By Silvia Villarreal, Rose Kim, Elizabeth Wagner, Nandita Somayaji, Ari Davis, M Cassandra Crifasi

This report outlines gun death data from 2022, the most recent year of finalized data available. All data were accessed using the Centers for Disease Control’s Underlying Cause of Death database, part of the Wide-ranging Online Data for Epidemiologic Research (WONDER) database. The Underlying Cause of Death database contains data based on death certificates for U.S. residents and is the most reliable national source of gun death data available in the U.S. The gun death data used from this database depicts injury mortality by intent using the following categories: homicide, suicide, unintentional, legal intervention, and undetermined. Rates are calculated by the residence listed of decedent, not where the shooting actually took place. For simplification purposes, we created the following age categories to examine gun violence centered on youth: children (ages 1–9) and teens (10–17). For smaller, specific age ranges, we created the following categories: older teens (15–17) and emerging adults (17–19).

Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Violence Solutions. Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. 2024. 23p.

By Colin Murphy

Precise figures about the numbers of illegal firearms in the European Union (EU) are lacking, but several indicators point to their widespread availability and accessibility. According to the Small Arms Survey, over half of the estimated total number of firearms held by civilians in the EU in 2017 were unlicensed. While most of these citizens had no criminal intentions, their illicit firearms could be used for self-harm or domestic violence, or end up in the hands of criminals or terrorists. Most criminals and terrorists have more sophisticated ways to get hold of illicit firearms. They can be trafficked from source countries, diverted from legal supply chains, illegally manufactured or assembled in the EU, converted from legally available weapons, or sourced on the internet. Firearms seizures suggest that the EU illicit firearms market is made up mostly of shotguns, pistols and rifles, with converted or convertible weapons also appearing frequently. Illicit firearms trafficking is driven by criminal demand, with organised crime groups that engage in firearms trafficking also involved in other forms of criminality. The EU considers illicit firearms a key crime threat precisely because they are used in many crimes and terrorist attacks. Even people who lack extensive criminal connections can access illicit firearms due to increased online trafficking and the availability of easy-to-convert weapons. The EU is actively involved in addressing the threat posed by illegal firearms by means of legislative and policy measures, and provides operational assistance to the Member States in the fight against firearms trafficking. The EU is also active in the international fight against firearms trafficking, working closely with the United Nations (UN) in its work to combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and engaging in the UN's global firearms programme. Although the export of arms remains a national competence, the EU has defined common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment and works actively with third countries that are viewed as source or transit countries for illicit firearms. This is an update of a briefing by Ann Neville, published in 2022.

Briefing 23-10-2024 Brussels: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service , 2024. 12p.

By Alice M. Ellyson, Avanti Adhia, Sandra Shanahan, Aisha Alsinai, Lisa DiMascolo, Maxmilliaan Reygers, Deirdre Bowen, Ali Rowhani-Rahbar

We quantified the implementation of WA state's domestic violence (DV)-related firearm prohibitions (RCW9.41.800) by the courts and the Regional Domestic Violence Firearms Enforcement Unit (RDVFEU), a regional approach to compliance promotion. We measured implementation, vetting, compliance, and enforcement of firearm prohibitions before (2014–2016) and after (2018–2020) the RDVFEU was implemented using a 55% random sample of granted domestic violence protection orders (DVPOs) in King County, WA (n = 3543). We evaluated differences in judicial orders to surrender firearms and other dangerous weapons (OTSWs), respondent documented compliance, and respondent weapon and/or firearm relinquishment before and after implementation. Compared to DVPOs granted prior to RDVFEU implementation, granted DVPOs after RDVFEU implementation were at least 4.5 times more likely to include an OTSW. RDVFEU implementation was also associated with at least 3.4 times the odds of respondent documented compliance and at least 3.3 times the odds of respondent relinquishment of at least one firearm and/or other dangerous weapon. These findings demonstrate RDVFEU implementation was associated with benefits at each stage of the protection order process with improvements in both judicial enforcement and respondent compliance. Overall, RDVFEU implementation was associated with improvements in granted orders to surrender weapons, respondent compliance, and relinquishment.

Policy Implications

DV-related firearm prohibitions can be supported by interdisciplinary teams within the legal system to promote respondent compliance and enhance safety planning for DV victim–survivors.

Criminology & Public Policy Volume 23, Issue 4 Nov 2024 Pages 801-1017

By Brady: United Against Gun Violence.

