By Ashmini Kerodal, Kelly Officer, Emma Dunn

During the 2019 legislative session, the legislature passed, and the Governor signed Senate Bill 577. Section 5 of the bill created a collection process for data on the prosecution of bias crimes, and requires the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) to analyze these data to identify gaps or weaknesses in the investigation, presentation, prosecution and sanctioning of crimes motivated by bias. This study pools the county District Attorney (DA) data submitted per SB 577 and ORS 137.676, with data from the Oregon State Police (OSP) and Oregon Judicial Department (OJD) to conduct a pre-post evaluation of SB 577 on bias crime prosecutions. The pre-SB 577 group covers all defendants with a bias crime court case or arrest between January 1, 2012 and July 14, 2019, while the post-SB 577 group covers all defendants with a bias crime court case or arrest between July 15, 2019 and December 31, 2022.1 Key Findings One thousand and nine bias crime cases were identified for the 11-year study period. This number excludes cases deemed unfounded by law enforcement (LE)2 and thus not referred to the deputy district attorney (DDA) for review for criminal charges, but includes fingerprintable arrests that were no filed, i.e., bias crime arrests for which no charges were filed by the prosecutor. A case with at least one conviction charge – guilty plea, jury or bench conviction, or no contest plea – was classified as a conviction, which was further divided into bias and non-bias convictions. Sentences and probation conditions were compared for bias conviction and non-bias conviction in the pre- and post-SB 577 periods to determine if conviction charge influenced sentence lengths and probation conditions, and thereafter compared for the pre-post periods to determine the effect of SB 577 on bias crime prosecution. • Eighty percent of filed cases in the pre- and 78.5% in the post-SB 577 group were disposed with a conviction on either a bias or non-bias charge; convictions in the post-SB 577 group are expected to increase as open cases (14.8%) are disposed (see Figure 4). • Slightly over half of defendants sentenced to probation on any conviction charge pre-SB 577 had at least one complex need – identified via post-conviction court mandated substance abuse, mental health or anger management treatment, or houseless status – which increased to 6 in 10 post-SB 577 (see Table 14). • There were no differences in sentencing for bias vs non-bias convictions, aside from the higher use of jail for bias convictions: 67.4% of defendants convicted on a bias vs 44.8% convicted on a non-bias charge in the pre-SB 577 group were sentenced to any jail time, while 54.8% of defendants convicted on a bias vs 41.1% convicted on a non-bias charge in the post-SB 577 group were sentenced to any jail time (see Table 9). • In the absence of formal bias crime treatment and restorative justice (RJ) programs, Clackamas, Multnomah, Wasco and Washington counties are assigning online courses and books/essays to improve defendants’ cultural awareness; community service in culturally appropriate community based organizations (CBOs); and RJ dialogue at the community level. Due to the lack of data on deferred sentences in the OJD Odyssey database, it is possible that these strategies are more prevalent than found in this study, and some creative RJ and sensitivity trainings were not identified. • Insufficient evidence, victim issue, 3 and defendant (in)ability to aid and assist were the most frequently cited reasons bias charges were no filed/no complaint, removed from the charging instrument, or dismissed – in the rare instance when details are provided in Odyssey (see Table 7). The county DA data is crucial to close this knowledge gap and identify challenges faced by DDAs when prosecuting bias crimes. Supplemental data from the Multnomah County District Attorney’s Office (MCDA) indicate that aid and assist concerns were confirmed (22.5%) or suspected (29.8%) in over half of bias crime referrals between 2020 and 2022 (see Table A8 in the Appendix). • Some DDAs communicate justifications for no filing, filing/issuing a case as non-bias, plea bargaining, and deferred sentences to the referring officer, but this is not a consistent practice. Community members who share identity with the victim and who research shows are similarly psychologically harmed when a community member is targeted, have no right to be informed of these decisions and occurrences.4 Recommendations This report focuses on the prosecution and sanctioning of bias crimes, which is a necessary first step to formulate research design(s) 5 to identify gaps in the investigation and presentation of bias crimes. When bias convictions, global plea agreements, and non-bias convictions’ probation conditions are considered, it shows that the criminal justice system contains more accountability than is apparent when one queries a single criminal justice system data point. While accountability is a good start, CJC recommends: • Continuation of the current probation practice of utilizing a 4th generation risk assessment instrument with integrated case management (e.g., LS/CMI), mandating programming recommended by the assessment, and treating housing insecurity to reduce reoffending. • The DA, victim advocates at the DA office, or victim advocates at LEAs typically attempt to inform victims of case outcomes, but communication may be stymied due to justice system capacity, language barriers, time constraints, and other barriers. To improve future bias crime reporting and procedural justice, victims should be informed of which charges were filed, justifications for no filed decisions, their rights to participate in plea bargaining negotiations, case outcomes including probation conditions, and other efforts to hold the defendant accountable. • Additional, rigorous research that utilizes administrative criminal justice, victim services, prosecutors, law enforcement, and community perspectives is required to determine the extent of bias crime and non-criminal bias incidents, barriers to reporting, and resources service providers and the justice system require to ensure defendant accountability and meet the needs of victims and affected communities. Academics, policy researchers and graduate students can help fill these knowledge gaps with qualitative and mixed-methods studies. Interested researchers should contact the CJC.

