ByFiona Mangan and Matthias Nowak

This Briefing Paper from the Small Arms Survey maps cross-border arms trafficking in West Africa and the Sahel through case studies on Niger, Mali, Guinea-Bissau, and the two tri-border areas of Burkina Faso–Côte d’Ivoire–Mali, and Ghana–Côte d’Ivoire–Burkina Faso. The study reveals that highly organized trafficking networks move sizable arms quantities across large areas of land north of the Niger River. Arms trafficking south of the river is more characterized by lower-level arms flows and local intermediaries engaging in so-called ‘ant trade’. Actors range from long-established criminals, corrupt officials, and organized trafficking rings, to tribal networks and low-level transporters. Based on field research, The West Africa–Sahel Connection: Mapping Cross-border Arms Trafficking analyzes the links between illicit arms trafficking and other forms of trafficking and organized crime in the region. The study also looks into the impacts of such arms trafficking as well as the responses to it.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2019. 24p.

By William Godnick, with Robert Muggah and Camilla Waszink

This paper provides a review of the impact of small arms and light weapons in Central America in the years following the end of the armed hostilities of the 1980s and early 1990s. In this instance, ‘Central America’ refers to the Spanish-speaking countries of the isthmus—Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Panama. The definition of small arms and light weapons used here is the one set out by the UN (1997), and covers a wide range of weaponry, including commercial firearms and military weapons that can be used by an individual soldier or small crew.1 ‘Small arms’, ‘firearms’, and ‘weapons’ are used more or less interchangeably in the paper. Military and civilian firearms are the principal focus, but because of the type of violence affecting present-day Central America, other weapons such as hand grenades and home-made pistols are also discussed. Homicide rates, and more specifically firearm-related homicide rates, are the primary indicators used to gauge the impact of weapons on Central American societies. Other indicators given more anecdotal consideration here include armed crime and injury rates, the growth in the private security industry, the costs of firearm-related violence to the public health system, the impact of such crimes on the economy and the effects of armed violence on governance in remote rural areas.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, 2002. 51p.

By Kate Buchanan

This publication identifies a number of areas where additional steps are needed to tackle the availability and misuse of small arms. It points to promising policy initiatives, draws on lessons learned, and sets out recommendations for action. The main themes addressed are:- Preventing misuse- Controlling supply- Providing assistance to survivors of gun violence- Focusing on gender- Taking guns and ammunition out of circulation- Addressing the demand for small arms- Justice and security sector governance. This publication is designed specifically for government representatives, to provide a compelling people-centred agenda for the next phase of multilateral small arms activity, and will be widely distributed in the lead-up to the UN Review Conference on small arms.

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 162p.

By Philip Alpers

This field study focuses on PNG's Southern Highlands Province, a conspicuous hot spot for armed violence and gun-related injury. It provides a preliminary tally of illegal high-powered guns in parts of the province seen as particularly vulnerable to armed violence, and documents the profound disruption wrought by their misuse. Tribal fighters, mercenary gunmen, and criminals provide details of their illicit firearms and ammunition, trafficking routes, and prices paid. The most common illegal assault weapon is the Australian-made self-loading rifle, followed by the US-made M16, both of which are sourced primarily from PNG Defence Force stocks. Many of the remainder are AR-15s obtained from the PNG police.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2005. 138p.

By James Silver; Andre Simons; and Sarah Craun

"In 2017 there were 30 separate active shootings in the United States, the largest number ever recorded by the FBI during a one-year period. With so many attacks occurring, it can become easy to believe that nothing can stop an active shooter determined to commit violence. [...] Faced with so many tragedies, society routinely wrestles with a fundamental question: can anything be done to prevent attacks on our loved ones, our children, our schools, our churches, concerts, and communities? There is cause for hope because there is something that can be done. In the weeks and months before an attack, many active shooters engage in behaviors that may signal impending violence. While some of these behaviors are intentionally concealed, others are observable and -- if recognized and reported -- may lead to a disruption prior to an attack. Unfortunately, well-meaning bystanders (often friends and family members of the active shooter) may struggle to appropriately categorize the observed behavior as malevolent. [...] Once reported to law enforcement, those in authority may also struggle to decide how best to assess and intervene, particularly if no crime has yet been committed. By articulating the concrete, observable pre-attack behaviors of many active shooters, the FBI hopes to make these warning signs more visible and easily identifiable. This information is intended to be used not only by law enforcement officials, mental health care practitioners, and threat assessment professionals, but also by parents, friends, teachers, employers and anyone who suspects that a person is moving towards violence."

Washington, DC: U.S.. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2018. 30p.

