By Arno Tausch

This open-access book describes how the world’s increasingly multicultural societies face the problem that more and more diverse lifestyles (LGBTQIA+ communities) are not universally accepted and that today, in addition to xenophobia, racism, and anti-Semitism, there is substantial homonegativity. This book explores this issue, reviews the empirical literature on the subject, and provides new empirically based evidence on a global and European scale. Based on an analysis of The World Values Survey using the statistical software SPSS, it provides a scientifically sound answer to the question of which social groups in Europe and around the globe are more homophobic and which are less, together with insights into the multivariate relationships between homonegativity and religiously motivated political extremism. The extensive and representative statistical samples allow cautious conclusions to be drawn for smaller religious groups in the European Union and other countries around the world.

Cham: Springer Nature,   2025. 114p.

By Mark Pyman and Paul M. Heywood

This open-access book provides accessible insight into how to tackle corruption in organizations and institutions. It explains how to recognize and analyze corruption issues, together with knowledge and advice on how they can be avoided, prevented, or minimized. It also provides a framework through which readers can examine what strategies are available to tackle corruption issues, a rationale for how to prioritize strategies depending on circumstances and context, and guidance on how to critique various options. The book will appeal to professionals and practitioners, as well as academics interested in governance and corruption.

Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2024. 182p.

Edited By Morena Tartari, Cosimo Marco Scarcelli, Cirus Rinaldi

Folk Devils and Moral Panics in the COVID-19 Pandemic analyses the phenomena of moral panics surrounding so-called folk devils in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. In this volume, internationally recognized moral panic scholars from disciplines including sociology, media studies, criminology, and cultural studies examine case studies of moral panics related to the COVID-19 pandemic. These analyses consider the different social, political, economic, organizational, and cultural contexts within which such moral panics emerged and assess how the concept of moral panic can be deployed to offer novel insights into sociocultural responses to the outbreak. By utilizing both classical approaches to moral panic analysis and more recent trends, chapters discuss the utility of the concept of moral panic that is, for the first time, applied to a global-scale event like the COVID-19 pandemic.

London: Routledge, 2024. 

By Vicky Mei , Felix Owusu, Sam Quinney, Anita Ravishankar, Daniel Sebastian 

In response to the increase in violent crime and specifically gun crime in Winston-Salem, the Winston-Salem Police Department (WSPD) established a crime gun intelligence center. The WSPD Crime Gun Intelligence Center activities were supported by the Fiscal Year 2019 Crime Gun Intelligence Center (CGIC) grant from the U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Assistance. To meet the requirements under this grant, the WSPD CGIC Initiative was created. This initiative has been supported by a cohesive infrastructure that includes technology, specialized investigation, ballistic evidence collection & processing, and partnership with external agencies. The majority of these initiative components resulted from WSPD’s CGIC Strategic Action Plan, which created an actionable design for implementing key CGIC elements. The Strategic Action Plan included establishing policies and procedures, additional training information sharing, and new personnel. The Strategic Action Plan was reviewed and approved by an external team of training and technical assistance providers who partner with the Bureau of Justice Assistance. During the grant period, progress was monitored through monthly meetings attended by WSPD personnel and team members from the technical assistance providers. This report provides a chronological narrative of the grant-funded WSPD CGIC Initiative along with data and statistics relevant to the project. All CGIC data and statistics were collected and maintained by WSPD’s crime analyst assigned to this project. The original project period for this grant was October 2019 through September 2022. The site visit from technical assistance providers for developing the Strategic Action Plan and the procurement of a gunshot detection system (per federal and local procurement requirements) took several months. Because of this, the tracking of statistics was not able to begin until August 2021 when the project was fully operational. Furthermore, because several performance metrics had not been tracked before the awarding of this grant, and therefore pre-award and post-award data was not available for those metrics. Among the key findings in this report are: • Consistent performance measurement. The recommendations addressed in the Strategic Action Plan, along with the required tracking and reporting of performance metrics necessitated the need to track and capture data, which gave WSPD opportunities to re-examine its approach to gun violence based on this data. Metrics in this analysis report will allow the Department to continue revising and developing policies and procedures that will enhance gun violence reduction efforts. • Improved case load summaries and overall investigation. The CGIC Initiative has created a more streamlined and cohesive approach to incident response, investigation, and the possible prosecution of offenders. This grant has allowed additional technology, regular intelligence sharing with external partners, and additional personnel dedicated to all aspects of this initiative, including investigative work, administration, and the National Integrated Ballistic Information Network (NIBIN). With additional personnel  dedicated to NIBIN activities, WSPD has had consistently high percentages of NIBIN acquisitions within 10 days of the offense. Between January 2020 and September 2023, 38 of the 86 months reported 80% or higher for acquisitions entered within the 10-day mark. • Benefits from the use of a gunshot detection system. WSPD has been using ShotSpotter gunshot detection technology since August 2021. Performance data shows multiple benefits from the use of this technology: ▫ Enhanced response. Dispatch delay was significantly less with ShotSpotter alerts compared to Priority 2 calls. Dispatch delay for ShotSpotter alerts averaged only 3.85 minutes, compared to 10.7 minutes with Priority 2 Calls. Officer travel time for ShotSpotter alerts was faster, averaging 6.25 minutes compared to 9.08 minutes with Priority 2 calls. An average of 44.4 minutes were spent by officers at crime scenes generated by ShotSpotter, compared to 37.10 minutes spent at crime scenes prompted by Priority 2 calls. ▫ Increase in reported gunshot incidents. The majority of gunshot incident responses within the ShotSpotter coverage area were initiated from ShotSpotter alerts versus citizen 911 calls. Of the 3,014 ShotSpotter alerts between August 2021 and September 2023, only 644 of these alerts were also reported via citizen 911 calls. To put this data into percentages, only 21.4% of the ShotSpotter alerts between August 2021 and September 2023 also had citizen 911 calls. ▫ Increase in evidence collection & NIBIN Leads. ShotSpotter’s technology of “pointing” to where shots are fired has made it easier to locate ballistic evidence. The increase in evidence collection is also a result of a more thorough processing of crime scenes. The increase in evidence collection also resulted in more NIBIN leads and connecting incidents that would not have been linked without the evidence. ▫ Lives saved. In two instances, had the ShotSpotter system not alerted law enforcement to the shooting, the victims would most likely have died, since neither of these incidents were reported by citizen 911 calls. When officers responded to the ShotSpotter alerts, they were able to render aid and request EMS, which ensured both victims were transported to a local hospital, where the person was treated for (and survived) life-threatening injuries. ▫ Community Engagement is a fundamental tenet within the guiding philosophy of the Winston-Salem Police Department. WSPD actively encourages the community’s involvement in addressing the prevalent issue of violence. Under the CGIC Initiative, the Department has embraced a multifaceted approach that implements various technologies and establishes numerous avenues for community involvement in combating crime. With the integration of ShotSpotter, officers are now promptly informed of gunfire in the coverage area, which means a significant increase in police responsiveness, approximately 80% more responses than before. Consequently, residents who may have hesitated to report gunfire are witnessing a greater police presence each time such incidents are detected. Moreover, officers, upon response, are actively engaging with residents by exiting their vehicles and initiating discussions about the incidents. This approach has led to a notable upswing in positive police-citizen interactions during times of heightened gun violence in the community. ▫ Cost Benefits. A 2022 report presented to Winston-Salem City Council estimated the use of the ShotSpotter gunshot detection system may save the community between $5 million and $8 million annually. This is based on an annual implementation cost of $230,000 - $350,000. Based on these estimates, savings would be a return of between $15 and $25 for each dollar spent. (A cost savings analysis has not yet been completed for 2023.)   

