Case Closing Report: Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities

By U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

CBP OPR’s Investigative Operations Directorate (IOD) conducts thorough, impartial, and timely investigations into CBP use of force incidents involving death or serious bodily injury and other critical incidents. This review sought to examine the facts and circumstances surrounding this incident (including use of force by CBP personnel); evaluate whether all personnel complied with relevant rules, regulations, and laws; and determine whether any actions could be taken to improve CBP’s performance in similar situations in the future. On May 24, 2022, at 11:33:02 AM (CDT), a lone assailant, , entered Robb Elementary School through an unsecured exterior side door. Upon entering the school, the assailant quickly moved down the hallway and pulled open one of the doors to adjoining Classrooms 111 and 112, both fourth-grade classrooms full of students and their teachers. An internal doorway connected Classroom 111 and Classroom 112. By entering through either classroom door, the assailant had access to both classrooms. Upon entering the classroom, the assailant began firing a semi-automatic rifle at the children and their teachers in both classrooms. Approximately 77 minutes after the assailant entered the classroom, CBP personnel consisting of Border Patrol Agents (BPAs) assigned to the Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC), along with state and local law enforcement officials, entered the classroom and, after an exchange of gunfire, shot and killed the assailant. By the time the incident at Robb Elementary was over, the assailant had killed 19 children and 2 teachers. An additional 16 students, teachers, and law enforcement officers were wounded. A total of 188 CBP personnel, along with law enforcement officers from more than 20 other federal, state, and local agencies, responded or provided support during or following the incident. The incident created immense logistical and tactical challenges that severely tested the resources and capabilities of responding officers and agencies. OPR reached the following conclusions based on this review: Involved CBP personnel at all levels had an inconsistent understanding of their authority to respond to non-federal incidents including active shooter situations. None of the responders whom OPR interviewed could cite a specific authority for being at Robb Elementary School on May 24, 2022. The failure of arriving law enforcement personnel to establish identifiable incident management or command and control protocols led to a disorganized response to the Robb Elementary School shooting. No law enforcement official ever clearly established command at the school during the incident, leading to delays, inaction, and potentially further loss of life. CBP personnel responding to the incident did not establish a command and control framework for their own responding personnel, which resulted in responders taking on tasks on an ad-hoc basis as requested by local law enforcement or at their own initiative.

OPR determined existing CBP training on active shooter response procedures did not adequately prepare responding personnel to deal with this situation. The current training and curriculum did not include the proper application of National Incident Management System (NIMS) or Incident Command System (ICS) protocols and did not prepare them for a number of factors, including the need to address an active shooter behind a locked door. None of the first responders from state, local, or federal law enforcement agencies in a position to take action against the assailant had access to an accurate school layout or knew how to obtain the correct keys to gain access to critical areas of the school. Additionally, none of the first responders from law enforcement agencies had the necessary tools to adequately breach the outwardly opening metal doors to Classrooms 111 and 112. Only one CBP law enforcement officer who arrived on scene had access to a Halligan tool (used for forcibly opening a locked door). CBP personnel established a medical triage area in the hallway of the west building and provided lifesaving care for multiple victims. However, the overall chaotic response caused by the lack of command and control led to the breakdown of adherence to established medical protocols for a mass-casualty incident. This led to some victims with gunshot wounds being inadvertently placed on a school bus without receiving immediate medical treatment. In the immediate aftermath of this incident, numerous investigative agencies, including the Texas Rangers and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), began to independently interview personnel and recover evidence, leading to fragmented crime scene processing and evidence collection. Text messages and other records from cellular devices used by CBP personnel during the incident were not obtained until OPR identified this deficiency and collected most of these materials months following the incident. Coordination with other investigative entities could prevent this oversight in the future. CBP lacked procedures for establishing a centralized point from which to disseminate all information pertaining to the incident. A centralized point of dissemination would have helped to ensure accurate and timely distribution of information while preserving the integrity of ongoing investigations. OPR made the following recommendations based on its review: CBP must ensure its officers, agents, and managers understand and properly work within the confines of their authority. To the extent CBP intends for its personnel to continue to respond to mass violence incidents in a non-federal setting, policy or law must be generated to ensure they have proper authority to do so. All CBP personnel tasked with responding to incidents such as the one at Robb Elementary School should be familiar with NIMS or ICS protocols. CBP should make NIMS or ICS protocols a facet of CBP’s response protocols. CBP’s active shooter training and doctrine should be revised to align with continuously emerging best practices, including lessons learned from this incident. Once the training is revised, all first responders within CBP should receive comprehensive training and the tools necessary to deal with the management of and response to active shooter events. CBP should establish procedures for following medical best practices during critical events and ensure that all CBP personnel are trained to properly assess people requiring medical care, especially because CBP personnel might arrive on scene before emergency medical technicians (EMTs) and paramedics. Responding to critical incidents can overwhelm both an organization’s and individuals’ ability to cope. The mental health needs of first responders must be addressed through comprehensive and universally established protocols. CBP should continue to invest in best practices for responding to critical incidents of all types, including mass violence events, focusing on the healing involved.

Washington, DC: U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 2024. 203p.