Salem, OR: Oregon Criminal Justice Commission, 2024. 54p.

By Susan McNeeley, Grant Duwe and Valerie Clark

A growing body of literature shows people released from prison have higher risk of mortality. However, few studies have identified characteristics that increase or decrease mortality among this population. Some studies suggest formerly incarcerated women may have especially high risk of death, despite their relatively lower mortality in the general population compared to men. We seek to contribute to the understanding of risk of mortality among people released from prison by testing whether demographic, social, and custodial factors differentially effect risk of mortality for men and women. We analyze a sample of 31,587 men and 5,129 women released from Minnesota state prisons between 2010 and 2019. We matched administrative data from the Minnesota Department of Corrections with death records from the Minnesota Department of Health. Separate Cox regression analyses were conducted for men and women to determine whether they exhibit different risk factors for all-cause, natural, and unnatural deaths. Our analyses found that release type and frequency of healthcare access were more strongly related to mortality among women, while educational achievement was more strongly related to mortality among men. The findings suggest there are sex-based differences in how programming, post-release community supervision, correctional health care, and education shape health outcomes during reintegration to the community. Examining how these aspects of correctional operations operate for men versus women may shed light on ways to improve releasees’ risk of mortality after release from prison.

St. Paul: Minnesota Department of Corrections, 2023. 32p.

By The University of Massachusetts Amherst. Campus Demonstration Policy Taskforce