Washington DC:  The Lab @ DC, Office of the City Administrator, 2019. 67p.

By Matteo Vergani,  Angelique Stefanopoulos, Alexandra Lee, Haily Tran, Imogen Richards, Dan Goodhardt, Greg Barton

Bias indicators – that is, facts, circumstances, or patterns that suggest that an act was motivated in whole or in part by bias – can be a useful tool for stakeholders working on tackling hate crimes. Government and non-government agencies can use them to improve and standardise data collection around hate crimes, which can have a cascade of positive effects. For example, they can help to demonstrate in court the prejudice motivation of a crime – and we know that this is often hard in Australia, because the legislation has a very high threshold of proving hateful motivation. They can also improve the precision of measurements of the prevalence of hate crimes in communities, which is necessary for planning appropriate mitigation policies and programmes and for assessing their impact. Bias indicators can also be useful for non-government organisations to make sure that their data collection and research is reliable, consistent and a powerful tool for advocacy and education. We acknowledge that bias indicators can be misused: for example, our lists are not to be read as exhaustive, and users should take them as examples only. Also, incidents can present bias indicators from multiple lists, and coders should not stop at trying to code the incident as targeting one identity only. Importantly, our bias indicators lists should not be used by practitioners to make an assessment of whether an incident is bias motivated or not. The absence of bias indicators does not mean that an incident is not hate motivated – if a victim or a witness perceives that there was a prejudice-motivation. At the same time, the presence of a bias indicator does not necessarily demonstrate that an incident is bias motivated (as the term ‘indicator’ implies). Ultimately, a judge will make this decision. In the Australian context, we are proposing that bias indicators should be used to support data collection, and to make sure that all potentially useful evidence is collected when an incident is reported. This report is structured in two parts: in Part 1, we introduce and discuss the concept of bias indicators, including their uses, benefits, and risks. In Part 2, we present a general list of bias indicators (which might be used to code a hate  motivated incident), followed by discrete lists of bias indicators for specific target identities. We also present a separate list for online bias indicators, which might apply to one or more target identities. We are keen to engage with government and non-government agencies that plan to use bias indicators and find this report useful. We welcome opportunities to share additional insights from our research on how 

Melbourne: Centre for Resilient and Inclusive Societies. 2022. 40p.

