Kaitlyn Robinson, Iris Malone, and Martha Crenshaw

The far-right anti-government extremist movement poses a significant threat in the United States. The January 6, 2021, attack on the US Capitol illustrates the capacity of this movement to plan and mount violent attacks against government targets and democratic institutions. In this article, we explore how the organisational and tactical characteristics of the far-right anti-government movement in the United States enable it to thrive despite the dangers it poses to the public. We argue that its deep-seated ideological roots, fluid organisational structure, and mix of violent and nonviolent tactics make the movement difficult for federal and state authorities to proscribe, prosecute, and ultimately eliminate. US policymakers need to develop an informed response that accounts for the fluid, decentralised, and public-facing nature of anti-government extremism, as well as the pervasive distrust of federal authority that it reflects. We suggest that this approach will likely differ from the modern counter-terrorism tools that were initially designed to combat terrorist threats emanating from abroad, such as those posed by Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. We ground our arguments in evidence from cases of anti-government extremist groups and followers active in the United States over the past three decades.

Perspectives on Terrorism, Volume XVII, Issue I March 2023.

By Neil Shortland and Matthew Crayne

Bottom Line Up Front (BLUF): Members of the DHS workforce and terrorism researchers are systematically exposed to the propaganda, ideologies, and psychologies of actors who seek to launch terrorist attacks. This content is inherently value-laden and possibly personally troubling, causing these individuals to confront potential violations of their “sacred” or “protected” values such as the preservation of life (e.g., Tetlock et al., 2000). Here we present the result of a Rapid Evidence Assessment (REA) which sought to review research across multiple fields of work in which individuals are exposed to traumatic imagery, or events. This REA found that there is a small body of extant research focused on a few key domains (namely digital forensic and Internet child sex abuse prevention) that has explored the significant psychological trauma caused by exposure to extreme content. This body of literature emphasizes the importance of gaining clarity on the nature of trauma that is caused and the role of different forms of media on traumatic outcomes (e.g., observing Reddit forums vs., watching beheading videos). However, this review also identifies a series of factors that can impact the degree of harm caused by exposure to this content. These factors include the nature of the content, individual traits, and the individual’s social and work environment. Overall, this REA has identified a range of immediate research needs to extend, or apply, this research to the DHS workforce. These include: 1. Disaggregating the relationship that exists between the various possible forms of trauma and the specific forms of media that are consumed. 2. Exploring the degree to which cognitive resilience strategies, such as those identified within Crime Scene Investigator (CSI) staff are effective. 3. Validate the degree to which organizational dynamics can negatively or positively impact the manifestation of trauma in the workforce. These include issues of culture and workload. The presence of these organizational barriers within DHS needs to be explored, and if present, mitigated. 4. While largely untested, several articles included suggestions for interventions that could increase resilience. These largely center on the importance of debriefing. Future research should investigate how effective debriefs can be structured and implemented within the DHS workforce to support the development of resilience by those who are exposed to such harmful content online. Impact on DHS capabilities: Research identified as part of this REA outlines the negative implications of individual trauma, and the important role of the organization in mitigating trauma. Specifically, factors at the organizational level such as workload management, job rotation, and organizational culture were identified as playing a potentially important role in protecting employees from trauma. Furthermore, some studies showed that experiences of secondary trauma stemming from exposure to traumatic imagery was correlated with turnover intentions. As such, to maintain a safe and effective workforce in the face of such extreme pressures, it is important that DHS emphasize the need to protect workers from the negative impacts of exposure to traumatic content and imagery.

Omaha: The National Counterterrorism Innovation, Technology, and Education Center, University of Omaha, 2023. 30p.