Formed by Chancellor Reyes on June 17, 2024, the Campus Demonstration Policy Taskforce was charged with: • Reviewing demonstration-related policies/guidelines including, but not limited to, the land-use policy, picketing code, and demonstration guidelines and make recommendations to the appropriate university governing bodies. • Making recommendations, based on best practices in higher education, regarding methods of demonstration-related intervention, including, but not limited to, the deployment of and composition of the Demonstration Response and Safety Team (DRST). • Making recommendations, based on best practices in higher education, regarding how to increase awareness of university policies and First Amendment protections as they apply to on-campus demonstrations. Between its formation on June 17, 2024, and the delivery of this report on August 30, 2024, the taskforce met six times. The subcommittees met ten times. Significant asynchronous discussion and document review was also completed via a shared Teams channel. The Campus Demonstration Policy Taskforce (CDPT) was guided by and fully endorses the text and spirit of the UMass Amherst Picketing Code, excerpted above, which is itself informed and backed by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The importance of clear policies – and the consistent application of them without regard to the subject matter of demonstrations (content neutrality) or the viewpoints expressed in them (viewpoint neutrality) - was a near-universal theme in a national workshop co-hosted by UMass Amherst during the CDPT’s work. This underscored the criticality of the CDPT’s charge. Throughout its work, the CDPT set out to ensure that the university’s policies reflect a commitment to the free and open exchange of ideas while equally protecting the rights of all to live, work, teach, and learn in a community of inquiry. The CDPT makes several recommendations in three areas: • clarify policy where reasonable interpretations could lead to divergent understandings; • strengthen the ability of the Demonstration Response and Safety Team (DRST) to serve the campus through its role providing demonstration-related safety, education, and deescalation; and • delineate the e distinct roles of university administrators and UMPD in terms of handling violations of policy and illegal acts, respectively. Specifically, we make the following substantive recommendations regarding the Land Use Policy: 1) adopt a definition of “Structure” informed by Massachusetts law; and 2) clarify the role of the University of Massachusetts Police Department (UMPD) in relation to policy enforcement and law enforcement Regarding the DRST, the CPDT recommends the following: 1) create an advisory council to the DRST that includes representatives from outside the university administration; 2) actively seek out post-action reports from other universities for review by the DSRT and advisory board; 3) develop off-ramps oriented towards de-escalating the potential for conflict, including building up a mediation infrastructure; 4) specify procedures for the identification of demonstrators that are UMass community members; and 5) clarify the use of law enforcement in relation to illegal acts, including violent acts, threats of public safety, substantial disorder, trespass, and the invasion of the rights of others, as opposed to policy violations. This also applies to a recommended edit in the Land Use Policy. The CDPT was also asked to provide guidance around “increasing awareness” of demonstration related policies. To that end, the task force 1) created a Free Expression FAQ, attached to this report, that we recommend sharing with the university community; 2) updated DRST handouts that can be shared with demonstrators; and 3) recommends a central website that shares all demonstration-related policies and guidance. e distinct roles of university administrators and UMPD in terms of handling violations of policy and illegal acts, respectively. Specifically, we make the following substantive recommendations regarding the Land Use Policy: 1) adopt a definition of “Structure” informed by Massachusetts law; and 2) clarify the role of the University of Massachusetts Police Department (UMPD) in relation to policy enforcement and law enforcement Regarding the DRST, the CPDT recommends the following: 1) create an advisory council to the DRST that includes representatives from outside the university administration; 2) actively seek out post-action reports from other universities for review by the DSRT and advisory board; 3) develop off-ramps oriented towards de-escalating the potential for conflict, including building up a mediation infrastructure; 4) specify procedures for the identification of demonstrators that are UMass community members; and 5) clarify the use of law enforcement in relation to illegal acts, including violent acts, threats of public safety, substantial disorder, trespass, and the invasion of the rights of others, as opposed to policy violations. This also applies to a recommended edit in the Land Use Policy. The CDPT was also asked to provide guidance around “increasing awareness” of demonstrationrelated policies. To that end, the task force 1) created a Free Expression FAQ, attached to this report, that we recommend sharing with the university community; 2) updated DRST handouts that can be shared with demonstrators; and 3) recommends a central website that shares all demonstration-related policies and guidance.

Amherst: University of Massachusetts Amherst, 2024. 11p.

By Ioli Filmeridis, Rachel Hodel, Thomas Oliver,

Targeted threats, harassment, and the perpetration of physical violence against elected officials are increasingly prevalent around the world. The United States and Southern California are no exception. Local leaders - the most foundational representatives of the democratic processes that undergird our system of government - face unprecedented levels of uncivil and anti- democratic threats, harassment, and attacks. 1 The language, actions and mobilization targeting elected officials is often intended to

intimidate and silence individuals and can lead to their resignation, self-censorship, or disengagement from public meetings and interactions with constituents. The tactics are often purposeful, intended to achieve a political goal with a chilling effect on politics and policy. This type of political violence (the use of force or violence to achieve political objectives) has been increasingly common and prevalent, marked by an increase in threats against public officials at all levels of government. 2 By nearly all measures, political violence is considered to be more acceptable in the US than it was five years ago. 3 Faith in the government's ability to resolve issues and ‘do the right thing’ has declined to the lowest levels in over 70 years. 4 This disillusionment and polarization is concomitant with the rising number of threats targeting public officials. 5 According to the United States Capitol Police, the number of threats targeting members of Congress went up 45% between 2018 and 2022 (from 5,206 to 7,501 over five years),

requiring additional investment of resources and funding to investigate, protect and mitigate threats. Other research reveals a spike in federal charges in response to threats made against public officials - almost doubling between 2016 and 2022. During the 2013- 2016 period there were 38 federal charges per year, in the subsequent six-year period this reached 62 charges per year. Initial research for 2023 and 2024 has recorded an even higher number of charges.