By Mario Peucker

In September 2016, one of the leading figures of Australia’s far-right movement – a man who had publicly expressed admiration for Adolf Hitler and was later dubbed ‘emperor’ by the extreme right-wing terrorist who murdered 51 Muslims in Christchurch in 2019 – appeared on ABC Triple J television to talk about ‘Aussie Patriotism’. Unsurprisingly, he used this opportunity to make ideological claims around an allegedly corrupt political system, white victimhood, and ‘national pride’ that makes people ‘want to fight’ in a war that is
supposedly being waged against them. The TV guest was well-known for his views at the time, and he would later become the first person ever convicted of serious religious vilification under Victoria’s Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 for staging a public mock beheading in Bendigo in 2015. Since then he – and other white nationalists and supremacists – have been given opportunities to share their views in mainstream media until almost two years later. In August 2018, he was invited to a live on-air interview on Sky News where he was asked about his views on Donald Trump and immigration issues. Again, he used this public platform to share his stance on national pride, identity and white victimhood. Although his nationalist and “white pride” dog-whistle statements were arguably less inciting and explicit compared to his appearance on ABC
Triple J in 2016, this time there was a broad public outcry, even from within Sky News. The broadcaster admitted the interview was a mistake and removed it from its online services, although the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) later ruled it did not constitute a breach of the respective code of practice. The critical public awareness around issues of platforming far-right extremists and their ideological messages has clearly increased over the years, and many editors and journalists have come to recognise the potential risks and problems of doing so. As a result, prominent white supremacists are no longer treated by Australia mainstream media as legitimate voices that deserve to be heard in broader public
debates. This does not mean, however, that they are no longer given any airtime and media attention. Some media outlets continue to offer them an opportunity to present their views, and many other media report about them and their far-right actions. Incidents involving far-right actors, both overseas and domestically, and their actions –from small-scale public stunts and online mobilisation to violent assaults and even in some instances acts of terrorism – have become frequent occurrences. This poses challenges for the media, and news reporting in particular, around ethical and practical questions of newsworthiness and public interest, the risks of amplifying hateful ideological propaganda or unintentionally helping with far-right extremists’ recruitment efforts, but also considerations of personal safety for journalists. The comprehensive report Inquiry into extremism in Victoria, tabled by the Legislative Council Legal and Social Issues Committee of
the Victorian state parliament in August 2022, dedicates significant attention to the role of mainstream media within the chapter ‘Risk factors for far‐right extremism in Victoria’. Acknowledging that ‘newsworthiness and public interest are primary drivers of the media’s coverage of violent extremism’, the report highlights several ‘ethical concerns consequently arise around responsible reporting by the media’. These include, according to the report: ‘dilemmas around what to report or ignore; the moral and legal quandaries of relating with, or amplifying the ideology of, an extremist group; the difficulties 

Melbourne: Centre for Resilient and Inclusive Societies. May 2023. 15p.

By Maria Cleary, David O’Loughlin, Rebecca Higgins, and Jessica Nolan.

Executive Summary This report examines the attitudes of employers in Ireland to hiring people with convictions(s) (PWCs) and the experiences of PWCs in employment. Employment remains a key protective factor on the desistance journey and supports the development of an inclusive, fair, and equal society (Carr et al., 2015; Healy, 2017; Reich, 2017). Successful reintegration can partially be measured by employment outcomes for PWCs (Ramakers, 2021). There is evidence that employers are broadly open to hiring PWCs, but raise concerns based on perceptions of risk in doing so. The absence of guidance and uncertainty about evidence-based approaches and legal requirements leads to inconsistent policies and practices while PWCs continue to face intersecting barriers to employment and reintegration. This report draws on a multi-method study of employers’ attitudes to hiring PWCs and experiences of employment pathways for PWCs, comprised of a survey (n = 55), interviews (n = 23), and a participatory symposium of key stakeholders in the summer of 2023. The report presents 10 recommendations based on the key findings listed below. – Perceptions of risk without an evidence base underpinned employer concerns about hiring PWCs including but not limited to safeguarding, reputational damage, reoffending, personality, qualifications, job performance, and lack of support. – Opportunities for progress emerged, with employers broadly willing to hire PWCs, but seeking guidance, information, and support to do so. – Half of the survey participants did not have specific policies or practices that require disclosure of criminal convictions but Garda Vetting and GDPR requirements are not clearly understood by all employer participants or PWCs. – Persistent barriers to employment for PWCs include stigma, lack of transparency in hiring processes, demands on resilience, motivation and desistance, and narrowing job opportunities. – The imperative of shifting mindsets from moral censure to inclusive policies and practices was highlighted, with the need for clear communication and messaging

Dublin: Irish Penal Reform Trust, 2024.  48p.

By Program on Extremism staff, including Lorenzo Vidino, Lara Burns, Sergio Altuna, Rosa Cabus, Cynthia Martinez and Jake Gilstrap.

The Islamic Republic of Iran and its network of proxies (often identified as Axis of Resistance) have a long history of activities targeting the United States, as opposing America constitutes one of their foundational dogmas. Said activities range from influence operations and propaganda to terrorist and military attacks. Tensions between the two sides have substantially escalated in the wake of the October 7, 2023 attacks in Israel and the conflict that followed making an assessment of these activities and their possible future developments highly relevant. While most of the anti-American activities by Iran and its proxies have been carried out in the greater Middle East, some of them have taken place inside America. Iran and its proxies have, in fact, been operating inside the United States for decades, engaging in a broad array of nefarious activities that can be divided into three main categories: lethal operations, procurement and propaganda.

• Lethal operations:

  • Iran has a history of carrying out assassinations inside America that dates back to 1980, when it commissioned the assassination of an Iranian dissident in Bethesda, MD.

  • While in recent years dissidents have been targeted with increasing frequency, Iran has also escalated its target selection by including US-based foreign diplomats and, even more brazenly, high ranking US officials.

  • Most of these plots appear to have been outsourced to hired guns, a choice largely dictated by necessity, but that also offers the Iranian regime the advantage of plausible deniability. The proxies so far used by Tehran to carry out assassinations inside the US have tended to be elements who were not ideologically aligned (mostly from the criminal underworld) and who displayed relatively low levels of professionalism.

• Procurement: Iranian-linked networks have also been active on American soil for decades to procure sensitive goods (high- tech equipment, dual-use tech, software, etc.), and conduct financial activities in violation of US sanctions. Schemes used have at times been very elaborate, amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars.

• Propaganda: America is home to a broad web  of entities (mosques, Islamic centers, schools, student groups) and individuals with close personal, financial, organizational, and ideological links to the Iranian regime and its proxies. They spread Iran’s religious and political worldview, glorifying the regime and its allies, undermining America and disseminating antisemitic views.

