By Edmund Fitton-Brown and Bakary Sambe 

  This short paper explores how Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the predominant coalition of al-Qaeda (AQ) affiliates in the region, is structured and financed and how its component parts relate to one another. The paper will outline how the various groups constituting JNIM train and operate jointly and the extent of their use of trafficking routes and overlap with regional organized crime. It addresses the extent to which the spillover of JNIM activity from Mali and Burkina Faso into the Atlantic/Gulf of Guinea littoral states represents a threat to their stability. It also addresses the impact of political instability in Mali, Burkina Faso, and elsewhere on counterterrorism (CT) activity and the impact on terrorism of external state and non-state assistance. The paper seeks to diagnose the challenges posed by JNIM considering its local and regional circumstances on the ground and to provide operationally relevant recommendations both for actions within the region itself and through the use of international resources. The recommendations seek to integrate CT with measures aimed at preventing and countering extremism, conflict resolution, and development goals. They also highlight that the needs vary between different countries in the region. For example, measures applied to Mali cannot easily be transferred to mitigate the challenges in Burkina Faso  

Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. , Counter Extremism Program, 2023. 14p.

By Jytte Klausen

This report analyses the networks and organizations that mobilize and direct Americans for jihadist action, or that raise money in the US for Hamas and Hezbollah. The study employs a quasi-experimental method using a control-case design, comparing the network structures of American terrorism offenders inspired by Hezbollah with those of Sunni extremist groups aligned with Al Qaeda, and in recent years ISIL.

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2016. 71p.

By Peter Bergen and Bruce Hoffman

Al-Qaeda and allied groups continue to pose a threat to the United States. Although it is less severe than the catastrophic proportions of a 9/11-like attack, the threat today is more complex and more diverse than at any time over the past nine years. Al-Qaeda or its allies continue to have the capacity to kill dozens, or even hundreds, of Americans in a single attack. A key shift in the past couple of years is the increasingly prominent role in planning and operations that U.S. citizens and residents have played in the leadership of al-Qaeda and aligned groups, and the higher numbers of Americans attaching themselves to these groups. Another development is the increasing diversification of the types of U.S.-based jihadist militants, and the groups with which those militants have affiliated. Indeed, these jihadists do not fit any particular ethnic, economic, educational, or social profile. Al-Qaeda’s ideological influence on other jihadist groups is on the rise in South Asia and has continued to extend into countries like Yemen and Somalia; al-Qaeda’s top leaders are still at large, and American overreactions to even unsuccessful terrorist attacks arguably have played, however inadvertently, into the hands of the jihadists. Working against al-Qaeda and allied groups are the ramped-up campaign of drone attacks in Pakistan, increasingly negative Pakistani attitudes and actions against the militants based on their territory, which are mirrored by increasingly hostile attitudes toward alQaeda and allied groups in the Muslim world in general, and the fact that erstwhile militant allies have now also turned against al-Qaeda. This report is based on interviews with a wide range of senior U.S. counterterrorism officials at both the federal and local levels, and embracing the policy, intelligence, and law enforcement communities, supplemented by the authors’ own research.

Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Center’s National Security Preparedness Group (NSPG), 2010. 44p.

By Mohammed Abu-Nimer

The emergence of “violent extremism” (VE)2 as a central framework and priority adopted by most Western and non-Western government agencies. It has become the primary lens through which to describe many of their activities, especially in conflict areas around the world, even when the issues are not or are only remotely related. There is no doubt that VE narratives, especially those promoting violence in the name of Islam spread by groups such as Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabab, Taliban and Daesh, have gained strength and visibility in the last two decades (regardless of the differences in the groups’ motivation or type of justification – be it nationalism, anti-Western intervention or religion). However, it is an overstatement to solely explain the motivation for endorsing or adopting VE in Muslim societies as a result of theological factors; as explained below, there are many other factors besides religious identity and theological reasoning contributing to the phenomenon. Nevertheless, it is possible to trace historical factors that led to the creation of such groups in predominantly Muslim countries. In Afghanistan, for example, one such factor is rooted in the Cold War dynamics between the United States (US) and the USSR at the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. To fight communism, the US government mobilised local Afghan communities, which included some fighters who subsequently employed extreme Islamic religious narratives. The US’s fervent desire to prevent the spread of communism thus led to the arming of members of Afghan society who later utilised the concept of jihad against non-believers in certain Sunni interpretations.

Berlin: Berghof Foundation, 2018. 21p.

By Jerome P. Bjelopera

The emphasis of counterterrorism policy in the United States since Al Qaeda’s attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) has been on jihadist terrorism. However, in the last decade, domestic terrorists—people who commit crimes within the homeland and draw inspiration from U.S.-based extremist ideologies and movements—have killed American citizens and damaged property across the country. Not all of these criminals have been prosecuted under federal terrorism statutes, which does not imply that domestic terrorists are taken any less seriously than other terrorists. The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) do not officially designate domestic terrorist organizations, but they have openly delineated domestic terrorist “threats.” These include individuals who commit crimes in the name of ideologies supporting animal rights, environmental rights, anarchism, white supremacy, anti-government ideals, black separatism, and beliefs about abortion

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017. 62p.

By The Soufan Center

Over the past twenty years, al-Qaeda has proven to be resilient and adaptive in its efforts to survive the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Twenty years after the attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States, perpetrated by al-Qaeda, the organization looks much different than it did at the time. “We are no longer dealing with the same terrorist threat, or even the same al-Qaeda, as we did on September 11,” says Ali Soufan. “What we have today is something more complex and resilient, and an organization that has learned lessons from our policies and counterterrorism approaches. We did a lot to secure the U.S. homeland, but in our handling of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, we may have shown terrorist groups that all it requires to outlast a superpower is patience.”

Washington, DC: The Soufan Center, 2021. 47p.