By Rajan Basra

Despite the importance of prisons to terrorist movements and the surge in the jihadist prison population in the Middle East, relatively little is understood about how the prison environment influences terrorists to become violent or peaceful. Prisons have been “centres of gravity” for virtually every terrorist group in the modern era. The strategies, goals, and operations of a variety of groups – from Egyptian Islamists to German Marxists and Irish Republicans – have all been heavily influenced by the imprisonment of their members. In many instances, the treatment of imprisoned comrades served as an important rallying cause, and the lives of extremists have been fundamentally shaped by their time in the jail cells of the state. The increase in the number of suspected and convicted terrorist inmates throughout the Middle East, particularly in Iraq and north-eastern Syria, has made prisons even greater focal points in countering Salafi-Jihadi movements. It is vitally important to continue to tailor policy according to the best available evidence in various contexts and to understand the dynamics and consequences of different types of prison management. Aims The aim of this rapid review of evidence (RoE) is to identify which interventions have been most effective in managing and rehabilitating violent extremists across the world. Its purpose is to help inform current and future FCDO policy debates about prison-related interventions for convicted or suspected violent extremists. Methods This review examines 34 studies (including academic articles, policy reports, programme evaluations, and the grey literature) published in English between 2000 and 2021. The systematic search generated 9,447 articles, of which 25 met the inclusion criteria. The hand search identified an additional nine studies for inclusion. Key findings: The evidence base for prison-based interventions targeting violent extremists, whether in fragile and conflict-affected states or in the developed world, is very poor. Many existing programmes are in their infancy, and so they have not yet been robustly evaluated. However, there are promising themes. The naming of programmes can affect attitudes towards them, whether of participants or wider society. Involving family members can be beneficial to participants, and relatives can be supportive of deradicalisation/disengagement measures. Using deradicalised/disengaged leaders of extremist groups in interventions can have a positive impact on low-level members. There are promising signs that rapport-building is an effective technique when interviewing terrorist detainees. The same is true of motivational interviewing (MI), especially when applied to detainees who are ambivalent about and resistant to change. These techniques encourage engagement and disclosure of information. There is also some evidence that conducting sessions in informal settings leads to greater engagement. Regarding wholesale programmes, the most effective programmes are ones with a comprehensive array of interventions, which include treating inmates with dignity and respect. The Sri Lankan programme has been most effective, and there are promising aspects of the Saudi Arabian and Pakistani initiatives. Those programmes are comprehensive and multifaceted in approach, including vocational training, psychological support, family support, religious counselling and education, and, in some cases, financial assistance.

London: Cross-Border Conflict Evidence, Policy and Trends (XCEPT), King's College London, 2022. 32p.

By James Barnett, Shiraz Maher, Charlie Winter

As intercommunal violence has intensified in many Western countries in recent years, members of the terrorism studies community have sought to better understand the commonalities and interplay between radical Islamists and extremists on the far‑right. One theory that has gained particular traction of late is that of “reciprocal radicalisation”, the notion that far‑right and Islamist extremists feed off each other’s words and actions in a “spiral of violence.” This theory entered the mainstream in the mid‑2000s and quickly attracted the attention of policymakers and counterterrorism practitioners, particularly in the United Kingdom (UK). In, for example, his 2007 speech on “bringing down the barriers to cohesion”, Prime Minister David Cameron appeared to allude to it when he described Islamist extremists as a “mirror image” of the far‑right British National Party (BNP).

The purpose of this review is to examine the extent to which reciprocal radicalisation plays out in reality and, if it does, whether there exists any operational or tactical exchange between far‑right and radical Islamist terrorists. To this end, our intent is to summarise and synthesise the literature on how and why terrorists across the ideological spectrum develop and deploy innovative practices, be they tactical, strategic, organisational, or doctrinal in nature. Beginning with an examination of how social scientists understand creative processes within “malevolent” organisations, we offer an overview of what factors have been identified as influencing the innovative and learning‑based practices of terrorist organisations. In the second section, we examine the existing literature on reciprocal radicalisation before turning to the limited scholarly work that covers what one might call “operational reciprocity” between far‑right and Islamist extremists – that is, an exchange of knowledge and/or material collaboration between groups.

There are important policy implications to each of these questions. If reciprocal radicalisation is indeed as widespread and consistent a phenomenon as some proponents of the theory claim, then it would mean that many Western societies are already trapped in a vicious cycle of violence where the far‑right and Islamist extremists act as self‑fulfilling influences on each other. Relatedly, it has been anecdotally established that far‑right extremists have borrowed from the jihadist playbook, which would potentially help them increase the efficacy of their tactics – both lethal (e.g. bombmaking) and non‑lethal (e.g. social media messaging). In short, were this to be the case, it would be a potentially grave mistake to treat the far‑right and jihadist threats in isolation rather than examining how they interact and influence one another.

