanmar nationals, including refugee status for those who qualify. At a minimum, the government should adopt a “temporary protection framework” for Myanmar nationals that will stop the endemic exploitation and extortion made possible because of their lack of immigration status.   

New York: Human Rights Watch, 2025. 54p.

By Human Rights Watch

The 155-page report, “The Gig Trap: Algorithmic, Wage and Labor Exploitation in Platform Work in the US” focuses on seven major companies operating in the US: Amazon Flex, DoorDash, Favor, Instacart, Lyft, Shipt, and Uber. These companies claim to offer gig workers “flexibility” but often end up paying them less than state or local minimum wages. Six of the seven companies use algorithms with opaque rules to assign jobs and determine wages, meaning that workers do not know how much they will be paid until after completing the job.

Human Rights Watch, May 12, 2025, p. 155

By Victoria A. Greenfield, Tobias Sytsma, Amanda Kerrigan, Maya Buen

Forced labor—work performed involuntarily and under menace of penalty—occurs globally, with reports of abuses in all countries. About 28 million people—one in every 300 people worldwide—work against their will, bound through physical violence, threats, debt bondage, and other exploitative means. The United States has long imposed prohibitions on imports of goods made with forced labor—notably, under the Tariff Act of 1930 and the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act of 2021 (UFLPA). The UFLPA targets China's extensive use of forced labor as a state-sponsored, coercive policy tool in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), by barring U.S. imports of goods made in the XUAR or sourced from entities connected to it. Still, such goods flow through global supply chains. In 2021, the United States accounted for over one-fifth of the world's imports of goods that were at risk of being made with forced labor.The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which leads trade enforcement under these laws, requested an analysis of trade enforcement and its impact. Researchers set out to (1) assist DHS in developing analytical capabilities for assessing the impact of its efforts to combat forced labor through trade enforcement and (2) evaluate the impact that DHS's actions and investments have had on meeting the goals of eliminating U.S. imports of goods made with forced labor and eliminating the use of forced labor globally. This report outlines the

researchers' methods for evaluating DHS's impact and presents findings on efforts and recommendations for strengthening enforcement.

Key Findings

DHS's impact in trade enforcement depends on stakeholders.

Trade enforcement is making measurable progress, but stakeholders are encountering impediments that DHS cannot address entirely on its own. U.S. businesses—and consumers—remain exposed to goods made with forced labor through indirect supply chain linkages with limited visibility.

Trade enforcement still holds value even if it, alone, cannot change China's policy on forced labor in the XUAR. Economic sanctions face inherent obstacles, but trade enforcement can help limit U.S. imports of goods made with forced labor, prevent U.S. complicity in other countries' labor abuses, and send a strong policy signal.

Trade enforcement comes with costs that can undermine its aims. U.S. businesses can incur costs from tracing supply chains, switching suppliers, and mitigating commercial disruptions; the environment could experience related harms; and China could retaliate and obfuscate.

DHS can track trade enforcement progress and unintended consequences, but it might be unable to know whether it is meeting its ultimate aims. Capturing broad effects on U.S. businesses, workers, and consumers; the environment; and global working conditions might be harder than capturing those on immediate goals for enforcement efforts.

DHS needs enough of the right resources and information to do its job, but stakeholders have suggested that it does not have them. Concerns about staffing included hiring, skills, burnout, and retention.

DHS and its stakeholders would benefit from more and higher-quality information. Better visibility into global working conditions, supply chain composition, the content of goods, and enforcement processes could strengthen trade enforcement.

Recommendations

Look for opportunities to encourage robust stakeholder participation by improving the flow and quality of information through greater transparency and improvements in tools, technology, and methods of data analysis.

Consider a more comprehensive approach to combating forced labor in global supply chains by working with other U.S. agencies and other countries to better leverage potential complementarities of economic sanctions and other types of measures.

Consider options for mitigating unintended consequences in concert with other U.S. agencies and with input from nongovernmental stakeholders, either by reducing them or responding to them, depending on their severity and likely prevalence.

Work with other U.S. agencies to monitor indicators of progress and unintended consequences over time to better understand how conditions are evolving.

Develop evidence with stakeholders to inform public debates on trade enforcement, including those on concerns about de minimis entries and environmental initiatives.

Continue to make the case for funding and staffing, which are critical resources for trade enforcement and are likely to need to increase.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2025. 196p.

By Amnesty International
Tens of thousands of migrant workers travel every year to Canada in the hope of providing a better life for their families. They are promised labour opportunities and working conditions that very often they cannot enjoy in their countries of origin. Yet, many find a different reality upon arrival. This report investigates the human rights impact of Canada’s Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP), a temporary migration scheme that allows employers to hire migrant workers, primarily in low-pay occupations.

London: Amnesty International, 2025. 71p.