By Mason Youngblood

Increasing levels of far-right extremist violence have generated public concern about the spread of radicalization in the United States. Previous research suggests that radicalized individuals are destabilized by various environmental (or endemic) factors, exposed to extremist ideology, and subsequently reinforced by members of their community. As such, the spread of radicalization may proceed through a social contagion process, in which extremist ideologies behave like complex contagions that require multiple exposures for adoption. In this study, I applied an epidemiological method called two-component spatiotemporal intensity modeling to data from 416 far-right extremists exposed in the United States between 2005 and 2017. The results indicate that patterns of far-right radicalization in the United States are consistent with a complex contagion process, in which reinforcement is required for transmission. Both social media usage and group membership enhance the spread of extremist ideology, suggesting that online and physical organizing remain primary recruitment tools of the far-right movement. In addition, I identified several endemic factors, such as poverty, that increase the probability of radicalization in particular regions. Future research should investigate how specific interventions, such as online counter-narratives to battle propaganda, may be effectively implemented to mitigate the spread of far-right extremism in the United States.

HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | (2020) 7:49 |

By Michael Fürstenberg

In the past, far-right aggression predominantly focused on national settings and street terror against minorities; today, however, it is increasingly embedded in global networks and acts within a strategic framework aimed at revolution, targeting the liberal order as such. Ideologically combining antisemitism, racism, and anti-feminism/anti-LGBTQI, adherents of this movement see modern societies as degenerate and weak, with the only solution being a violent collapse that they attempt to accelerate with their actions. The terrorist who attacked the synagogue and a kebab shop in Halle, Germany, in October 2019 clearly identified with this transnational community and situated his act as a continuation of a series of attacks inspired by white supremacy in the past decade. The common term ‘lone wolf’ for these kinds of terrorists is in that sense a misnomer, as they are embedded in digital ‘wolf packs’. Although this movement is highly decentralized and heterogeneous, there are interactive processes that connect and shape the online milieu of extremists into more than the sum of its parts, forming a structure that facilitates a certain degree of cohesion, strategic agency, and learning. This paper uses the model of collective learning outside formal organizations to analyze how the revolutionary accelerationist right as a community of practice engages in generating collective identities and knowledge that are used in the service of their acts of death and destruction.

Halle (Saale), Germany: Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, 2022. 62p.

By Annemarie van de Weert ,  Radicalisation Awareness Network

  Over the course of the previous years, counterterrorism has focused more on anticipating the threat of terrorism. In this context, institutions such as the United Nations Security Council and the European Commission have increasingly emphasized that acts of terrorism cannot be prevented through repressive measures alone. Through countering violent extremism (CVE) and preventing violent extremism (PVE), the aim is to detect deviant attitudes in an early stage and promote social inclusion and cohesion at the same time. In particular, CVE consists of the early detection of radicalisation towards violent extremism and includes various approaches to increase the resilience of communities and individuals to the use of extremist violence and other related unlawful acts. In turn, the concept of PVE consists of systematic preventive measures which directly address the drivers of extremist environments. Both approaches emphasise tackling the context conducive to terrorism such as situational, social, cultural and individual factors. Because of their direct contact with society, frontline professionals are tasked with dealing with individuals who may threaten the rule of law, national security, and democratic values. This ought to be done by building normative barriers against violent extremism at an early stage, the so-called uncharted terrains between non-violent extremist ideology and terrorism. The question remains: How can youth, family and community workers intervene in radicalisation processes without infringing on personal freedoms? This overview paper focuses on right-wing extremism (RWE) and freedom of expression. It provides advices from first-line practitioners on how to deal with and respond to extremists publicly expressing their ideologies in a nonviolent, but still potentially harmful, way. It also delves into the matter of how practitioners can protect themselves against potential backlash and threats of violence from extremist organisations or movements  

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2021 . 29p.

