By Michael Fürstenberg

In the past, far-right aggression predominantly focused on national settings and street terror against minorities; today, however, it is increasingly embedded in global networks and acts within a strategic framework aimed at revolution, targeting the liberal order as such. Ideologically combining antisemitism, racism, and anti-feminism/anti-LGBTQI, adherents of this movement see modern societies as degenerate and weak, with the only solution being a violent collapse that they attempt to accelerate with their actions. The terrorist who attacked the synagogue and a kebab shop in Halle, Germany, in October 2019 clearly identified with this transnational community and situated his act as a continuation of a series of attacks inspired by white supremacy in the past decade. The common term ‘lone wolf’ for these kinds of terrorists is in that sense a misnomer, as they are embedded in digital ‘wolf packs’. Although this movement is highly decentralized and heterogeneous, there are interactive processes that connect and shape the online milieu of extremists into more than the sum of its parts, forming a structure that facilitates a certain degree of cohesion, strategic agency, and learning. This paper uses the model of collective learning outside formal organizations to analyze how the revolutionary accelerationist right as a community of practice engages in generating collective identities and knowledge that are used in the service of their acts of death and destruction.

Halle (Saale), Germany: Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, 2022. 62p.

By Annemarie van de Weert ,  Radicalisation Awareness Network

  Over the course of the previous years, counterterrorism has focused more on anticipating the threat of terrorism. In this context, institutions such as the United Nations Security Council and the European Commission have increasingly emphasized that acts of terrorism cannot be prevented through repressive measures alone. Through countering violent extremism (CVE) and preventing violent extremism (PVE), the aim is to detect deviant attitudes in an early stage and promote social inclusion and cohesion at the same time. In particular, CVE consists of the early detection of radicalisation towards violent extremism and includes various approaches to increase the resilience of communities and individuals to the use of extremist violence and other related unlawful acts. In turn, the concept of PVE consists of systematic preventive measures which directly address the drivers of extremist environments. Both approaches emphasise tackling the context conducive to terrorism such as situational, social, cultural and individual factors. Because of their direct contact with society, frontline professionals are tasked with dealing with individuals who may threaten the rule of law, national security, and democratic values. This ought to be done by building normative barriers against violent extremism at an early stage, the so-called uncharted terrains between non-violent extremist ideology and terrorism. The question remains: How can youth, family and community workers intervene in radicalisation processes without infringing on personal freedoms? This overview paper focuses on right-wing extremism (RWE) and freedom of expression. It provides advices from first-line practitioners on how to deal with and respond to extremists publicly expressing their ideologies in a nonviolent, but still potentially harmful, way. It also delves into the matter of how practitioners can protect themselves against potential backlash and threats of violence from extremist organisations or movements  

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2021 . 29p.

By Diane Marie Amann   

A ruling group at times takes certain children out of their community and then tries to remake them in its image. It tries to rid the child of undesired differences, in ethnicity or nationality, religion or politics, race or ancestry, culture or class. There are too many examples: the colonialist residential schools that forced settler cultures on Indigenous children; the military juntas that kidnapped dissidents’ children; and today’s reports of abductions amid crises like that in Syria. Too often nothing is done, and the children are lost. But that may be changing, as the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) is seeking to arrest Russian President Vladimir Putin and Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova for the war crimes of unlawfully deporting or transferring children from Ukraine to Russia. This article examines the criminal phenomenon that it names “child-taking.” By its definition, the crime occurs when a state or similar powerful entity, first, takes a child, and second, endeavors, whether successfully or not, to alter, erase, or remake the child’s identity. Using the ICC case as a springboard, this article relies on historical and legal events to produce an original account of child-taking. Newly available trial transcripts help bring to life a bereft mother and five teenaged survivors, plus the lone woman defendant,  who testified at a little-known child-kidnapping trial before a postwar Nuremberg tribunal. Their stories, viewed in the context of the evolution of international child law, inform this article’s definition. These sources further reveal child-taking to be what the law calls a matter of international concern. At its most serious, child-taking may constitute genocide or another crime within the ICC’s jurisdiction. Yet even if circumstances preclude punishment in that permanent criminal court, child-taking remains a grave offense warranting prosecution or other forms of local and global transitional justice. This is as true for the Indigenous children of residential schools in North America, Australia, and elsewhere, and for children in Syria and many other places in the world, as it is for the children of Ukraine.   

