MCBRIDE, MEGAN K.; JENKINS, MONIQUE

From the document: "Within the public violence literature--that is, the literature on domestic terrorism, mass shootings, school shootings, and hate crimes, among others--leakage has been identified as a core warning behavior. Leakage occurs when a would be assailant communicates an intention to harm a target before committing an attack. This communication can vary in timing, level of detail, form, intentionality, and audience. Through such a communication, an individual might directly verbalize an intent to commit an act, make more subtle threats and innuendos, or share a plan via social media. Researchers have found relatively high levels of leakage associated with acts of public violence, including adolescent-perpetrated mass murders, mass shootings, political and public figure assassinations, and domestic terrorism. For this reason, leakage--which often occurs in interactions online or with loved ones--can be an important warning sign. But leakage to family, friends, or acquaintances is not the only way to detect when an individual is intending to commit an act of public violence, and over the last decade, researchers have started to examine preattack contact with system stakeholders, such as law enforcement, mental health, and education professionals. [...] We sought to advance understanding of what percentage of the violent extremist population could be 'catchable' in the sense that an individual had been in previous contact with a system stakeholder (e.g., law enforcement, mental health provider) or had been reported to a system stakeholder (e.g., by a friend or loved one to whom they had intentionally or unintentionally leaked information). To explore this issue, we leveraged a new dataset: the Domestic Terrorism Offender Level Database (DTOLD). The database includes detailed information on the 320 non-Islamist individuals who carried out terrorist attacks in the United States between January 1, 2001, and December 31, 2020. Specifically, we sought to understand what percentage of this population was known to system stakeholders at some point before they perpetrated their attacks." Further information for this document can be found here: www.cna.org/reports/2024/08/domestic-terrorists-contact-with-system-stakeholders-before-attacks

CNA CORPORATION. 2024. 4p.

Keneally, Katherine; Davey, Jacob

From the document: "This project by the Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET) looks at the user journeys of individuals who enter and participate in the online spaces of extremist communities. A user journey here refers to the distinct path a user may follow to reach their goals when accessing and using an online space belonging to extremist communities. User journeys are particularly important in offering insights into the rationale and motivations of users on the one hand, and to the inner workings of extremist online communities on the other. This is vital for understanding their goals and objectives. In selecting the ideologies for this project, we drew upon extremist communities - rather than extremist and terrorist organisations or groups - including those actors that participate in the extremist milieu and share ideas but do not necessarily operate in concert. These ideologies include those of formal and well-defined extremist organisations of White supremacist and anti-government extremist groups in the United States, supporter networks of Islamic State (IS), and looser communities of extremist actors including accelerationists, incels and chan site members who operate on shared platforms, congregating around common beliefs but without the connection of formal membership. This project is a response to the growing interest in understanding how individuals enter and participate in online spaces of extremist communities."

Global Network On Extremism And Technology (GNET). 24 JUL, 2024.

ByJoshua D. Freilich, Steven M. Chermak, Rachael A. Arietti, and Noah D. Turner

This review focuses on terrorism and extremist crimes, including ideologically motivated hate crimes. Research on these topics has become more rigorous in recent decades, and more scholars have engaged in original data collection. Our assessment found a burgeoning literature that increasingly includes the application of integrated theories, but gaps remain as few studies examine life-course and critical approaches. Our review of the policing of terrorism found a limited evidence base for counterterrorism initiatives. We also found that court/sentencing issues are understudied. We suggest improving data quality in these areas by creating a national data collection protocol on these crimes, enhancing the rigor of offender and victim self-report studies, and requiring more transparency from open-source research efforts. We propose that government agencies fund rigorous evaluations of policing strategies in the terrorism context. Finally, it is hoped that increased access to federal court documents will lead to more scholarly attention on sentencing issues.

