By Courtney C. Siegert, Molly A. Kaplan, Nicholas P. Herrmann and M. Kate Spradley

This paper details the structural and resource challenges in Texas related to identifying migrant decedents, investigating their deaths, repatriating them, and adhering to legal and ethical requirements in addressing this humanitarian tragedy. While actors working on migrant decedent investigations in Arizona can map and provide accurate counts of migrant deaths, this is not yet possible for Texas cases. Texas’ mixed Medical Examiner/Justice of the Peace medicolegal system suffers from fragmentation across county jurisdictions, lack of resources, and minimal access to investigative tools for transnational families. These challenges produce a landscape where unidentified presumed migrants may structurally disappear (e.g., buried in temporarily marked graves as unidentified persons with no investigation or case tracking). The article highlights the work of Operation Identification (OpID), a humanitarian project formed to assist border counties with recovering, identifying, and repatriating migrant decedents. OpID’s extensive community outreach and collaboration with governmental and nongovernmental partners in the United States and Latin America have improved practices in some Texas counties. However, systemic change is still needed to address this humanitarian disaster. The article proposes that presumed migrant decedents be managed using a disaster victim identification (DVI) approach, which prioritizes identification, rather than how and why someone dies. It also proposes the establishment of regional Migrant Identification Centers (MICs) to streamline identification and repatriation efforts, while ensuring compliance with Texas law by Justices of the Peace (JPs). Centralization, the article argues, can lead to more accurate counts of migrant deaths and lay the groundwork for greater resources. The article also supports increased access to national databases including the National Combined DNA Indexing System (CODIS) and the National Missing and Unidentified Persons System (NamUs). It argues that transnational families of missing persons be afforded expanded access to investigative tools (e.g., NamUs)

Journal on Migration and Human SecurityVolume 12, Issue 3, September 2024, Pages 257-276

By Robin C. Reineke and Daniel E. Martinez

In this article, we present a qualitative analysis of the events surrounding death or disappearance in autopsy and missing person reports from the Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner (PCOME) in Arizona to highlight how interactions between border enforcement personnel and migrants can be deadly. We reviewed PCOME records of undocumented border crosser deaths between 2000 and 2023 and observed three main types of deadly U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) practices: reckless motor vehicle pursuits, aggressive strategies used to detain individuals who are on foot, and the use of lethal force. Our findings reveal that these tactics, which we argue constitute forms of “excessive use of force,” represent significant yet overlooked factors contributing to migrant death and disappearance in southern Arizona. We make the following policy recommendations:

1. Immediate measures to prevent the loss of life

(A). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should mandate a ban on border enforcement methods that provoke fear, panic, or confusion.

(B). DHS should take measures to substantially reduce the use of high-speed motor vehicle pursuits by USBP and other immigration enforcement officials.

(C). DHS should ensure that USBP officers are compliant with Department of Justice (DOJ) standards on use of deadly force, in particular the policy that “Deadly force may not be used solely to prevent the escape of a fleeing suspect.”

2. Investigate Border Fatalities Involving Border Enforcement Officers

(A). We call on the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to conduct an official review of all medical examiner and coroner records along the U.S.-Mexico border for fatality cases in which border enforcement personnel were involved in any way in the circumstances surrounding death.

(B). We encourage the formation of civilian review boards in border regions to review medical examiner and coroner records of migrant fatalities involving immigration officials as well as immigration officials’ apprehension strategies immediately preceding fatal encounters with migrants.

Journal on Migration and Human SecurityVolume 12, Issue 3, September 2024, Pages 243-256

