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Uncovering the Truth About Pennsylvania Crime Guns

By Brady: United Against Gun Violence.

Every gun on our streets starts somewhere, and the overwhelming majority have their origins in the legal marketplace. Understanding how guns — particularly those that have been diverted from legal commerce to the underground market — make their way to crime scenes is essential to crafting evidence-based and life-saving solutions to the American gun violence epidemic. There is — or should be — nothing controversial about this tracing approach. Epidemiologists and other scientists routinely study the origins of public health challenges in order to develop effective solutions, treatments, and preventative measures. It is a key component of the scientific method. Unfortunately, the best national data on the sources and paths of crime guns has been hidden from researchers, journalists, and the general public for nearly two decades. The gun industry successfully pushed the federal government to restrict public access to this critical gun trace data, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) has aided the industry’s efforts by adopting an overly broad interpretation of those regulatory restrictions. Although some state and local law enforcement agencies have released gun UNDERSTANDING HOW GUNS — PARTICULARLY THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN DIVERTED FROM LEGAL COMMERCE TO THE UNDERGROUND MARKET — MAKE THEIR WAY TO CRIME SCENES IS ESSENTIAL TO CRAFTING EVIDENCE-BASED AND LIFE-SAVING SOLUTIONS TO THE AMERICAN GUN VIOLENCE EPIDEMIC. trace data in the last 20 years, the amount has been insufficient to develop the comprehensive, life-saving solutions that we need. In this report you will find an analysis of the most important gun trace dataset to be publicly available in decades. Attorney General Josh Shapiro of Pennsylvania has released trace data for 186,000 crime guns from over 150 law enforcement agencies in his state, allowing the public to identify, for the first time in decades, which gun dealers appear to supply the most guns to the illegal market. This data is publicly available on the Pennsylvania Gun Tracing Analytics Platform. It is very important to note that the gun tracing dataset, while extensive, is not comprehensive. It does not include crime guns recovered by local Pennsylvania law enforcement agencies that have opted against sharing trace data. For that reason, the findings in this report are not the definitive picture of crime guns in the state. However, this dataset should nonetheless enable the public, policymakers, and law enforcement to hold the gun industry accountable for its role in supplying crime guns — and, in doing so, ultimately save lives. By focusing on the small number of gun dealers now known to be contributing to the problem, Pennsylvanians and their leaders will be able to put political, legal, and economic pressure on the irresponsible actors of the gun industry and bring about needed reforms to ensure that firearms are transferred responsibly and safely. Like all data, gun trace data has its limits; its insights, while key to understanding gun trafficking, are just one part of that process. Earlier this year, Brady unveiled an extensive — and ever-growing — database containing another piece to the puzzle: ATF compliance inspection reports detailing federal firearms licensees (FFLs) who have been issued a warning letter or more severe remedy for cited violations of gun laws. We encourage readers to also view that resource, the Gun Store Transparency Project, at www.gunstoretransparency.org. As you read through these findings, keep in mind that many of the 186,000 crime guns in the database are likely associated with one or more crime victim(s) and their families. If this were not staggering enough, the devastating ripple effects gun violence inflicts on families, neighborhoods, and communities are not captured in these numbers. Brady invites you to join us in advocating for solutions that address the supply side of gun violence. We invite researchers to study this data and build on our analysis; we implore journalists to report on not just the tragic results of gun violence incidents, but how crime guns end up in our communities; we urge lawmakers and law enforcement to adopt life-saving, supply-side solutions to gun violence; and we call on federal, state, and local authorities to be more transparent by releasing more trace data to the public. It is long past time for the gun industry as a whole to adopt meaningful supply-side solutions ensuring firearms are transferred safely and responsibility, as it is neither fair nor just to ask the communities suffering the immense harms of gun violence to also bear the burden of providing all the solutions.

Washington, DC: Brady: United Against Gun Violence, 2022. 43p.

Origin of an Insurrection: How Second Amendment Extremism Led to January 6

By Brady: United Against Gun Violence.