  • The New York-based Alavi Foundation is arguably the most prolific actor in the spread of Iranian regime influence in the United States. With its multimillion-dollar budget, it either directly owns or funds through grants, no-interest loans, and donations a broad array of mosques and entities nationwide that disseminate Tehran’s viewpoint. In 2008, the Department of Justice filed a civil forfeiture complaint against Alavi, arguing that it “secretly served as a front for the Iranian government and as a gateway for millions of dollars to be funneled to Iran in clear violation of U.S. sanctions laws.” In 2017, a jury found Alavi guilty, but the judgment was overturned by the appellate court due to procedural errors in the district court’s rulings. The legal battle is ongoing.

  • This report identified more than a dozen organizations that disseminate pro- Iranian regime and pro-Hezbollah viewpoints and operate schools and mosques nationwide that host radical preachers who weave anti-US and antisemitic sentiments throughout their teachings. Some of the most important ones are based in Houston, New York and Potomac, Maryland. Additionally, Dearborn, Michigan is a particularly important hub, as it hosts several prominent institutions disseminating Tehran’s worldview.

  • Many of the key individuals behind this web of entities maintain close connections to the Iranian regime, frequently traveling to Iran and actively participating in Iranian soft power organizations like Ahlul Bayt World Assembly and Al-Mustafa International University.

  • Many of the Iran-aligned institutions identified in the report host events like commemorations of the anniversary of the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the anniversary of the death of Iran’s first post-revolution Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini; ceremonies memorializing the lives of IRGC-Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani and Hezbollah spiritual leader Hussein Fadlallah; and Quds Day, a day of protest against Israel declared by Khomeini in 1979 and commemorated the last Friday of every Ramadan.

  • Particularly troubling is the presence in the suburbs of various American cities of Islamic schools—some of which receiving state funding—that teach the Iranian regime’s interpretation of Islam and political worldview to scores of American children.

US authorities have repeatedly highlighted that “Iran typically relies on individuals with preexisting access to the United States for surveillance and lethal plotting” and, similarly, that “the arrests of individuals in the United States allegedly linked to Hezbollah's main overseas terrorist arm and their intelligence collection and procurement efforts demonstrate Hezbollah's interest in long-term contingency planning activities here in our homeland.” In substance, the possibility that Iran and its proxies could mobilize known and trusted assets based in the US rather than hired guns to carry out some kind of violent action in the future is a concrete one. In light of these dynamics, procurement and propaganda networks should be seen as natural recruitment pools for Iranian security apparatuses and their proxies seeking to plan attacks. Hezbollah is the oldest and most established of Iran’s proxies. It has long operated in the US, and Program on Extremism research has identified 142 US- based individuals who have been prosecuted for Hezbollah-related activities since 2000. Most individuals provided financial assistance to the group as money launderers/ bundlers/fraudsters and goods smugglers. About 13% of the prosecutions related to individuals who provided operational support as human smugglers, weapons procurers, and surveillance operatives. Clusters of friends or family members, some of them based out of Michigan, New York, California and North Carolina, play a central role in Hezbollah’s activities in the United States, particularly in fundraising operations. Iran and its proxies are also active in Canada and many Latin American countries. Exactly as in the US, their activities in those countries range from the creation of extensive propaganda centers to networks engaged in procurement and other financial activities and, occasionally, terrorist attacks (most recently, Brazil thwarted an alleged Hezbollah attack against Jewish targets in 2023). Many Latin American countries constitute a highly permissive environment that allows Tehran and its proxies to operate almost undisturbed. This dynamic poses a security challenge, not just to those countries, but also to the United States, given their geographical proximity. Given the heightened geopolitical tensions that have followed the October 7, 2023 attacks and Iran’s unrelenting commitment to highly adversarial positions towards the United States, an in-depth understanding of its networks inside the US and throughout the Western Hemisphere is of paramount importance. This required awareness applies not just to actors who are directly engaged in violent actions, but also to procurement and propaganda networks, as they not only serve useful roles for Tehran in and of itself, but can also potentially be utilized to support or carry out attacks.


Washington, DC: Program on Extremism at George Washington University,2024. 126p.

By Stuart Wexler,  Jon Lewis,  Jessa Mellea,  M.B. Tyler

This report traces the evolution of the Christian Identity milieu in the United States. From its origins in 19th-century Great Britain through its subsequent transnational spread, the Christian Identity movement has long enjoyed a small but fanatical following within the American far right. A racist and antisemitic theology whose followers believe that white people are God’s chosen ones, the Christian Identity ideology has long influenced a wide range of white supremacist and anti-government extremist movements in the United States.[1] Christian Identity militants have engaged in terrorist violence since at least the late 1950s, working under the idea that God will endorse an end-times racial holy war against “demonic” Jews and the sub-human minority groups they have manipulated for centuries.[2] In contextualizing the Christian Identity movement within the broader domestic violent extremist landscape, this report finds that Christian Identity militants often sought to downplay their apocalyptic, genocidal goals to infiltrate, appropriate, and influence more “mainstream” religious extremists, enabling individuals like white Christian nationalists to engage in provocative acts of dangerous violence. In assessing this movement, this report examines the prevalence of two well-worn tactics used by Christian Identity extremists — propaganda of the deed and entryism — and offers a new strategy of necessity evidenced by the movement: co-optive extremism. Through this effort, this report argues that Christian Identity extremists are likely to attempt co-optive extremism to manipulate or provoke larger and more robust (but less outwardly violent) groups, such as militant, white Christian nationalists, into potential acts of mass violence. It also explores the modern strands of Christian Identity ideology that has emerged in a range of domestic extremist movements and ideologies as a result of the mainstreaming of antisemitism within this ecosystem.    

Washington DC:  Program on Extremism at George Washington University, 2024. 37p.