By Jasmine R. Hernandez and Heather J. H. Edgar

The United States is no stranger to migration across its borders. In 2020, its Southwestern border saw a drastic increase in apprehensions by the Border Patrol. While imperfect and an undercount of the true number of migration events, apprehension data is often used as a proxy to understand migration patterns. The rise in migration was coupled with an increased but unknown number of deaths along migration routes. This article focuses on the New Mexico portion of the El Paso Border Patrol Sector and the increased migrant caseload at New Mexico’s Office of the Medical Investigator (OMI) over the last few years. To the best of our knowledge, this article is the first academic study to examine migrant deaths in detail in southern New Mexico. We begin by contextualizing the changing pattern of migrant deaths in New Mexico within the broader framework of border policing strategies that have intentionally pushed migration routes to remote areas. We describe the work of the OMI, highlighting its very recent initiatives to track migrant deaths in its database. We then discuss the changes seen by the OMI in its migrant caseload from fiscal year (FY) 2009 to 2023, with the most drastic increase in cases occurring from 2022 to 2023. For instance, the data indicate that most of the identified migrants that have died in New Mexico were recovered in June and July (45 percent), crossed through Doña Ana County (66 percent), were male (60 percent), and among those identified, were from Mexico (65 percent) and between 20 and 39 years of age (69 percent). Of the 248 cases of migrant deaths, 87 percent have been identified. The most common causes of death were undetermined (46 percent) and environmental exposure (41 percent). We then explore the effects of changing governmental policies and state initiatives to curb/reduce migration in the US on OMI’s increased caseload. We discuss the impact that the rapid shift in migration deaths is having on the OMI and how OMI is working to respond and adjust to the dynamic situation. This work highlights the collateral damage of border security measures, underscored by the increasing number of deaths and challenges faced by the OMI. We consider the need for new and amended policies aimed at mitigating the humanitarian crisis that continues to unfold, emphasizing the need for the humane treatment of migrants. Finally, we suggest allocating resources to death investigating agencies. These resources would provide essential support to find, identify, and repatriate migrants, improve agencies’ abilities to collaborate with governmental agencies and programs such as Border Patrol’s Missing Migrant Program, and improve our understanding of the circumstances along the Southwestern border.

Journal on Migration and Human SecurityVolume 12, Issue 3, September 2024, Pages 226-242

By Daniel E. Martínez, Sam Chambers, Geoff Boyce and Jeremy Slack 

Immigration at the US-México border has drastically changed since the mid-2010s. Instead of adult undocumented Mexican men, generally migrating for economic purposes, there are now large numbers of men, women, unaccompanied minors, and families from diverse countries seeking asylum in the United States, as they are allowed to do under US and international law. In response to these changes, the US federal government leveraged multiple strategies to impede access to the country’s asylum system, including relying on Title 42 “expulsions.” Title 42, a COVID-19-era health measure, prevented migrants from initiating an asylum claim. Instead, asylum-seekers were typically immediately expelled to the closest port of entry in México. The use of public health as a pretext to control the border placed these migrants at risk and led many to attempt repeat border crossings. Given this policy context, we ask: what, if any, is the association between Title 42 expulsions and migrant deaths in southern Arizona? We address this question by drawing on records of recovered undocumented border crosser (UBC) remains investigated by the Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner (PCOME) in Tucson, Arizona. We examined differences in the number and demographic characteristics of UBC remains recovered between what prior studies have characterized as the “Localized Funnel Effect” Era of border enforcement in southern Arizona (i.e., October 1, 2013–March 19, 2020; N = 851), and the “Title 42” Era (i.e., March 20, 2021–September 30, 2023; N = 709). We also assessed how, if at all, the geography of recovered UBC remains shifted between these eras. We found that migrant deaths rose from an annual mean of 133 during the Localized Funnel Effect (LFE) Era to 198 in the Title 42 (T42) Era, representing a 48 percent increase. Compared to the earlier era, remains recovered during the T42 Era clustered closer to the border and near the cities of Nogales and Agua Prieta, Sonora, having shifted from west to east in southern Arizona. Additionally, we found that Title 42 disproportionately affected Mexican and Guatemalan nationals both in terms of expulsions as well as deaths. We propose several policy recommendations based on our study’s findings intended to reduce unnecessary suffering and increase human security:

• The US federal government should not impede or limit migrants’ access to the asylum system. Policymakers should instead create clear pathways and procedures that obviate the need for migrants to undertake dangerous journeys and overcome barriers to fair consideration of their claims.

• The US government must expand its ability to address these claims, as continued attempts to block asylum seekers will result in additional loss of life and increased violence. It should increase its capacity to screen asylum seekers at the US-México border. We propose an increase in USCIS Asylum Officers to carry out this duty. US Customs and Border Protection agents should not screen asylum seekers, nor should they assume the responsibility of serving as asylum officers, given the agency’s extensively documented record of persistently dehumanizing and mistreating migrants.

