By Middlebury Institute of International Studies

Active Clubs make up a decentralized network of individually-formed organizations that are centered around the premise of a white supremacist fraternal brotherhood. First introduced in December of 2020 by Robert Rundo, the leader of the white supremacist Rise Above Movement (R.A.M), Active Clubs are intended to preserve and defend the white population and traditional European culture from a perceived global genocide by non-white ethnic and racial groups. 

Rundo was inspired to create the Active Club network—something he referred to as “white nationalism 3.0”—in response to the numerous arrests of R.A.M. members made in 2018. He wanted to create an organization that would be less perceptible to law enforcement, and thus less susceptible to disruption or destruction. From this, Active Clubs were born—small, decentralized organizations that would focus recruitment efforts on localized areas and thus garner less attention than traditional white nationalist organizations. This structure would also ensure that Active Clubs were not reliant on a particular physical entity or leadership figure for survival.

Active Clubs provide like-minded white men with physical spaces where they can train in mixed martial arts in preparation for war against their perceived enemies. Ideologically, Active Clubs adhere to neofascist and accelerationist principles, with the promotion of violence comprising a key theme in Active Club communication and propaganda. Located across the United States and in several countries transnationally, the Active Club network ensures that groups of men devoted to training for battle are available for mobilization in multiple locations across Western countries. 

Monterey, CA: Middlebury Institute of International Studies and Center on terrorism, Extremism, and Counterterrorism, 2024.

By Ciarán O’Connor, Laurie Wood, Katherine Keneally and Kevin D. Reyes

The number of Active Clubs in the United States, Canada and Europe is increasing, posing a threat to public safety. Active Clubs (“ACs”) are white nationalist extremist groups that emphasize physical fitness and hand-to-hand combat skills and have a history of violence. Though each “club” is autonomous, the groups frequently engage in coordinated activities offline, such as mixed martial arts (MMA) tournaments, protests and physical training. In recent years, these clubs have used their social media profiles to encourage likeminded individuals to establish their own clubs in their respective locations. ISD’s research shows this strategy has been highly effective throughout the US.

This report identifies and analyzes the network of Active Clubs operating within the US along three themes: ideology, tactics and targets. The research predominately focuses on the use of the messaging platform Telegram by ACs, and includes detailed data analysis exploring how this network uses Telegram to produce and promote white nationalist propaganda, expand the network of clubs, and facilitate on- and offline collaboration between members and groups.

Amman | Berlin | London | Paris | Washington DC: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2023. 17p.

By Riza Kumar 

Culture of Violence: Terrorism Reaches Its Peak in Burkina Faso paints a harrowing picture of a nation consumed by escalating extremist attacks, militarized ethnic tensions, and a state strategy that empowers untrained civilian militias with deadly consequences.

Key points include:

• Burkina Faso ranks #1 in global terrorism deaths, with over 3,000 civilians killed in 2024 alone.

• State-sponsored militias—the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP)—now outnumber the national army, but their lack of training and ethnic bias has fueled further violence.

• Over 80% of Burkinabe territory is under the control of terrorist groups, with projections estimating nearly 4 million people could be internally displaced by year-end.

• Human rights abuses are rampant: civilian massacres, ethnic targeting—particularly of the Fulani—and extrajudicial killings are now common features of the government’s counterterrorism effort.

• Public trust in the state is collapsing, while extremist groups like al-Qaeda affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) are increasingly seen as more reliable providers of security.

The report warns that the Burkinabe government's hardline, militarized approach—relying on loosely controlled militias and sidelining local peace negotiations—has entrenched a self-perpetuating “culture of violence.” This normalization of brutality not only undermines stability in Burkina Faso but risks setting a dangerous precedent for the broader Sahel region.

Riza Kumar, Senior Research Analyst, CEP and author of the report, said:

“Without law, accountability, or a credible strategy, Burkina Faso’s counterterrorism model is spiraling into a humanitarian catastrophe. Security solutions that disregard human rights and social cohesion are destined to fail—and are only empowering the extremists they aim to defeat.”

CEP calls for an urgent reevaluation of counterterrorism strategy in Burkina Faso, emphasizing demilitarization of rogue militia forces, restoration of local mediation mechanisms, and the increased recognition and integration of marginalized communities across all security sectors.  

New York; Berlin; London: Counter Extremism Project, 2025. 24p.

