By Alex Nowraster

A total of 298 mass shooters were responsible for 1,733 murders and 2,459 people injured in the United States from 1966 through the end of 2024. Over the 59 years studied here, the chance of being murdered by a mass shooter was about 1 in 9.1 million per year, and the annual chance of being injured was about 1 in 6.4 million. The murder victims of mass shooters account for about 0.15 percent of all homicides from 1966 through the end of 2024, but that percentage has risen in recent years. The deadliest year for mass shootings was 2017, when 14 shooters murdered 130 people and injured 959 others, accounting for 0.7 percent of all homicides in that year. Of those 298 shooters, 255 were native-born and 43 were foreign-born. The chance of being murdered in a mass shooting committed by a native-born American was about 1 in 10.5 million per year, about 6.5 times higher than the chance of being killed by a foreign-born mass shooter, which was about 1 in 68.4 million per year. The annual chance of being injured by a foreign-born mass shooter was about 1 in 94.7 million, and the chance of being injured by a native-born shooter was about 1 in 6.9 million per year. About 14.4 percent of mass shooters were foreign born, and they were responsible for 13.3 percent of murders, roughly in line with their share of the population, and 6.8 percent of injuries in mass shootings, roughly half their share of the population.

Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2025. 10p.

By Jacob D. Charles

Gun violence is a pressing national concern. And it has been for decades. Throughout nearly all that time, the primary tool lawmakers have deployed to stanch the violence has been the machinery of the criminal law. Increased policing, intrusive surveillance, vigorous prosecution, and punitive penalties are showered on gun offenders. This Article spotlights and specifies this approach—what it calls “firearms carceralism”—and details how a decades-long bipartisan consensus generated a set of state-centered solutions to gun violence that has not meaningfully impacted the problem. Instead, those policies have exacerbated racial inequity and compounded civic and community harms. The Article traces the escalating punitive measures imposed on gun offenders over the past half century. It first peers down into one microcosmic exemplar of firearms carceralism etched into federal mandatory minimum provisions and Supreme Court case law magnifying those penalties. It describes how criminal justice reforms have traditionally excluded those whose offenses are categorized as violent, and specifically and emphatically 2812 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [108:2811 those who offend with guns by their side. It then draws out promising hints of a path to including gun offenders in efforts to reform or reimagine the criminal legal system. Most fundamentally, however, the Article wages a sustained critique of the system of firearms carceralism that fronts aggressive law enforcement and draconian terms of incarceration. It describes the unjustifiable breadth and depth of these practices and the harmful, racialized, and exclusionary values they simultaneously draw from and reinscribe. Finally, the Article argues in favor of three alternative paths to equitable peace and safety. First, it outlines private sector steps to, for example, dampen illicit firearms supply. Second, it highlights civil legal interventions like red flag laws and tort lawsuits against irresponsible gun sellers. Third, and most prominently, it underscores the promise of community violence intervention and restorative justice programs to bring meaningful safety apart from the carceral tools of coercive control.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [108:2811), 2024.

By Paul M. Reeping, Hannah S. Laqueur & Rose M. C. Kagawa

To date, there have been no peer-reviewed studies in the United States estimating the impact of gun-free zone policies in alcohol-serving establishments on rates of firearm violence in and around such establishments. In this study, we utilized a cross-sectional design to estimate the impact of Texas’s 51% alcohol law, which prohibits the carrying of firearms in establishments that generate over half of their revenue from alcohol sales. The analysis focused on the difference in shooting incidents in and around establishments with and without firearm carrying prohibitions in 2021 and 2022. After adjusting for establishment type (bar/restaurant), alcohol sales volume, census tract level demographic factors, and the number of nearby restaurants and bars, results indicated that gun-prohibiting bars experienced significantly fewer shootings compared to those that allowed guns. Specifically, establishments that were gun-prohibited had 37% fewer shootings within 50 m than those that were gun-allowing, with a 95% confidence interval ranging from 60% fewer to 0.2% fewer. This association was more prominent in bars than in restaurants. The protective association with gun-prohibited status diminished with increased distance from the establishments; results were not significant at 100 m. Our study findings align with research suggesting that gun-free zones can reduce firearm violence. However, future studies using quasi-experimental designs that can better support causal inference are needed to support such a conclusion, as are studies exploring the efficacy of such policies in various settings and over longer periods.