• The US federal government must take measures to eliminate the backlog of asylum cases in the immigration courts. These measures need to include reforms in the underlying immigration system and in the removal adjudication system, such as greater access to legal counsel and changes to the law that offer legal pathways to imperiled migrants who do not meet the narrow definition of asylum. Absent these reforms, the asylum case backlog will grow, and many asylum seekers with strong claims to remain will be removed after living for years in the United States.

Journal on Migration and Human SecurityVolume 12, Issue 3, September 2024, Pages 182-203

By Nicole Hallett

The border has never played a larger role in the American psyche than it does today, and yet it has never been less legally significant. Today, a noncitizen’s place of residence tells you less about what rights and privileges they enjoy than it ever has in the past. The border has migrated inward, affecting many aspects of non-citizens’ lives in the United States. The divergence between the physical and legal border is no accident. Instead, it is a policy response to the perceived loss of control over the physical border. But the physical border remains porous despite these legal changes. People keep migrating even as we continue to draw boundaries within communities, homes, and workplaces far away from the border. This paper explores how U.S. law has evolved to render the border superfluous, even as its symbolic importance has grown, and how it might further evolve in the future.

University of Chicago Legal Forum: Vol. 2023, Article 6.

By César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández

Borders do not exist. They are made and remade. At every step, the law creates, moves, reforms, reproduces, and reinforces the border. Focusing on the boundary that México and the United States share, this essay critiques the U.S. Supreme Court’s privileging of the sovereign prerogative to control access to the nation’s territory. In their efforts to control movement across and near the border, legal doctrine permits Executive officials to deviate from ordinary legal constraints on the use of violence. This creates a modern version of the sovereign that Carl Schmitt described a century ago: extra-constitutional in origin and subject to law only on its own terms. Urging an end to the law of border exceptionalism, the essay argues that the Schmittian sovereignty that exists in the borderlands is neither justified by the facts on the ground nor required by the very legal principles that the Supreme Court points to.

Ohio State Legal Studies Research Paper No. 820

University of Chicago Legal Forum: Vol. 2023, Article 5

By Matthew Lisiecki and Gerard Apruzzese

In 2017, the Center for Migration Studies (CMS) analyzed the effects of a mass deportation program for undocumented immigrants proposed by then-President Donald Trump (Warren & Kerwin 2017). With now-candidate Trump reintroducing a similar proposal as a key element of his platform, CMS has conducted a new analysis using the most recent available data: the 2022 American Community Survey microdata, released by the US Census Bureau (Ruggles et al. 2024). In this report, we highlight the devastation of mass deportation on both undocumented residents and their US citizen and legal noncitizen families and communities. We discuss individual, household, and family characteristics of the 10.9 million undocumented residents living in the US, and 4.7 million households with both undocumented residents and residents with permanent legal status (referred to henceforth as “mixed status” households). We investigate the economic effect of the deportation on US citizens and undocumented residents, as well as the negative fiscal impact on the broader economy should mass deportation be carried out.

Key findings of the updated analysis include:

• 5.8 million US households are home to at least one undocumented resident. Of those, 4.7 million households are home to undocumented residents and US citizens or others with legal status. Therefore, mass deportation threatens to break up nearly 5 million American families.

• Over half of the US undocumented population is woven into American life, having been in the country for at least 10 years; their deportation would damage long-standing communities.

• Mass deportation would push nearly 10 million US citizens into economic hardship. Median household income for mixed-status households would drop from $75,500 to $39,000 (a drop of over 48 percent).

• 5.5 million US-born children live in households with at least one undocumented resident, including 1.8 million living in households with two undocumented parents.

• The monetary cost of paying to complete the upbringing of these US-born children in the event of mass deportation is estimated to be at least $116.5 billion.

• Undocumented workers contribute an estimated $96.7 billion in federal, state, and local taxes; their removal from the workforce would have a substantial impact on local economies.

This report is one of several CMS publications outlining the negative impacts of a mass deportation policy for undocumented immigrants. In 2017, we analyzed the social and economic impacts of mass deportation using Census Bureau data from 2014 (Warren & Kerwin 2017). Earlier in 2024, we explored other immediate and downstream impacts of the Trump campaign’s proposed mass deportation policy, including the moral, legal, and public safety crisis caused by implementing a mass search-and-seizure operation across the nation.

New York: Center for Migration Studies, 2024. 7p.