London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), King’s College London , 2021. 22p.

By The Anti-Defamation League, Center on Extremism

Extremists are using online crowdfunding platforms like GiveSendGo and GoFundMe to raise millions of dollars for their ideologically driven activities. Through crowdfunding, extremists have generated at least $6,246,072 from 324 campaigns between 2016 and mid-2022. Extremist campaigns found on these platforms espouse hateful rhetoric including antisemitism, white supremacy, QAnon conspiracies and anti-LGBTQ+ extremism, as well as rhetoric from antisemitic sects of Black Hebrew Israelites. Crowdfunding campaigns have been used by extremists to fund direct actions and attacks on their perceived enemies or marginalized communities; legal defenses for extremists who face consequences for these actions; propaganda efforts and other expenses.

New York: ADL, 2023. 42p.

By Marc-Andre Argentino; Jessica Davis; Tore Refslund Hamming

This workbook teaches researchers, analysts and practitioners how different sorts of terrorist and violent extremist actors utilise financial technologies and cryptocurrencies to finance their operations. The process of terrorist adoption of financial technologies is spelled out for various organisations and can assist analysts to estimate whether and when a group or terrorist actor would embrace a financial technology or cryptocurrency. The workbook also includes terms that may be used to search information holdings for terrorist adoption of cryptocurrencies or financial technologies, offering early warning of terrorist adoption. • Most terrorist organisations, cells and individuals gradually embrace new technology, tactics, strategies and processes. Finance is more confined by external constraints than other areas of potential innovation and adaptation, hence few organisations or entities actually innovate in finance. • Most terrorist actors are bound by financial and economic institutions, making terrorist financing difficult to innovate. Structures control them. Thus, terrorist finance patterns and approaches are better regarded as adaptation and learning rather than innovation. • When economic and financial systems evolve, most terrorists adapt to new financing methods. Terrorists employ financial technologies and cryptocurrencies when they are convenient and widely used. Until then, motivated individuals or cells can innovate, but groups or more established cells or organisations seldom adopt new financing methods early.

London: National Counterterrorism Innovation, Technology, and Education Center; and International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation. 2023. 44p.

By J.M. Berger

The Turner Diaries, the infamous racist dystopian novel by neo-Nazi William Luther Pierce, has inspired more than 200 murders since its publication in 1978, including the single deadliest act of domestic terrorism in U.S. history, the Oklahoma City bombing. The book is arguably the most important single work of white nationalist propaganda in the English language, but it is not a singular artifact. The Turner Diaries is part of a genre of racist dystopian propaganda dating back to the U.S. Civil War. This paper will document the books that directly and indirectly inspired Turner and examine the extensive violence that the novel has inspired. By comparing and contrasting The Turner Diaries to its less-remembered predecessors, this paper analyses the reasons for the novel’s lasting impact, including its focus on rational choices over identity choices, its simplification of white nationalist ideology, its repeated calls to action, and the powerfully persuasive nature of dystopian narratives, which can be understood as a secular analogue for religious apocalyptic texts.

The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 50p.

By Sarah L. Carthy, Colm B. Doody, Katie Cox, Denis O'Hora, Kiran M. Sarma

In the field of terrorism research, the violent radicalisation of individuals towards perpetrating acts of terror has been the subject of academic enquiry for some time. One core focus by social scientists has been the role of narratives in this process. Narratives have the ability to present a socially constructed version of reality which serves the interest of the narrator(s). In the context of terrorism, by depicting violence as a viable antidote to individual vulnerabilities, the narratives purported for propagandistic purposes have the potential to thwart perceptions of instrumentality (a key characteristic of violent radicalisation). In order to prevent this from happening, researchers and counter-terrorism practitioners have increasingly sought to explore the potential for counter-narratives; targeted interventions that challenge the rationalisation(s) of violence purported in dominant narratives which, in turn, reconstructs the story. However, there is overwhelming consensus in both government and academic spheres that the concept of the counter-narrative is underdeveloped and, to date, there has been no synthesis of its effectiveness at targeting violent radicalisation-related outcomes.