By U.S. Department of Homeland Security,  he Office of Intelligence and Analysis

Executive Summary - The Homeland faces a complex set of threats to our public safety, border security, critical infrastructure, and economy from violent extremists, transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), adversarial nation-states, and malicious cyber actors. These threats, while varied in scope and intended purpose, at times compound one another in unexpected ways, harming our communities and generating costly disruptions to the US economy. Meanwhile, technological advances, climate change, and natural disasters have the potential to exacerbate many of the aforementioned threats. PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY: Over the next year, the terrorism threat environment in the Homeland will remain high. We are particularly concerned about a confluence of factors this year, including violent extremist responses to domestic sociopolitical developments—especially the 2024 election cycle—and international events that domestic and foreign violent extremists likely will use to justify or encourage attacks in the Homeland. Lone offenders and small groups continue to pose the greatest threat of carrying out attacks with little to no warning. Meanwhile, foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) and their supporters will maintain their enduring intent to conduct or inspire attacks in the Homeland. In addition, the production, trafficking, and sale of illegal drugs by transnational and domestic criminal actors will continue to pose the most lethal threat to communities in the United States. Fentanyl and other synthetic opioids remain the most lethal of drugs trafficked into the country, but small increases in overdoses linked to cocaine and methamphetamine highlight the danger from other drug types. 

We expect the Homeland also will face threats to public safety from state actors using subversive tactics in an effort to influence and divide the American public and undermine confidence in our institutions. Many of these actors—in particular, the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—also target ethnic and religious minorities, political dissidents, and journalists in the United States to silence and harass critical voices, violating our sovereignty and the rule of law. The 2024 election cycle will be an attractive target for many adversaries. Some domestic violent extremists (DVEs) likely view a wide range of targets indirectly and directly associated with elections as viable targets for violence with the intent of instilling fear among voters, candidates, and election workers, as well as disrupting election processes leading up to and after the November election. Nation-state-aligned foreign malign influence actors almost certainly will continue to target democratic processes with the aims of affecting US voter preferences, exacerbating social tensions, and undermining confidence in our democratic institutions and the integrity of the electoral process. BORDER AND IMMIGRATION SECURITY: Migrant encounters at our border have declined over the last year, but migrants are still arriving in high numbers, complicating border and immigration security. As overall encounters have declined, so too have encounters with individuals in the Terrorist Screening Data Set, also known as the “terrorism watchlist,” which includes individuals associated with information indicating they may be directly engaged in or supporting terrorist activities as well as known associates of watchlisted individuals, such as family members. For several years prior to this year's decline, terrorism watchlist encounters had increased, a trend consistent with the overall increase in migrant encounters at the southwest border. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY: Domestic and foreign adversaries almost certainly will continue to threaten the integrity of our critical infrastructure with disruptive and destructive cyber and physical attacks, in part, because they perceive targeting these sectors will have cascading impacts on US industries and our standard of living. The PRC, Russia, and Iran will remain the most pressing foreign threats to our critical infrastructure. Most concerningly, we expect the PRC to continue its efforts to pre-position on US networks for potential cyber-attacks in the event of a conflict with the United States. Nation-states, criminal hacktivists, and financially motivated criminals will likely hone their techniques to disrupt US services or to conduct espionage focused on gaining access to US networks, including critical infrastructure entities. We assess that domestic and foreign violent extremists will continue to call for physical attacks on critical infrastructure in furtherance of their ideological goals and, at times, in response to international conflicts and crises. ECONOMIC SECURITY: Multifaceted and diverse economic threats—primarily from the PRC—will likely continue to harm US producers and consumers and degrade the competitiveness and future health of US companies and industries. The PRC likely will remain our greatest economic security threat because of its aggressive use of anticompetitive, coercive policies and theft of US intellectual property, technology, and trade secrets. Lastly, we expect our supply chains will remain vulnerable to foreign manipulation abroad, which could harm global productivity and consumer demand.    

Washington, DC: DHS, 2024. 46p.

By: Amber Woodburn McNair, Jason Reece, Destiny N. Thomas, Imani Mitchell-Wyatt, Julia Nagy, and Sara Kaplan

Airport Cooperative Research Program (ACRP) Project 02-99: Incorporating Environmental Justice and Equity Principles and Data into Airport Decision-Making provides resources to educate and support airport practitioners integrating environmental justice, equity principles and data into airport decision-making. Airports (and the impacted communities that surround them) need resources to carefully assess and respond to inequitable outcomes, particularly with respect to impacts felt by airport passengers, the airport workforce, and the airport-adjacent communities whose environments are impacted by airport development and operations. This document is one of two research publications associated with ACRP Project 02-99.

To adequately incorporate environmental justice, equity principles, and data into airport decision-making processes, it is critical for practitioners to understand the historical context of current conditions. This publication provides evidence that the structural origins of inequity, as experienced in the United States, can be traced back to four broad conceptual themes: group-based othering (Chapter 2), settler colonialism (Chapter 3), economic systems of racial capitalism (Chapter 4), and systemic oppression (Chapter 5). Where Chapters 2 through 5 focus on key concepts and provide specific examples pertinent to the air transportation system today, Chapter 6 begins to explore the aspirational goal of an inclusive, equitable, and just airport planning and decision-making process. Chapters 2-6 each begin with a one-page “Insight Warm-Up” that lists the learning goals for the chapter and short prompts about the relevant historical context, lenses and ways of knowing, and present-day legacies in aviation. Overall, this publication intends to improve a reader’s knowledge of systemic racism within the United States, as well as improve their understanding of the links between historical instances of harm to outcomes that persist within the aviation industry today (with a focus on airports where applicable).