By Alex P. Schmid

Based on an in-depth literature review, Research Fellow Dr. Alex P. Schmid explores the terms “radicalisation”, “de-radicalisation” and “counter-radicalisation” and the discourses surrounding them. Much of the literature on radicalisation focuses on Islamist extremism and jihadist terrorism. This is also reflected in this Research Paper which explores the relationship between radicalisation, extremism and terrorism. Historically, “radicalism” – contrary to “extremism” – does not necessarily have negative connotations, nor is it a synonym for terrorism. Schmid argues that both extremism and radicalism can only be properly assessed in relation to what is mainstream political thought in a given period. The paper further explores what we know well and what we know less well about radicalisation. It proposes to explore radicalisation not only on the micro-level of “vulnerable individuals” but also on the meso-level of the “radical milieu” and the macro-level of “radicalising public opinion and political parties”. The author reconceptualises radicalisation as a process that can occur on both sides of conflict dyads and challenges several widespread assumptions. The final section examines various counter-radicalisation and deradicalisation programmes. It concludes with a series of policy recommendations.

The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2013. 105p.

By Tanya Mehra, Méryl Demuynck, Colin P. Clarke, Nils Duquet, Cameron Lumley, Matthew Wentworth

This report presents the main findings of ICCT’s year-long research project on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) as a source of terrorism financing. Chapters 2 and 3 take a regional focus and explore this phenomenon in respectively West Africa and the Middle East. Chapter 4 then investigates the possible role that DDR programmes can play in reducing SALW flows. Chapter 5 assesses the existing legal and policy frameworks from a multitude of angles. Chapter 6 reflects on the short and long-term implications the possession and identified use of SALW by terrorist groups has for Europe. The final chapter considers the various direct and indirect ways through which terrorists are ‘Cashing in on Guns’, and lists a number of policy recommendations for the EU to take a step forward in addressing this phenomenon.

The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2021. 147p.

By The Federal Commission on School Safety

Communities across the country are responding to school violence with a number of measures, including assigned school resource officers (SRO). School administrations, law enforcement agencies, families, and community stakeholders are diligently working to protect children and education personnel from school attacks. The National Police Foundation (NPF), in collaboration with the COPS Office, created the Averted School Violence (ASV) database in 2015 as a platform for law enforcement, school staff, and mental health professionals to share information about ASV incidents and lessons learned with the goal of mitigating and ultimately preventing future injuries and fatalities in educational institutions. The database includes school incidents beginning with the Columbine High School attack (1999) and continuing to the present day. The NPF has partnered with stakeholder groups National Association of School Resource Officers (NASRO) and the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA) to conduct research and analysis on improving school safety. This report examines a dozen case studies of targeted violence incidents thwarted by the positive and often heroic actions of classmates, school administrators, SROs, and law enforcement agencies. It also includes recommendations and lessons learned from all cases in the ASV database. In addition, a companion publication entitled Targeted Violence Averted: College and University Case Studies presents information on post-secondary averted violence incidents and lessons learned to support student safety.

Washington, DC: Department of Education, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice, 2018. 180p.

By Jeff Allison, Mo Canady, and Frank G. Straub

Tuesday, April 20, 1999, was sadly the last day of school for the seniors of Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado. On that day, two 12th-grade students armed with a semiautomatic pistol, two shotguns, and a rifle murdered a teacher and 12 of their fellow students; an additional 21 people were injured by gunfire, and three were injured escaping from the school. The perpetrators took their own lives in the school library where they had killed most of their victims. At the beginning of the attack, one of the shooters exchanged gunfire outside with the school resource officer (SRO). While the Columbine shooting inarguably contributed to the expanded deployment of SROs in schools, it was not the advent of school-based law enforcement in the United States. There are indications in the research literature that Flint, Michigan, assigned a police officer to its schools in 1953, and the Fresno (California) Police Department first assigned plainclothes officers to its elementary and middle schools in 1968 (West and Fries 1995). The Fresno initiative was an attempt to enhance police-community relations specifically with youth. The federal impetus for increasing the number of SROs can be traced in part to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 as well as the Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994. The Cops in School program, funded by the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office), grew out of the former statute. The latter statute was enacted in response to juvenile and gang violence. Soon after the tragedy at Columbine, which at the time was the worst mass casualty shooting at a school in the United States, the U.S. Department of Education (DoED) and the U.S. Secret Service undertook a study of past school shootings to identify factors that might help prevent future targeted school attacks (Vossekuil et al. 2004). The key recommendation from that study was that all schools should establish behavior threat assessment teams. The report recommended that school administrators, law enforcement officers (especially SROs), teachers, and counselors participate in these teams to address concerning behavior by members of the school community.

Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. 2020. 44p.