Annual Review of Criminology, Volume 7, Page 187 - 209

By Daniel Milton and Andrew Mines

The issue of extremism in the military community has posed challenges for a long time. From the role of combat veterans in driving the rise of the militia movement after Vietnam and beyond, the U.S. military has contended with all manner of extremist movements and ideologies. Historically, extremist activities manifested in a number of ways, including attacks andor hate crimes against fellow service members and civilians, theft of military equipment, security breaches, and broader harm to morale, unit cohesion, personnel retention, recruiting efforts, and mission success. Although the vast majority of U.S. Department of Defense DoD personnel 5and veterans uphold our nations highest values during and well after their service, the worlds largest employer has struggled at times to confront a problem that affects all corners of American society. In the past decade, various organizations have raised serious red flags to both the DoD and Congressional oversight bodies regarding this looming threat. More recent reporting has pointed to growing evidence of white supremacy and racist ideologies in the military these last few years. Additionally, the siege on the U.S. Capitol and the surrounding focus on the involvement of individuals with military experience has highlighted the pressing need to take meaningful steps to understand and confront the problem at hand. To be clear, the Capitol Hill siege does not provide an all-encompassing view of modern day extremism in the military. However, an examination of the individuals charged in connection with that event can offer some perspective as to the diversity and scale of the connection between extremism and those with military experience.

Washington DC: Program on Extremism, George Washington University, West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, New York: 2021. 44p.

By Elizabeth Yates and Erin E. Wilson

This report examines how the QAnon movement exploits the U.S. military’s credibility in society to further its aim of undermining American democracy. It shows how 25 U.S. military veterans – all of whom have been engaged in the QAnon movement since the failed insurrection on January 6, 2021 – spread disinformation and build support for the movement. Analysis of their social media, along with a broader review of QAnon content, reveals how Q influencers portray the U.S. military as a heroic protagonist in their conspiratorial propaganda, and how they exploit military veterans to legitimate such claims and even recruit. It concludes with policy recommendations that focus on protecting members of the armed services, those who have served and their families, and communities the movement targets with its conspiracies

The mainstreaming of the QAnon extremist movement presents a growing threat to the American system of government. QAnon’s effort to create the perception that they are allied with the U.S. military has particularly alarming implications for our democracy:  It strengthens the QAnon movement by facilitating recruitment from both military and civilian communities and encourages active participation among adherents;  It lends legitimacy to discriminatory and anti-democratic conspiracies that are integrated into the Q movement, such as antisemitism and election denial;  It distorts the public’s understanding of the primary responsibilities of the military, and, importantly, the legal boundaries of domestic military intervention;  It undermines public faith in democratic institutions by regularly encouraging the acceptance of authoritarian actions; and  It threatens the communities the movement targets with its conspiracies and maligns the reputation of U.S. servicemembers, veterans, and their families.

New York: Human Rights First, 2022. 20p.

by Heather J. Williams, Luke J. Matthews, Pauline Moore, Matthew A. DeNardo, James V. Marrone, Brian A. Jackson, William Marcellino, Todd C. Helmus

Racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism (REMVE) and extremists (REMVEs) present some of the most pressing threats to the United States. REMVE also has been identified as the White identity terrorist movement (WITM). REMVEs are among the most lethal domestic violent extremists, and they are the most likely to commit mass-casualty attacks. These movements are characterized by a broad ideological orientation toward xenophobic, anti-Semitic, racist, and misogynistic sentiment.

For this report, the authors reviewed the relevant literature on REMVE networks and collected and analyzed social media data from six social networks (Twitter, Reddit, Gab, Ruqqus, Telegram, and Stormfront) to produce a global network map of the digital REMVE space. That network map evaluates each network's construction, connectivity, geographic location, references to prominent organizations, and proclivity to violence. The authors also reviewed ten countries' experiences with REMVE to sketch out an understanding of the REMVE space in these countries and how REMVEs in those countries relate to those in the United States.

Key Findings

The WITM/REMVE global network on social media is largely created and fueled by users in the United States

• WITM/REMVE is fueled by U.S. domestic drivers, and this movement is less of an issue in other countries.

• Programs to counter violent extremism are generally most productive when they are local.

• The primary need is for robust national strategies to counter WITM/REMVE, specifically in the United States.

An organization- or actor-focused counter-WITM/REMVE strategy likely will not work because of the diffuse nature of REMVE movements

• REMVE is a post-organizational movement; many REMVEs are radicalized outside an organized group and groups are loosely organized, meaning that U.S. strategy to counter REMVE should not be centered around key organizations and actors.

Intervention strategies should be multifaceted because of the complex nature of the problem and its intersections with protected civil rights

• The scale of REMVE and the depth of its ideological roots in the United States suggest that targeting and ostracizing sympathizers would not be a successful intervention strategy.

There are structural differences in how REMVE manifests and is countered in Europe versus in the United States

• The parliamentary system in many European countries gives those on the far right a presence in the political system, which provides a nonviolent outlet for fringe-movement adherents. Many European countries also have active intervention and counter-REMVE programs underway.

Racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism (REMVE) and extremists (REMVEs) present some of the most pressing threats to the United States. REMVE also has been identified as the White identity terrorist movement (WITM). REMVEs are among the most lethal domestic violent extremists, and they are the most likely to commit mass-casualty attacks. These movements are characterized by a broad ideological orientation toward xenophobic, anti-Semitic, racist, and misogynistic sentiment.

For this report, the authors reviewed the relevant literature on REMVE networks and collected and analyzed social media data from six social networks (Twitter, Reddit, Gab, Ruqqus, Telegram, and Stormfront) to produce a global network map of the digital REMVE space. That network map evaluates each network's construction, connectivity, geographic location, references to prominent organizations, and proclivity to violence. The authors also reviewed ten countries' experiences with REMVE to sketch out an understanding of the REMVE space in these countries and how REMVEs in those countries relate to those in the United States.

Key Findings

The WITM/REMVE global network on social media is largely created and fueled by users in the United States

• WITM/REMVE is fueled by U.S. domestic drivers, and this movement is less of an issue in other countries.

• Programs to counter violent extremism are generally most productive when they are local.

• The primary need is for robust national strategies to counter WITM/REMVE, specifically in the United States.

An organization- or actor-focused counter-WITM/REMVE strategy likely will not work because of the diffuse nature of REMVE movements

• REMVE is a post-organizational movement; many REMVEs are radicalized outside an organized group and groups are loosely organized, meaning that U.S. strategy to counter REMVE should not be centered around key organizations and actors.

Intervention strategies should be multifaceted because of the complex nature of the problem and its intersections with protected civil rights

• The scale of REMVE and the depth of its ideological roots in the United States suggest that targeting and ostracizing sympathizers would not be a successful intervention strategy.

There are structural differences in how REMVE manifests and is countered in Europe versus in the United States

• The parliamentary system in many European countries gives those on the far right a presence in the political system, which provides a nonviolent outlet for fringe-movement adherents. Many European countries also have active intervention and counter-REMVE programs underway.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2022. 184p.

Edited By Olivier J. Walther, William F.S. Miles

Since the end of the Cold War, the monopoly of legitimate organized force of many African states has been eroded by a mix of rebel groups, violent extremist organizations, and self-defence militias created in response to the rise in organized violence on the continent. African Border Disorders explores the complex relationships that bind states, transnational rebels and extremist organizations, and borders on the African continent. Combining cutting edge network science with geographical analysis, the first part of the book highlights how the fluid alliances and conflicts between rebels, violent extremist organizations and states shape in large measure regional patterns of violence in Africa. The second part of the book examines the spread of Islamist violence around Lake Chad through the lens of the violent Nigerian Islamist group Boko Haram, which has evolved from a nationally-oriented militia group, to an internationally networked organization. The third part of the book explores how violent extremist organizations conceptualize state boundaries and territory and, reciprocally, how do the civil society and the state respond to the rise of transnational organizations. The book will be essential reading for all students and specialists of African politics and security studies, particularly those specializing on fragile states, sovereignty, new wars, and borders as well as governments and international organizations involved in conflict prevention and early intervention in the region.

London: Routledge, 2018. 230p

By Anna Kruglova

This policy brief analyses the phenomenon of conspiracy theories, and how they fit in the realm of research on violent extremism. Using the case study of QAnon, this Policy Brief looks at how the movement mobilises people to violence on social media and attempts to determine how different this process is from any other process of radicalisation to violence. By combining discourse analysis of the movement’s Gab posts, interviewing former supporters, and analysing three illustrative case studies, this Policy Brief identifies five discourses - such as revenge, “the Other”, chosenness/ specialness, apocalypse, and urgency for action and altruism - that are used to bring people into the violent mindset. It emphasises the similarity of these discourses to the ones used by other extremist organisations and argues against exceptionalising the threat of QAnon and other conspiracy theories. It concludes by making recommendations about how to tackle QAnon propaganda.

The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) , 2023. 22p.