By Aoife Gallagher, Ciarán O’Connor, Pierre Vaux, Elise Thomas, Jacob Davey

Discord is a free service accessible via phones and computers. It allows users to talk to each other in real-time via voice, text or video chat and emerged in 2015 as a platform designed to assist gamers in communicating with each other while playing video games. The popularity of the platform has surged in recent years, and it is currently estimated to have 140 million monthly active users.1 Chatrooms – known as servers - in the platform can be created by anyone, and they are used for a range of purposes that extend far beyond gaming. Such purposes include the discussion of extreme right-wing ideologies and the planning of offline extremist activity. Ahead of the far-right Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, in August 2017, organizers used Discord to plan and promote events and posted swastikas and praised Hitler in chat rooms with names like “National Socialist Army” and “Führer’s Gas Chamber”.2 In this briefing we provide an analysis of 24 English-language Discord servers associated with extreme right-wing activity. This analysis is intended as a snapshot of current trends on Discord with a specific focus on the role of gaming, rather than a comprehensive overview of extreme right activity on the platform. Key Findings • We found that Discord primarily acts as a hub for extreme right-wing socialising and community building. Our analysis suggests that Discord provides a safe space for users to share ideological material and explore extremist movements. • Of particular concern is the young age of the members of these servers, who on average, when determinable, were 15 years old. This suggests that Discord could act as an entry point for children to come into contact with extremist ideology. • We found limited evidence that gaming played a role in serious strategies to radicalise and recruit new individuals on the platform. Instead gaming was primarily referenced in cultural terms, being used by members of these servers to find common-ground. • Gamified online harassment through ‘raids’ was a popular activity across the channels analysed. This suggests that this semi-organised cyber-bullying could be a vector which brings young people into contact with extremist communities. • We identified discussion in these channels expressing support for the proscribed terrorist organisations Atomwaffen Division and Sonnenkrieg Division. This included the sharing of branded content produced by these organisations, as well as the identification of one user who expressed an interest in joining Atomwaffen.  

Amman | Berlin | London | Paris | Washington DC: ISD Global, 2021. 13p.