San Diego: University of San Diego, Kroc Institute for Peace and Justice. 2024. 51p.

By David J. Bier

In “The Lifetime Fiscal Impact of Immigrants” (2024), the Manhattan Institute (MI) constructed a sophisticated model to estimate the likely lifetime fiscal e!ect of new immigrants on the US federal budget. MI concludes that the average immigrant will be fiscally positive a modest $10,000 in present value over a lifetime but that immigrants without a bachelor’s degree will be extremely fiscally negative. MI projects that the recent increase in migration will cost the federal government over $1.1 trillion over a century. A careful review of MI’s model finds that this result hinges on several unlikely assumptions, such as new arrivals causing large, immediate increases in defense spending, and no increase in corporate tax payments. When more realistic assumptions are adopted, MI’s model indicates that young, low-skilled immigrants will produce a positive lifetime contribution to the federal budget. For instance, the fiscal e!ect for a 22-year-old high school dropout changes from a negative $315,000 to a positive $45,000. After making revisions, including accounting for lower rates of benefits usage by immigrants, the model predicts the new group of unlawful entrants will likely be positive an aggregate $4.9 trillion.

Cato Institute, Working Paper, no 82

Washington, DC: Cato Institute 2024. 22p.

By Cevat Giray Aksoy, Barry Eichengreen, Anastasia Litina, Cem Özgüzel, Chan Yu:

Scholars and politicians have expressed concern that immigrants from countries with low levels of political trust transfer those attitudes to their destination countries. Using large-scale survey data covering 38 countries and exploiting origin-country variation across different cohorts and survey rounds, we show that, to the contrary, immigrants more exposed to institutional corruption before migrating exhibit higher levels of political trust in their new country. Higher trust is observed for national political institutions only and does not carry over to other supra-national institutions and individuals. We report evidence that higher levels of political trust among immigrants persist, leading to greater electoral participation and political engagement in the long run. The impact of home-country corruption on political trust in the destination country is further amplified by large differences in levels of income and democracy between home and host countries, which serve to highlight the contrast in the two settings. It is lessened by exposure to media, a source of information about institutional quality. Finally, our extensive analyses indicate that self-selection into host countries based on trust is highly unlikely and the results hold even when focusing only on forced migrants who were unlikely to have been subject to selection.

IZA DP No. 17553

Bonn: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2024. 76p.

By Amnesty International

Peaceful protest is a powerful and public way for people to make their voices heard. It has long been a vital means for advancing human rights around the world. However, in Europe, the right of peaceful assembly is increasingly coming under attack, with state authorities stigmatizing, impeding, deterring, punishing and cracking down on those organizing and participating in peaceful protests.

This report documents an array of trends and patterns of human rights violations that curtail this right, and contains detailed recommendations for states to ensure that everyone’s right to protest is protected, respected and fulfilled.

London: Amnesty International, 2024. 209p.

By Sarah Anderson, Logan Seacrest, Christi M. Smith, and Jillian Snider

In the past five years, tragic police-citizen interactions have led to increased community engagement, as citizens across the country rallied to protest police violence. In this changing environment, law enforcement agencies have begun experimenting with new types of de-escalation training with support from federal funding. This paper explores the current landscape of de-escalation training in law enforcement, its uses and effectiveness, and the existing availability and impact of federal grants. We focus on understanding how funding has changed since 2020 and what opportunities exist to improve upon existing practices; assessing police perceptions of the grant process and efficacy of funding; and making recommendations on the types of de-escalation programs that should be made eligible for funding as the federal curriculum is developed. We identify barriers to de-escalation implementation and training funding in communities where it is most needed and make recommendations to improve awareness of and access to federal resources. The recommendations are intended to help reduce police use of force by ensuring federal funding streams are effective. Key Points: 1. Despite recent definition in federal legislation and prominence among law enforcement, de-escalation remains ambiguous in practice. Many variations of de-escalation training exist, which allows for customization to local issues. However, agencies across the country would benefit from a federal program to serve as a foundation for training and evaluation. 2. In recent years, law enforcement agencies have learned from crisis intervention teams and conflict resolution practitioners and created trainings for individual officers. Effective de-escalation training is a long-term investment in reducing the costs of the policing system and limiting government size and impact in the communities that law enforcement serves. 3. Federal resources for police de-escalation training have significantly increased since calls for policing system changes grew louder in 2020, yet law enforcement agencies still face barriers in accessing these resources. Fortunately, a new federal program currently being implemented seeks to alleviate many of these barriers, which will empower law enforcement to employ best-practice de-escalation training.