The objective of this review was to provide a synthesis of the effectiveness of counter-narratives in reducing the risk of violent radicalisation.

Campbell Systematic Reviews, Volume16, Issue3 September 2020. 37p.

By Julie Emmelkamp, Jessica J. Asscher, Inge B. Wissink, Geert Jan J.M. Stams

Juveniles who become radicalized pose a great threat for society. Although research on radicalization is accumulating, a quantitative review of risk factors for youth radicalization is lacking. Therefore, a series of metaanalyses were conducted on k = 30 studies (247 effect sizes) to examine risk factors for radicalization in youth, yielding significant effects for 15 out of 17 risk domains, ranging in magnitude from r = 0.080 to r = 0.482. Medium positive effects were found for activism, perceived in-group superiority and perceived distance to other people, while small effects were found for gender, personality, delinquency and aggression, lower educational level, negative peers, in-group identification, perceived discrimination, perceived group threat, perceived procedural injustice, perceived illegitimacy of authorities, and other, whereas the effect for poverty was very small. Moderator analyses showed that the risks of negative parenting and societal disconnection were smaller for right-wing radicalization than for religious or unspecified radicalization. The risks of personality and perceived group threat were greater for willingness to carry out extremist acts and extremist behavior than for attitude towards radicalization. Further, when the percentage of ethnic minorities in the sample increased, the risks of personality, negative parenting, and societal disconnection for radicalization were larger.

Aggression and Violent Behavior, 55, [101489].

By Sara Zeiger and Joseph Gyte

In the age of selfies, snaps, likes and shares, the internet and social media have transformed the way in which people communicate. In early 2019, global internet penetration reached 57%, or 4.4 billion users, and the overall number of mobile social media users reached 42%, or 3.2 billion people.1 This means that people are able to share ideas, communicate and interact more rapidly than ever before, including with audiences on the other side of the world. Terrorist groups have certainly leveraged these new mechanisms and platforms for communicating amongst themselves and to potential recruits. For example, the Islamic State of Iraq and alSham (ISIS) has been known for producing sleek videos circulated on YouTube and Twitter, and has mastered new and emerging technologies and social media platforms, such as Telegram; all to promote its messages and recruit new members in cyberspace. This chapter focuses on the prevention of radicalization on social media and the internet in this digital age. It first reviews the relevant methods and approaches that terrorists employ to spread their propaganda and recruit online. Subsequently, it looks at some of the more common and emerging prevention and preparedness strategies which address the online space. Besides reviewing the theoretical foundations to prevent radicalization on social media and the internet, this chapter will also draw upon specific examples, predominantly from three regions: Europe, Southeast Asia and East Africa, to illustrate what some countries are doing to tackle the problem of online radicalization.

From: International Handbook of Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness, 2023. 38p.

By Arthur Bradley and Deeba Shadnia: Tech Against Extremism

This paper analyzes the use of terrorist and violent extremist (TVE) operated websites and platforms on the Domain Name System (DNS), as part of a multi-platform approach within terrorist exploitation of the internet. In particular, this paper situates the resurgent exploitation of internet infrastructure within the context of improved content moderation by tech companies, and a growing trend of terrorist and violent extremist dispersion across more niche online platforms, where the audience reach of these actors is limited. This paper considers how terrorist and violent extremist actors could respond to industry improvements in content removal policies on websites and self-operated platforms on the surface web, including potential migration to decentralized web hosting technologies and the dark web. It argues that counter-terrorism practitioners, researchers, governments, and the tech sector should pay more attention to terrorist and violent extremist operated websites and platforms, after several years of focusing on the exploitation of social media and messaging platforms used by the wider general public.

Washington, DC: Program on Extremism at George Washington University, 2022. 26p.