University of Georgia School of Law Research Paper Series Paper No. 2023-10 

By Aoife Gallagher, Ciarán O’Connor, Pierre Vaux, Elise Thomas, Jacob Davey

Discord is a free service accessible via phones and computers. It allows users to talk to each other in real-time via voice, text or video chat and emerged in 2015 as a platform designed to assist gamers in communicating with each other while playing video games. The popularity of the platform has surged in recent years, and it is currently estimated to have 140 million monthly active users.1 Chatrooms – known as servers - in the platform can be created by anyone, and they are used for a range of purposes that extend far beyond gaming. Such purposes include the discussion of extreme right-wing ideologies and the planning of offline extremist activity. Ahead of the far-right Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, in August 2017, organizers used Discord to plan and promote events and posted swastikas and praised Hitler in chat rooms with names like “National Socialist Army” and “Führer’s Gas Chamber”.2 In this briefing we provide an analysis of 24 English-language Discord servers associated with extreme right-wing activity. This analysis is intended as a snapshot of current trends on Discord with a specific focus on the role of gaming, rather than a comprehensive overview of extreme right activity on the platform. Key Findings • We found that Discord primarily acts as a hub for extreme right-wing socialising and community building. Our analysis suggests that Discord provides a safe space for users to share ideological material and explore extremist movements. • Of particular concern is the young age of the members of these servers, who on average, when determinable, were 15 years old. This suggests that Discord could act as an entry point for children to come into contact with extremist ideology. • We found limited evidence that gaming played a role in serious strategies to radicalise and recruit new individuals on the platform. Instead gaming was primarily referenced in cultural terms, being used by members of these servers to find common-ground. • Gamified online harassment through ‘raids’ was a popular activity across the channels analysed. This suggests that this semi-organised cyber-bullying could be a vector which brings young people into contact with extremist communities. • We identified discussion in these channels expressing support for the proscribed terrorist organisations Atomwaffen Division and Sonnenkrieg Division. This included the sharing of branded content produced by these organisations, as well as the identification of one user who expressed an interest in joining Atomwaffen.  

Amman | Berlin | London | Paris | Washington DC: ISD Global, 2021. 13p.