Texas. J Urban Health, 2024, 9p.

By Dru Stevenson

Firearm policy in the United States is subject to longstanding political gridlock. Up to now, most of the legal academic literature has focused on the constitutionality of various—or any—regulations regarding firearm possession, sales, or usage. This article inverts the problem and proposes a system for voluntary registration and certification of nonowners, those who want to waive or renounce their Second Amendment rights as a matter of personal conviction. The proposed system is analogous to both the registration of conscientious objectors during wartime conscriptions, and the newer suicide prevention laws whereby individuals can add their names to a do-not-sell list for firearm dealers—though the proposal made here is broader and more permanent. Voluntary registration, with official certification, would serve three important purposes. First, this would help create social identification markers for the gunless-by-choice movement, something that historically has been missing; formal signals and labels of identification with a movement are necessary for a movement’s success, especially with prohibition or abstinence movements. Second, registration and certification as gunless would be a personal moral commitment marker; all societies provide ways for solemnizing one’s vows and solidifying one’s resolve on serious, lifelong moral decisions. Third, certification allows for a market signaling effect, providing useful information that can trigger a beneficial response from the private sector; market responses, in turn, provide useful information about otherwise hotly-debated beliefs, such as whether guns in fact enhance or reduce safety for individuals and public places. This article develops each of these points and offers a unique and simple regulatory and statutory alternative for a new system of registration and certification.

86 Brook. L. Rev. (2021).

By C4ADS

Executive Summary

Gun violence in Guatemala is fueled by the licit import of handguns. Once weapons have entered Guatemala, illicit actors have greater opportunity to divert these firearms from their intended use and users, instead wielding them to pursue crime and perpetrate violence.

This report uses seizure data and supply chain analysis to assess how the international flow of weapons into Guatemala is vulnerable to diversion, or the rerouting of licitly transferred conventional arms from their intended recipient or use.

This analysis reveals:

Handguns are the predominant weapon type used in violent crime in Guatemala. Many of the seized handguns are produced by major international weapons manufacturers such as Glock, Israeli Weapons Industries (IWI), Taurus, and Beretta.

Diversion pathways in-country appear among private citizens, commercial, andgovernment actors, presenting opportunities for illicit actors to acquire licit firearms.

Handguns, predominantly those made by top manufacturers, continue to flow into Guatemala.

These weapons are most often manufactured in the U.S., Brazil, and Turkey.

Manufacturers or entities within the manufacturer’s corporate network account for most handgun exports to Guatemala.

Handguns entering Guatemala primarily do so via air. They often transit through third countries and/or third parties, complicating due diligence and creating greater opportunity for diversion.

The U.S., Canada, and Germany are the most common transit countries for Guatemalan handgun imports.

U.S. gun stores are the most common non-manufacturer exporters of handguns to Guatemala.

The majority of Guatemalan importers are not end-users, but retailers that sell to both government and civilian consumers.

This report uses cases of weapons seizure and diversion to explore each of these findings. Using new data, we re-examine a case of Israeli arms that were sold in Guatemala in exchange for weapons later diverted to paramilitary forces in Colombia.

These findings illuminate areas where Guatemalan and international stakeholders can do more to counter the diversion of firearms in Guatemala. To this end, the report makes targeted recommendations for closing gaps in current legislation and enforcement.

Washington, DC: C4ADS2025. 24p.

By Richard Stansfield, Daniel Semenza, Jie Xu, Elizabeth Griffiths

This study uses a combination of tract-level and street network-level analyses to exam-ine: (1) the overall association between federally licensed firearm dealers (FFLs) and homicides, (2) the relation-ship between dealers with serious violations (such as selling to prohibited buyers or failing to record sales)and homicide, and (3) whether the dealer–homicideassociation is moderated by community disadvantage.Results replicate and confirm a relationship between dealers and homicides in disadvantaged neighborhoods.Importantly, however, we also find that proximity to non compliant dealers specifically elevates the risk of lethal violence.Policy implications: We detail how a coordinated effort between federal, state, and local agencies to reg-ulate firearm dealers and ensure that legal compliance can be instrumental in reducing gun violence. There Is a clear need for increased oversight of gun dealers and more robust policies that hold negligent dealers accountable, including the necessary funding and regu-latory manpower to enable regular auditing and support consistent follow-up for noncompliant dealers. A com-prehensive policy framework that supports supply-side gun violence reduction should include additions to state-level laws that require record keeping, videotap-ing and store security, and regular inspection for firearm dealers.