R Street Policy Study No. 307 July 2024, 16p.

By C. Jarrett Dieterle

Introduction In January 2020, the world of alcohol rules seemed to be mired in a kind of stasis. It had been 85 years since Prohibi琀椀on, but the broad legal structure governing alcohol remained remarkably unchanged. Just three months later, in March 2020, everything changed. The COVID-19 global pandemic that gripped America and the broader world led to unprecedented realignments in our way of life. Governments began issuing mask mandates, social distancing orders, and even rules around how—and if—businesses could con琀椀nue opera琀椀ng. In response, innova琀椀ons like to-go and delivery alcohol took hold across the country, leading to a substan琀椀al shi昀琀 in how alcohol was regulated. Now, three years later, opposi琀椀on to these changes has started to become more prevalent. Most of the pushback has been focused on concerns that less stringent alcohol regula琀椀on could create nega琀椀ve externali琀椀es. One of the prime areas of concern has been underage drinking and whether enhanced alcohol delivery will lead to a spike in youth drinking across the country. This study breaks down the latest underage drinking data to help provide a more informed debate around America’s pandemic-era alcohol reforms.

R Street Shorts No. 128, Washington, DC: R Street, 2023. 7p.

By Christi M. Smith

One in three Americans, roughly 70 to 100 million, have a criminal record that limits their earning capacity and options for suitable housing, as well as makes it more challenging to remain law-abiding. These records are often not the result of serious or violent crime, but rather due to the ever-widening net of “tough-on-crime” legislation that criminalizes poverty, substance use and mental illness. Socioeconomic and behavioral health issues combined with the collateral consequences of an arrest or criminal record make it nearly impossible for individuals to secure or maintain minimum standards of social stability. Absent legitimate opportunities to provide for themselves and their families, some may feel compelled to resort to crime to mitigate stress and account for their most basic needs. This situation subjects law-abiding members of the community to additional crime and escalating product costs associated with increased security-related expenses. Taxpayers also incur the ballooning expense of funding low-level law violator involvement in the justice system and bear the burden of the social costs of record-based discrimination, including a rise in homelessness, a lack of generational mobility and the need for various forms of public assistance. Record-based discrimination is extremely costly to taxpayers and the overall economy, resulting in an estimated $78-$87 billion loss in the national gross domestic product. While the majority of states offer some form of petition-based record sealing, fewer than 10 percent of eligible individuals pursue the option, owing to the cost and complexity of the process. Clean Slate legislation bridges the gap between eligibility and opportunity by automating the process of sealing old records at no cost to the individual. Public safety carve-outs that exclude certain convictions from eligibility; provide access to the records under speci昀椀c and limited circumstances; and include provisions for employer immunity reduce the risk of sealing records from community access. When these records are not available to the general public, the collateral consequences of arrest or conviction no longer present a pervasive barrier to the resources people need to fully reintegrate into the community. Armed with the ability to provide for oneself and thrive in mainstream society, individuals are less likely to return to crime and be琀琀er equipped to contribute to the overall economy. Clean Slate legisla琀椀on is the pathway to prosperity for all Americans. It is a model policy with bipar琀椀san, bicameral and public support. Free, automatic record clearing is smart public policy that reduces recidivism, increases public safety and stimulates the economy. Key Points: 1. Individuals with prior arrests or convictions records experience a host of collateral consequences that limit their access to stable housing, employment, education, food and financial assistance. These barriers unduly burden the individual, their families and communities long after the initial sentence has been served and the debt to society has been repaid. 2. The majority of states offer petition-based record sealing to remove these records from public view, though fewer than 10 percent of eligible individuals take advantage of this opportunity owing to the complexities and costs associated therewith. 3. Individuals who have demonstrated the ability to remain law-abiding in the years following the completion of their sentence are no more likely to reoffend than their counterparts without criminal histories. Automatic record sealing through Clean Slate legislation prioritizes public safety and ends the cycle of punishment in perpetuity for eligible people by allowing them to fully reintegrate into their communities and contribute to the overall economy.