By The American Immigration Council

Temporary Protected Status (TPS) is a temporary immigration status provided to nationals of certain countries experiencing problems that make it difficult or unsafe for their nationals to be deported there.1 TPS has been a lifeline to hundreds of thousands of individuals already in the United States when problems in a home country make their departure or deportation untenable. This fact sheet provides an overview of how TPS designations are determined, what benefits TPS confers, and how TPS beneficiaries apply for and regularly renew their status.

Washington DC: American Immigration Council, 2024. 8p.

By Emily M. Brown

The Temporary Protected Status (TPS) program protects migrants from deportation when their native countries have been struck by armed conflict, environmental disaster, or other extraordinary upheaval. Enacted by Congress in 1990, the program largely escaped attention and controversy for many years as presidential administrations of both parties designated, extended, and terminated TPS designations at similar rates. However, beginning in 2017, then-President Trump tried to end TPS protections for 300,000 beneficiaries—more than 95% of the total. His efforts were blocked in federal district courts, and President Biden has since rescinded the terminations and issued many new designations, expanding the program to its largest size ever and protecting hundreds of thousands of vulnerable migrants. Nonetheless, the future of TPS is more uncertain than ever now that it has become as politically polarizing as many other aspects of the national immigration debate. Many TPS holders have now held the temporary status for over two decades, and they deserve a solution to enable them to reside permanently in the U.S. Some scholars have proposed legislative reforms to enable long-time TPS holders to qualify for green cards while also making modest adjustments to the program that would make it more temporary in nature for the future. But efforts to provide a path to permanent residence for long-time TPS holders through legislation are unlikely to be fruitful in the current political climate. Meanwhile, newer TPS beneficiaries, who are fleeing armed conflict and civil strife in countries like Afghanistan, Haiti, and Venezuela, are plagued by slow processing times of their applications, keeping them out of the formal labor market, and they often remain stuck in immigration removal proceedings, which is unnecessary, costly, and could put them in greater danger of removal if a future administration terminates their TPS designation. This Article argues that this and future administrations should build on the accomplishment of extending humanitarian protection to hundreds of thousands of new beneficiaries by taking additional executive actions to benefit both long-time and new TPS beneficiaries, including designating and redesignating more countries for TPS, terminating removal proceedings for those who are eligible for TPS, and creating a parole program that will help longtime TPS holders eventually attain permanent residency.

Ohio State Legal Studies Research Paper No. 879, Buffalo Law Review, Volume 72, pp. 101-168, 

By The University of Washington, Center for Human Rights

2019’s Keep Washington Working (KWW) Act and 2020’s Courts Open to All Act (COTA) place Washington state at the forefront of national efforts to protect immigrant rights through state law. Yet the mere passage of these laws doesn’t mean they’re actually being enforced. After 18 months of research evaluating the implementation of KWW and COTA through the analysis of practices in 13 priority counties, this first report of the University of Washington Center for Human Rights (UWCHR) “Immigrant Rights Observatory” shares several key findings. Because the local police and sheriffs have historically played a significant role in bringing Washingtonians into contact with federal immigration enforcement, this report focuses on the ways in which law enforcement agencies and jails have implemented KWW. Key findings include the following:

• Law enforcement agencies across our state are dedicating energy and effort to KWW implementation—though not, for the most part, using the Attorney General Office’s model policies designed to provide guidance to local agencies on this process.

• Everyday policing still blurs into opportunities for federal immigration enforcement. Despite KWW’s prohibitions on the sharing of non-public information about immigrant Washingtonians with ICE/CBP for purposes of civil immigration enforcement, some local police and sheriff’s deputies continued to summon federal agents to the scene of traffic stops, to provide tips about the location of specific individuals, and to participate in multi-agency task force operations that include civil immigration arrests.

• Washington jails and prisons remain key points in the pipeline to immigration detention and deportation. In the booking process, some jails continued to request place of birth information that the law bars them from gathering, and to share it—as well as other information—with ICE/CBP. Detainers, or “immigration holds” which request jails keep custody of individuals beyond their release date to facilitate their apprehension by ICE/CBP, continued to be honored in multiple jurisdictions.

