By Rupert Horsley

Human smuggling across these regions continues to evolve rapidly. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, significant changes have emerged in the volume and direction of migratory flows and smuggling networks. These shifts are closely linked to ongoing political, economic and security developments, including protracted conflict, governance crises and economic uncertainty.

Since 2016, the GI-TOC has monitored the political economy of human smuggling and trafficking in North Africa and the Sahel. This work was expanded and formalised in 2018 with the establishment of the North Africa and Sahel Observatory (NAS-Obs). Through annual country reports and thematic studies, the Observatory has provided a detailed understanding of the actors, routes and dynamics shaping mobility and exploitation in the region.

The 2025 series features country reports on Libya, Niger, Chad and Tunisia. Together, they capture the current transformations in human smuggling across both regions: from the persistence of hybrid smuggling systems in Libya, to evolving migration routes through Niger and Chad, and the increasing mobility of Sudanese refugees across North Africa. The reports also analyse the political and security contexts driving these trends, including the deepening conflict in Sudan, ongoing instability in Libya, and growing pressures along Tunisia’s coastal migration routes.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, . 2025. 36p.

By The Mixed Migration Centre

Sudan serves as a key country of transit for movements along the Central Mediterranean Route, linking countries in East and the Horn of Africa to North Africa. Since the outbreak of conflict in April 2023, safe migration routes through the country have shifted away from Khartoum and migrants from conflict-affected regions are more reliant on smuggling networks to overcome limited mobility options and restrictive visa policies in neighbouring countries. This snapshot examines migrants' perceptions of their smugglers, the services they provide, and the abuses that migrants perceive smugglers to be perpetrating. It should be noted that while interviews with migrants were carried out in the second half of 2024, most respondents had been in Sudan since before the outbreak of war in April 2023 and are reflecting both on their interactions with smugglers along the journey to Sudan and once in the country. This is the first of two snapshots published on smuggling dynamics along routes to and within Sudan. The second snapshot on the role of smugglers is available here. Key findings • Over half of migrants felt that their smugglers helped them to reach their intended destination (59%) and did not feel intentionally misled by their smugglers (56%). • Perceptions varied by age, with youth (aged 18-24) expressing less confidence in their smugglers than older respondents (aged 25+). • The main services supplied by smugglers were providing accommodation (45%) and food/water (46%), facilitating border crossings (33%), and dealing with authorities (32%). Youth were more reliant on smugglers for crossing borders and dealing with authorities compared to older migrants (56% and 41% vs. 25% and 29%, respectively). • More than half of respondents (58%) described their smuggler as a "service provider or businessperson". Youth more often perceived their smugglers as criminals than older respondents (33% vs. 15-18%). • Few migrants (9%) perceived smugglers as perpetrators of abuse during their journey. For those who did (n=28), kidnapping (18 cases), detention (16 cases), physical violence (10 cases), and robbery (7 cases) were the top abuses.

London/Denmark: Mixed Migration Centre, 2025. 10p.