R Street Policy Study No. 279, Washington, DC: R Street, 2023. 19p.

By Chelsea Boyd

The United States is in the midst of an overdose crisis. One promising harm reduction intervention that could prevent overdoses and curb the crisis is overdose prevention centers (OPCs). OPCs are facilities where people who use drugs (PWUD) can consume pre-obtained substances under medical supervision. In addition to supervised consumption services, OPCs o昀琀en provide other harm reduction and basic services, such as syringe exchange, treatment referrals, wound care, public assistance referrals and more. The first OPC opened in Switzerland in the 1980s, and OPCs now exist in at least 11 countries Evidence supporting OPCs largely comes from the facilities operating in Canada and Australia. Evaluations of these centers have shown that they are remarkably effective at decreasing health harms associated with drug use, and there has never been a reported overdose death at an OPC. Additionally, OPCs have been shown to reduce syringe and consumption equipment sharing, decrease overdose deaths in the area around the center, prevent new HIV and hepatitis C infections, increase treatment uptake and decrease public injecting and syringe litter. Studies also have found that OPCs do not increase crime or drug use. Nevertheless, in both Canada and Australia, advocates who wanted to open the facilities faced uphill battles that left the OPCs in legal limbo for many years before ultimately receiving permanent legal authorization. The United States currently has two locally sanctioned OPCs in operation in New York City, and several states and cities are working toward opening OPCs despite their federally illegal status under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Although no jurisdiction other than New York City has opened an OPC in the United States, these centers have been authorized by policymakers at the state, county and local levels. In addition to New York City, Philadelphia, Seattle, Rhode Island and California have made progress toward authorizing OPCs. Policymakers at every level of government can take action to facilitate the opening of OPCs. Local policymakers and groups, such as mayors or city councils, can authorize OPCs, although this path provides the least protection from state or federal interference. States can pass legislation that authorizes OPCs through pilot programs, which allows them to be rigorously evaluated and ensures that an OPC’s existence does not conflict with state law. Nevertheless, federal action legitimizing OPCs is also necessary. Congress could consider amending the CSA to clarify that OPCs do not violate the act or stipulate that federal funds cannot be used to enforce the CSA in regard to OPCs. Alternatively, the administration could release a memorandum stating that the federal government will not interfere with OPCs operating under state or local authorization, or the Department of Justice could release a similar statement. The challenge with either of those actions is that future administrations could decide not to honor these statements. Regardless of how OPCs are authorized, policymakers can apply pragmatic approaches to authorize them in their jurisdictions. These include getting community buy-in, working with law enforcement, formalizing requirements for operation and evaluation and ensuring that the facilities and policies are designed to meet the needs of the populations they serve.

R Street Policy Study No. 265, Washington, DC: R Street, 2022. 19p.

By Stacey McKenna

To combat rising rates of drug overdoses, the United States government has begun to embrace a public health response that has been saving lives for decades: harm reduction. This pragmatic public health approach aims to mitigate the health risks associated with a range of behaviors rather than insisting people quit them altogether. Despite the benefits of harm reduction programs, stigma, paraphernalia laws and weak or inconsistent protections from such laws can undermine the uptake of their services. In addition, a small but growing body of evidence indicates that, despite the legalization and expansion of these programs, successful implementation may also be limited by outdated local, state and federal policy. To better understand how outdated policy might create barriers to providing optimal harm reduction services, we interviewed 10 harm reduction providers serving diverse populations across the United States. These interviews revealed two primary areas of concern that harm reduction providers perceived as hindering the services they offered, both of which relate to government overreach: the overregulation of operations and the excessive restrictions on how funding can be used. To remove these barriers and enable harm reduction organizations to save more lives, we suggest that—instead of supporting legislation that regulates the details of harm reduction practice—lawmakers support bills that emphasize organizational autonomy for these groups. Doing so would allow harm reduction providers to tailor programs as needed, remain flexible in the face of changing science and provide more effective services to their communities.