Michael Wolfowicz, Gian Maria Campedelli, Amber Seaward and Paul Gill

While countries differ significantly in how they handle terrorism, in the west, criminal justice systems tend to treat terrorism similar to other crime, with police, prosecutors, judges and courts, and penal systems carrying out similar functions of investigations, apprehension, charging, convicting, and overseeing punishments respectively. While there is a robust literature on deterrent effects for crime, there is a dearth of research when it comes to terrorism. This despite evidence of significant overlaps between crime and terrorism. We address this gap in the literature with a unique dataset covering terrorism offending, arrests, charges, convictions, and sentencing over 16 years in 28 EU-member states. Applying a dynamic panel data model, we find that the probability of apprehension and punishment has an inverse relationship with terrorism offending. Conversely, the rate of charged individuals is associated with a small increase in the terrorism offending rate. The results for sentence length are less clear, with either negligible, or small iatrogenic effects. The results demonstrate that the overlap between crime and terrorism may extend to general deterrence. These findings should be informative for both the research agenda and policy discussion.

PREPRINT - 2023. 16p.

By Yael Litmanovitz, David Weisburd, Badi Hasisi, and Michael Wolfowicz

Perhaps one of the most pressing issues facing the world today is that of the threat of radicalization and terrorism. Whilst terrorism affects almost every country in the world to some extent, the threat of terrorism has increased exponentially in democratic and semi-democratic countries (especially the OECD). The most current figures state that OECD countries experienced a 650% increase in terrorism related deaths between 2014 and 2015, with many of the attacks having been linked to or inspired by the Islamic State (ISIS) (GTI, 2016). The last year has been witness to many high-profile attack in Europe, namely in Paris and Brussels. There have also been a significant number of attacks which were foiled by intelligence and security services (Europol, 2016; MFA, 2016). Terrorism affects us in many ways, not only causing death and destruction but also having negative impacts on health (Holman et-al, 2008; Deboutte, 2016), economy (Eldor & Melnik, 2004), society (Waxman, 2011) and politics (Downes-Le Guin & Hoffman, 1993; Getmansky & Zeitzoff, 2014; Williams et-al, 2013). Economically, there has been a steady increase in the cost of terrorism over the last decade. For example, terrorism has significant effects on markets and tourism in countries affected by it (Sandler & Enders, 2008; Thompson, 2011; Baker, 2014). The GTI (2016) estimates that in 2015 alone the cost of terrorism reached US$89.6 billion, up from US$52.9 billion in 2014 (GTI, 2015). Certainly, the impacts of terrorism are far reaching and in a sense, difficult to quantify (GTI, 2014).

Oslo: Campbell Collaboration, 2017. 23p.

By Ritzmann, Alexander

From the document: "This study demonstrates that several violence-oriented right-wing extremist (VRWE) individuals and groups in Europe and the U.S. engage in or maintain ties with organized crime (OC). Many of the identified cases have a transnational dimension, for example, through cross border activities like the acquisition of illegal drugs for distribution or parallel memberships in VRWE and transnational OC groups. Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs, VRWE-affiliated football hooligan groups, white supremacist prison gangs and a range of other VRWE individuals and groups are part of such transnational networks which are particularly visible in Austria, Germany, Poland, Sweden and the United States. The linkages between VRWE and OC are multifaceted and vary in intensity, ranging from mere operational contacts to supply illegal materials to a full-scale transformation of VRWE structures into OC structures that follow an RWE ideology."

Washington DC. Counter Extremism Project. 2023. 139p.

