By The Mixed Migration Centre

  Drawing on more than 1,000 surveys with refugees and migrants, this infographic examines their perceptions of dangerous locations, direct experiences of abuse and harsh conditions and their interactions with and perceptions of smugglers. Additionally, it explores the sources of information that refugees and migrants relied on before and during their journey, as well as their access to assistance.  

London/Denmark: Mixed Migration Centre, 2024. 6p.

By The Mixed Migration Centre

Sudan serves as a key country of transit for movements along the Central Mediterranean Route, linking countries in East and the Horn of Africa to North Africa. Since the outbreak of conflict in April 2023, safe migration routes through the country have shifted away from Khartoum and migrants from conflict-affected regions are more reliant on smuggling networks to overcome limited mobility options and restrictive visa policies in neighbouring countries. This snapshot examines migrants' perceptions of their smugglers, the services they provide, and the abuses that migrants perceive smugglers to be perpetrating. It should be noted that while interviews with migrants were carried out in the second half of 2024, most respondents had been in Sudan since before the outbreak of war in April 2023 and are reflecting both on their interactions with smugglers along the journey to Sudan and once in the country. This is the first of two snapshots published on smuggling dynamics along routes to and within Sudan. The second snapshot on the role of smugglers is available here. Key findings • Over half of migrants felt that their smugglers helped them to reach their intended destination (59%) and did not feel intentionally misled by their smugglers (56%). • Perceptions varied by age, with youth (aged 18-24) expressing less confidence in their smugglers than older respondents (aged 25+). • The main services supplied by smugglers were providing accommodation (45%) and food/water (46%), facilitating border crossings (33%), and dealing with authorities (32%). Youth were more reliant on smugglers for crossing borders and dealing with authorities compared to older migrants (56% and 41% vs. 25% and 29%, respectively). • More than half of respondents (58%) described their smuggler as a "service provider or businessperson". Youth more often perceived their smugglers as criminals than older respondents (33% vs. 15-18%). • Few migrants (9%) perceived smugglers as perpetrators of abuse during their journey. For those who did (n=28), kidnapping (18 cases), detention (16 cases), physical violence (10 cases), and robbery (7 cases) were the top abuses.

London/Denmark: Mixed Migration Centre, 2025. 10p.

By Tuesday Reitano and Prem Mahadevan

This brief brings together key lessons emerging from GI-TOC research on the smuggling of migrants (SOM) between 2015-23. The research emphasises (1) The need to provide sufficient opportunities for legal migration (2) The importance of timing for enforcement-led responses (3) The adaptive nature of the smuggling industry, with route changes being implemented swiftly in response to seemingly formidable obstacles to population movement.

Hostility towards migrants has increased in the aftermath of COVID-19, however drivers of migration have intensified. Regional smuggling markets and routes are consolidating under influential poly-criminals, while governments crack down on smaller players. To counter this, state intervention efforts might consider prioritising the slowing, and ideally, the reversal of this consolidation. This would require a holistic approach that addresses migrant smuggling through development interventions, over solely concentrating on interdiction measures.

Policy implications

• Legal migration prospects offer a clear boundary between lawful and unlawful entry, facilitating prompt action for those not using established channels.

• Setting up humanitarian support infrastructure along smuggling routes could help mitigate power imbalances between migrants and smugglers

• Multilateral intelligence collection states with visa-free travel arrangements between them, could use tracking to detect criminal consolidation on key routes, enabling targeted interdiction and counter-action against smuggling networks.

• Differentiating between migrant smuggling networks: standalone operations vs. career criminal groups.

• Partnering with NGOs and CSOs could help map smuggling networks, as they often have access to migrant accounts.

• Strengthening of data collation capacity within law enforcement agencies could build up a longterm evidence base to curate policy responses.

Briefing Note 28

The Hague: Serious Organised Crime & Anti-Corruption Evidence (SOC ACE), 2024. 10p.