In January 2020, Brady advocates planned to take part in an annual Martin Luther King Jr. gun violence prevention advocacy event at the Virginia State Capitol, but state officials cautioned would-be participants that 2020 would be different: Second Amendment extremists were planning to turn out. Out of caution, Brady cancelled its official participation in the event because an estimated 20,000 individuals from across the country, armed with assault-style rifles and wearing tactical gear, descended on the State Capitol in Richmond, VA. It was a deeply troubling moment for members of the gun violence prevention movement, who saw their First Amendment right to speak and assemble quashed by gun-toting extremists. We did not know then that the events of that day were only a dress rehearsal for far worse to come. On January 6, 2021, Congress was set to certify the results of the 2020 election. But extremists, many of them armed, mounted an insurrection with violent force that resulted in death and injury and nearly derailed Congress’ capacity to confirm a president duly elected by the citizens of the United States. For Brady supporters and gun violence prevention advocates, it was both a sickening gut punch and deja vu. Although only one of the four people killed on January 6 was shot, the 2021 attack had the same roots as the 2020 Virginia State Capitol unrest: Second Amendment extremism. Second Amendment extremism arises from what’s commonly known as the “insurrectionist” construction of the Second Amendment: a false interpretation fomented by extremists, marketed by the gun lobby, and adopted by some mainstream politicians, including the 45th President of the United States. Second Amendment extremism lays the foundation for much domestic unrest and weaponized terror throughout American history, including but not limited to the Oklahoma City Bombing, the armed agitation at the Michigan State Capitol, and yes — January 6, 2021. Indeed, investigations and firsthand accounts of January 6 show that many of its agitators were armed, ready, and willing to harm lawmakers. Accordingly, officers on duty at the U.S. Capitol that day had credible reasons to fear that many rioters were armed; a number of these officers have since testified before Congress that those fears hindered their ability to control the insurrectionist mob. Yet the common narrative around January 6 often omits the role of Second Amendment extremism. Ignoring the ways in which guns, and gun mythology, fuel domestic extremism in America has been — and will continue to be — a deadly error. For these reasons, this report sets out to examine the role U.S. gun culture and policy played in laying the foundation for January 6. If we do not spend time reflecting upon our past, we are doomed to repeat it — and that we cannot do, because human lives and bedrock civic principles hang in the balance of this understanding and reckoning. At Brady, we have confronted extremism before, and we know that unless we take action, we will face it again.

Washington, DC: Brady: United Against Gun Violence. 2022. 16p.

Case Closing Report: Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities

By U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

CBP OPR’s Investigative Operations Directorate (IOD) conducts thorough, impartial, and timely investigations into CBP use of force incidents involving death or serious bodily injury and other critical incidents. This review sought to examine the facts and circumstances surrounding this incident (including use of force by CBP personnel); evaluate whether all personnel complied with relevant rules, regulations, and laws; and determine whether any actions could be taken to improve CBP’s performance in similar situations in the future. On May 24, 2022, at 11:33:02 AM (CDT), a lone assailant, , entered Robb Elementary School through an unsecured exterior side door. Upon entering the school, the assailant quickly moved down the hallway and pulled open one of the doors to adjoining Classrooms 111 and 112, both fourth-grade classrooms full of students and their teachers. An internal doorway connected Classroom 111 and Classroom 112. By entering through either classroom door, the assailant had access to both classrooms. Upon entering the classroom, the assailant began firing a semi-automatic rifle at the children and their teachers in both classrooms. Approximately 77 minutes after the assailant entered the classroom, CBP personnel consisting of Border Patrol Agents (BPAs) assigned to the Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC), along with state and local law enforcement officials, entered the classroom and, after an exchange of gunfire, shot and killed the assailant. By the time the incident at Robb Elementary was over, the assailant had killed 19 children and 2 teachers. An additional 16 students, teachers, and law enforcement officers were wounded. A total of 188 CBP personnel, along with law enforcement officers from more than 20 other federal, state, and local agencies, responded or provided support during or following the incident. The incident created immense logistical and tactical challenges that severely tested the resources and capabilities of responding officers and agencies. OPR reached the following conclusions based on this review: Involved CBP personnel at all levels had an inconsistent understanding of their authority to respond to non-federal incidents including active shooter situations. None of the responders whom OPR interviewed could cite a specific authority for being at Robb Elementary School on May 24, 2022. The failure of arriving law enforcement personnel to establish identifiable incident management or command and control protocols led to a disorganized response to the Robb Elementary School shooting. No law enforcement official ever clearly established command at the school during the incident, leading to delays, inaction, and potentially further loss of life. CBP personnel responding to the incident did not establish a command and control framework for their own responding personnel, which resulted in responders taking on tasks on an ad-hoc basis as requested by local law enforcement or at their own initiative.