Every gun on our streets starts somewhere, and the overwhelming majority have their origins in the legal marketplace. Understanding how guns — particularly those that have been diverted from legal commerce to the underground market — make their way to crime scenes is essential to crafting evidence-based and life-saving solutions to the American gun violence epidemic. There is — or should be — nothing controversial about this tracing approach. Epidemiologists and other scientists routinely study the origins of public health challenges in order to develop effective solutions, treatments, and preventative measures. It is a key component of the scientific method. Unfortunately, the best national data on the sources and paths of crime guns has been hidden from researchers, journalists, and the general public for nearly two decades. The gun industry successfully pushed the federal government to restrict public access to this critical gun trace data, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) has aided the industry’s efforts by adopting an overly broad interpretation of those regulatory restrictions. Although some state and local law enforcement agencies have released gun UNDERSTANDING HOW GUNS — PARTICULARLY THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN DIVERTED FROM LEGAL COMMERCE TO THE UNDERGROUND MARKET — MAKE THEIR WAY TO CRIME SCENES IS ESSENTIAL TO CRAFTING EVIDENCE-BASED AND LIFE-SAVING SOLUTIONS TO THE AMERICAN GUN VIOLENCE EPIDEMIC. trace data in the last 20 years, the amount has been insufficient to develop the comprehensive, life-saving solutions that we need. In this report you will find an analysis of the most important gun trace dataset to be publicly available in decades. Attorney General Josh Shapiro of Pennsylvania has released trace data for 186,000 crime guns from over 150 law enforcement agencies in his state, allowing the public to identify, for the first time in decades, which gun dealers appear to supply the most guns to the illegal market. This data is publicly available on the Pennsylvania Gun Tracing Analytics Platform. It is very important to note that the gun tracing dataset, while extensive, is not comprehensive. It does not include crime guns recovered by local Pennsylvania law enforcement agencies that have opted against sharing trace data. For that reason, the findings in this report are not the definitive picture of crime guns in the state. However, this dataset should nonetheless enable the public, policymakers, and law enforcement to hold the gun industry accountable for its role in supplying crime guns — and, in doing so, ultimately save lives. By focusing on the small number of gun dealers now known to be contributing to the problem, Pennsylvanians and their leaders will be able to put political, legal, and economic pressure on the irresponsible actors of the gun industry and bring about needed reforms to ensure that firearms are transferred responsibly and safely. Like all data, gun trace data has its limits; its insights, while key to understanding gun trafficking, are just one part of that process. Earlier this year, Brady unveiled an extensive — and ever-growing — database containing another piece to the puzzle: ATF compliance inspection reports detailing federal firearms licensees (FFLs) who have been issued a warning letter or more severe remedy for cited violations of gun laws. We encourage readers to also view that resource, the Gun Store Transparency Project, at www.gunstoretransparency.org. As you read through these findings, keep in mind that many of the 186,000 crime guns in the database are likely associated with one or more crime victim(s) and their families. If this were not staggering enough, the devastating ripple effects gun violence inflicts on families, neighborhoods, and communities are not captured in these numbers. Brady invites you to join us in advocating for solutions that address the supply side of gun violence. We invite researchers to study this data and build on our analysis; we implore journalists to report on not just the tragic results of gun violence incidents, but how crime guns end up in our communities; we urge lawmakers and law enforcement to adopt life-saving, supply-side solutions to gun violence; and we call on federal, state, and local authorities to be more transparent by releasing more trace data to the public. It is long past time for the gun industry as a whole to adopt meaningful supply-side solutions ensuring firearms are transferred safely and responsibility, as it is neither fair nor just to ask the communities suffering the immense harms of gun violence to also bear the burden of providing all the solutions.

Washington, DC: Brady: United Against Gun Violence, 2022. 43p.

By Brady: United Against Gun Violence.

In January 2020, Brady advocates planned to take part in an annual Martin Luther King Jr. gun violence prevention advocacy event at the Virginia State Capitol, but state officials cautioned would-be participants that 2020 would be different: Second Amendment extremists were planning to turn out. Out of caution, Brady cancelled its official participation in the event because an estimated 20,000 individuals from across the country, armed with assault-style rifles and wearing tactical gear, descended on the State Capitol in Richmond, VA. It was a deeply troubling moment for members of the gun violence prevention movement, who saw their First Amendment right to speak and assemble quashed by gun-toting extremists. We did not know then that the events of that day were only a dress rehearsal for far worse to come. On January 6, 2021, Congress was set to certify the results of the 2020 election. But extremists, many of them armed, mounted an insurrection with violent force that resulted in death and injury and nearly derailed Congress’ capacity to confirm a president duly elected by the citizens of the United States. For Brady supporters and gun violence prevention advocates, it was both a sickening gut punch and deja vu. Although only one of the four people killed on January 6 was shot, the 2021 attack had the same roots as the 2020 Virginia State Capitol unrest: Second Amendment extremism. Second Amendment extremism arises from what’s commonly known as the “insurrectionist” construction of the Second Amendment: a false interpretation fomented by extremists, marketed by the gun lobby, and adopted by some mainstream politicians, including the 45th President of the United States. Second Amendment extremism lays the foundation for much domestic unrest and weaponized terror throughout American history, including but not limited to the Oklahoma City Bombing, the armed agitation at the Michigan State Capitol, and yes — January 6, 2021. Indeed, investigations and firsthand accounts of January 6 show that many of its agitators were armed, ready, and willing to harm lawmakers. Accordingly, officers on duty at the U.S. Capitol that day had credible reasons to fear that many rioters were armed; a number of these officers have since testified before Congress that those fears hindered their ability to control the insurrectionist mob. Yet the common narrative around January 6 often omits the role of Second Amendment extremism. Ignoring the ways in which guns, and gun mythology, fuel domestic extremism in America has been — and will continue to be — a deadly error. For these reasons, this report sets out to examine the role U.S. gun culture and policy played in laying the foundation for January 6. If we do not spend time reflecting upon our past, we are doomed to repeat it — and that we cannot do, because human lives and bedrock civic principles hang in the balance of this understanding and reckoning. At Brady, we have confronted extremism before, and we know that unless we take action, we will face it again.