By Ciarán O’Connor

This briefing is part of ISD’s Gaming and Extremism Series exploring the role online gaming plays in the strategy of far-right extremists in the UK and globally. This is part of a broader programme on the ‘Future of Extremism’ being delivered by ISD in the second half of 2021, charting the transformational shifts in the extremist threat landscape two decades on from 9/11, and the policy strategies required to counter the next generation of extremist threats. It provides a snapshot overview of the extreme right’s use of Twitch. Twitch launched as a livestreaming service in 2011 focused on gaming and eSports and was acquired by Amazon in August 2014 for $970 million. According to Twitch, the platform has over 30 million average daily visitors and almost half of all Twitch users are between 18 - 34 years old, while 21% are between 13 - 17. In the UK, based on the most recent Ofcom figures from 2019, Twitch accounts were held by 8% of 16-24 year olds, 3% of 25-34 year olds and 2% of 35-44 year olds. Users typically stream themselves playing a game and others can tune in to watch or interact with the gamer through the in-app chat function, whereby a gamer will respond to text questions via their microphone, or to users who send voice comments via a connected chat channel set up by the host gamer on another messaging platform like Discord. There are several ways for Twitch users to monetize their content, most of which are supported and facilitated by the platform. This includes donations sent using the platform’s digital currency, Bits, or via a third-party donations tool like Streamlabs, or via a payment platform like Paypal. Additionally, users earn revenue by running ads on their content or channel, paid subscriptions from other Twitch users (followers), or sponsorships and selling merchandise. Extremist activists have used Twitch in the past to livestream. The platform hosted numerous streams, primarily rebroadcasts or live streams from other platforms, showing events inside the US Capitol in Washington DC on 6 January as protesters stormed the Capitol. In response to extremist threats in the past, Twitch has instituted an in-house moderation team, which suspends or remove channels which breach their rules. Twitch has also been used to promote extremist ideologies and broadcast terrorist attacks. In October 2019, a man killed two people during an attempted attack on a synagogue in Halle. The attack was live streamed for 25 minutes on Twitch. According to the platform, only five viewers watched the video while it was live while a recording of the video generated automatically after the stream ended was viewed by 2,200 people in the 30 minutes it was available before it was flagged and removed. The Twitch account used to broadcast the attack was created about two months prior to the attack and had attempted to stream only once before. In October 2020, Twitch updated its community guidelines to clarify and broaden its ban on terrorist and extremist content. Twitch does not allow content “that depicts, glorifies, encourages, or supports terrorism, or violent extremist actors or acts,” while additionally, users may not display footage of terrorist or extremist violence “even for the purposes of denouncing such content.” In March 2021, Twitch released its first-ever transparency report, detailing its safety initiatives and efforts to protect users on the platform. To better understand the current use of Twitch by the extreme right, and to analyse the overlap with gaming we performed scoping analysis of the platform by searching the platform for keywords associated with extremist activity with the aim of identifying extremist accounts and content. In total we analysed 73 videos and 91 channels on the platform. Key findings • We discovered that content which expresses support for extreme right wing ideologies can be discovered on Twitch with relative ease. These videos are probably better considered as sporadic examples of support for these ideologies on the platform, rather than representative of the systemic use of Twitch by the extreme right for radicalisation and coordination. However, this nevertheless demonstrates that the platform still has a problem with extremist activity. ISD also discovered that there are, and have recently been, prominent extreme right-wing content creators active on the platform, but that these appear to be low in number. • Twitch is one of many live streaming platforms that are favoured by extremists in the practice of “Omegle Redpilling.” This practice involves extremists using the live video chat platform Omegle to troll and spew racism towards others, whilst simultaneously live streaming themselves to their own followers on their profile on another livestream platform. ISD found evidence of at least two such online extremists who have used Twitch for these purposes.Extreme right-wing activists are platform agnostic. Based on findings in this and other reports in this ISD series, there is growing evidence that points to extreme right-activists online adopting a multi-platform approach, where they use as many platforms as possible as part of a strategy to avoid moderation efforts. • A Twitch account belonging to jailed white supremacist Paul Miller is still live. ISD discovered that a Twitch account run by Paul Miller, a white supremacist who used multiple Twitch accounts to simultaneously broadcast hate on multiple video platforms, is still live. Though it features no content, it continues to grow in subscribers and serves as a promotional page for Miller and his hateful ideology. • Streams of gaming did not appear to be used systemically to target, groom or recruit individuals on the platform. ISD did not find evidence that gaming content or communities on Twitch are routinely used or targeted, groomed or recruited by extremists. • We discovered that counter-speech content which pushes back against the extreme right is widely accessible on Twitch. Counter-speech is term for a tactic used by individuals and groups online in countering hate speech, extremism or misinformation by presenting critical responses, debates or alternative narratives in reaction to offensive narratives. ISD discovered there is an active anti-extremist progressive community of counter-speech channels on the platform. • Compared to other online platforms analysed in other reports in this series Twitch does not appear to be a major hub for extreme right-wing communities, content creators or organisations. Notwithstanding some high profile examples of extremist trolling, these appear to be isolated rather than evidence of systemic extremist mobilisation on the platform to reach large audiences, incite violence or recruit others.   

Beirut Berlin London Paris Washington DC Copyright © Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2021. 13p.