OPR determined existing CBP training on active shooter response procedures did not adequately prepare responding personnel to deal with this situation. The current training and curriculum did not include the proper application of National Incident Management System (NIMS) or Incident Command System (ICS) protocols and did not prepare them for a number of factors, including the need to address an active shooter behind a locked door. None of the first responders from state, local, or federal law enforcement agencies in a position to take action against the assailant had access to an accurate school layout or knew how to obtain the correct keys to gain access to critical areas of the school. Additionally, none of the first responders from law enforcement agencies had the necessary tools to adequately breach the outwardly opening metal doors to Classrooms 111 and 112. Only one CBP law enforcement officer who arrived on scene had access to a Halligan tool (used for forcibly opening a locked door). CBP personnel established a medical triage area in the hallway of the west building and provided lifesaving care for multiple victims. However, the overall chaotic response caused by the lack of command and control led to the breakdown of adherence to established medical protocols for a mass-casualty incident. This led to some victims with gunshot wounds being inadvertently placed on a school bus without receiving immediate medical treatment. In the immediate aftermath of this incident, numerous investigative agencies, including the Texas Rangers and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), began to independently interview personnel and recover evidence, leading to fragmented crime scene processing and evidence collection. Text messages and other records from cellular devices used by CBP personnel during the incident were not obtained until OPR identified this deficiency and collected most of these materials months following the incident. Coordination with other investigative entities could prevent this oversight in the future. CBP lacked procedures for establishing a centralized point from which to disseminate all information pertaining to the incident. A centralized point of dissemination would have helped to ensure accurate and timely distribution of information while preserving the integrity of ongoing investigations. OPR made the following recommendations based on its review: CBP must ensure its officers, agents, and managers understand and properly work within the confines of their authority. To the extent CBP intends for its personnel to continue to respond to mass violence incidents in a non-federal setting, policy or law must be generated to ensure they have proper authority to do so. All CBP personnel tasked with responding to incidents such as the one at Robb Elementary School should be familiar with NIMS or ICS protocols. CBP should make NIMS or ICS protocols a facet of CBP’s response protocols. CBP’s active shooter training and doctrine should be revised to align with continuously emerging best practices, including lessons learned from this incident. Once the training is revised, all first responders within CBP should receive comprehensive training and the tools necessary to deal with the management of and response to active shooter events. CBP should establish procedures for following medical best practices during critical events and ensure that all CBP personnel are trained to properly assess people requiring medical care, especially because CBP personnel might arrive on scene before emergency medical technicians (EMTs) and paramedics. Responding to critical incidents can overwhelm both an organization’s and individuals’ ability to cope. The mental health needs of first responders must be addressed through comprehensive and universally established protocols. CBP should continue to invest in best practices for responding to critical incidents of all types, including mass violence events, focusing on the healing involved.

Washington, DC: U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 2024. 203p.

Firearm Violence: A Public Health Crisis in America

UNITED STATES. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE. OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL

From the document: "A recent nationally representative survey (n=1,271) found that the majority of U.S. adults or their family members (54%) have experienced a firearm-related incident. Among all respondents, 21% have personally been threatened with a firearm, 19% have a family member who was killed by a firearm (including by suicide), 17% have witnessed someone being shot, 4% have shot a firearm in self-defense, and 4% have been injured by a firearm (Figure 2). 'Nearly 6 in 10 U.S. adults say that they worry 'sometimes,' 'almost every day,' or 'every day,' about a loved one being a victim of firearm violence.' Such high levels of exposure to firearm violence for both children and adults give rise to a cycle of trauma and fear within our communities, contributing to the nation's mental health crisis. This Advisory describes the public health crisis of firearm violence in America and describes strategies for firearm injury and violence prevention, with a focus on the health and well-being of children, families, and communities."

United States. Public Health Service. Office of the Surgeon Genera. . 2024. 49p.