Washington, DC: Brady: United Against Gun Violence. 2022. 16p.

Nils Duquet & Maarten Van Alstein

On a regular basis, news stories appear in the media about public shootings where shooters use their guns to open fire and kill people in shopping malls or on school campuses. Mostly these stories deal with incidents in the United States. Over the last years, however, a number of European countries have experienced similar public shooting incidents. Notable cases were the shootings at Tuusula and Kauhajoki in Finland (2007 and 2008), the killings in Cumbria in the UK (2010), the Utøya attacks by Anders Breivik in Norway (2011), and the shootings at Alphen aan den Rijn in the Netherlands and Liège in Belgium in 2011. Public shootings draw a high level of media attention. Less striking in the public eye, but not less significant – not least in quantitative terms –, are the numbers of people in Europe killed by firearms in the context of gun-related crime or in domestic shootings. It is estimated that between 2000 and 2010, over 10,000 victims of murder or manslaughter were killed by firearms in the 28 Member States of the European Union (EU). Every year, over 4000 suicides by firearm are registered in the EU. This means that, on average, there are 0.24 homicides and 0.9 suicides by firearm per 100,000 population in Europe every year.

Compared with the US or other countries around the globe, the rates of gun-related violent death in Europe are rather low, certainly where the homicide rates are concerned. This does not mean, however, that the problem of gun violence has not appeared on the European policy radar in recent years. On the contrary, the attention devoted to the problem by law enforcement agencies and policy-makers has been growing. Reacting not only to shooting incidents such as those mentioned above, but also to warnings by police and law enforcement agencies that criminals are increasingly willing to use (heavy) firearms and that illegal trafficking in firearms is on the rise, a number of European countries have announced policy interventions targeted at reducing levels of gun-related violence and crime. The European Commission has also become an active actor in firearms policy. In October 2013 it announced a plan to reduce gun violence in Europe, in which it defined the misuse of firearms, whether legally-owned or illicitly manufactured or acquired, as “a serious threat to the EU’s security from both an internal and external perspective”. One of the major problems the Commission identified in its initial policy papers was the problem of a lack of sound and adequate knowledge about firearms in Europe. The commission noted that “a lack of solid EU-wide statistics and intelligence hampers effective policy and operational responses”.. One of the ambitions of the EU-wide statistics and intelligence hampers effective policy is, therefore, to address the gaps in knowledge concerning gun violence.

An additional problem is that the lack of reliable and comprehensive information on firearms in Europe is not limited to the sphere of law enforcement and policy-making. European scholarly research focusing specifically on firearms availability, gun control and gun-related violence is scarce. There is a research community in Europe focusing on small arms and light weapons (SALW), but it is predominantly concerned with the export of firearms and the connections between these arms flows and violence in developing, transitional or fragile states outside Europe. Scientific research on firearms and gun-related violence in the domestic European context is much less advanced. The scanty research efforts made in this field by epidemiologists, criminologists and legal scholars remain fragmented, and suffer from the fact that there is no integrated scholarly community dealing with gun-related issues. Language barriers, moreover, often prevent the wider dissemination of research results. Given this relative lack of European firearms research, American studies are still clearly dominant at present in research on the links between the availability of firearms and gun-related violence. Greene and Marsh have calculated that out of the 665 studies on firearms and violence that they reviewed, 64% were about the USA. Of the remaining studies not on the USA, 13% concerned cross-national comparisons or articles in which the geographical focus was unspecified (such as reviews), while 8% were about developing countries. Only 15% concerned other developed countries such as Canada, Australia, the UK and Germany. Given the particularities of the American context, and more specifically the fact that the US has one of the highest rates of gun-related deaths and crime among industrialized democracies, simply transposing the results of American research to the European context is problematic.

What are the levels of firearms availability in Europe? Are there links between the levels of gun ownership in European countries and these countries’ rates of violence and violent death? And what is the impact of European gun laws on public safety and health? The absence of evidence specifically for the European context makes it difficult for policy-makers and researchers to find impartial and unbiased answers to these questions. Hence the pressing need for research that specifically focuses on gun-related violence in the European context: and with the present report, we would like to make a contribution to that effort. As we are moving into largely uncharted territory, our analysis of the European situation will necessarily be exploratory. Our primary ambition is to collect and take stock of the fragmented evidence that is available on gun-related violence in Europe. Our geographical coverage will be broader than the EU and encompasses a group of approximately 40 European countries, although in some instances we will limit our analyses to the EU28.