By Rachel Kinsella, Patrick Williams and Kevin Wong

Chance to Change is a deferred prosecution scheme which was delivered across two pilot sites in West Yorkshire and London. Deferred prosecution schemes intentionally remove the legal requirement for an admission of guilt, allowing people who are accused of an offence to access supportive interventions designed to address the personal, social, and economic factors that may contribute to offending behaviour. This study draws on the views and experiences of pilot stakeholders and service users to explore how the Chance to Change projects were delivered and received, and the potential benefits for individuals of participating in the scheme.

 Manchester, UK:  Policy Evaluation and Research Unit, Manchester Metropolitan University 2023, 24p.

By Henry A. Thompson

This paper uses economic reasoning to analyze the organization of one of the most successful criminal groups in modern US history: La Cosa Nostra (LCN). Drawing on recently declassified Federal Bureau of Investigation reports and a hand-collected data set, I argue that the costs of violent disputes are key for an economic understanding of La Cosa Nostra’s core institutions. Violent disputes were costly as they consumed resources, were destructive, and raised the group’s profile. As a member did not bear the full costs of a profile-raising police investigation, each had a perverse incentive to resolve a dispute with violence. Hierarchical firms and a sophisticated court system were the LCN’s solution. They gave bosses the authority and incentive to limit violent disputes and to use violence judiciously. La Cosa Nostra’s longevity and success are, in part, a testament to these institutions’ efficacy.

The Journal of Law and Economics Volume 67, Number 3 August 2024

By Beatrix Immenkamp

Hate speech and hate crime can destroy lives, harm people and property, threaten individual rights, terrify communities, reduce trust between members of society, create and amplify tensions between social groups, disturb public peace and order, and endanger peaceful coexistence. Hate speech distorts public debate and, at its worst, leads to an abuse of rights that endangers the rule of law. Hate speech and hate crime are incompatible with the EU's common values and fundamental rights, as enshrined in EU Treaties and in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. EU law currently criminalises hate speech and hate crime, but only if it is related to a limited set of characteristics, namely race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin. The European Commission, with the support of the European Parliament, would like to widen the scope of the prohibition to include other protected characteristics, such as gender, sexual orientation, age and disability. In December 2021, the Commission proposed to the Council and the Parliament to extend the list of EU crimes under Article 83(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to hate speech and hate crime. With this initiative, the Commission hopes to address Member States' divergent and fragmented approaches to hate speech and hate crime and to guarantee consistent protection of victims across the EU. In this context, it is important to understand how Member States currently criminalise hate speech and hate crime. This briefing therefore provides an overview of relevant legal provisions in selected EU countries. There are significant differences between Member States, strengthening the argument in favour of harmonising legislation across the EU. This briefing is to be read in conjunction with the briefing 'Hate speech and hate crime: Time to act?', published in September 2024

Brussels: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, 2024. 13p.

By Blyth Crawford

This report examines the often under‑studied connections between antisemitism and anti‑gender sentiment within the neofascist militant accelerationist (NMA) movement. It considers the central importance of family within the NMA mission to maintain white racial ‘purity’, before outlining dominant antisemitic conspiracy theories prevalent between accelerationist movements such as the ‘Great Replacement’. Closely related is the ‘Cultural Marxism’ conspiracy theory which is a key point of focus of this paper. This narrative frames Jewish people as having disproportionate influence within cultural institutions, such as the media, with Jews often imagined as using this power to influence society subtly in a variety of ways that might lead to the white race being ‘replaced’. In particular, this report focuses on how the NMA movement imagines Jewish people as influencing sexual politics in ways that are regarded as being ‘anti‑family’ and therefore constitute a threat to the white race.

Key Findings

• The rigid conceptions of what constitutes a ‘real’ family typical among NMA movements has direct implications for sex and gender norms. Any sexuality or aspect of sexual politics that falls outside these strict constructions is regarded as a threat to the white race and is attributed to hostile Jewish influence.

• NMA groups’ anti‑gender narratives therefore constitute a multi‑pronged threat, combining hatred towards feminists and the LGBTQ+ community with antisemitism.

London: ICSR King’s College London 2022. 40p.