• Jail contracts in flux. KWW mandates Washington’s jails to cease holding immigrants in civil detention under contract with ICE/CBP by December 2021; in anticipation of this date, at least two jails have already terminated the practice. However, one other jail has indicated it expects to continue its contract with CBP beyond that date, using probable cause statements from CBP to justify the detention as criminal rather than civil detention.

• Areas unaddressed by the law remain cause for concern. These include regular DOC-ICE release notifications, local/federal database interoperability, and other ways in which immigrants with criminal recormcnairds—not necessarily even convictions—experience law enforcement and the justice system in dramatically different ways than other Washingtonians, solely because of their citizenship.

Seattle: University of Washington, Center for Human Rights. 2021

By The University of Washington, Center for Human Rights

In 2019, the Washington state legislature passed a landmark “sanctuary” law aimed at safeguarding immigrant rights, the Keep Washington Working Act (KWW). In doing so, it prohibits many once-routine practices that, in the past, funneled many Washington state residents into contact with federal immigration enforcement. While many migrant justice organizations worked hard to secure the law’s passage, in achieving victory they also faced an important challenge. The law’s requirements are sweeping, but the provisions for its enforcement – its “teeth” – are quite modest. Unlike the Sanctuary Promise Act subsequently passed in Oregon, Keep Washington Working does not task any agency with monitoring or responding to violations of the law. And it does not contain a private right of action, which would incentivize efforts to secure compliance by allowing individuals or organizations to recover damages from jurisdictions that violate the law. Indeed,  in the early days of the law, some jurisdictions openly indicated their intention to flout its provisions, signaling that implementation challenges were likely ahead. Since 2020 the UWCHR has examined the law’s implementation, both in policy and practice, across Washington. In this context, it is not easy to know whether the law has accomplished the changes it promised for Washington’s communities. For this reason, since 2020 the UWCHR has examined the law’s implementation, both in policy and practice, across Washington. While real-time monitoring of conditions in communities across the state exceeds our capacity, we conducted this work by sampling areas and practices identified as high priority concerns by partner organizations, including the Washington Defender Association, Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, ACLU of Washington, Columbia Legal Services, OneAmerica, and Washington Immigrant Solidarity Network, and using public records requests to document patterns of concern.6 We also rely on analysis of quantitative data obtained from ICE through requests and litigation under the federal Freedom of Information Act to track enforcement trends in our state in ways that shed light on shifting practices. (We anticipate publication of a full report on those trends in the weeks ahead.) Our first report on KWW’s impact, “Protecting Immigrant Rights: Is Washington’s Law Working?”, was published in August 2021, and identified areas of progress as well as concern. Today, we offer an update on the law five years after its entry into force. While concerns about lack of compliance remain, and we note some of these below, we also highlight some of the behind-the-scenes ways that advocates in civil society and government have acted to ensure the law is effectively securing protections for the rights of migrants in Washington. 

Seattle: The University of Washington Center for Human Rights 2024. 20p.