In the report’s first chapter, we briefly dwell on one of the most crucial variables in research on gun control and violence: the level of gun ownership in society. Although the prevalence or availability of firearms is a key variable, collecting adequate data on levels of gun ownership can be troublesome. In chapter 1 we therefore devote some space to a critical assessment of the available statistics for Europe. Next, in chapter 2, we look at gun-related violence in Europe. Given the absence of good data on gun-related violence in general, including information not only on mortality but also on injuries and other forms of firearms-related victimization, we will focus exclusively on violent deaths – which seems a legitimate methodological choice for exploratory purposes. We urge the reader, however, to keep in mind that gun-related violence is a much more complex phenomenon than this focus might suggest. As is normal in research dealing with gun control not only from a public safety but also a public health perspective, we shall look both at gun-related homicides and at suicides. Taking the analysis further, we then ask in chapters 3 and 4 whether rates of gun possession and violent death in Europe are correlated: do high levels of gun possession in European countries correlate with high levels of homicide and suicide? The results of probing that question lead us to suggest that research into gun possession and violent death should also factor in the effects of firearms legislation. Specific European research into this question is scarce, which makes it difficult at the moment to arrive at conclusions for the whole of Europe. In chapter 5 we therefore focus on the results of three recent studies on the effects of stricter gun legislation on violent death rates in Austria, Belgium and Switzerland.

Flemish Peace Institute Report June 2015

By: Vladislav Chernavskikh

Recent advances in the capabilities of artificial intelligence (AI) have increased state interest in leveraging AI for military purposes. Military integration of advanced AI by nuclear-armed states has the potential to have an impact on elements of their nuclear deterrence architecture such as missile early-warning systems, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and nuclear command, control and communications (NC3), as well as related conventional systems.

At the same time, a number of technological and logistical factors can potentially limit or slow the adoption of AI in the nuclear domain. Among these are unreliability of output, susceptibility to cyberattacks, lack of good-quality data, and inadequate hardware and an underdeveloped national industrial and technical base.

Given the current and relatively early stage of military adoption of advanced AI, the exploration of these factors lays the groundwork for further consideration of the likely realities of integration and of potential transparency measures and governance practices at the AI–nuclear nexus.

SIPRI Background Paper, September 2024

By: KELSEY DAVENPORT

From the document: "This report makes several assessments. [1] Structural factors in the existing array of organizations and treaty bodies focused on disarmament have prevented bold, creative action to advance the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. These factors include inadequate or overly broad membership, overreliance on consensus-based decision-making, and limited high-level political engagement. [...] [2] The NSS [nuclear security summit] process offers a model for creating a new series of disarmament summits designed to inject momentum into current efforts to reduce the risk posed by nuclear weapons and eliminate nuclear arsenals. Certain characteristics of the NSS process contributed to its success. [...] [3] A nuclear disarmament summit process modeled off the NSS process could provide a forum better suited to address new challenges that the existing forums have struggled to tackle in the current geopolitical environment. Like the NSS process, states would be encouraged to make national commitments ('house gifts') and work in partnership to make multinational commitments ('gift baskets') that exceed least-common denominator, consensus-based decision-making. Reporting within the summit process could drive accountability, and high-level political participation could create pressure for leaders to make ambitious but achievable commitments that advance disarmament. This report also argues how a high-level disarmament summit process would complement, not replace, existing initiatives and treaties that form the disarmament architecture."

Sep 2024 ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION (WASHINGTON, D.C.)

By U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

CBP OPR’s Investigative Operations Directorate (IOD) conducts thorough, impartial, and timely investigations into CBP use of force incidents involving death or serious bodily injury and other critical incidents. This review sought to examine the facts and circumstances surrounding this incident (including use of force by CBP personnel); evaluate whether all personnel complied with relevant rules, regulations, and laws; and determine whether any actions could be taken to improve CBP’s performance in similar situations in the future. On May 24, 2022, at 11:33:02 AM (CDT), a lone assailant, , entered Robb Elementary School through an unsecured exterior side door. Upon entering the school, the assailant quickly moved down the hallway and pulled open one of the doors to adjoining Classrooms 111 and 112, both fourth-grade classrooms full of students and their teachers. An internal doorway connected Classroom 111 and Classroom 112. By entering through either classroom door, the assailant had access to both classrooms. Upon entering the classroom, the assailant began firing a semi-automatic rifle at the children and their teachers in both classrooms. Approximately 77 minutes after the assailant entered the classroom, CBP personnel consisting of Border Patrol Agents (BPAs) assigned to the Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC), along with state and local law enforcement officials, entered the classroom and, after an exchange of gunfire, shot and killed the assailant. By the time the incident at Robb Elementary was over, the assailant had killed 19 children and 2 teachers. An additional 16 students, teachers, and law enforcement officers were wounded. A total of 188 CBP personnel, along with law enforcement officers from more than 20 other federal, state, and local agencies, responded or provided support during or following the incident. The incident created immense logistical and tactical challenges that severely tested the resources and capabilities of responding officers and agencies. OPR reached the following conclusions based on this review: Involved CBP personnel at all levels had an inconsistent understanding of their authority to respond to non-federal incidents including active shooter situations. None of the responders whom OPR interviewed could cite a specific authority for being at Robb Elementary School on May 24, 2022. The failure of arriving law enforcement personnel to establish identifiable incident management or command and control protocols led to a disorganized response to the Robb Elementary School shooting. No law enforcement official ever clearly established command at the school during the incident, leading to delays, inaction, and potentially further loss of life. CBP personnel responding to the incident did not establish a command and control framework for their own responding personnel, which resulted in responders taking on tasks on an ad-hoc basis as requested by local law enforcement or at their own initiative.