By Peter Langman, Anthony Petrosino, and Hannah Sutherland

School shootings are the subject of debate in the media and in communities across the United States, and there is much discussion about prevention and the root causes of such attacks. But what does research say about these tragic events and their perpetrators? Do all shooters fit a specific profile? And what meaningful steps can schools and communities take to reduce the likelihood of these events? In concise, clear language, this research brief, produced by the WestEd Justice & Prevention Research Center, describes and refutes five common misconceptions about school shootings and suggests an evidence-based strategy to reduce the probability of attacks. The authors conclude that schools and communities are better served when presented with a balanced perspective informed by the wealth of available research about perpetrators, their varying motivations, and pre-attack behaviors.

San Francisco, CA: WestEd Justice and Prevention Research Center, 2018. 5p.

By Michael Rocque, Grant Duwe, Michael Siegel, James Alan Fox, Max Goder-Reiser, and Emma E. Fridel

In the past decade, mass shootings, particularly those that take place in public areas, have increasingly become part of the national conversation in the United States. Mass public shootings instill widespread fear, in part because of their seeming randomness and unpredictability. Yet when these incidents occur, which has been with somewhat greater frequency and lethality as of late, public calls for policy responses are immediate. In this policy brief, we review efforts to evaluate the effect of gun control measures on mass public shootings, including a discussion of our recently published study on the relationship between state gun laws and the incidence and severity of these shootings. The findings of this work point to gun permits and bans on large capacity magazines as having promise in reducing (a) mass public shooting rates and (b) mass public shooting victimization, respectively. Interestingly, however, most gun laws that we examined, including assault weapon bans, do not appear to be causally related to the rate of mass public shootings.

Albany, NY: Rockefeller Institute of Government, 2021. 20p.

By International Crisis Group

What’s new? Research by International Crisis Group has for the first time quantified the positive impact of the UN’s Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG). This report shows how CICIG’s justice reform activities since 2007 helped contribute to a 5 per cent average annual decrease in murder rates in the country. This compares with a 1 per cent average annual rise among regional peers. Why does it matter? Guatemalan President Jimmy Morales has announced that he will end CICIG’s mandate in 2019. But the commission has won widespread public support in Guatemala for its prosecution of previously untouchable elites. It is a rare example of a successful international effort to strengthen a country’s judicial system and policing. What should be done? With U.S. support for the CICIG under seeming strain, the commission’s other supporters should propose a new deal between the Guatemalan government and the UN based on a revised strategy of case selection and continuing support for political and judicial reforms. The U.S. should wholeheartedly back such a reformulated CICIG.

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2018. 33p.

By Christina Schori Liang and Matthew John Cross

Right-wing extremists (RWEs) are using the current protests over police brutality in the United States as a cover to commit terroristic acts and to grow their numbers. They present a significant danger to public safety and security and are a growing threat in the West. Despite this, the rise of right-wing extremism (a homogenized term for white ethnonationalists, alt-rights, white supremacist groups, male supremacist groups, and rightwing anti-government extremists) has not been afforded the priority and attention it justly deserves. There are three reasons for this. First, the global narrative maintains that terrorism rests almost exclusively in the hands of a balaclava-clad Salafi-jihadist holding a Kalashnikov. Second, Western right-wing media has largely pushed back against covering the rise of right-wing extremism and the media as a whole has failed to contextualize the systematic threat RWEs present. Third, the global pandemic has forced governments to focus their attention on maintaining public health and socioeconomic order and have consequently failed to see how RWEs are subversively using the pandemic to support and expand their own agenda. RWEs have utilized the lawless and unmoderated internet to reach broader audiences, disseminate literature, and target vulnerable people. They have done so quietly, pushing an ideological campaign that manifests itself under the surface of popular internet discourse, rather than the aggressive proselytizing of Salafi-jihadist groups like the Islamic State. These efforts can be understood as a kind of subversive exposure, where memes and fake news dominate discourse. This paper will analyse the scope of the RWE threat, describe their latest modus operandi, and explore how the pandemic is being instrumentalized by such groups and how the internet has become their principal tool and battleground. The paper will then provide theory and evidence for how counter-narrative programs, especially through digital disruption, can help neutralise the threat.

Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2020. 27p.

By Seth G. Jones

Right-wing extremism in the United States appears to be growing. The number of terrorist attacks by far-right perpetrators rose over the past decade, more than quadrupling between 2016 and 2017. The recent pipe bombs and the October 27, 2018, synagogue attack in Pittsburgh are symptomatic of this trend. U.S. federal and local agencies need to quickly double down to counter this threat. There has also been a rise in far-right attacks in Europe, jumping 43 percent between 2016 and 2017.

Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2019. 9p.

By Lucía Miranda Leibe, Bettina Steible, Almudena Díaz Pagés and Natalia Sueiro Monje

Violent right-wing extremism has resurfaced as a worrying phenomenon in Europe, with terrorism being one of its most serious and visible forms. Old and new forms of right-wing based violence have emerged in recent years, as the Utøya attack showed in 2011. This massacre served as a wake-up call for European societies and security authorities, and highlighted the dangers of right-wing terrorism in Europe, particularly for the youth. Furthermore, terrorism is not the sole form of extreme-right and hate-based violence. Conversely, the range of extreme-right related violence also includes hate crime and hate speech, two phenomena that should not be overlooked. The former is especially relevant considering the impact it has on minority groups, on women, but also on the general population. As for the latter, the increasing use of the Internet and social media platforms has facilitated the exponential dissemination of hate speech. While two decades ago, much more effort was required by individuals to gain access to extremist right-wing ideology, nowadays these ideas are spread at a much higher speed and to a much broader audience. This is not a trivial matter. The spread of hate speech has an important impact on minority groups, as the primary victims, but also on society as a whole, as it affects social cohesion and the quality of democratic debate.

Madrid: Observatorio de la Juventud en España, 2020. 98p.

Chairman: The Rt Hon. Dr Julian Lewis MP

This report highlights the significant close working relationship between our security and intelligence agencies and counter-terrorism policing. It is through this regular collaborative approach that we can keep our citizens safe from all forms of terrorism. I would like to take this opportunity to thank our agencies and counter-terrorism policing for their excellent work to better understand and disrupt the threat from extreme right-wing terrorism.

London: Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, 2022. 137p.

By Topher McDougal, David A. Shirk, Robert Muggah and John H. Patterson

Mexico is experiencing a surge in gun-related violence since 2006. Yet Mexico does not manufacture small arms, light weapons or ammunition in sizeable quantity. Moreover, Mexico has some of the most restrictive gun legislation in the world. It is assumed that a considerable proportion of weapons in Mexico are illegal, most having been trafficked from the United States (U.S.). The volume of firearms sold in the United States and trafficked across the U.S.-Mexico border, however, is notoriously difficult to record. Previous attempts have involved multiplicative approximations based upon the quantity of arms confiscated at the border.

San Diego: Trans-Border Institute, University of San Diego; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Igarapé Institute, 2013. 31p.

By Mary Ellen O'Toole

This paper presents a systematic procedure for threat assessment and intervention of school shooters. The model is designed to be used by educators, mental-health professionals, and law-enforcement agencies and is intended to help refine and strengthen the efforts of the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime. Its fundamental building blocks are its threat-assessment standards, which provide a framework for evaluating a spoken, written, and symbolic threat, along with a four-pronged assessment approach, which looks at the personality of the student, the student's family dynamics, the school dynamics, the student's role in those dynamics, and social dynamics. The model is not a profile of the school shooter or a checklist of danger signs pointing to the next adolescent who will bring lethal violence to a school. It discusses misinformation about school shootings; how to assess a threat, including motivations; types of threats; factors in threat assessment; and levels of risk. The document cautions that one or two traits or characteristics should not be considered in isolation or given more weight than the others. The text outlines the intervention process and closes with a number of recommendations. Four appendices list methodologies used in the report, suggested readings, and other information. (RJM)

Quantico, VA: Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG), National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime (NCAVC), FBI Academy , 1999. 52p.

By Edward Gaughan, Jay D. Cerio, and Robert A. Myers

American public schools are safe places, perhaps even safer than American homes. The tragic school shootings that are the focus of this report have occurred in less than one-hundredth of one percent of schools. The probability of being shot at school is similarly low. But shootings have occurred at schools, have been largely unpredictable, and have raised the anxieties and concerns of students, families, teachers, and the public at large. Between 1974 and 2000, the National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) of the United States Secret Service identified 37 incidents. At least 20 incidents have been reported in the national media since 1992, and eight since 1999, and these do not include several planned shootings that were prevented by authorities. Why do these shootings occur? Why do they occur where they do? What can we do to protect our children?

Alfred, NY: Alfred University, 2001. 44p.

By J,M, Nowicki

GAO found that shootings at K-12 schools most commonly resulted from disputes or grievances, for example, between students or staff, or between gangs, although the specific characteristics of school shootings over the past 10 years varied widely, according to GAO’s analysis of the Naval Postgraduate School’s K-12 School Shooting Database. (See figure.) After disputes and grievances, accidental shootings were most common, followed closely by school-targeted shootings, such as those in Parkland, Florida and Santa Fe, Texas.

Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2020. 58p.