By Ioana Sendroiu, Ron Levi & John Hagan

The Roma are Europe’s largest minority group and face extensive discrimination across the continent. Drawing on a survey of Roma and non-Roma households in twelve Central and Eastern European countries, we analyze the extent to which legal cynicism, as a cognitive frame, is connected to the avoidance of helpful social institutions. We thus expand existing research on legal cynicism to focus on individuals’ contacts with potentially helpful institutions that can buffer inequality. We conclude that the interplay of legal cynicism and system avoidance, which have provided deep insights into the reproduction of structural disadvantage in American cities, also provide us with international insights into the causes of inequality and minority disadvantage across hundreds of towns in Central and Eastern Europe. In this way, legal cynicism and system avoidance work to reproduce durable inequality.

Social Forces, Volume 101, Issue 1, September 2022, Pages 281–308,

By Justice for Children

“For children deprived of liberty, who remain an inherently vulnerable group, experiences of violence are sadly a reality for a vast majority. (…) The impact of such violence is devastating, immediate, and lifelong. It impairs children’s brain development, their physical and mental health, and their ability to learn. To end violence against children in detention there is an urgent need for States and their statistical offices to collect better data and conduct more analysis of the information that is collected – both of which remain scarce.”

- Manfred Nowak

This research report maps current data collection practices, gaps, and needs for monitoring violence against children across the European Union and highlights the need for better safeguarding policies in these facilities. This research is realized in the framework of the Data for Monitoring the Safety of Imprisoned Children (Data MOSAIC) project which is implemented by Penal Reform International, Social Activities and Practice Institute (SAPI), Fundatia Terre des Hommes – Elvetia (TdH Romania) and Fundación Tierra de Hombres (TdH Spain) in collaboration with Universidade NOVA de Lisboa between 2023-2025. The project aimed at taking a step toward better-safeguarding children from violence during criminal justice detention by improving the existing data collection practices in children's detention facilities across the European Union. Within this background, this research report combines a mapping of tools and practices for data collection on VAC in criminal detention facilities in Europe, identifies gaps, needs, and promising practices, and seeks to provide relevant recommendations and elements for developing an improved monitoring system. Conducted in close collaboration with authorities, staff, and international experts, this research underpins the development of the Data MOSAIC tool, a data collection tool that aims at supporting facilities to devise more evidence-based practices and policies by enabling them to monitor VAC incidents and trends.

The Hague: Penal Reform International, 2024. 76p.

Edited By David Ehrhardt, David Oladimeji Alao, M. Sani Umar

Exploring the contentious landscape of Nigeria’s escalating violence, this book describes the changing roles of traditional authorities in combatting contemporary security challenges. Set against a backdrop of widespread security threats – including insurgency, land disputes, communal violence, regional independence movements, and widespread criminal activities – perhaps more than ever before, Nigeria’s conventional security infrastructure seems ill-equipped for the job. This book offers a fresh, empirical analysis of the roles of traditional authorities – including kings, Ezes, Obas, and Emirs – who are often hailed as potent alternatives to the state in security governance. It complicates the assumption that these traditional leaders, by virtue of their customary legitimacy and popular roots, are singularly effective in preventing and managing violence. Instead, in exploring their creative adaptation to governance roles after a dramatic postcolonial downturn, this book argues that traditional leaders can augment, but not substitute, the state in addressing insecurity. This book’s in-depth analysis will be of interest to researchers and policy makers across African and security studies, political science, anthropology, and development.

London; New York: Routledge, 2024. 313p.

By Darshana Sreedhar Mini

In the 1990s, India’s mediascape saw the efflorescence of edgy soft-porn films in the Malayalam-speaking state of Kerala. In Rated A, Darshana Sreedhar Mini examines the local and transnational influences that shaped Malayalam soft-porn cinema and maps the genre’s circulation among the Indian diaspora in the Middle East. She explores the soft-porn industry’s precarious labor structure, as well as how actresses and production personnel who are marked by their involvement with a taboo form navigate their social lives. By surveying the tense negotiations among sexuality, import policy, and censorship, this study offers a model for understanding film genres as entire fields of social relations and gendered imaginaries.