Firearm Storage Behaviors — Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, Eight States, 2021–2022

By Norah W. Friar, Molly Merrill-Francis, Elizabeth M. Parker, Carlos Siordia, Thomas R. Simon

Secure firearm storage might help reduce access by children and other unauthorized users and the related risk for injury or death. Information about state-specific prevalence of firearm storage practices can be used to develop secure storage messages and programs; however, such information is often unavailable. Data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, by respondent characteristics, were used to estimate prevalence of keeping firearms in or around the home and related storage practices for eight states that administered the firearm safety module in 2021 or 2022. Overall, 18.4% (California) to 50.6% (Alaska) of respondents reported that a firearm was kept in or around their home. Among those with a firearm in or around the home, 19.5% (Minnesota) to 43.8% (North Carolina) reported that a firearm was stored loaded. Across all eight states, approximately one half of those with a loaded firearm stored at least one loaded firearm unlocked. Among respondents with a child and a loaded firearm in the home, 25.2% (Ohio) to 41.4% (Alaska) reported that a loaded firearm was stored unlocked. Variability in firearm storage practices highlights the importance of local data and suggests opportunities to tailor prevention efforts to specific population groups to reduce risk for firearm handling by children without adult supervision, and other unauthorized persons.

Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, Vol. 73 / No. 23 , June 13, 2024.

Firearm Homicide Demographics Before and After the COVID-19 Pandemic

By Alex R. Piquero, John K. Roman

In 2020, the US experienced the largest 1-year increase in homicide since 1960. The spike began in the first few months of the year, accelerating during the COVID-19 pandemic, emergency measures, the murder of George Floyd, and social protests.1 Three additional observations are relevant. First, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported that the homicide increase in 2020 was due to firearm injuries. While the overall homicide rate increased 28.4%, the firearm homicide rate increased 34.6%.2 Second, the spike in violence was concentrated within certain demographic groups. CDC researchers found 19 384 victims of firearms homicide in 2020.3 Of those victims, 61% were Black individuals, and they experienced firearm homicide at 14 times the rate of White indviduals in 2020. This racial disparity does not exist for other types of violence.4 Third, the largest increases in death by firearm homicide were for Black men aged between 10 and 44 years old

JAMA Network Open. 2024;7(5):e2412946. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2024.12946

Firearm Violence: A Public Health Crisis in America

By The U.S. Surgeon General

Since 2020, firearm‑related injury has been the leading cause of death for U.S. children and adolescents (ages 1–19), surpassing motor vehicle crashes, cancer, and drug overdose and poisoning (Figure 1). In 2022, 48,204 total people died from f irearm‑related injuries, including suicides, homicides, and unintentional deaths. This is over 8,000 more lives lost than in 2019 and over 16,000 more lives lost than in 2010 .

Washington, DC: Office of the U.S.Surgeon General, 2024. 40p.

Research on a 15-Year Statewide Program to Generate Enhanced Investigative Leads on Crime Gun Violence

By Glenn L. Pierce; David Lambert; Daniel Trovato; and Peter Gagliardi

This study examines the innovative use of firearms related evidence to enhance violent crime investigations in New Jersey. This effort changed the use of firearms forensic evidence from a sole evidential focus to one that also incorporates a premonitory focus required to generate investigative leads. This project demonstrated the critical importance of fusing firearms forensic evidence such as ballistics imaging with locally available information, such as arrest and incident data on a statewide basis. This study further demonstrated the value of ballistics imaging to connect previously unconnected incidents, individuals, and weapons particularly when combined with other law enforcement data sets. This project demonstrated the critical importance of fusing firearms forensic evidence such as ballistics imaging with locally available information, such as arrest and incident data on a statewide basis. This study further demonstrated the value of ballistics imaging to connect, previously unconnected incidents, individuals, and weapons particularly when combined with other law enforcement data sets. It illustrated the critical need of information sharing across forensic, criminal intelligence (such as fusion and real time crime centers), and investigative entities across all levels of government – local, state, and federal - in supporting violent crime suppression efforts. The study is a mixed methods approach to policy analysis using both quantitative and qualitative analysis. The researchers’ analyzed ballistics imaging submissions over a multi-year period in addition to examining open source and agency documents that tracked many of the crime reduction projects the New Jersey State Police incorporated into their crime gun intelligence effort.