By Theo Clement | Hans-Jakob Schindler

The nexus between terrorist and transnational organized crime (TOC) networks in West Africa presents one of the most significant security challenges. Both networks undermine governance and the rule of law and cooperate on a multitude of levels in a complex web of mutual beneficial arrangements. Therefore, this nexus presents a mutually enforcing mechanism that supports and accelerates regional destabilization. This paper argues that the risks emanating from this cooperation are not limited to terrorism financing alone as terrorist groups also use their cooperation with TOC networks to gain access to resources needed for their activities, such as arms and ammunition. Finally, such cooperation also allows terrorist groups to carve out spaces that allow them to control the local population while at the same time provide security for local licit and illicit economic activities. Therefore, this cooperation is in some cases also a tool through which terrorist groups can gain support and acceptance among the local population. Therefore, tackling this nexus must involve both the regaining of territorial control from terrorist groups by the respective governments as well as the strengthening of governance structures. Both aims should also be attempted concurrently. This paper presents a range of recommendations for German and European decision-makers that primarily aim to disrupt the entry as well as exit points of the flows of illicit goods of the region. Given the current challenges European and German projects face when cooperating with some of the governments in the region, an emphasis on increasing regional cooperation in West Africa seems advisable. In particular, the paper suggests strengthening national and regional law enforcement and border control capabilities, especially within the coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea. Increased cooperation with the Intergovernmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), increased support to strengthen the management and control mechanisms for national parks, and intensified exchange mechanisms, such as the West Africa Police Chief Committee (WAPCC) of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), could be contemplated. In addition, German and European decision-makers could encourage and support governments in the region in their efforts to intensify the use of existing regional mechanisms such as the ECOWAS sanctions mechanism, as well as increase the participation of regional states in the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)-World Customs Organization (WCO) Container Control Program and INTERPOL’s West African Police Information System (WAPIS) as possible priorities.

Berlin: Counter Extremism Project Germany GmbH ,2023. 16p

By Dele-Adedeji | Sofia Koller

This policy paper summarizes the current state of affairs regarding the linkages of terrorist groups in West Africa with terrorist networks in other African regions. It also provides recommendations for policymakers and security agencies. The paper looks at linkages of JNIM, IS West Africa Province (ISWAP), and IS in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) with terrorist groups in North, West-Central, Eastern, and Southern Africa. In West Africa, ISWAP’s activities have been regionally confined to Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. There is no indication that ISWAP intends to expand its territorial base beyond these countries or that it has any transregional linkage with terrorist groups in other parts of Africa. JNIM and ISGS have demonstrated that they possess the intention and capability of regional expansion across West Africa. Increasing attacks further southwards in West Africa and their presence in the neighboring regions of Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, and Benin suggests that both groups intend to expand their geographical zone of influence to the Gulf of Guinea. There is, however, no indication of either JNIM or ISGS forming a transregional linkage with terrorist groups in other African sub-regions. ● In North, West-Central, East, and Southern Africa, there are also currently no indications that terrorist groups have developed linkages with other terrorist networks beyond their own region. ● Terrorist groups in West Africa are pragmatic in their approach to collaborations. Their choice of network linkages is guided by local dynamics and their own particular agenda rather than ideology. Hence, existing linkages are driven by the involvement in transnational organized crime (TNCO), potential financial gains as well as the potential of financing terrorism via local and international sources, training of fighters, foreign terrorist fighters from other African countries, and weapons smuggling and use of small arms and light weapons (SALWs).

Berlin: Counter Extremism Project Germany GmbH ,2023. 16p.

By Joshua D. Freilich, Steven M. Chermak, and Joseph Simone Jr.

ABSTRACT. This study presents American state police agencies’ perceptions about three signifi- cant terrorism and public safety issues. First, we asked about the threat posed by specified extremist groups nationally and to their state. We asked about the number of such groups and their supporters, and the number of activities each group parti- cipates in during a typical year in their state. We also asked about the number of criminal incidents each group commits and the number of their supporters arrested in a typical year. Second, we asked the agencies to rate the usefulness of fifteen spe- cified terrorism sources. Third, we queried the agencies about their views of eight terrorism definitions. These data were collected by surveying the fifty state police.

Terrorism and Political Violence, 21: 3, 450 — 475. DOI: 10.1080/09546550902950324 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546550902950324.

By Unidad de investigación de Venezuela

For twenty years, Venezuela was a refuge for Colombia’s Marxist guerrillas, a place where they could hide out from the military, run criminal economies, and carry out political work with impunity thanks to their friendly relationship with the government of President Hugo Chávez. But today, it is so much more. Guerrillas such as the ELN have spread deep into Venezuelan territory, they are filling their ranks with recruits, taking control of communities, and interfering in politics. Today, they are binational guerrilla groups. The product of five years of fieldwork along the Colombia-Venezuela border and beyond, this investigation reveals the Venezuelan operations of Colombia’s guerrillas and explores the far-reaching implications for both countries of their evolution into Colombo-Venezuelan groups.