By Anthony Morgan, Timothy Cubitt, Alexandra Voce and Isabella Voce  

We conducted a randomised survey experiment involving 13,301 online Australians. Respondents were asked about their support for environmental, anti-lockdown and sovereign citizen protests. They were randomly allocated to one of three groups presented with different protest tactics—peaceful marching, disrupting traffic and violent clashes with police. Respondents were significantly more likely to oppose violent or disruptive protests than peaceful protests, regardless of the issue or movement in question. The strongest opposition was to anti-lockdown and anti-vaccination protests, followed by protests relating to the sovereign citizen movement. Protests about environmental issues had the most support. The effect of conspiratorial beliefs on support for protests varied by protest cause. Belief in conspiracy theories increased support for protest violence, relative to other tactics. Support for certain protest causes and tactics is shaped by a person’s ideological beliefs.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 702. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2024. 23p.

By Bethany Jackson, Esther Weir, Meghan Alexander, Kimberley Hutchison, Jolaade Olatunbosun, Vicky Brotherton, and Doreen Boyd , Mary Alexander

Realigning Modern Slavery and Climate Change for Equitable Governance and Action’ is part of a larger collective of research projects aiming to understand the intersections between climate change and modern slavery and generate new evidence on how policies can recognize, address and positively influence these linkages between modern slavery and climate change. This project focuses on how modern slavery and climate change can be jointly integrated in UK Government and devolved administrations' policies. This pursuit is to demonstrate how modern slavery can be ‘mainstreamed’ into climate change action, and vice versa. The project and this report are the result of collaboration between the Rights Lab (University of Nottingham), Transparentem, and International Justice Mission (IJM) UK. Context Modern slavery and climate change intersect through complex, direct and indirect pathways that span borders and propagate through interconnected human-environmental systems. Climate change can increase vulnerabilities to modern slavery through the occurrence of changing environmental conditions and slow-onset events (such as drought), or rapid-onset events, both of which can cause climate-induced displacement or longer-term migration and heighten vulnerabilities that can be exploited (both in home and receiving countries). In response to changing environmental conditions, people may be forced to enter exploitative situations or engage in exploitative activities to provide alternative livelihoods and survive. In this regard, climate change can exacerbate pre-existing risk factors for modern slavery and disproportionally affect certain groups, notably women and girls. However, climate change action may also be a driving factor. For instance, planned relocations of communities as part of adaptive, risk management approaches can also create or exacerbate vulnerabilities to modern slavery, particularly if rights and/or livelihood opportunities are limited in receiving locations. Likewise, the ‘race to net zero’ could prompt new businesses to engage in modern slavery and human rights abuses, while the loss of certain industries could create new vulnerabilities in the absence of just transitions. The intersections and cascading risks that exist between climate change and modern slavery make it paramount that the two agendas be addressed together; yet to date, these issues have largely been treated as policy silos. Research methods This research examines the policy intersections and opportunities for strengthening alignment between modern slavery and climate change through UK policies and devolved administrations (Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland). The research addresses the following questions: 1. To what extent are anti-slavery efforts currently integrated into UK Government and devolved administrations’ climate change policies? 2. How can anti-slavery actions be better aligned and integrated (if at all) into climate change policies through existing and/or new mechanisms (i.e., ‘mainstreaming’)? To address these questions, we undertook a comprehensive evidence review, alongside policy and legal analyses, both domestically and internationally to identify potential transferable lessons. This was accompanied by in-depth interviews with governance actors (n = 17) and a focus group (October 2023) with those working on modern slavery and/or climate change policies (n = 4).