Boston: Northeastern University, 2023. 120p.

The Contours of the Gun Industry Impunity: Separation of Powers, Federalism, and the Second Amendment

By Hillel Y. Levin & Timothy D. Lytton

In 2005, Congress passed the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), granting the firearms industry sweeping immunity from civil lawsuits. However, PLCAA immunity is not absolute. This Article demonstrates that both state and federal courts have fundamentally misread PLCAA when adjudicating cases involving the scope of gun industry immunity. Properly understood, PLCAA permits lawsuits against the gun industry so long as they are based on statutory causes of action rather than common law. While broadly preempting state common law claims, PLCAA affords state legislatures autonomy in deciding how to regulate the gun industry within their borders.

Additionally, this Article addresses unresolved questions concerning constitutional limits on gun industry regulation. PLCAA explicitly strikes a balance between three constitutional principles. It safeguards the individual right to keep and bear arms by protecting the gun industry from civil litigation that would unduly curtail civilian access to firearms. It insists that the separation of powers requires that gun industry regulation should derive from legislation not common law adjudication. It affords state governments autonomy in deciding how to regulate the gun industry, recognizing that there are regional differences in attitudes about how to best reduce firearms-related violence. We counsel against interpretations of the Second Amendment’s application to gun industry regulation that would expand the right to keep and bear arms at the expense of other important constitutional principles such as the separation of powers and federalism

75 Florida Law Review 833 (2023),

Washington State Assault Weapon Firearm Violence Before and After Firearm Legislation Reform

By Avneet Bhullar, Jonathan Shipley, […], and Jeffry Nahmias, , et al,

Background

In January of 2019, Washington State (WA) passed Initiative 1639 making it illegal for persons <21 years-old to buy assault weapons (AWs). This study aimed to evaluate the effects of WA-1639 on firearm-related incidents involving AWs by those <21 years-old in WA, hypothesizing a decrease in incidents after WA-1639.

Methods

Retrospective (2016-2021) data on firearm violence (FV) events were gathered from the Gun Violence Archive. The rate of FV was weighted per 100,000 people. Total monthly incidents, injuries, and deaths were compared pre-law (January 2016-December 2018) vs post-law (January 2019-December 2021) implementation. Mann-Whitney U tests and Poisson’s regression were used for analysis.

Results

From 4091 FV incidents (2210 (54.02%) pre-law vs 1881 (45.98%) post-law), 50 involved AWs pre- (2.3%) and 15 (.8%) post-law. Of these, 11 were committed by subjects <21 years-old pre-law and only one occurred post-law. Total incidents of FV (z = −3.80, P < .001), AW incidents (z = −4.28, P < .001), and AW incidents involving someone <21 years-old (z = −3.01, P < .01) decreased post-law. Additionally, regression analysis demonstrated the incident rate ratio (IRR) of all FV (1.23, 95% CI [1.10-1.38], P < .001), all AW FV incidents (3.42, 95% CI [1.70-6.89], P = .001), and AW incidents by subjects <21 years-old (11.53, 95% CI [1.52-87.26], P = .02) were greater pre-law vs post-law.

Discussion

Following implementation of WA-1639, there was a significant decrease in FV incidents and those involving AWs by individuals <21 years-old. This suggests targeted firearm legislation may help curtail FV. Further studies evaluating FV after legislation implementation in other states is needed to confirm these findings.

The American SurgeonTM. 2024;0(0). doi:10.1177/00031348241244644 (Online First)

Out of Control:  The Trafficking of Improvised Explosive Device Components and Commercial Explosives in West Africa

By David Lochhead, Tidiani Diakité, Roberto Sollazzo, Saikou Sow, Raoul Sumo Tayo, Leonard Tettey