By: DUMBRAVA Costica

More than 90 % of people who cross the external borders of the European Union (EU) irregularly do so with the assistance of migrant smugglers. The facilitation of irregular migration is a highly profitable criminal activity, given the relatively low risks incurred by the perpetrators. Detections of irregular border crossings are at their highest levels since 2016, yet demand for migration facilitation services has also risen to a new high. This high demand is not only due to the fact that people in severe distress – whether because of genuine fear for their lives or for economic reasons – keep trying to reach the EU, by irregular means if necessary. Demand is also high because it has become harder to cross the EU's external borders illegally, because of increased external border controls and other measures put in place to prevent irregular migration. This is where migrant smuggling networks step in. Migrant smugglers are among some of the most agile criminals. They go to great lengths to avoid getting caught, quickly adapting the routes and methods they use to smuggle migrants into, within or beyond the EU. The facilitation of irregular migration is a complex crime, interconnected with many other criminal activities, such as document fraud, trafficking in human beings and other types of illicit smuggling. The criminal organisations involved in smuggling migrants are increasingly sophisticated, professional and violent. Although people willingly pay smugglers to help them cross borders, they do so at great personal risk. Too many lose their lives, or are at risk of serious harm or exploitation. Preventing and combating migrant smuggling and related crimes is therefore one of the key priorities of EU action against irregular migration and organised crime. The European Parliament has repeatedly called for more and better operational cooperation, data sharing and legal migration channels. The European Commission has just proposed new legislation to break the smugglers' business model. This is an update of a briefing from 2021.

Strasbourg, France:European Parliament , 2023. 12p

By Rhoda Margesson, Kristin Finklea

Migrant smuggling, also known as human smuggling, refers to the voluntary transportation of an individual across international borders, in violation of one or more countries’ laws. Smugglers facilitate migrant travel, typically in exchange for payment, sometimes using fraudulent identity documents and covert transit. While smuggled migrants agree to be smuggled—a condition that distinguishes the practice from human trafficking—they may be vulnerable to abuse by their smuggler or later become a trafficking victim. Various United Nations (U.N.) sources cite estimates that globally, migrant smuggling totals $7-$10 billion a year or more, but the full extent of the problem is not known. Through oversight hearings and proposed legislation, Congress has sought more information on migrant smuggling and on ways to deter and punish smugglers

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2021. 3p.

By Andreas Schloenhardt

This research report identifies, outlines, and examines criminal offences pertaining to the smuggling of migrants in the ten ASEAN Member States. The report gives insight into the legislative framework relating to the criminalisation of smuggling of migrants in Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR), Malaysia, the Union of Myanmar (Myanmar), the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam. Domestic offences are compared to the criminalisation requirements set out in the United Nations Smuggling of Migrants Protocol and the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Using this approach, similarities and differences to the international framework are highlighted and recommendations are developed to facilitate the accurate and comprehensive implementation of the Protocol requirements into domestic laws. Recent developments led by ASEAN to provide coordinated responses to smuggling of migrants and to facilitate cooperation and information exchange between Member States are also documented and their potential further explored. This report serves to assist ASEAN Member States in their efforts to prevent and combat the smuggling of migrants effectively, enhance international cooperation, protect the rights of smuggled migrants, and to strengthen the role of ASEAN in this field.

Bangkok, Thailand: United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific, 2019. 208p.

By Pia Orrenius

Border enforcement of immigration laws raises the costs of illegal immigration, while interior enforcement also lowers its benefits. Used together, border and interior enforcement therefore reduce the net benefits of illegal immigration and should lower the probability that an individual will decide to illegally migrate. While empirical studies find that border and interior enforcement serve as deterrents to illegal immigration, immigration enforcement is costly and carries unintended consequences, such as a decrease in circular migration, an increase in smuggling, and higher prevalence of off-the-books employment and use of fraudulent and falsified documents.

Bonn: Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), 2019.. 11p.