By Iftekharul Bashar

Hizb ut-Tahrir Bangladesh, an extremist organisation banned since 2009, is swiftly expanding by recruiting Bangladeshi youth through social media and educational institutions. The group’s recent rally in Dhaka, attended by over 2,000 supporters, underscores its resurgence and the growing challenge for the government. Bangladesh must recalibrate its response to this threat by strengthening law enforcement measures, enhancing counter-radicalisation programmes, and creating job and entrepreneurship opportunities for its youth.

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore, 2025. 4p.

By Emily Thompson and Galen Lamphere-Englund

Violent extremist, terrorist, and targeted hate actors have been actively exploiting video games to propagandise, recruit and fundraise for more than 30 years. This report presents an analysis of that history using a unique dataset, the Extremist and Terrorist Games Database (ETGD), developed by the authors. It contains 155 reviewed entries of standalone games, modifications for existing games (mods) and browser‑based games dating from 1982 to 2024. The titles analysed appear across the ideological spectrum: far right (101 titles), jihadist (24), far left (1) and other forms of extremism and targeted hate (29), including school‑massacre ideation (12). They span platforms ranging from simple standalone games for Atari in the 1980s to sophisticated mods for some of today’s most popular games. The number of titles has increased year on year – in line with global conflict and extremist ideological trends, and revealing a continued push by malicious actors to exploit gaming. Meanwhile, the means of distribution have shifted from violent extremist organisations and marketplaces – such as white supremacist, neo‑Nazi and jihadist organisations – to distributed repositories of extremist games hosted on internet archives, Ethereum‑hosted file‑sharing, Telegram and with subtly coded titles on mainstream platforms like Steam. While most of the titles in the ETGD are available for free, several that have been sold (often at symbolic prices like $14.88 or $17.76) appear to have generated revenue for groups ranging from Hezbollah to the National Alliance, an American neo‑Nazi group. Through new analysis of Steam data, we also show that a small number of extremist and targeted hate titles have generated almost an estimated $600,000 in revenue for small publishers on the platform. Far from being a comprehensive analysis of the ETGD, we intend this preliminary launch report to form a basis for future research of the dataset and a framework for continued contributions to the ETGD from Extremism and Gaming Research Network (EGRN) members. Above all, we seek to contribute to sensible policymaking to prevent violent extremism that situates games as part of a wider contested and exploited information space, which deserves far more attention from those working towards peaceful ends.

Complete recommendations are provided in the conclusion section of this report, but include the following: 1. Prohibit and prevent violent extremist exploitation: Gaming platforms should explicitly prohibit violent extremist and terrorist behaviours and content. Leadership exists here from Twitch, Discord, Microsoft/Xbox and the affiliated Activision‑Blizzard. a. Audio and video platforms, such as Spotify, Apple Music and YouTube should seek to identify extremist gaming content currently available under misleading titles and tags. b. Flag and remove extremist titles across platforms: Hashing and preventing outlinking to ETGD games and links should be a priority across platforms. 2. Improve reporting mechanisms: Platforms must improve reporting mechanisms to make it easier for players to report violative content found in games and in‑game conduct. 3. Understand and take down distributed repositories: Larger repositories of extremist gaming content readily available on the surface web accelerate user exposure. 4. Collaborate across sectors: Addressing the spread of extremist games requires a collaborative effort between tech companies, government agencies and civil society organisations. 5. Educate across sectors: Programmes supporting educators and frontline community moderators should be developed. 6. Support research and innovation: Including cross‑sector initiatives like the Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET) and EGRN, which produced this database. 7. Enhance regulatory frameworks: Governments should update regulatory frameworks applying to digital platforms, recognising the nuances of gaming platforms and complying with human rights. 8. Encourage positive community engagement: Thoughtful, well designed community guidelines, moderation policies and reporting mechanisms can support community‑building.

London: The Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET). 2024. 40p.

By Michael Jensen, Sheehan Kane, Sean Doody and Elena Akers

Recently, several studies have found that threats against state targets, including public officials, elections, and law enforcement, have been on the rise in the United States. In this brief, we take a closer look at terrorist plots and attacks in the United States that targeted government, police, and military entities over a thirty year period (1992-2022). This brief looks specifically at 460 premeditated plots and attacks against state targets in which the perpetrators either (1) successfully committed attacks, or (2) mobilized to violence but were interdicted by law enforcement before they could carry out attacks. For this brief, evidence of mobilization includes the acquisition of weapons or weapons-making materials, target surveillance, the recruitment of co-conspirators, raising funds for an attack, or engaging in military-style training. Using data from the Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) project, this brief shows that anti-state terrorist plots and attacks have increased sharply, reaching all-time highs over the past five years.

College Park, MD: The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) , 2024. 6p.