The use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in West Africa expanded dramatically between 2014 and 2022. As of 2022, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria were heavily affected by these weapons, while Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo suffered from their use as an emerging threat. IED-building networks have established material and training links across conflict theatres in West and Central Africa, including the Lake Chad Basin, where armed groups have used IEDs extensively. IED designs have remained constant and inexpensive throughout the West Africa region, making them attractive for use in attacks against domestic and international security forces, UN peacekeepers, and civilians. The Small Arms Survey collected data on more than 2,200 IED-related incidents between March 2013 and September 2022, including the type, date, and location of these events. Information on perpetrators, their targets, and more than 6,600 casualties from deaths and injuries was also collected (Small Arms Survey, 2022). The data was collected through research undertaken in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Niger, as well as desk research and remote interviews concerning Benin, Chad, and Nigeria. Where relevant from a comparative perspective, discussion of other regions that have countries with IED incidents or components occurs throughout the Report, such as those in North Africa, Central Africa, East Africa, and the Middle East. Most IED incidents analysed during this study involved IEDs containing explosive components or precursors specifically manufactured for the commercial extractive and construction sectors. Chemical products such as ammonium nitrate (AN), manufactured and supplied for bulk mining explosive emulsions, have entered IED-building networks, and are sourced principally from Ghana and Nigeria. Commercial explosives in bulk, including their precursors and accessories such as electric initiators and detonating cords, are diverted from the legal to illicit markets. This diversion primarily fulfils demand from the largely unregulated artisanal gold mining sector across West and Central Africa. A small subset of this diverted material also provisions IED construction. Captured, stolen, and recovered explosive ordnance—including legacy anti-vehicle mines trafficked from Chad, Libya, and possibly Sudan—also constitutes a source of IED components. Coordinated action among affected, source, and transit states is required to prevent armed groups and criminals from accessing commercial explosive materials and other IED components. Such action can involve: national stocktaking exercises; the development of national and regional counter-IED (C-IED) strategies; monitoring, information-sharing, and coordination mechanisms; regulatory modernization and harmonization;  engagement with artisanal mining associations, the mining and explosives industry, states, and regional trade blocs in pursuit of regulatory reform; and efforts to establish minimum standards for bulk and individual traceability of commercial explosives. Reducing the recovery of explosive ordnance requires renewed programmatic investment in clearing minefields and explosive remnants of war across the Sahe   

Geneva, SWIT:  Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies , 2023.  124p.

Preventing explosions: taking stock of weapon stockpiles in the ECCAS and SADC regions

By Nelson Alusala

This policy brief reviews the state of physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) in Central and Southern Africa as at 2022. Africa’s most progressive legally binding instruments for controlling small arms and light weapons can be found in these regions. The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Convention became legal in 2017 and the Southern African Development Community Protocol was revised in 2020. However, compliance with these instruments requires commitment from all stakeholders, including civil society. Key findings ∙ The region’s long-term stability depends on good principles of physical security and stockpile management (PSSM). Until ECCAS members enforce policy and implement steps to improve the PSSM of arms and ammunition in government possession, leakage and diversion to non-state actors will continue undeterred. ∙ Implementation should be next. The Kinshasa Convention, like the Arms Trade Treaty and UN Agenda 2030, are considered some of the latest instruments on disarmament, human security and development. The review of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Firearms Protocol in 2020 aligned the SADC region with the latest developments, and the African Union (AU) vision for silencing the guns by 2030. ∙ A review of other regional instruments is required. This is vital, especially for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and other Related Materials, and the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States.

ENACT Africa, 2022. 11p.

Preventing explosions: taking stock of weapon stockpiles in West Africa and the Sahel

By Nelson Alusala

Without effective security and stockpile management systems, the wave of political instability in the two regions is likely to endure.

This policy brief reviews the state of the physical state of security and stockpile management (PSSM) in West Africa and the Sahel as at 2022. Through desk research and policymaker interviews, it explores key policies and practices. It questions whether governments struggle to maintain their arms and ammunition because they bite off too much, encounter unforeseen consequences that lead to the exposure and diversion of weaponry, or are just negligent. Regardless, loss of life and the destruction of property continue unabated as criminals, violent extremists and other non-state actors take advantage of the armouries’ sub-standard security.

Key findings ∙ The region (West Africa and the Sahel) implemented several PSSM measures from 2011 to 2020; and the African Union (AU) decided in December 2020 to extend the Silencing the Guns initiative until 2030. ∙ Interventions in the region were not harmonised and were short-lived, making their impact difficult to quantify. Most initiatives were programmes and capacity-building training rather than disarmament and/or practical steps to secure the safety and security of national stockpiles. ∙ The movement of people between countries oblivious of borders is a tradition linked to pastoralism and transhumance. However, the corridor proclaimed for this purpose has been subsumed by human settlement, leading to herder-farmer conflicts that have exacerbated the demand for illegal arms. These have put excess pressure on national stockpiles.