R Street Policy Study No. 262 July 2022, 9p.

By C. Jarrett Dieterle

Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the concept of to-go alcohol was largely unheard of in America. Certain locales, such as New Orleans, offered so-called “go-cups” for alcoholic beverages, and a handful of municipalities across the country had open-container zones that allowed consumers to walk from restaurant to restaurant with a drink in hand. But by and large, alcohol purchased at a bar or restaurant had to be consumed inside the restaurant. When COVID-19 hit and dining inside turned into a public health liability, most restaurants and bars pivoted to a takeout and delivery model of service to keep their doors open. While food was readily convertible to this format, alcohol was not. In most states, antiquated laws governing the sale of alcoholic beverages prevented alcohol from being sold either as a curbside to-go opt-on or via delivery. In response, governors and alcohol regulatory agencies around the country issued emergency orders that granted both on-premise and off-premise establishments the ability to sell alcohol in a to-go or delivery capacity. This rapid reaction resulted in some of the fastest alcohol regulation changes in the last hundred years. To-go and delivery privileges provided a badly needed lifeline to restaurants, bars and liquor stores during an unprecedented time of government-imposed lockdowns and social distancing orders. As one example of the impact of these reforms, states that permitted to-go and delivery drinks saw higher rates of furloughed employees being hired back by restaurants during the pandemic. Given this measurable success, many states have since made the decision to legisla琀椀vely extend, or make permanent, to-go and delivery alcohol. As of last fall, 29 states had extended or made permanent to-go drinks, and 32 states had passed to-go or delivery reforms of some kind (either from on- or off-premise retailers). Despite this reform wave, opposition has begun to develop against to-go and delivery alcohol reform—specifically around concerns that it could raise the prevalence of drunk driving. This paper examines that opposition and presents research to determine if to-go alcohol has had any impact on alcohol-impaired driving fatalities over the past two years.

R Street Shorts No. 114, June 2022, 6p.

By C. Jarrett Dieterle

When it comes to having alcoholic beverages delivered to our doors, America is in a very different place today than it was 24 months ago. As COVID-19 spread across the world, markets were forced to adapt to the delivery economy model that has dominated throughout the pandemic. Although the sale of most goods could readily be converted from brick-and-mortar purchases to doorstep shipping, alcohol was a notable exception. Many states still prohibited liquor stores, grocery stores and alcohol producers from delivering alcohol locally to consumers’ homes, and nearly every state prohibited restaurants and bars from selling alcohol “to-go” or via delivery. And while wineries were able to ship their bottles to customers in most states, distilleries and breweries were largely barred from the direct-to-consumer (DtC) shipping market. The COVID-19 effect on alcohol delivery and shipping has been both broad and deep. As of last fall, the vast majority of states had passed at least some type of alcohol delivery reform, if not multiple reforms. In fact, many states are still actively considering alcohol delivery legislation or planning to do so in the years ahead. As alcohol delivery has taken off, pushback has emerged. Although much of the pushback can be attributed to protectionist impulses by industry stakeholders, some of the concern stems from health and safety concerns like underage drinking as well as driving under the influence. As more lawmakers across the country consider the future of alcohol delivery in their states, it is important to understand these concerns and engage in data-driven investigations of their legitimacy.

R STREET SHORTS NO. 113 April 2022, 5p.

CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, US. Department of Justice

• Tulsa Race Massacre: Violent attack on Black community of Greenwood, Oklahoma, May 31-June 1, 1921.
• Massive Destruction: 10,000 white Tulsans destroyed homes, businesses; hundreds of Black residents killed.
• Law Enforcement’s Role: Deputized white residents participated in violence, looting, and arson.
• Failure of Justice: Authorities failed to help survivors; legal attempts for reparations were unsuccessful.
• Historical Reckoning: DOJ review acknowledges massacre’s impact, despite expired statutes of limitations.
• Legal Analysis: Modern laws could have prosecuted hate crimes, but were unavailable in 1921.
• Insurance Denials: Black residents denied compensation due to “riot clause” in policies.
• Federal Investigation: DOJ’s Cold Case Unit reviewed the events under the Emmett Till Act.
• Government’s Role: White officials obstructed rebuilding efforts, imposed restrictive fire codes.
• Survivors’ Plight: Left without resources, faced systemic racism and state-sanctioned brutality.
• Historical Documentation: Review includes survivor accounts, primary materials, and past investigations.
• Confrontation Trigger: Arrest of Dick Rowland and sensationalized newspaper article incited violence.
• Continued Efforts: Work to ensure future generations understand the massacre’s magnitude continues.

CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, US. Department of Justice. 2025. 126p

By April M. Zeoli, Amy Molocznik, Jennifer Paruk, Elise Omaki, Shannon Frattaroli, Marian E. Betz, Annette Christy, Reena Kapoor, Christopher Knoepke, Wenjuan Ma, Michael A. Norko, Veronica A. Pear, Ali Rowhani-Rahbar, Julia P. Schleimer, Jeffrey W. Swanson & Garen J. Wintemute

Background

Extreme Risk Protection Orders (ERPOs) are civil court orders that prohibit firearm purchase and possession when someone is behaving dangerously and is at risk of harming themselves and/or others. As of June 2024, ERPOs are available in 21 states and the District of Columbia to prevent firearm violence. This paper describes the design and protocol of a six-state study of ERPO use.

Methods

The six states included are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Maryland, and Washington. During the 3-year project period (2020–2023), ERPO case files were obtained through public records requests or through agreements with agencies with access to these data in each state. A team of over four dozen research assistants from seven institutions coded 6628 ERPO cases, abstracting 80 variables per case under domains related to respondent characteristics, events and behaviors leading to ERPO petitions, petitioner types, and court outcomes. Research assistants received didactic training through an online learning management system that included virtual training modules, quizzes, practice coding exercises, and two virtual synchronous sessions. A protocol for gaining strong interrater reliability was used. Research assistants also learned strategies for reducing the risk of experiencing secondary trauma through the coding process, identifying its occurrence, and obtaining help.

Discussion

Addressing firearm violence in the U.S. is a priority. Understanding ERPO use in these six states can inform implementation planning and ERPO uptake, including promising opportunities to enhance safety and prevent firearm-related injuries and deaths. By publishing this protocol, we offer detailed insight into the methods underlying the papers published from these data, and the process of managing data abstraction from ERPO case files across the multi-state and multi-institution teams involved. Such information may also inform future analyses of this data, and future replication efforts.

Injury Epidemiology volume 11, Article number: 49 (2024) 

Edited By David Ehrhardt, David Oladimeji Alao, M. Sani Umar

Exploring the contentious landscape of Nigeria’s escalating violence, this book describes the changing roles of traditional authorities in combatting contemporary security challenges. Set against a backdrop of widespread security threats – including insurgency, land disputes, communal violence, regional independence movements, and widespread criminal activities – perhaps more than ever before, Nigeria’s conventional security infrastructure seems ill-equipped for the job. This book offers a fresh, empirical analysis of the roles of traditional authorities – including kings, Ezes, Obas, and Emirs – who are often hailed as potent alternatives to the state in security governance. It complicates the assumption that these traditional leaders, by virtue of their customary legitimacy and popular roots, are singularly effective in preventing and managing violence. Instead, in exploring their creative adaptation to governance roles after a dramatic postcolonial downturn, this book argues that traditional leaders can augment, but not substitute, the state in addressing insecurity. This book’s in-depth analysis will be of interest to researchers and policy makers across African and security studies, political science, anthropology, and development.

London; New York: Routledge, 2024. 313p.

By Mark Pyman and Paul M. Heywood

This open-access book provides accessible insight into how to tackle corruption in organizations and institutions. It explains how to recognize and analyze corruption issues, together with knowledge and advice on how they can be avoided, prevented, or minimized. It also provides a framework through which readers can examine what strategies are available to tackle corruption issues, a rationale for how to prioritize strategies depending on circumstances and context, and guidance on how to critique various options. The book will appeal to professionals and practitioners, as well as academics interested in governance and corruption.

Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2024. 182p.