Washington, DC: Insight Crime, 2022. 53p.

By Pieter Van Ostaeyen | Kwesi Aning  

Since the initial rise in violent extremist and terrorist groups in the Sahel in the mid-2000s, the number of such groups in the region has continued to grow. This is reflected in the nature of the opportunistic alliances that have developed among different groups, with varying interests and memberships. Furthermore, these groups have changed their operational tactics over time and, since 2019, began a gradual expansion of their activities towards the littoral states of West Africa. This paper focuses on two of the most important extremist groups in the Sahel: Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Islamic State in Greater Sahel (ISGS). In discussing the origins of both groups, this paper argues that their establishment was not borne out of religious rationales alone. Rather, ISWAP’s and ISGS’s formation and expansion were based on their fractured relationships with the organizations from which they split and to a certain extent transformed, as well as their pursuit for new allegiances and competition for preeminence in the leadership as they battled to expand and establish Islamic states in northern Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and the Sahel. Ideologically, this paper identifies the adoption of Takfiri doctrines as the driving force resulting in more draconian interpretation and implementation of Islamic laws implemented by the hisba relating to zakat, hudud, ta’zir, and qisas. This paper argues that factionalism and splits from the original organizations represent fundamental splits from their original members and that the alliances formed by these originally distinct groups constitute a fundamental split and shift in operational tactics. ISWAP and ISGS operations are characterized by opportunism and exploitation of local grievances that enables them to build specific narratives for support….

Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V.. Counter Extremism Program, 2023. 20p.  

By Edmund Fitton-Brown and Bakary Sambe 

  This short paper explores how Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the predominant coalition of al-Qaeda (AQ) affiliates in the region, is structured and financed and how its component parts relate to one another. The paper will outline how the various groups constituting JNIM train and operate jointly and the extent of their use of trafficking routes and overlap with regional organized crime. It addresses the extent to which the spillover of JNIM activity from Mali and Burkina Faso into the Atlantic/Gulf of Guinea littoral states represents a threat to their stability. It also addresses the impact of political instability in Mali, Burkina Faso, and elsewhere on counterterrorism (CT) activity and the impact on terrorism of external state and non-state assistance. The paper seeks to diagnose the challenges posed by JNIM considering its local and regional circumstances on the ground and to provide operationally relevant recommendations both for actions within the region itself and through the use of international resources. The recommendations seek to integrate CT with measures aimed at preventing and countering extremism, conflict resolution, and development goals. They also highlight that the needs vary between different countries in the region. For example, measures applied to Mali cannot easily be transferred to mitigate the challenges in Burkina Faso  

Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. , Counter Extremism Program, 2023. 14p.

By Ini Dele-Adedeji | Sofia Koller

This policy paper summarizes the current state of affairs regarding the linkages of terrorist groups in West Africa with terrorist networks in other African regions. It also provides recommendations for policymakers and security agencies. ● The paper looks at linkages of JNIM, IS West Africa Province (ISWAP), and IS in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) with terrorist groups in North, West-Central, Eastern, and Southern Africa. ● In West Africa, ISWAP’s activities have been regionally confined to Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. There is no indication that ISWAP intends to expand its territorial base beyond these countries or that it has any transregional linkage with terrorist groups in other parts of Africa. ● JNIM and ISGS have demonstrated that they possess the intention and capability of regional expansion across West Africa. Increasing attacks further southwards in West Africa and their presence in the neighboring regions of Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, and Benin suggests that both groups intend to expand their geographical zone of influence to the Gulf of Guinea….

Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. Counter Extremism Program, 2023. 16p.

By Theo Clement and Hans-Jakob Schindler  

The nexus between terrorist and transnational organized crime (TOC) networks in West Africa presents one of the most significant security challenges. Both networks undermine governance and the rule of law and cooperate on a multitude of levels in a complex web of mutual beneficial arrangements. Therefore, this nexus presents a mutually enforcing mechanism that supports and accelerates regional destabilization. This paper argues that the risks emanating from this cooperation are not limited to terrorism financing alone as terrorist groups also use their cooperation with TOC networks to gain access to resources needed for their activities, such as arms and ammunition. Finally, such cooperation also allows terrorist groups to carve out spaces that allow them to control the local population while at the same time provide security for local licit and illicit economic activities. Therefore, this cooperation is in some cases also a tool through which terrorist groups can gain support and acceptance among the local population. Therefore… 

• More....