The intended audience for this document includes practitioners who are tasked with setting forth equitable policies and procedures, practitioners who are responsible for prioritizing projects and fiscal allocations, planners whose work includes designing infrastructure and implementing engagement strategies, and practitioners tasked with collecting, analyzing, and reporting on equity-related data, among others. Each chapter contains specific learning objectives that guide airport practitioners to reflect on a range of systemic inequalities and consider ways to intervene on current practices within their industry, within their organization, or through their specific role.

The research team sought to highlight lived experiences and offer qualitative depictions of the ways people experience inequities in terms of airport planning, siting, and operations. This publication illustrates the meaning of terms like environmental justice and equity by exploring the ways people experience the processes by which inequities occur within transportation and airport planning. As described throughout this publication, those processes are fostered by racism, ableism, sexism, homophobia, xenophobia, and anti-indigeneity. This publication’s narrative approach to illustrating environmental justice and equity is an analytical departure from the (more common) practice of listing brief definitions or brief descriptions of inequities, which often lead to over-simplification or ‘checklist thinking’ that can undermine efforts to orchestrate more equitable processes and outcomes.

The National Academies Press 2024

By Sunder Katwala, Jill Rutter, and Steve Ballinger

The asylum system is failing. In 2022 a total of 45,756 people made the perilous journey across the Channel, up from 1,900 in 2019. At least 50 people have drowned or are missing, including 32 people who died when a boat capsized in November 2021. Criminal gangs are profiting from people’s desperation. Those who arrive in the UK face lengthy delays in processing their asylum applications. At the end of September 2022, just 7% of asylum applicants were processed within six months and 120,300 people were waiting for a decision on their initial application1. Unable to work while their decisions are processed, asylum seekers are left in unsuitable and expensive accommodation for months or sometimes years. This is unfair to asylum-seekers and costly to the taxpayer, with the bill for emergency hotel accommodation currently amounting to £5.6 million per day2. Moreover, the Home Office is failing to remove people whose asylum claims are refused, with just 816 voluntary and enforced removals in 2021, compared with 10,489 ten years previously3. Politicians must now prioritize reforms to build an asylum system that is controlled, well-managed and fair. The UK-Rwanda scheme is not the answer. It is wrong in principle, as it removes people without hearing their cases. It is also costly to the taxpayer and will not achieve its aims in practice. We believe, however, that there are constructive alternatives for asylum reform – measures that can secure broad consensus across parties, with civil society, and among most of the public. We propose an orderly, workable, and humane alternative reform agenda, comprised of the following elements: 1. Asylum policy should uphold Britain’s values, traditions, and international obligations to protect refugees. This means we reject proposals which violate the principles of a fair hearing for every case; or which break with the spirit and letter of our international commitments under the Refugee Convention. 2. Put in place a streamlined process to make fairer and faster asylum decisions. The Home Office should invest sufficient resources in a reformed asylum system, with a new strategy to triage initial applicants, simplify country guidance, and meet targets to make most decisions in six months. A fast-track process to refugee status for the strongest cases should also be introduced, together with a streamlined appeals procedure. 3. Hire a task force to tackle backlogs. With an individual target of processing four asylum cases each week or 100 asylum claims in six months, 1,000 temporary Home Office posts would be needed to eliminate the asylum backlog in six months, at an approximate cost of £60 million. With emergency hotel accommodation costing the Home Office £5.6 million each day in October 2022, this move would pay for itself within a fortnight, eliminating the need for hotels by freeing up dispersal accommodation. 4. Safer arrivals through a new humanitarian visa to come to the UK. This should be made available to people who have family or other close links to this country and issued in a select number of UK consulates in countries of transit. Parliament should set an annual quota for people admitted through this route, which would run alongside the UK Resettlement Scheme and community sponsorship, as well as refugee family reunion visas. 5. Adopt a policy of ‘comprehensive cooperation’ with our allies to tackle smuggling and irregular migration. The Government should seek enhanced cooperation with countries of transit and safe countries of origin. It should seek new and more comprehensive UK-France and UK-Belgium agreements, covering security, police cooperation, returns, and systems to share responsibility for people who do not qualify for asylum. The Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office should also support refugees in countries of transit such as Lebanon and Turkey, enabling them to support themselves there rather than travel across Europe. The UK Government should build on the agreement it signed with Albania in 2021 to allow the return of people who are not authorized to remain in the UK. It should also seek further return agreements with safe countries of return such as Bangladesh, Georgia, India, Nepal, and Nigeria. Safe countries of return should also be supported through the British overseas aid budget to enact programs to reduce irregular migration flows. 6. Ensure more and safer returns. The government should significantly increase the number of voluntary returns, reintroducing independent advice for those refused asylum, along with faster removals for irregular entrants whose asylum claims are refused. 7. Promote integration through ‘welcoming hubs’ that increase social contact between newcomers and receiving communities and help refugees to rebuild their lives and flourish. There is a public appetite to play a part in welcoming refugees. Faith and civil society organizations should harness this and set up local welcoming projects for asylum-seekers and refugees. More volunteers could be involved in activities such as English language conversation clubs and sports, offering advice and mentoring. Welcoming hubs should offer such community contact activities to asylum-seekers, refugees, and those on humanitarian visas, as part of a proactive approach to civic contact, integration, and citizenship. 8. Help more refugees to work. English language classes should be accessible in all parts of the UK so that refugees have the skills they need for work. Employment support should be better tailored to meet refugees’ needs and practical partnerships with employers should be strengthened. This will help more refugees to find work and enable them to make their contribution to our economy. 9. Sufficient and fairer funding to enable Home Office targets to be met rather than forgotten, through investment in an effective asylum system, reducing backlogs, and providing access to affordable English language classes in colleges. The dispersal of refugees across the UK should be based on a clear set of principles, with a fairer distribution of people and funding across regions and nations of the UK. Local authorities (and communities) should be consulted about new arrivals. 10. Stronger democratic accountability and public voice in asylum. An annual Immigration Review should be presented to Parliament, which should include a transparent review of asylum, refugee, and resettlement policy. The public should be involved in this review, through a well-organised engagement exercise that reaches people whose voices are not usually heard in consultations. Past experiences show that where communities are consulted about asylum dispersal accommodation and can ask questions, this process often unlocks public consent. The views of local communities should also contribute to this annual review and to plans to house asylum-seekers in their neighborhoods.   