ENACT Africa, 2020. 12p,

Motorbikes and Armed Groups in the Sahel: Anatomy of a regional market

By Eleanor Beavor

This report examines how motorbikes are drivers of both stability and instability in the Sahel region of West Africa. Specifically, it examines how variants of motorbike crime contribute to destabilization at a local economic level and in the broader Sahelian conflict. In that regard, the practices of both motorbike theft and motorbike trafficking are examined. The involvement of the Sahel’s armed groups in trafficking is closely explored, and it is argued that motorbike trafficking is critical to the operations and mobility of Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State Sahel (IS Sahel). It is difficult to overstate the importance of motorbikes to the daily life of residents of the Sahel region.1 Motorbikes are an essential means of transport in both urban and rural settings in these three countries, and the lynchpin of many local economies. This is because they represent the cheapest, and often most reliable, means of transport for citizens who cannot or do not want to rely on public transport, or who cannot afford a car. They have very often replaced donkey carts, camels or bicycles as forms of transport, and have become a staple in business and family life in the Sahel.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , 2023. 37p.

Mass shootings, fatality thresholds and defining by numbers: Political and social consequences

By Sarah Watson

Mass sho are otingsone example of a focusing event that has particular significance for firearms legislation. Mass shootings shock, disturb and provoke enormous and controversial debate, often causing significant public and media resonance, becoming the subject of intense discussion politically. At times providing an impetus for legislative amendments, often in distinct ways that routine gun violence does not. If certain events highlight the need for reform, policy change becomes more likely. Cases with the lowest number of victims are likely to generate the least amount of attention and are most likely to be missed in data collection, rendering them the least noteworthy, least important in terms of lethality and social and political consequence. Various problems come to the attention of people in and around government, necessitating an understanding of why such problems occupy officials’ attention and appear to be more ‘deserved>

Criminology & Criminal JusticeOnlineFirst, July 19, 2022

Arms Trafficking

Edited by Gian Ege, Christian Schwarzenegger and Monika Stempkowski

Trafficking in arms and weapons material is, perhaps, one of the most notorious forms of organised crime. Fuelled by both the movie industry as well as real world examples, criminal organisations are widely believed to engage in the trafficking of firearms and weapons material, including nuclear material. This illicit trade is further facilitated by corruption and other forms of collusion with government entities as well as by links between the criminal elements and the arms industry. As part of a joint teaching programme on transnational organised crime, students from the Universities of Queensland, Vienna and Zurich researched the topic of arms trafficking in a year-long course. Some of their academic papers are compiled in this volume, addressing topics ranging from international and national legal frameworks to levels and characteristics of this phenomenon in selected places, and enforcement and industry measures adopted to prevent and suppress this illicit trade.

Berllin: Carl Grossman Verlag, 2022. 300p.

Under The Gun: Weapons, Crime, and Violence in America

By James D. Wright, Peter H. Rossi, Kathleen Daly with the assistance of Eleanor Weber-Burdin

FRON THE JACKET: “The United States is one of the most heavily armed private populations in world history; one-half the households in the country possess at least one firearm, and the total number of firearms in private hands is well over 100 million. The rates of criminal violence in the United States are among the highest in the world. What, if anything, is the relationship between these facts? UNDER THE GUN provides -for the first time a comprehensive review and analysis of both the published and the unpublished literature on weapons, crime, and violence in the U.S.

Each chapter explores the issues and trends which have been widely debated over the years. Some of the topics covered include: the number of guns in private hands, recent upward trends in firearms sales, demographic characteristics of gun owners, uses of guns in self-defense, patterns of violent crimes committed in the U.S., characteristics of weapons used in crimes, public opinion on gun control issues, and the effectiveness of gun control laws.”

"Wright/Rossi/Daly bring balanced judgment, the best data available, and careful analysis to each issue. They outline an agenda for research which is sensi ble and critical to the matters at hand. The book is more than 'state of the art.' It separates data from inference, logic from value-based argument, and identifies the sorts of issues which cannot be settled by empirical inquiry..” — James Short.

NY. Aldine Publishing Company. 1983. 350p.