By Ciarán O’Connor

This briefing is part of ISD’s Gaming and Extremism Series exploring the role online gaming plays in the strategy of far-right extremists in the UK and globally. This is part of a broader programme on the ‘Future of Extremism’ being delivered by ISD in the second half of 2021, charting the transformational shifts in the extremist threat landscape two decades on from 9/11, and the policy strategies required to counter the next generation of extremist threats. It provides a snapshot overview of the extreme right’s use of Twitch. Twitch launched as a livestreaming service in 2011 focused on gaming and eSports and was acquired by Amazon in August 2014 for $970 million. According to Twitch, the platform has over 30 million average daily visitors and almost half of all Twitch users are between 18 - 34 years old, while 21% are between 13 - 17. In the UK, based on the most recent Ofcom figures from 2019, Twitch accounts were held by 8% of 16-24 year olds, 3% of 25-34 year olds and 2% of 35-44 year olds. Users typically stream themselves playing a game and others can tune in to watch or interact with the gamer through the in-app chat function, whereby a gamer will respond to text questions via their microphone, or to users who send voice comments via a connected chat channel set up by the host gamer on another messaging platform like Discord. There are several ways for Twitch users to monetize their content, most of which are supported and facilitated by the platform. This includes donations sent using the platform’s digital currency, Bits, or via a third-party donations tool like Streamlabs, or via a payment platform like Paypal. Additionally, users earn revenue by running ads on their content or channel, paid subscriptions from other Twitch users (followers), or sponsorships and selling merchandise. Extremist activists have used Twitch in the past to livestream. The platform hosted numerous streams, primarily rebroadcasts or live streams from other platforms, showing events inside the US Capitol in Washington DC on 6 January as protesters stormed the Capitol. In response to extremist threats in the past, Twitch has instituted an in-house moderation team, which suspends or remove channels which breach their rules. Twitch has also been used to promote extremist ideologies and broadcast terrorist attacks. In October 2019, a man killed two people during an attempted attack on a synagogue in Halle. The attack was live streamed for 25 minutes on Twitch. According to the platform, only five viewers watched the video while it was live while a recording of the video generated automatically after the stream ended was viewed by 2,200 people in the 30 minutes it was available before it was flagged and removed. The Twitch account used to broadcast the attack was created about two months prior to the attack and had attempted to stream only once before. In October 2020, Twitch updated its community guidelines to clarify and broaden its ban on terrorist and extremist content. Twitch does not allow content “that depicts, glorifies, encourages, or supports terrorism, or violent extremist actors or acts,” while additionally, users may not display footage of terrorist or extremist violence “even for the purposes of denouncing such content.” In March 2021, Twitch released its first-ever transparency report, detailing its safety initiatives and efforts to protect users on the platform. To better understand the current use of Twitch by the extreme right, and to analyse the overlap with gaming we performed scoping analysis of the platform by searching the platform for keywords associated with extremist activity with the aim of identifying extremist accounts and content. In total we analysed 73 videos and 91 channels on the platform. Key findings • We discovered that content which expresses support for extreme right wing ideologies can be discovered on Twitch with relative ease. These videos are probably better considered as sporadic examples of support for these ideologies on the platform, rather than representative of the systemic use of Twitch by the extreme right for radicalisation and coordination. However, this nevertheless demonstrates that the platform still has a problem with extremist activity. ISD also discovered that there are, and have recently been, prominent extreme right-wing content creators active on the platform, but that these appear to be low in number. • Twitch is one of many live streaming platforms that are favoured by extremists in the practice of “Omegle Redpilling.” This practice involves extremists using the live video chat platform Omegle to troll and spew racism towards others, whilst simultaneously live streaming themselves to their own followers on their profile on another livestream platform. ISD found evidence of at least two such online extremists who have used Twitch for these purposes.Extreme right-wing activists are platform agnostic. Based on findings in this and other reports in this ISD series, there is growing evidence that points to extreme right-activists online adopting a multi-platform approach, where they use as many platforms as possible as part of a strategy to avoid moderation efforts. • A Twitch account belonging to jailed white supremacist Paul Miller is still live. ISD discovered that a Twitch account run by Paul Miller, a white supremacist who used multiple Twitch accounts to simultaneously broadcast hate on multiple video platforms, is still live. Though it features no content, it continues to grow in subscribers and serves as a promotional page for Miller and his hateful ideology. • Streams of gaming did not appear to be used systemically to target, groom or recruit individuals on the platform. ISD did not find evidence that gaming content or communities on Twitch are routinely used or targeted, groomed or recruited by extremists. • We discovered that counter-speech content which pushes back against the extreme right is widely accessible on Twitch. Counter-speech is term for a tactic used by individuals and groups online in countering hate speech, extremism or misinformation by presenting critical responses, debates or alternative narratives in reaction to offensive narratives. ISD discovered there is an active anti-extremist progressive community of counter-speech channels on the platform. • Compared to other online platforms analysed in other reports in this series Twitch does not appear to be a major hub for extreme right-wing communities, content creators or organisations. Notwithstanding some high profile examples of extremist trolling, these appear to be isolated rather than evidence of systemic extremist mobilisation on the platform to reach large audiences, incite violence or recruit others.   

Beirut Berlin London Paris Washington DC Copyright © Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2021. 13p.