By Daniel W. Webster, Carla G. Tilchin, Mitchell L. Doucette

  Background Safe Streets Baltimore (Safe Streets) is a community violence intervention (CVI) program designed to reduce gun violence in neighborhoods with high levels of gun violence. Frontline workers are recruited for their ability to connect with individuals at highest risk for involvement in gun violence and mediate disputes, promote nonviolent norms for settling disputes, and connect program participants to services. Baltimore has fully implemented the program in 11 neighborhoods between 2007 and 2021. Six of these sites have been fully operational for less than three years and have not been previously evaluated. Prior evaluations of Safe Streets have shown mixed results across the sites and over time. Study Methods To estimate program effects, we analyzed variation in neighborhood-level monthly counts of homicides and nonfatal shootings for the period January 1, 2003 through July 31, 2022. The primary analyses were augmented synthetic control models for each site. This method generated a “synthetic” comparison for each Safe Streets site using a weighted combination of data from neighborhoods that did not implement the program but had similar levels and trends of violence before program implementation. We calculated program effects comparing treated sites to their synthetic controls, estimating what would have happened if Safe Streets had not been implemented. Because confidence in forecasts from statistical models tends to decrease over long periods of time, we generated estimates for the first four years of program implementation for the longer running sites in addition to estimates of the entire time a Safe Streets site has been in operation. We calculated average effects across all sites and within strata of site tenure (longer running and new sites) weighted by the precision of each site’s estimated effects. Key Findings: During the first four years of program implementation across the five longer-running sites, Safe Streets was associated with a statistically significant average reduction in homicides of 32%. Over the entire study period among these longer-running sites, homicides were 22% lower than forecasted if the program had not been implemented. Three of the five sites had significant reductions ranging from 28% in McElderry Park to 48% in Lower Park Heights. In SandtownWinchester, Safe Streets implementation was associated with a significant increase in homicides. Estimates of Safe Streets effects across the six new sites varied with an average reduction of 8% that was not statistically significant. Over the entire study period across all sites, Safe Streets was associated with a statistically significant 23% reduction in nonfatal shootings. Eight of the 11 sites had program-related reductions in nonfatal shootings. Four sites had significant reductions ranging from 29% in Lower Park Heights to 84% in Franklin Square. Sandtown-Winchester’s site was associated with a 53% reduction in nonfatal shootings over a period of more than seven years

Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Center for Gun Violence Solution, 2023. 34p.

By Daniel W. Webster, | Cassandra K. Crifasi, Rebecca G. Williams, | Marisa Doll Booty  | Shani A. L. Buggs

This report is the product of the Reducing Violence, Building Trust: Data to Guide Gun Law Enforcement in Baltimore project. Researchers from the Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Policy and Research (JHCGPR) collected and analyzed data relevant to the enforcement of laws restricting the possession of firearms by prohibited individuals and unlawful carrying of concealed firearms to provide data-driven recommendations for more fair and effective practices. The project was designed to help inform the response to the dual crises in Baltimore—extraordinarily high rates of gun violence, and gun law enforcement practices that, in some cases, have violated the law and more generally weakened community members’ trust in the police. In 2017, Baltimore experienced its highest homicide rate on record during two out of the past three years and had the highest murder rate among cities with a population greater than 500,000 in the U.S.1 Homicides declined in 2018, but in 2019, Baltimore’s per capita homicide rate eclipsed the 2017 record, ending the year with 348 total homicides (58.6 per 100,000 population). Nine out of 10 homicides (291) in the city were committed with firearms. The number of nonfatal shootings in 2019, 771, was also higher than that seen in the past five years.2 Because illegal gun possession is often a precursor to shootings, making arrests for illegal gun possession has long played a prominent role in the Baltimore Police Department’s strategy to combat violent crime. While BPD arrests for drug-related crimes have plummeted by 70% from 2014 to 2019, arrests for weapons violations, principally illegal possession of firearms, have changed relatively little during that time period. Police units focused on illegal gun carrying in hot spots for shootings have helped to reduce shootings, but less focused enforcement practices have not always translated into measurable reductions in violence.3 Past efforts to get illegal guns off the streets and deter illegal gun possession without adequate oversight enabled civil rights violations, facilitated alarming criminal activity by BPD’s Gun Trace Task Force, and increased distrust of the police in many communities. These practices and their aftermath have lasting and harmful implications for public safety and justice. They also motivate current efforts by BDP to facilitate reforms and build trust with community members in compliance with the Consent Decree. Researchers from JHCGPR drew from a variety of sources of data from Baltimore and studies from other cities to summarize key findings concerning proactive gun law enforcement practices—legal issues, impacts of police stops and searches on individuals, impacts on gun violence, community members’ views on the appropriateness of police practices and their desire for greater police accountability, and measures some law enforcement agencies are taking to improve the effectiveness and prevent abuses from proactive gun law enforcement. The report cites prior systematic and expert reviews of relevant research, especially the 2018 report by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine’s committee on proactive policing.a Several sources of data from Baltimore were used, including: 1) findings from a recent JHCGPR report on the effects of law enforcement and city-led strategies on gun violence (2,3) the United States Department of Justice’s City of Baltimore Consent Decree and reports from the selected Independent Monitor;  3) new data from court records on case dispositions for cases involving charges for illegal firearm possession; and 4) household surveys and focus group interviews with residents living in some of Baltimore’s neighborhoods most impacted by gun violence. The JHCGPR study team sought to identify promising models for effective and fair proactive gun law enforcement through interviews with law enforcement officials in 24 other jurisdictions. This report provides 13 specific research findings relevant to eight recommendations informed by evidence that is intended to guide future proactive gun law enforcement efforts capable of reducing crime and enhancing community confidence and trust.  

Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Center for Gun Violence Solutions, 2020. 65p.

By Nathaniel M. Lesher

With the rising threat of active shooters, armed off-duty and retired law enforcement officers may prove to be an effective tool in American homeland security. Yet, while the number of active shooter and critical incidents in the United States have continued to rise, the number of non-traditional response interventions has remained minimal. Unfortunately, the presence of armed, off-duty law enforcement officers can create other problems, often referred to as blue-on-blue encounters. This thesis examines the questions Can tools such as Hero911 mitigate some of the major risks associated with self-dispatch How can off-duty or plainclothes officers be best incorporated into active shooter response Finally, what processes can make utilization of non-traditional responders safer for all This thesis concludes that over the past 20 years of active shooter responses, first responders have missed an opportunity with respect to the use of non-traditional responders. On- or off-duty non-traditional responders serve as a force multiplier, which widens the pool of available responders. Use of any technology is not without risks, and to avoid more confusion during an active shooter event, training is paramount. Properly used, tools such as Hero911 can reduce the risks involved in non-traditional officer response.

Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2022. 103p.

By Robert VerBruggen

Decades ago, carrying a gun—especially a concealed gun—was a reliable indicator of criminal activity in much of the country. Police officers who noticed a civilian “packing” were justified in assuming that the individual was thereby breaking the law; in short, he was an armed criminal. Under a key 1968 Supreme Court decision, this was reason enough to both stop and frisk the suspect.

Things have changed. Over the past several decades, most states have radically liberalized their gun-carrying laws, first by granting concealed-carry permits on a “shall-issue” basis, which means that anyone who meets certain requirements, such as training and a clean background check, is entitled to a permit. Now, more than 20 states no longer require a permit at all. And in June 2022, the Supreme Court, in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, held that all states must allow law-abiding citizens to carry guns, invalidating New York’s requirement that applicants for a carry license must show a special need to carry, beyond the basic desire for self-defense.

Particularly during a time in which cities across the country have experienced rising gun violence, the court’s decision raises certain issues that need to be resolved. Chief among them: How can police continue to get illegally possessed guns off the street when it is legal—and, indeed, a constitutional right—for many individuals to carry guns on the street?

This report summarizes the legal landscape surrounding stops and frisks. It also investigates—using data from New York City’s stop-and-frisk program—how pedestrian stops of armed individuals tend to play out in practice. The goal here is not to take stances on guns or policing practices. Instead, it is to map out the legal status quo, highlight the tensions among competing priorities, and lay out options that judges and states with different sets of values might consider.

New York: Manhattan Institute, 2023. 17p.

By Alex Schmid

From the introduction: The need for a Handbook of Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness needs little explanation in the light of the fact that the dominant approach of counterterrorism, based largely on heavy-handed military action, has been such a failure - especially in the Middle East. The traditional military instrument of deterrence has not worked against enemies who have, in most cases, no fixed territorial basis while claiming to love death more than life. The decapitation of terrorist organizations by killing their leaders in drone strikes has created martyrs rather than broken their organization’s will to fight. The collateral damage of military strikes has often turned family members, friends and other witnesses near and far into avengers. For many societies, the “cure” of militarized counterterrorism has been worse than the “disease” of terrorism.

Netherlands. The Hauge.ICCT Press. 2021.

By Alex P. Schmid

From the Introduction: While “terrorism” is one of the most widely used terms in adversarial political discourse, there is still no international consensus about its exact meaning.1 The discussion about the definition of terrorism has been going on for more than half a century and has led to a large number of publications (see bibliography at the end). The purpose of this article is to revisit and review some conceptual approaches in academia, government and international organisations to enable the reader to familiarise her-/himself with the current state of affairs, building on, and expanding, some of the author’s previous conceptual work.

Netherlands. The Hague. ICCT. March 2023. 50p.