OPR determined existing CBP training on active shooter response procedures did not adequately prepare responding personnel to deal with this situation. The current training and curriculum did not include the proper application of National Incident Management System (NIMS) or Incident Command System (ICS) protocols and did not prepare them for a number of factors, including the need to address an active shooter behind a locked door. None of the first responders from state, local, or federal law enforcement agencies in a position to take action against the assailant had access to an accurate school layout or knew how to obtain the correct keys to gain access to critical areas of the school. Additionally, none of the first responders from law enforcement agencies had the necessary tools to adequately breach the outwardly opening metal doors to Classrooms 111 and 112. Only one CBP law enforcement officer who arrived on scene had access to a Halligan tool (used for forcibly opening a locked door). CBP personnel established a medical triage area in the hallway of the west building and provided lifesaving care for multiple victims. However, the overall chaotic response caused by the lack of command and control led to the breakdown of adherence to established medical protocols for a mass-casualty incident. This led to some victims with gunshot wounds being inadvertently placed on a school bus without receiving immediate medical treatment. In the immediate aftermath of this incident, numerous investigative agencies, including the Texas Rangers and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), began to independently interview personnel and recover evidence, leading to fragmented crime scene processing and evidence collection. Text messages and other records from cellular devices used by CBP personnel during the incident were not obtained until OPR identified this deficiency and collected most of these materials months following the incident. Coordination with other investigative entities could prevent this oversight in the future. CBP lacked procedures for establishing a centralized point from which to disseminate all information pertaining to the incident. A centralized point of dissemination would have helped to ensure accurate and timely distribution of information while preserving the integrity of ongoing investigations. OPR made the following recommendations based on its review: CBP must ensure its officers, agents, and managers understand and properly work within the confines of their authority. To the extent CBP intends for its personnel to continue to respond to mass violence incidents in a non-federal setting, policy or law must be generated to ensure they have proper authority to do so. All CBP personnel tasked with responding to incidents such as the one at Robb Elementary School should be familiar with NIMS or ICS protocols. CBP should make NIMS or ICS protocols a facet of CBP’s response protocols. CBP’s active shooter training and doctrine should be revised to align with continuously emerging best practices, including lessons learned from this incident. Once the training is revised, all first responders within CBP should receive comprehensive training and the tools necessary to deal with the management of and response to active shooter events. CBP should establish procedures for following medical best practices during critical events and ensure that all CBP personnel are trained to properly assess people requiring medical care, especially because CBP personnel might arrive on scene before emergency medical technicians (EMTs) and paramedics. Responding to critical incidents can overwhelm both an organization’s and individuals’ ability to cope. The mental health needs of first responders must be addressed through comprehensive and universally established protocols. CBP should continue to invest in best practices for responding to critical incidents of all types, including mass violence events, focusing on the healing involved.

Washington, DC: U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 2024. 203p.

By Julia Korkman

Traffickers often use manipulation to tie their victims with what is sometimes called “invisible chains”. These, often subtle and large ly psychological means of controlling and manipulating victims are hard to detect and prove by the criminal justice system. The terms used for this phenomenon in the scientific literature are psychological coercion, psychological control and coercive control. IN THIS POLICY brief, we use the term psychological coercion, as it is widely used in the human trafficking literature. This policy brief pro vides a brief insight into psychological coercion as a phenomenon, what is known about the use of such coercion in the context of trafficking in human beings and how investigators can strive to address the issue of psychological coercion within criminal investigation

Helsinki: HEUNI, 2023. 4p.

By The Little Hoover Commision

California must improve and expand efforts to identify labor trafficking, the state’s independent government watchdog recommends in a new report.

In Labor Trafficking: Strategies to Uncover this Hidden Crime, the Little Hoover Commission calls for increased efforts to identify labor trafficking through better training, data collection, and public awareness. This is the Commission’s second report studying California’s response to human trafficking and builds upon the recommendation from its first report on the topic, released in June 2020, to create a statewide Anti-Human Trafficking Council.

“Too often, this heinous crime goes undetected, and those who have been preyed upon have nowhere to turn,” said Commission Chair Pedro Nava. “This horrible crime demands an aggressive response, and our recommendations will help California do just that.”