By Mario Peucker

In September 2016, one of the leading figures of Australia’s far-right movement – a man who had publicly expressed admiration for Adolf Hitler and was later dubbed ‘emperor’ by the extreme right-wing terrorist who murdered 51 Muslims in Christchurch in 2019 – appeared on ABC Triple J television to talk about ‘Aussie Patriotism’. Unsurprisingly, he used this opportunity to make ideological claims around an allegedly corrupt political system, white victimhood, and ‘national pride’ that makes people ‘want to fight’ in a war that is
supposedly being waged against them. The TV guest was well-known for his views at the time, and he would later become the first person ever convicted of serious religious vilification under Victoria’s Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 for staging a public mock beheading in Bendigo in 2015. Since then he – and other white nationalists and supremacists – have been given opportunities to share their views in mainstream media until almost two years later. In August 2018, he was invited to a live on-air interview on Sky News where he was asked about his views on Donald Trump and immigration issues. Again, he used this public platform to share his stance on national pride, identity and white victimhood. Although his nationalist and “white pride” dog-whistle statements were arguably less inciting and explicit compared to his appearance on ABC
Triple J in 2016, this time there was a broad public outcry, even from within Sky News. The broadcaster admitted the interview was a mistake and removed it from its online services, although the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) later ruled it did not constitute a breach of the respective code of practice. The critical public awareness around issues of platforming far-right extremists and their ideological messages has clearly increased over the years, and many editors and journalists have come to recognise the potential risks and problems of doing so. As a result, prominent white supremacists are no longer treated by Australia mainstream media as legitimate voices that deserve to be heard in broader public
debates. This does not mean, however, that they are no longer given any airtime and media attention. Some media outlets continue to offer them an opportunity to present their views, and many other media report about them and their far-right actions. Incidents involving far-right actors, both overseas and domestically, and their actions –from small-scale public stunts and online mobilisation to violent assaults and even in some instances acts of terrorism – have become frequent occurrences. This poses challenges for the media, and news reporting in particular, around ethical and practical questions of newsworthiness and public interest, the risks of amplifying hateful ideological propaganda or unintentionally helping with far-right extremists’ recruitment efforts, but also considerations of personal safety for journalists. The comprehensive report Inquiry into extremism in Victoria, tabled by the Legislative Council Legal and Social Issues Committee of
the Victorian state parliament in August 2022, dedicates significant attention to the role of mainstream media within the chapter ‘Risk factors for far‐right extremism in Victoria’. Acknowledging that ‘newsworthiness and public interest are primary drivers of the media’s coverage of violent extremism’, the report highlights several ‘ethical concerns consequently arise around responsible reporting by the media’. These include, according to the report: ‘dilemmas around what to report or ignore; the moral and legal quandaries of relating with, or amplifying the ideology of, an extremist group; the difficulties 

Melbourne: Centre for Resilient and Inclusive Societies. May 2023. 15p.

By Program on Extremism staff, including Lorenzo Vidino, Lara Burns, Sergio Altuna, Rosa Cabus, Cynthia Martinez and Jake Gilstrap.

The Islamic Republic of Iran and its network of proxies (often identified as Axis of Resistance) have a long history of activities targeting the United States, as opposing America constitutes one of their foundational dogmas. Said activities range from influence operations and propaganda to terrorist and military attacks. Tensions between the two sides have substantially escalated in the wake of the October 7, 2023 attacks in Israel and the conflict that followed making an assessment of these activities and their possible future developments highly relevant. While most of the anti-American activities by Iran and its proxies have been carried out in the greater Middle East, some of them have taken place inside America. Iran and its proxies have, in fact, been operating inside the United States for decades, engaging in a broad array of nefarious activities that can be divided into three main categories: lethal operations, procurement and propaganda.

• Lethal operations:

  • Iran has a history of carrying out assassinations inside America that dates back to 1980, when it commissioned the assassination of an Iranian dissident in Bethesda, MD.

  • While in recent years dissidents have been targeted with increasing frequency, Iran has also escalated its target selection by including US-based foreign diplomats and, even more brazenly, high ranking US officials.

  • Most of these plots appear to have been outsourced to hired guns, a choice largely dictated by necessity, but that also offers the Iranian regime the advantage of plausible deniability. The proxies so far used by Tehran to carry out assassinations inside the US have tended to be elements who were not ideologically aligned (mostly from the criminal underworld) and who displayed relatively low levels of professionalism.

• Procurement: Iranian-linked networks have also been active on American soil for decades to procure sensitive goods (high- tech equipment, dual-use tech, software, etc.), and conduct financial activities in violation of US sanctions. Schemes used have at times been very elaborate, amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars.

• Propaganda: America is home to a broad web  of entities (mosques, Islamic centers, schools, student groups) and individuals with close personal, financial, organizational, and ideological links to the Iranian regime and its proxies. They spread Iran’s religious and political worldview, glorifying the regime and its allies, undermining America and disseminating antisemitic views.

  • The New York-based Alavi Foundation is arguably the most prolific actor in the spread of Iranian regime influence in the United States. With its multimillion-dollar budget, it either directly owns or funds through grants, no-interest loans, and donations a broad array of mosques and entities nationwide that disseminate Tehran’s viewpoint. In 2008, the Department of Justice filed a civil forfeiture complaint against Alavi, arguing that it “secretly served as a front for the Iranian government and as a gateway for millions of dollars to be funneled to Iran in clear violation of U.S. sanctions laws.” In 2017, a jury found Alavi guilty, but the judgment was overturned by the appellate court due to procedural errors in the district court’s rulings. The legal battle is ongoing.