London: British Future, 2023. 48p.

By Jill Rutter and Sunder Katwala, British Future; Andrew Dixon and Jamie Scudamore, Belong; Emeka Forbes and Brendan Cox, Together.  

Trying to move on from the violent disorder without addressing its causes or putting in place the foundations to address them, the publication says, could “risk recurring episodes of the kind of disturbances we have seen, and increased polarisation and social conflict in future.” Instead, “Central government needs to provide leadership and a policy strategy, empowering local stakeholders to take action,” with a national social cohesion strategy and resources supporting and empowering local strategies from councils. The report includes recommendations for increasing social contact between people from different backgrounds in communities; piloting restorative justice programmes; pressuring social media companies to tackle hate speech and mis/disinformation and helping children to identify misinformation; and ensuring that asylum accommodation does not become a focus for community grievances. 

London: British Future, Belong and Together, 2024. 16p.

By Brittany Torrez, LaStarr Hollie, Jennifer Richeson, and Michael Kraus

Despite a checkered racial history, people in the US generally believe the nation has made steady, incremental progress toward achieving racial equality. In this paper, the researchers investigate whether this US racial progress narrative will extend to how the workforce views the effectiveness of organizational efforts surrounding diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI). Across three studies (N = 1,776), they test whether Black and White US workers overestimate organizational racial progress in executive representation. Torrez, Hollie, Richeson, and Kraus also examine whether these misperceptions, surrounding organizational progress, drive misunderstandings regarding the relative ineffectiveness of common organizational diversity policies. Overall, they find evidence that US workers largely overestimate organizational racial progress, believe that organizational progress will naturally improve over time and that these misperceptions of organizational racial progress may drive beliefs in the effectiveness of DEI policies.

Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, Institute for Policy Research, 2024. 49p.

MAY COTAIN MARKUP

By Victor Turner

Symbolism in Rituals:Turner emphasizes that symbols are the smallest units of ritual, each carrying multiple meanings and associations. These symbols are integral to the rituals, which are frequent and vital in Ndembu life.

Properties of Ritual Symbols:oSymbols possess three main properties: condensation (multiple meanings in one symbol), unification of disparate significata (linking diverse ideas), and polarization of meaning (ideological and sensory poles).oDominant symbols, such as the mudyi (milk tree) and mukula tree, recur in various contexts and represent core values and beliefs.

Examples of Dominant Symbols:Mudyi Tree: Central to the girls puberty ritual, symbolizing motherhood,matriliny, and tribal unity. Mukula Tree: Associated with blood, masculinity, and hunting prowess, used in circumcision and hunting rituals. Chikoli Tree: Represents strength and masculinity, used in boys circumcision rituals.

Optional and Positional Meanings:oOperational meaning is derived from how symbols are used in rituals,revealing social dynamics and conflicts.oPositional meaning comes from the symbol’s relationship to other symbols within the ritual, determining its specific sense in different contexts.

Rituals of Affliction and Life-Crisis Rituals:oRituals of Affliction: Aim to propitiate ancestor spirits causing misfortune,involving public confessions and symbolic acts to restore harmony.

Life-Crisis Rituals: Mark significant transitions in an individual’s life, such as birth, puberty, and death, emphasizing social and moral order.6.Color Symbolism.

The Forest of Symbols”provides a comprehensive analysis of Ndembu rituals, illustrating the intricate interplay between symbols, social structure, and individual experience.Turner’s work underscores the importance of understanding the multifaceted meanings of symbols to grasp the full significance of ritual practices in Ndembu society. This book is crucial contribution to the fields of anthropology and religious studies, offering deep insights into the symbolic dimensions of human culture.

Cornell University Press, 1967, 405 pages

MAY COTAIN MARKUP

By Chris Mullard

Institute of Race Relations: The book discusses the history and transformation of the Institute of Race Relations (IRR), particularly its shift in 1972 under the leadership of A. Sivanandan.

Black Struggle: It highlights the ongoing struggle against white racism,drawing connections between historical and contemporary resistance movements.

Ideology and Utopia: The text explores the concepts of ideology and utopian thinking, particularly how ruling groups maintain power and how oppressed groups envision societal change.

Resistance and Change: The book emphasizes the importance of resistive struggle in achieving social change and the role of intellectual and personal space in fostering political awareness and action.

Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985, 258 pages

By Edward T. Devine

This book, first published in 1904 discusses the increase in wealth and the resulting social injustices, emphasizing the community's responsibility to provide relief to those in need.It outlines the principles for charitable relief, stressing the importance of a clear policy and the need for cooperation among various charitable agencies.The author Edward Devine, presents digest of seventy-five illustrative cases to highlight the real nature of relief problems. Finally, as though prescient of modern day inequalities, he offers historical examples of disaster relief, such as the Chicago Fire and the Johnstown Flood, and the lessons learned from these events

Macmillan, 1910, 495 pages

MAY COTAIN MARKUP

Edited by Shivu Ishwaran

Micro-Macro Criminology Shoham links traditional criminology theories to broader cultural theories, introducing the concept of “mythogenes” to explain individual and group criminal behavior. Mythogenes are motivational structures that connect personal experiences to collective myths, influencing criminal behavior.