Labor trafficking occurs when employers use force, fraud or coercion to exert a level of control over workers that leaves them trapped in oppressive situations. It can occur in a variety of workplaces, including restaurants, construction sites, farm fields, and households, and is often very difficult to detect. Widespread unemployment due to the COVID-19 pandemic may contribute to the conditions necessary for labor trafficking to flourish.

The Commission’s report focuses on the obstacles that make it difficult to identify labor trafficking, including a lack of enforcement of anti-trafficking laws and a lack of familiarity about the issue among government officials and the public. The report also notes that the state’s primary focus has been on combatting sex trafficking, a focus that must continue but be expanded to include labor trafficking as well.

“We need to know where labor trafficking is occurring in California and who is being affected so we can direct resources to help victims and bring traffickers to justice,” explained Commissioner Cynthia Buiza, chair of the Commission’s subcommittee for the labor trafficking studies. “More information will mean a stronger state response.”

The report also notes the strides taken by state officials to combat and deter child sex trafficking and calls for similar investment in protections for child victims of labor trafficking.

“It is crucial that all children are protected,” said Commissioner Dion Aroner, a member of the study’s subcommittee. “Nothing is more important than ensuring that California’s youngest and most vulnerable residents do not fall prey to the evil of human trafficking.”

Report #251, September 2020; Sacramento: Little Hoover Commission, 2020. 30p.

By The Little Hoover Commission

The Commission assessed California’s efforts to combat labor trafficking in 2020 and produced three reports that included recommendations to strengthen the state’s stance against this horrific crime. Together, in these reports, the Commission offers recommendations to help California coordinate its response to human trafficking, detect labor trafficking, help victims, and bring traffickers to justice. In 2023, the Commission held a public hearing and sought additional input from five state agencies to learn about progress made towards implementing its recommendations. As part of this follow-up review, the Commission found a growing need for support of labor trafficking survivors. Yet, barriers—such as insufficient resources to identify and prosecute this crime—continue to undermine the state’s efforts. These challenges are exacerbated by gaps in state and local leadership that hinder continuity of effort in anti-trafficking work. Coordinating Leadership Around Anti-Trafficking Activities In its initial study, the Commission found that California’s response to human trafficking focuses principally on combatting sex trafficking. Additionally, the state lacks a coordinated strategy to target human trafficking statewide. In its report, Human Trafficking: Coordinating a California Response, the Commission recommended the creation of an antihuman trafficking council to build and enhance collaboration among communities throughout the state, study and improve services for survivors of both sex and labor trafficking, and assist in the successful prosecution of human traffickers. While there have been several legislative attempts to create such a coordinating body, none have been successful thus far. Nonetheless, representatives from regional human trafficking task forces told the Commission that such an entity would elevate trafficking as an explicit statewide priority, help them to implement strategies to identify labor trafficking, share best practices, and access published case law. California must institutionalize its response to human trafficking through the creation of a state-level centralized hub. Uncovering Labor Trafficking Combatting labor trafficking within California must begin with effectively detecting this crime— whenever and wherever it occurs. Yet, uncovering labor trafficking can be particularly challenging, as few understand the nature of the crime and to the untrained observer, the work itself may appear legitimate. In its report, Labor Trafficking: Strategies to Uncover this Hidden Crime, the Commission identified several strategies to help California better detect labor trafficking, including through increased worker training, public education and outreach, and equal application of statutory protections to help identify and address all forms of child trafficking. In its review, the Commission found some efforts to improve identification of this crime, such as periodic training on labor trafficking for certain public officials and workers, increased public awareness resources, and legislative attempts to equally address all forms of child human trafficking. While important, these efforts do not meet the scale or scope envisioned by the Commission in its original study. California must expand upon this work to have a chance at significantly reducing labor trafficking. In this report, the Commission reiterates a few such opportunities, including regular and robust support to train public officials to serve as “first identifiers,” expanded worker training opportunities and informational campaigns across industry sectors, and statutory amendments to ensure equal protection against all forms of trafficking.

Report #278; Sacramento: Little Hoover Commision, 2024. 25p.

By Jessica Reichert and Maryann Mason

In the United States, firearm homicide is a major public health concern. Certain populations are at greater risk for being a victim of firearm homicide, such as those with prior criminal justice involvement. The overlap between violent victimization and offense history, referred to as the victim-offender overlap, is empirically supported, but research is limited on the overlap of firearm homicide victimization and justice involvement. Therefore, we examined the extent of victim-offender overlap of firearm homicide decedents by matching Illinois public health data with state arrest data. A total of 1,331 firearm homicide decedents were examined, including 20.4% (n = 271) with no arrest records and 79.7% (n = 1,060) with an arrest record, as well as 55.6% (n = 740) with a prior conviction and 31.8% (n = 423) with a prior incarceration. A higher proportion of firearm homicide victims with an arrest record were male, another race than White, non-Latinx, and single or never married than those without an arrest record. This study further supports the existence of the victim-offender overlap and highlights demographic disparities in criminal justice involvement among victims of fatal firearm violence.