  , tackling this nexus must involve both the regaining of territorial control from terrorist groups by the respective governments as well as the strengthening of governance structures. Both aims should also be attempted concurrently. This paper presents a range of recommendations for German and European decision-makers that primarily aim to disrupt the entry as well as exit points of the flows of illicit goods of the region. Given the current challenges European and German projects face when cooperating with some of the governments in the region, an emphasis on increasing regional cooperation in West Africa seems advisable. In particular, the paper suggests strengthening national and regional law enforcement and border control capabilities, especially within the coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea. Increased cooperation with the Intergovernmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), increased support to strengthen the management and control mechanisms for national parks, and intensified exchange mechanisms, such as the West Africa Police Chief Committee (WAPCC) of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), could be contemplated. In addition, German and European decision-makers could encourage and support governments in the region in their efforts to intensify the use of existing regional mechanisms such as the ECOWAS sanctions mechanism, as well as increase the participation of regional states in the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)-World Customs Organization (WCO) Container Control Program and INTERPOL’s West African Police Information System (WAPIS) as possible priorities. 

Berlin:  Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. Counter Extremism Program 2023. 16p 

By The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

This report focuses on the funding behind ethnically or racially motivated terrorism, also referred to as extreme right-wing terrorism. Extreme right-wing attacks have increased in recent years, highlighting the need to raise awareness about this complex phenomenon and its financing. While most of these attacks were carried out by self-funded lone actors, they can also involve small and medium organisations, as well as transnational extreme right-wing movements. Few countries have designated these groups or individuals as terrorists and there are differences in the countries’ legal regimes to addressing their activities. Extreme right-wing groups can obtain funding from criminal activity, but most funding comes from legal sources, such as donations, membership fees and commercial activities. These groups are becoming increasingly sophisticated in the way they move and use funds and there are growing transnational links between the groups.

The report highlights the challenges in tackling the financing of extreme right-wing terrorism and preventing attacks. These challenges include how countries view the threat, ranging from terrorism, to racially motivated violence. The report encourages countries to continue to develop their understanding of this increasingly transnational criminal activity, including by considering ethnically or racially motivated terrorism financing in their national risk assessments. It also encourages public, private and international partners to work together to identify the threats and exchange best practices on combating ethnically or racially motivated terrorism financing. The findings in this report are based on inputs from around 30 jurisdictions across the FATF Global Network, as well as expertise from the private sector and international bodies partnered with the FATF.

Paris: FATF, 2021. 48p.

By Colin Powers, Erik Skare, Georges Fahmi, Nouran Ahmed, Ahmad Mhidi, Myriam Ababsa and Olivier Roy

Conceptual and epistemological challenges have to date constrained the generation of scientific knowledge on violent extremism. This article inverts the field’s seminal research question with an eye on furnishing a sturdier foundation for inquiry and theory building. Rather than seeking generalisable truths on why violent extremism occurs, we induce tentative propositions on why it does not, particularly within the context of enabling environments. Based on original data gathered through case studies conducted in the Middle East and North Africa, our primary findings are that the probability of violent extremism in enabling environments is reduced by three variables: i) hard interventions by the state; ii) the availability of credible ideological alternatives; and iii) the opportunity to opt out of the economy of violent extremism. At the conceptual level, we also propose that violent extremism be considered as a modality of action practiced by discrete political actors—namely, terrorist organisations—rather than as a phenomenon more diffusely pervading societies, nations, or faiths.