U.S. And Chinese Military AI Purchases: An Assessment of Military Procurement Data Between April and November 2020

By Konaev, Margarita; Fedasiuk, Ryan; Corrigan, Jack; Lu, Ellen; Stephenson, Alex; Toner, Helen; Gelles, Rebecca.

From the webpage: "This data brief uses procurement records published by the U.S. Department of Defense and China's People's Liberation Army between April and November of 2020 to assess, and, where appropriate, compare what each military is buying when it comes to artificial intelligence. We find that the two militaries are prioritizing similar application areas, especially intelligent and autonomous vehicles and AI applications for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance."

Georgetown University. Walsh School Of Foreign Service. Center For Security And Emerging Technology. 2023.

Reducing Violent Crime: A Dialogue on Handguns and Assault-Style Firearms. Engagement Summary Report

By Public Safety Canada

Public Safety Canada (“Public Safety”) launched an engagement process in October 2018 to help inform policy, regulations and legislation to reduce violent crime involving firearms. Through this engagement, Public Safety sought to engage and hear from a wide range of stakeholders, which included those both in support of and opposed to limiting access to handguns and assault-style firearms. While the engagement was framed by the examination of a potential ban, the discussion explored several potential measures to reduce violent crime. The engagement process included a series of eight in-person roundtables, an online questionnaire, a written submission process, and bilateral meetings with a range of stakeholders. Given the diversity of perspectives on this issue, this report highlights key common themes and ideas shared by participants, as well as unique and divergent views. The goal of this report is to accurately represent “what we heard” on this issue. Overall Key Findings  There are polarized views on a potential ban and limiting access: Overall, participants were strongly polarized on the issue of banning handguns and assault-style firearms. The stakeholder views expressed in two of the engagement channels - the in-person dialogues and written submissions - provided a variety of perspectives both opposed to and in support of a ban. In contrast, most questionnaire respondents (representing a self-selected group of Canadians) were opposed to a ban.  Target crime and focus on enforcement: Many participants felt strongly that a ban would target law-abiding owners, rather than illicit firearms, and would not greatly impact crime reduction (particularly gang violence). As a result, many called for enhanced enforcement capacity for law enforcement and border services, as well as harsher punishments for firearms trafficking and gun-related crime.  Address underlying causes of firearm violence: One point of consensus among the diverse perspectives is the need to address the socioeconomic conditions that can lead to gun violence, which requires more support for community-level programs and initiatives. These factors include poverty, a lack of education or employment opportunities, lack of mental health supports and social exclusion.  Collect and share relevant data on gun crime: There is a need to improve the ongoing collection and sharing of data on gun crime, particularly in terms of sources of illicit firearms and the types of crime being committed. It was expressed that data is critical for supporting law enforcement and border agencies efforts, as well as informing policy and legislation.  Willingness for collaboration with the firearms community/industry: Many stakeholders representing various aspects of the firearms community want the opportunity to be more engaged and to collaborate with the federal government to develop solutions on this issue.  Need a multi-faceted approach: A wide range of approaches and ideas were discussed, which suggests that a multifaceted approach is needed to address this issue – rather than implementing a ban in isolation.

Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2023. 34p.

Association of Firearm Access, Use, and Victimization During Adolescence

By Linda A Teplin, Nicholas S Meyerson, Jessica A Jakubowski, David A Aaby, Nanzi Zheng 1, Karen M Abram, Leah J Welty

In adulthood, 41.3% of males and 10.5% of females perpetrated firearm violence. Depending on the type of behavior during adolescence, between 44% and 67% of participants who had been involved with firearms before age 18 years perpetrated firearm violence as adults. All but 1 type of involvement before age 18 years was associated with firearm perpetration in adulthood . Notably, participants who had owned a firearm during adolescence had 9.0 (95% CI, 4.5-18.2; P < .001) times the odds of perpetrating firearm violence in adulthood. Victimization was also significant: adolescents who had been threatened with a weapon or injured by gunshot had 3.1 (95% CI, 2.0-4.9; P < .001) and 2.4 (95% CI, 1.2-4.9; P = .01) times the odds of perpetrating firearm violence in adulthood, respectively.

JAMA Network Open. 2021;4(2):e2034208. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.34208