  • This report identified more than a dozen organizations that disseminate pro- Iranian regime and pro-Hezbollah viewpoints and operate schools and mosques nationwide that host radical preachers who weave anti-US and antisemitic sentiments throughout their teachings. Some of the most important ones are based in Houston, New York and Potomac, Maryland. Additionally, Dearborn, Michigan is a particularly important hub, as it hosts several prominent institutions disseminating Tehran’s worldview.

  • Many of the key individuals behind this web of entities maintain close connections to the Iranian regime, frequently traveling to Iran and actively participating in Iranian soft power organizations like Ahlul Bayt World Assembly and Al-Mustafa International University.

  • Many of the Iran-aligned institutions identified in the report host events like commemorations of the anniversary of the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the anniversary of the death of Iran’s first post-revolution Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini; ceremonies memorializing the lives of IRGC-Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani and Hezbollah spiritual leader Hussein Fadlallah; and Quds Day, a day of protest against Israel declared by Khomeini in 1979 and commemorated the last Friday of every Ramadan.

  • Particularly troubling is the presence in the suburbs of various American cities of Islamic schools—some of which receiving state funding—that teach the Iranian regime’s interpretation of Islam and political worldview to scores of American children.

US authorities have repeatedly highlighted that “Iran typically relies on individuals with preexisting access to the United States for surveillance and lethal plotting” and, similarly, that “the arrests of individuals in the United States allegedly linked to Hezbollah's main overseas terrorist arm and their intelligence collection and procurement efforts demonstrate Hezbollah's interest in long-term contingency planning activities here in our homeland.” In substance, the possibility that Iran and its proxies could mobilize known and trusted assets based in the US rather than hired guns to carry out some kind of violent action in the future is a concrete one. In light of these dynamics, procurement and propaganda networks should be seen as natural recruitment pools for Iranian security apparatuses and their proxies seeking to plan attacks. Hezbollah is the oldest and most established of Iran’s proxies. It has long operated in the US, and Program on Extremism research has identified 142 US- based individuals who have been prosecuted for Hezbollah-related activities since 2000. Most individuals provided financial assistance to the group as money launderers/ bundlers/fraudsters and goods smugglers. About 13% of the prosecutions related to individuals who provided operational support as human smugglers, weapons procurers, and surveillance operatives. Clusters of friends or family members, some of them based out of Michigan, New York, California and North Carolina, play a central role in Hezbollah’s activities in the United States, particularly in fundraising operations. Iran and its proxies are also active in Canada and many Latin American countries. Exactly as in the US, their activities in those countries range from the creation of extensive propaganda centers to networks engaged in procurement and other financial activities and, occasionally, terrorist attacks (most recently, Brazil thwarted an alleged Hezbollah attack against Jewish targets in 2023). Many Latin American countries constitute a highly permissive environment that allows Tehran and its proxies to operate almost undisturbed. This dynamic poses a security challenge, not just to those countries, but also to the United States, given their geographical proximity. Given the heightened geopolitical tensions that have followed the October 7, 2023 attacks and Iran’s unrelenting commitment to highly adversarial positions towards the United States, an in-depth understanding of its networks inside the US and throughout the Western Hemisphere is of paramount importance. This required awareness applies not just to actors who are directly engaged in violent actions, but also to procurement and propaganda networks, as they not only serve useful roles for Tehran in and of itself, but can also potentially be utilized to support or carry out attacks.


Washington, DC: Program on Extremism at George Washington University,2024. 126p.