Perspectives on Terrorism, Volume XVII, Issue I March 2023

By Rajan Basra

Despite the importance of prisons to terrorist movements and the surge in the jihadist prison population in the Middle East, relatively little is understood about how the prison environment influences terrorists to become violent or peaceful. Prisons have been “centres of gravity” for virtually every terrorist group in the modern era. The strategies, goals, and operations of a variety of groups – from Egyptian Islamists to German Marxists and Irish Republicans – have all been heavily influenced by the imprisonment of their members. In many instances, the treatment of imprisoned comrades served as an important rallying cause, and the lives of extremists have been fundamentally shaped by their time in the jail cells of the state. The increase in the number of suspected and convicted terrorist inmates throughout the Middle East, particularly in Iraq and north-eastern Syria, has made prisons even greater focal points in countering Salafi-Jihadi movements. It is vitally important to continue to tailor policy according to the best available evidence in various contexts and to understand the dynamics and consequences of different types of prison management. Aims The aim of this rapid review of evidence (RoE) is to identify which interventions have been most effective in managing and rehabilitating violent extremists across the world. Its purpose is to help inform current and future FCDO policy debates about prison-related interventions for convicted or suspected violent extremists. Methods This review examines 34 studies (including academic articles, policy reports, programme evaluations, and the grey literature) published in English between 2000 and 2021. The systematic search generated 9,447 articles, of which 25 met the inclusion criteria. The hand search identified an additional nine studies for inclusion. Key findings: The evidence base for prison-based interventions targeting violent extremists, whether in fragile and conflict-affected states or in the developed world, is very poor. Many existing programmes are in their infancy, and so they have not yet been robustly evaluated. However, there are promising themes. The naming of programmes can affect attitudes towards them, whether of participants or wider society. Involving family members can be beneficial to participants, and relatives can be supportive of deradicalisation/disengagement measures. Using deradicalised/disengaged leaders of extremist groups in interventions can have a positive impact on low-level members. There are promising signs that rapport-building is an effective technique when interviewing terrorist detainees. The same is true of motivational interviewing (MI), especially when applied to detainees who are ambivalent about and resistant to change. These techniques encourage engagement and disclosure of information. There is also some evidence that conducting sessions in informal settings leads to greater engagement. Regarding wholesale programmes, the most effective programmes are ones with a comprehensive array of interventions, which include treating inmates with dignity and respect. The Sri Lankan programme has been most effective, and there are promising aspects of the Saudi Arabian and Pakistani initiatives. Those programmes are comprehensive and multifaceted in approach, including vocational training, psychological support, family support, religious counselling and education, and, in some cases, financial assistance.

London: Cross-Border Conflict Evidence, Policy and Trends (XCEPT), King's College London, 2022. 32p.

By James Barnett, Shiraz Maher, Charlie Winter

As intercommunal violence has intensified in many Western countries in recent years, members of the terrorism studies community have sought to better understand the commonalities and interplay between radical Islamists and extremists on the far‑right. One theory that has gained particular traction of late is that of “reciprocal radicalisation”, the notion that far‑right and Islamist extremists feed off each other’s words and actions in a “spiral of violence.” This theory entered the mainstream in the mid‑2000s and quickly attracted the attention of policymakers and counterterrorism practitioners, particularly in the United Kingdom (UK). In, for example, his 2007 speech on “bringing down the barriers to cohesion”, Prime Minister David Cameron appeared to allude to it when he described Islamist extremists as a “mirror image” of the far‑right British National Party (BNP).

The purpose of this review is to examine the extent to which reciprocal radicalisation plays out in reality and, if it does, whether there exists any operational or tactical exchange between far‑right and radical Islamist terrorists. To this end, our intent is to summarise and synthesise the literature on how and why terrorists across the ideological spectrum develop and deploy innovative practices, be they tactical, strategic, organisational, or doctrinal in nature. Beginning with an examination of how social scientists understand creative processes within “malevolent” organisations, we offer an overview of what factors have been identified as influencing the innovative and learning‑based practices of terrorist organisations. In the second section, we examine the existing literature on reciprocal radicalisation before turning to the limited scholarly work that covers what one might call “operational reciprocity” between far‑right and Islamist extremists – that is, an exchange of knowledge and/or material collaboration between groups.

There are important policy implications to each of these questions. If reciprocal radicalisation is indeed as widespread and consistent a phenomenon as some proponents of the theory claim, then it would mean that many Western societies are already trapped in a vicious cycle of violence where the far‑right and Islamist extremists act as self‑fulfilling influences on each other. Relatedly, it has been anecdotally established that far‑right extremists have borrowed from the jihadist playbook, which would potentially help them increase the efficacy of their tactics – both lethal (e.g. bombmaking) and non‑lethal (e.g. social media messaging). In short, were this to be the case, it would be a potentially grave mistake to treat the far‑right and jihadist threats in isolation rather than examining how they interact and influence one another.

London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), King’s College London , 2021. 22p.