Findings and recommendations Three key emerging findings were identified as part of the study. First, policy silos currently exist because of inaction, a lack of ability and willingness to incorporate combined activities in work and disconnects of scale mean activities to combine modern slavery and climate change action are further ahead in the anti-slavery sector, than the climate change space. Second, there are perceived and real barriers associated with resource and capacity strain which mean the research community should work to support governance actors and provide evidence for the development of new streams of policy action. Finally, domestic and international legislative action can be used as a baseline for combined action addressing modern slavery and climate change. For example, the inclusion of decent work within Scotland and Northern Ireland’s climate change policies demonstrates integrated policy achievements. Our findings highlight several ways through which modern slavery and climate change agendas could be more strongly aligned and strengthened through governance mechanisms. Seventeen (17) overarching recommendations are identified according to four core themes – governance, knowledge-to-action, capacity building and finance, and support, lived experience and inclusion, and have been assigned an urgency score. The urgency scoring adopts a similar approach to that used by the latest Climate Change Risk Assessment (CCRA3) (HM Government, 2022), taking into account current levels of risks or opportunities, how this is currently being managed and the benefits of further action in the next five years. More action is needed for most recommendations, meaning that new, stronger or different government action is required over and above that already planned in the next five years. It is vital that governments step-up action to address these dual challenges simultaneously to ensure a rights-based, socially just response to climate change. Summary of recommendations Governance  G1: Strategic oversight of Greater strategic oversight is needed between the leading departments focused on modern slavery (Home Office and Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, FCDO), to include and address intersecting issues of modern slavery and climate change at domestic and international scales.  G2: Problem framing and recognition o An overarching human rights lens should be centred at the core of public policy and should be integrated across all departments (national and devolved) and their mandates.  G3: Enhanced cross-departmental collaboration of Mechanisms are needed to overcome current siloed approaches throughout the UK government and devolved administrations, including cross departmental sub-groups and establishing internal networks.  G4: Legislative change o Consider the development of new combined legislation addressing modern slavery and climate change concerns, and in the interim update current legislation to strengthen UK response to modern slavery and climate change.  G5: Alignment of Inclusion of climate change as an issue of concern in relation to modern slavery as part of the agenda pursued by the Global Commission on Modern Slavery.  G6: Intergovernmental collaboration o The UK should revive its reputation as a multi-lateral governance actor and provide international leadership around climate change and modern slavery through its role within the UN multilateral systems, the new Global Commission on Modern Slavery, through the FCDO Modern Slavery Envoy and other multi-lateral systems  (continued)   

Nottingham, UK: University of Nottingham, Rights Lab, 2024. 53p.

By Kori Cordero,  Suzanne M. Garcia, Lauren van Schilfgaarde

Intergovernmental Collaboration is intended to assist Tribal Healing to Wellness Courts interested in building intergovernmental collaborations, including tribal-state collaborations. Whether a Wellness Court has been operational for decades or is still in the planning process, collaboration is essential. This resource frames the subject by providing a brief history of Tribal Healing to Wellness Courts, discusses some common traits found in existing collaborations, and then uses those common traits to discuss actual collaborations that are operating in the Tribal Wellness Court context. (2021

West Hollywood, CA: Tribal Law and Policy Institute. 2021. 46p.

By Carrie Garrow and Catherine Retana

Using traditional storytelling as a guide,Tribal Judicial Leadership in Healing to Wellness Courts looks at leadership from a tribal perspective. Tribal Healing to Wellness team leaders and tribal judges are faced with numerous responsibilities. Tribal judges are expected to actively participate with team members, participants, and ensure the sustainability of the Tribal Healing to Wellness Court within the Judicial Branch. This publication looks to traditional stories to provide a guide for tribal judges for effective tribal judicial leadership within Tribal Healing to Wellness Courts by discussing the responsibilities of Tribal judges, the cultural components of Tribal judicial leadership, and how they interact with the Tribal Healing to Wellness Court Ten Key Components.

West Hollywood, CA: Tribal Law and Policy Institute. 2024. 230p.

By Alyssa Harrold and Grace Carson

Promising Strategies for Tribal Healing to Wellness Courts: Peer to Peer Learning through Mentor Courts describes The Tribal Law and Policy Institute’s Mentor Court Program, which was conceived to address a critical gap in the provision of Tribal specific technical assistance. While Federal and State mentor court programs offer valuable insights, they often lack focus on Tribal-specific issues such as jurisdictional complexities, limited access to resources, heightened rates of substance abuse, co-occurring disorders, cultural values, and historical trauma. Furthermore, the unique sovereign status of Tribal nations, each with its own customs, laws, and cultural needs, necessitates tailored approaches to the development and sustainability of Tribal Healing to Wellness programs. The peer-to-peer learning that occurs between Mentor Courts and Sister Courts (or mentee courts) is representative of the interconnectedness of indigenous peoples and the significance of shared knowledge. We believe that the Mentor Court/Sister Court model promotes Tribal sovereignty and self-determination within Indigenous justice systems.