What Does the World Spend on Policing?by Farrell, Lane, Clark, and Tseloni:oThis paper examines global policing expenditures, highlighting the challenges of using available data sets for meta-level analysis. Itpresents three models for estimating global policing expenditure, with varying results:Per Capita Model: $264 billion (2000, inflation-adjusted)Linear Multiple Regression Model: $158.3 billion (2000, inflation-adjusted )Double Log Multiple Regression Model: $193.8 billion (2000, inflation-adjusted)

Issues and Patterns in the Comparative Study of Police Strength By Maguire andSchulte-Murray:oThe authors address the complexities of measuring police strength internationally, noting the rise in police strength outpacing population growth. They discuss the reliability of international data, primarily sourced from the United Nations World Crime Surveys (UNCJS), and provide estimates of police strength relative to population for various countries.

Women, Justice and Customs By Cyndi Banks:oBanks compares judicial discourse on custom in Papua New Guinea andCanada, focusing on its impact on women’s justice. In Papua New Guinea,the case of Miriam, an 18-year-old girl offered as compensation for her father's death,highlights the conflict between custom and constitutional rights. In Canada, Inuit customs have been used in legal defenses,sometimes leading to lenient sentencing in sexual assault cases.

Confronting the Contradiction: Global Capitalism and Environmental HealthbyMark Seis:o'Seis links environmental degradation to global capitalism, questioning the boundaries of criminology. He argues that economic globalization threatens democratic social movements and exacerbates environmental and social disparities.

Toward a Universal Declaration of the Rule of Lawby Bouloukos and Dakin:oThe authors advocate for a universal rule of law to ensure justice and sustainable development. They propose a Universal Declaration of the Rule of Law, modeled after the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to provide a common framework for promoting the rule of law internationally.

Toward Comparative Studies of the U.S. Militia Movementby Freilich, Pienik, andHoward:oThis paper compares the U.S. militia movement to other social movements,providing a complex understanding of contemporary issues. The authors argue that militias share similarities with various social movements over time and place.

Crime Prevention Policy and Government Research By Gloria Laycock and RonClarke:oThe authors compare crime prevention programs in the U.S. and the U.K.,discussing the challenges of linking research to policy in different bureaucratic structures. They highlight the importance of strategic management and proactive dissemination of research findings to influence policy effectively.Conclusion:The document emphasizes the importance of including policing in comparative criminology and the need for future research to cover the many unrepresented topics and approaches. It highlights the role of judicial discretion, the complexities of integrating custom with modern legal systems, and the broader implications for human rights and gender equality. The struggle for ecological health is intertwined with the fight for human rights and democratic control over economic processes, posing significant threats to both environmental sustainability and social equity.

Brill, 2001, 260 pages

By Russell L. Ackoff

"The Design of Social Research" outlines the principles and methodologies essential for conducting social research. It begins by defining methodologically designed research and emphasizes the importance of formulating clear research problems. The text discusses the idealized research model and practical research design, focusing on sampling techniques and the logic behind statistical procedures. It covers hypothesis testing, including analysis of variance and covariance, and the observational and operational phases of research design. The document also highlights the significance of methodological rigor in research,suggesting methods for evaluating operational specifications through pilot studies andpretests. Overall, it serves as a comprehensive guide for researchers to design effective studies, ensuring that their findings are valid and reliable.

University of Chicago Press, 1953, 420 pages

By Besiki Luka Kutateladze 

Goals & objectives The goal of this study is to enhance public safety and community well-being through effective identification, investigation, and prosecution of antiLGBTQ hate crimes in Miami. This important goal was achieved by examining: victimization experiences, victim and offender characteristics, crime reporting outcomes, victimization consequences, case processing, as well as the criminal justice system’s challenges and opportunities for reform. The project focuses on the hate crime victimization within Miami’s Latine community. Research questions What is the prevalence of the anti-LGBTQ hate crime victimization? What are the victim and offender demographic characteristics? What are the barriers for crime reporting and for victim cooperation with law enforcement? What are the predictors of crime reporting? What are the consequences of victimization? How does the criminal justice system identify, process, and dispose of hate crimes? What are the challenges for reporting and case processing? What type of evidence is used by law enforcement for determining the hate motivation? What are the opportunities for reforming police and prosecutorial capacity for tackling hate crimes? Research design The study employs a mixed-methods design using quantitative and qualitative data from victim interviews, case file reviews, and practitioner interviews. 400 LGBTQ individuals who have been victims of a crime have been interviewed using a three-stage venue-based sampling. Furthermore, all hate crimes disposed of by the Miami-Dade State Attorney’s Office between June 2005 and July 2019 (n = 23) were reviewed to collect data on specific offenses, case processing, and disposition outcomes. Finally, 10 semi-structured in-depth interviews were carried out with prosecutors, police detectives, and service providers to assess the practitioners’ perceptions of the problem and opportunities for reforming the system. Applicability of the research The research yielded significant recommendations for law enforcement, the LGBTQ advocacy groups, and the research and academic community. The findings help police and prosecutors develop more effective internal policies and practices for identifying and investigating hate crimes, processing them accordingly, and providing assistance to crime victims. This increased awareness will likely bolster confidence in the justice system, and have significant justice and public safety implications through increased reporting and cooperation with police and prosecutors.  

Miami: Florida International University, 2020.   157p.