By The University of Washington, Center for Human Rights

As the United States enters the height of the 2024 electoral season, a familiar pattern is at the forefront of campaign rhetoric: Democrats and Republicans alike declare themselves ever tougher on “the border,” making claims about “record” numbers—of arrests, deportations, border crossings—to bolster their arguments. The deep politicization of immigration policy provides incentives for the data to be used misleadingly by both sides. In fact, the reality of how immigration policy is carried out is more complex: against the backdrop of shifting local and national policies, raw numbers do not necessarily capture what is happening on the ground in actual communities, and may in fact obscure our understanding of the human rights implications of immigration enforcement. This report dives into the question of what shifting trends in immigration enforcement – nationally and locally – mean for communities here in the Pacific Northwest (PNW).1 Drawing on various collections of data from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including some datasets we release here for the first time, as well as on data from immigration courts and insights from immigrant-serving organizations, we examine three central questions: • How is immigration enforcement happening in the PNW? • How does our region’s experience compare to national trends? • What are the implications of these trends for human rights? We find that recent changes in state and local   In this report, we refer to the “Pacific Northwest” or “PNW” as shorthand for the states of Oregon and Washington. These two states, plus Alaska, make up ICE’s “Seattle Area of Responsibility.” Because there is comparatively little immigration enforcement in Alaska, we do not address the circumstances in that state here. policy have contributed to important gains for migrant justice here in the PNW, many of which are highlighted in our recent report “Paths to Compliance: The Effort to Protect Immigrant Rights in Washington State”. This is reflected in changing arrest patterns across the PNW: whereas in past years, local and state law enforcement helped channel migrants into the custody of US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP), in the wake of “sanctuary state” legislation in Oregon and Washington, this happens much less frequently. And while ICE officials warned that they would compensate for curtailed collaboration in sanctuary jurisdictions by conducting more “at large” arrests on the streets and in communities, this does not appear to have been the case in recent years. Instead, Biden administration policies have attempted to alleviate bottlenecks at the US/ Mexico border by shifting the processing of new arrivals to the interior of the country and opening up new pathways for some migrants seeking asylum. For the most part, the growing enforcement numbers we have seen in the PNW reflect this, as migrants arriving here from the southern border are arrested at subsequent check-ins while following instructions from CBP and ICE, rather than in community raids. This is not to suggest that enforcement has been lax. Quite the contrary: recently-arrived migrants, many of them families with small children, and from communities with fewer established support networks in the PNW, face dire conditions and deep challenges defending their rights. And although reports of workplace raids or community-based arrests appear to have waned, such practices could return under a more overtly repressive administration;  thanks to DHS’ growing use of public and private databases, tracking technologies, and digital detention, data on migrant communities is readily available to ICE and CBP, here as elsewhere in the country. At the same time, analysis of court data shows that in fact, outcomes of immigration court cases brought in Washington and Oregon are markedly worse than the national average. This means that although our communities have taken important steps to protect the rights of immigrants, there is no firewall between the “progressive” PNW and national anti-immigrant practices. The border is, in this sense, everywhere: our neighbors continue to be separated from their families in our courts, held under abysmal conditions in ICE detention, and deported through our airports; in some ways, in fact, migrants fare worse here than in other parts of the country. We have a lot of work to be done before the PNW can truly consider itself a “sanctuary” for immigrants.    

Seattle: The University of Washington Center for Human Rights 2024. 24[p.

By Andrea Gómez Cervantes, and Cecilia Menjívar

Using interviews and ethnography started in 2016 in rural and urban Kansas, we examine the consequences of an amplified immigration enforcement combined with a local limited health care infrastructure that reproduce legal violence manifesting on Latina immigrants’ health, access to care, and community participation. We highlight the conditions rooted in place that generate short- and long-term negative impacts for Latina immigrants’ health. Fear and anxiety about the deportation of themselves and their family members make them ill and also generate apprehension about contacting medical institutions, driving, and spending time in public spaces. These circumstances coalesce in women’s lives to block access to medical care and undermine women’s roles in their communities. Following gendered expectations, women turn to their informal networks to seek health care for their families. In the context that the 

Journal of Health and Social Behavior Volume 61 Issue 3 Pages 307-323, 2020

By Cecilia Menjívar

This essay examines the intertwined nature of seemingly neutral immigration laws that illegalize certain immigrant groups and the socially constructed attitudes and stereotypes that associate the same legally targeted groups with “illegality,” to produce the racialization of illegality. These complementary factors are further sustained by other social forces, including media discourses that reify those associations. The racialization of illegality is a fundamentally situational, relational, dynamic, and historically and context-specific process. Today, Latino groups are the preeminent target group of both the social and the legal production of illegality. Thus, this essay examines Latinos' racialized illegality across geographical contexts, within their group, and in relation to other contemporary immigrants. Although expressions of racialized illegality and specific targeted

Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences , 150 Issue 2 Pages 91-105, 2021

By  Ariel G. Ruiz Soto and Andrew Selee

Increasingly, research suggests that providing legal pathways for migration may reduce unauthorized migration pressures, especially when coupled with targeted enforcement. As policymakers across the Americas assess whether and how to expand legal mobility pathways, understanding the pathways that exist currently and how they are used is a vital starting point. This fact sheet examines the U.S. legal pathways that exist for nationals of Mexico and the northern Central American countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, which have long been among the top sources of unauthorized migration to the United States. By analyzing U.S. government data, the fact sheet provides an overview of the extent to which migrants from these countries are issued immigrant visas, for those who intend to live permanently in the country; nonimmigrant visas, for those who seek to enter temporarily for seasonal work, study, or business; and humanitarian forms of admission, including refugee resettlement and humanitarian parole.

Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2024. 15p.