West Hollywood, CA: Tribal Law and Policy Institute. 2024. 54p.

By Lauren van Schilfgaarde

Formalizing Healing to Wellness Courts in Tribal Law (2022) tracks the ways in which Tribes have drafted Wellness Courts into tribal law. Tribal Healing to Wellness Courts are restorative justice components of the Tribal Court. To the extent they operate a docket, adjudicate cases, and most critically, heal and restore members and the community, some Tribes have noted their existence in the Tribal code. Because each Tribe is structurally and culturally unique, there is no one correct way to promulgate a Wellness Court into Tribal law, or if that exercise is even necessary. This publication identifies the considerations for code drafting, identifies variations, and pushes Tribes to contemplate how the Wellness Court operates in relation to other parts of the Tribal judiciary and Tribal law.

West Hollywood, CA: Tribal Law and Policy Institute , 2023. 179p.

By Nicole Gelinas 

During Mayor Eric Adams’s first seven weeks in office, soaring violent crime in New York City’s subway system dominated the local news. Public fear and frustration peaked in mid-January, with the murder of 40-year-old Michelle Go, who was shoved from a Times Square subway platform onto the tracks in the middle of the day. Go’s alleged killer, an apparently mentally ill and homeless man who had repeatedly violated parole for a 2017 violent felony conviction, was yet another example of the city and state’s failure to treat and supervise violent mentally ill people, or to incarcerate violent offenders. Go’s death was a tragic instance of a now nearly two-year-old phenomenon. When subway ridership fell precipitously in March 2020, to as low as 6.5% of the pre-Covid normal level of 5.6 million riders each weekday, violent felonies did not fall with passenger numbers. Violent felonies rose sharply, not only on a per-rider basis but in absolute numbers. A beneficial “safety in numbers” effect, supplemented by the legacy of decades of proactive policing, had disappeared. Now the full data for 2021 are in, and a new, longer-term trend persistent through the second year of Covid has become clear. As ridership has gradually returned, to an average of 59% of normal from early November until Christmas Eve 2021, violent crime has not gradually declined in tandem. Violent crime, both per passenger and, in some categories, in raw numbers, has remained persistently higher than it was in 2019. Where there was safety in numbers before Covid and grave peril in desolation beginning in March 2020, there now exists an unhappy medium. Modest-size crowds—though larger than those in 2020—are not by themselves helping to deter violent crime. This stagnation of both crowd size and public safety is unlikely to fix itself: as people fear taking trains because of violent crime, they keep crowd levels low, thus enabling violent crime to persist at elevated levels. At the same time, the NYPD and prosecutors have not stepped in to fill the vacuum. Preventive policing, in terms of arrests and civil summonses for alleged low-level law violations, remains far below pre-Covid levels. In January 2022, before Go’s murder, new Mayor Eric Adams and Governor Kathy Hochul announced a joint state-city plan to secure the subways. (The city-run NYPD is generally responsible for public safety in the subways, not the state-run Metropolitan Transportation Authority, which runs the trains.) As of mid-March 2022, however, the plan has not yet achieved results: for the year through March 13, transit crime was up 80.3% compared with the same period in 2021. To restore order on the subways, the city must go beyond the improved mental-health treatment that the plan promises. Rather, police have to return to proactive and preventive policing and deterrence—and prosecutors need to follow through on these cases. In 2019, New York City and tristate residents depended on mass transit for three-fourths of their daily commutes into Manhattan. Without safe transit, Manhattan and the city cannot recover economically from Covid.4 

New York: The Manhattan Institute, 2022. 17p.