Chicago: Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, 2023. 16p.

By Shelby L Bandel , Allison E Bond , Michael D Anestis 

Background: Firearms account for over 40,000 deaths in the USA each year in addition to thousands of nonfatal injuries. One notable prevention strategy for firearm-related fatalities and nonfatal injuries is safe storage. Safe storage of firearms emphasizes using storage mechanisms that limit the ready access of firearms to unauthorized users. Cable locks are one safe storage option that is easy to access and typically free, as they are included in many firearms sales. The present study examined the extent to which firearms retailers notifying purchasers at the point of sale about the included cable locks was associated with subsequent locking device use in two large samples and three subsamples. Exploratory analyses then examined demographic factors associated with the frequency of seller notification of locks.

Methods: Sample 1 included 1203 firearm owners and sample 2 included 1556 firearm owners. Subsamples were drawn from sample 2 to examine if there were differences by state. The three subsamples included firearm owners from Minnesota (n = 515), Mississippi (535), and New Jersey (506). Logistic regressions were used to examine the association between the frequency of sellers notifying buyers of locks and subsequent locking device use. Linear regressions were used to examine what demographic factors were associated with greater frequency of seller notification of locking devices.

Results: Results indicated a general trend such that more frequent notification of cable locks at the point of purchase was associated with a greater likelihood of using locking devices to secure firearms. At the subsample level, these findings were most consistent for Mississippi relative to Minnesota and New Jersey. Exploratory analyses generally indicated those who were younger and those living in more densely populated areas were more likely to be notified about cable locks at the point of purchase.

Conclusions: These findings suggest that interactions about cable locks at the point of firearm purchase has an impact on firearm storage behaviors. Such results indicate that encouraging firearm retailers to have these discussions with those purchasing firearms might be an important strategy for preventing firearm-related fatalities and nonfatal injuries.

Inj Epidemiol. 2023; 10: 11

By Rose M. C. Kagawa and Elise D. Riley

Background: Unstably housed women experience high levels of violence. While previous studies have investigated psychological, physical, and sexual violence, weapon and gun violence are rarely delineated. We examined factors associated with experiencing violence as an adult among unhoused and unstably housed women, with a focus on gun violence. Methods: We recruited women with a history of housing instability from San Francisco homeless shelters, street encampments, free meal programs, low-income hotels, and health clinics. Participants completed interviews including questions regarding both childhood and adult violence. We used multivariable logistic regression to examine associations of specific types of childhood violence (i.e., physical, sexual, gun, and other weapon-involved violence), age, race, ethnicity, educational attainment, and sexual orientation, with risk of experiencing specific types of violence as an adult (i.e., gun, other weapon-involved, physical violence). Because the violence outcomes were not rare, odds ratios were transformed to approximate risk ratios. Results: Nearly half of women (n = 110, 45%) had been attacked with a gun as an adult. Violent victimization in adulthood was common, with 33% having experienced all three forms of violence. The probability of being attacked with a gun as an adult was almost 70% higher among women who had been hit or kicked hard enough to cause injury as a child (RR = 1.68; 95% CI = 1.24, 2.11), and this association was present for all three violence outcomes. No other risk factors explored, including other types of violence experienced as a child, met the statistical threshold to be considered significant. Conclusions: The high prevalence of gun violence reported here is consistent with prior studies of violence conducted in similar populations. Considered in combination with prior research, findings suggest that multi-generational violence prevention interventions for low-income women and girls are needed. They also emphasize the need to more actively include people who experience unstable housing in statewide and national violence surveys to better understand the extent of the problem and address on a broader scale the high rates of violence experienced by unstably housed populations, which have been consistently documented in local research

Inj. Epidemiol. 8:52, 2021

By Garen J. Wintemute 

Inter-related sustained upward trends in firearm purchasing, violence, and political extremism are converging to put the USA at risk for disaster and threaten our future as a democracy. This narrative review provides a critical assessment and call to action. It explores each trend separately, considers the effects of their likely and imminent convergence, and suggests possibilities for collective and individual action to prevent or at least reduce those effects.

Injury Epidemiology volume 8, Article number: 64 (2021)

By Roberto Uchôa de Oliveira Santos

In recent decades, the global debate on gun control has been prominent, with many countries adopting more restrictive policies. Brazil followed this trend by implementing stringent measures in 2003; however, the presidency of Jair Bolsonaro in 2019 introduced normative changes aimed at facilitating public access to firearms and ammunition. Throughout his term, the legal firearms market doubled, allowing access to weaponry previously restricted to the general public. The analyzed hypothesis suggests that these normative changes, especially those related to the quantity and authorization of acquisition of previously restricted firearms, altered the types of firearms in circulation, strengthening the interaction between legal and illegal markets. Using data from the mandatory firearms re-registration, a total of 962,782 firearms were analyzed. The assessment of the increase in circulation of these firearms in the illegal market was conducted through the analysis of seizures in the states of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, revealing a significant growth in seizures of these types of firearms, possibly correlated with the increase in their circulation. Three police investigations were selected to exemplify how the connection between markets intensified, allowing criminals to obtain firearms in the legal market that were previously only accessible through international trafficking or diversion from state agencies.

Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 6(1): pp. 16–29. 2024

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

Countries across the Near and Middle East have registered an escalation in both the scale and sophistication of drug trafficking operations over the past decade. The destabilizing risks posed by illicit drugs have become increasingly prominent on the regional agenda. Of particular concern for governments and societies across the region is the rising production, trafficking and consumption of amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), in particular, tablets containing amphetamine sold under the name “captagon”, and methamphetamine. Iraq and neighbouring countries have documented a sharp increase in the trafficking and use of “captagon” over the past five years. “Captagon” seizures in Iraq increased by almost 3,380 per cent in Iraq from 2019 to 2023. Iraq reported the seizure of over 4.1 tons of “captagon” tablets between January and December 2023 alone. Seizures of amphetamine (mainly in the form of “cap tagon”) in the Near and Middle East doubled from 2020, reaching a record high of 86 tons in 2021. In parallel to “captagon” trafficking, a methamphetamine market is quickly developing in the Near and Middle East, as shown by a rise in seizures.3 UNODC research has found that Iraq is at risk of becoming an increasingly important node in the drug trafficking ecosystem spanning the Near and Middle East. Iraq lies near the intersection of a complex global drug trafficking ecosystem spanning Southwest Asia, Africa, and Europe, notably the Balkan and Southern routes associated with opiate smuggling from Afghanistan to Europe, through Southeastern Europe, and towards the Indian Ocean and Eastern Africa, including through the Arabian Peninsula. Within Iraq, drugs are trafficked along three key internal corridors, in the north, central and southern regions of the country. There are distinct territorial, ethnic, economic, and political factors and differentiated drug market dynamics connected to each route. The main categories of drugs traf f icked through Iraq include opium, heroin, hashish and especially, methamphetamine and “captagon”. While Iraq is not necessarily the most affected country in the region in terms of volumes of drugs seized, there are risks that the situation could deteriorate if drug trafficking, in particular of methamphetamine and “captagon”, keeps intensifying. A particular challenge facing countries across the Near and Middle East are armed groups with cross-border affiliations and transborder economic interests. Alongside a recent history marked by armed conflict and corruption, this situation has contributed to cross-border trafficking. The Government of Iraq and its partners have stressed the need for collective responses to tackle the security, social and economic ramifications of drug trafficking across the Near and Middle East. As seen in different regional contexts, the persistence – and potential reactivation – of armed groups poses a significant threat, not least given their potential involvement in illicit drug production and trafficking. There is growing awareness among governments of how drug trafficking intensifies corruption, undermines governance and legitimate business, degrades services and contributes to violent competition between armed groups. There is also growing concern over evidence of increasing drug use and related social harms, requiring sustained treatment and rehabilitation efforts.6 Practical responses are being implemented but are still at an early stage. Iraq established its first drug law and commission in 2017 and in 2023 launched a National Strategy on Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances (2023–2025) in 2023. Moreover, Iraq organized the first regional event on the issue in 2023 to accelerate collaboration and coordinate efforts in drug detection and disruption..

Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 46p.

Liana W. Rosen

Sanctions play a role in U.S. national drug control strategies to disrupt and deter the illicit production and trafficking of foreign-produced drugs. The 118th Congress has focused on the role of sanctions in combating synthetic opioid production and trafficking (including fentanyl). Opioids are a leading contributor to U.S. drug overdose deaths.

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service; 2024

By Jeffrey W. Swanson, April M. Zeoli, Shannon Frattaroli, Marian Betz, Michele Easter, Reena Kapoor, Christopher Knoepke, Michael Norko, Veronica A. Pear, et al..

More than half of suicide deaths in the United States result from self-inflicted firearm injuries. Extreme risk protection order (ERPO) laws in 21 states and the District of Columbia temporarily limit access to firearms for individuals found in a civil court process to pose an imminent risk of harm to themselves or others. Research with large multistate study populations has been lacking to determine effectiveness of these laws. This study assembled records pertaining to 4,583 ERPO respondents in California, Connecticut, Maryland, and Washington. Matched records identified suicide decedents and self-injury method. Researchers applied case fatality rates for each suicide method to estimate nonfatal suicide attempts corresponding to observed deaths. Comparison of counterfactual to observed data patterns yielded estimates of the number of lives saved and number of ERPOs needed to avert one suicide. Estimates varied depending on the assumed probability that a gun owner who attempts suicide will use a gun. Two evidence-based approaches yielded estimates of 17 and 23 ERPOs needed to prevent one suicide. For the subset of 2,850 ERPO respond ents with documented suicide concern, comparable estimates were 13 and 18, respectively. This study’s findings add to growing evidence that ERPOs can be an effective and important suicide prevention tool.

J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 52(3) online, 2024. DOI:10.29158/JAAPL.240056-24