By Megan K. McBride, Zack Gold, Pamela G. Faber, and Kaia Haney With contributions by William Rosenau and Alexander Powell

Concern about extremism in the military did not begin with the January 6 insurrection on the US Capitol, but media reporting on the issue increased in the wake of the attack, which ensured the kind of sustained attention that is often necessary to compel action. On February 5, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin directed a force-wide stand-down to address the problem. He also asked the Countering Extremism Working Group to update the Department of Defense (DOD) definition of extremist activities, update training modules so that transitioning servicemembers are aware that they might be targeted for recruitment by extremist organizations, and review the screening questions for new recruits in order to solicit information about extremist behavior. As part of a CNA-initiated project to examine past efforts to address extremism in the US military, we identified a number of interesting parallels between this issue and the problem of sexual harassment and sexual assault. The purpose of this paper is to describe and explain these parallels, and to identify lessons that DOD should learn from its past experiences trying to address sexual harassment and assault in the context of its current challenge with racial extremism. Critically, we are not arguing that DOD’s approach to sexual harassment and sexual assault has been successful. Nor are we arguing that sexual harassment, sexual assault, and racial extremism are equivalent or comparable violations. Our argument is more modest: DOD’s approach to sexual harassment and sexual assault contains elements that are relevant to the problem of racial extremism and could provide a foundation on which to identify both helpful and unhelpful ways of approaching this issue.

Arlington, VA: CNA, 2021. 72p.

By William Rosenau, Megan McBride

The alleged participation of off-duty law enforcement personnel in the January 6, 2021, assault on the US Capitol has generated fresh interest in the broader issue of police participation in right-wing extremist groups and activities. Such extremism poses obvious but significant challenges for police agencies and their  communities. It can undermine the rule of law, damage police morale, compromise investigations, hinder successful prosecutions, and disrupt relationships between the police and the communities they serve (particularly communities of color). In the words of one police captain, “whenever the police department shirks its unbiased responsibility. . .the community then is in for real trouble.” Although we know that there are right-wing extremists among the nation’s 800,000 law enforcement officers, we do not know the extent of that presence or the most common ideologies. We also lack a detailed understanding of the strategies and tactics right-wing extremists use to infiltrate and recruit within police ranks and the extent to which the extremist presence may imperil investigations, including those concerning criminal extremist activities. In addition, while much has been made of the threat posed by intentional infiltrations, a potentially greater concern is the organic and gradual radicalization of those already on the force. This paper provides an overview of the current state of knowledge about police officer engagement in rightwing extremism, including the sustained use of racist, misogynistic, and homophobic language and stereotyping, both online and offline. After surveying the contemporary right-wing extremist landscape, this paper uses publicly available sources to explore in a preliminary way aspects of extremist penetration and recruitment, pre-employment screening challenges, police participation in extremist activity, and the role of social media platforms and the internet in enabling extremism. The paper concludes with a set of analytical questions that practitioners and policy-makers must answer if they hope to mitigate the rightwing extremist threat. 

Arlington, VA: CNA, 2021. 9p

By Milo Comerford and Hannah Rose

The UK hate and extremism threat landscape faces a new era of contemporary threats, characterised by an increasingly diverse and amorphous set of threat actors. Since October 7, harmful online content and systems have catalysed real world threats to public safety, social cohesion and democracy across borders. However, policy and legislative responses are often slow to adapt to the rapid pace of change and struggle to respond to the increasingly hybridised contemporary threat environment.

In the first part of this paper, ISD provides a landscape assessment of the extremism, targeted hate and hostile state actors threats currently facing the UK. It evidences the broad ideological spectrum of extremism, analysing the communities impacted by targeted hate and exploring the intersection of these harm areas.

In the second section, the paper explores a roadmap for a holistic policy strategy capable of responding to the interconnectivity of these threats, including practical considerations for the effective implementation of a coordinated cross-government strategy.

London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue. 2024, 28pg

By Richard Chalk

This policy brief explores new and innovative communications approaches to reduce the threat from all forms of violent extremism in Europe today based on a precise analysis of the strategic problem and corresponding strategic communications solutions deployable in response. In the context of an ever-evolving violent extremist landscape, including new and emerging forms of violent extremism, unfolding events in Israel and Gaza, and an accelerating digital environment this policy brief looks at how governments can take a more strategic approach to preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). Based on a strategic analysis of current events and an informed analysis of previous policy responses, this policy brief offers a new and practical approach to the use of strategic communications aimed at safeguarding all communities from all forms of extremist and violent threats, to turn back the tide of extremist influence for good.

The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT). 2024, 17pg