Criminology & Public Policy, 22, 323–345.

By Rocco Pallin, Amanda J. Aubel, Christopher E. Knoepke, Veronica A. Pear, Garen J. Wintemute & Nicole Kravitz-Wirtz

Background

Following the 2018 mass shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida, there was a dramatic increase in media coverage of extreme risk protection orders (ERPOs) and in state policy proposals for ERPO laws. This study documents the frequency of news coverage of ERPOs throughout 2018 and examines the narratives used by media outlets to describe this risk-based firearm policy.

Methods

Using a mixed-method descriptive design, we examine the frequency of national news media coverage of ERPO legislation in 2018, before and after the Parkland shooting, and analyze the content of news articles related to a sample of states that considered ERPO legislation after the shooting.

Results

We find a sharp increase in the frequency of articles related to ERPOs following the Parkland shooting and smaller increases in coverage surrounding ERPO policy proposals and other public mass shootings that year. Nearly three-quarters of articles in our content analysis mentioned the Parkland shooting. The news media often mentioned or quoted politicians compared to other stakeholders, infrequently specified uses for ERPOs (e.g., prevention of mass violence, suicide, or other violence), and rarely included evidence on effectiveness of such policies. More than one-quarter of articles mentioned a mass shooting perpetrator by name, and one-third of articles used the term “gun control.”

Conclusions

This study describes the emerging public discourse, as informed by media messaging and framing, on ERPOs as states continue to debate and implement these risk-based firearm violence prevention policies.

BMC Public Health 21, 1986 (2021), 13p.

By Elizabeth B. Klerman, Mahmoud Affouf, Rebecca Robbins, Jay M. Iyer|| , Cornelia Griggs, Peter T. Masiakos, Chana A. Sacks

Developing interventions to prevent firearm-related violence and to address its consequences requires an improved understanding of when these violent events are most likely to occur. We explored gunshot events in 6 of the most populated cities in the United States by time of day, day of week, holiday/ non-holiday, and month using publicly available datasets. In some of these cities, gunshot events occurred most often at nighttime, on holidays and weekends, and during summer months, with significant interaction effects. There were also time-related changes in characteristics of the victims. Primary prevention efforts aimed at curbing firearm-related violence should consider these differential risks.

J Biol Rhythms. 2024 February ; 39(1): 100–108.

By Center for Neighborhood Engaged Research & Science (Corners)

Gun violence is an urgent, but often overlooked, issue in Latino1 communities. With hundreds of Latinos shot and killed every year2, it is important to understand the unique forces that drive violence in Latino communities. This brief provides a descriptive overview of Latino gun violence victimization in Chicago. While most analysis in this brief is done at the city scale, we acknowledge that Latino communities in Chicago are diverse and that community violence intervention organizations who work in these communities employ different approaches that are responsive to their hyper-local context. We examine definitions, demographics, and gun violence networks before concluding with a summary of a convening of practitioners, leaders, and researchers in December 2022.

Chicago: CORNERS, 2022. 9p.'

By Amnesty International

A wide variety of electric shock devices are specifically designed for and marketed to law enforcement. These range from electric shock stun guns, batons and shields, and body-worn electric shock devices which deliver electric shocks through direct contact with the body; to projectile electric shock weapons (PESWs) which can be fired from a distance. Despite the clear human rights risks associated with this equipment, there are no global regulations controlling what type of electric shock law enforcement equipment is permitted to be manufactured and used, or where equipment which can have a legitimate role in law enforcement can be traded. There is an urgent need for legally-binding, global regulations – a Torture-Free Trade Treaty - which prohibits the production of and trade in inherently cruel, inhuman and degrading devices, such as direct contact electric shock equipment, and strictly controls the trade in PESWs to law enforcement agencies to ensure

London: Amnesty International, 2025. 72p..  

By ENACT Africa

  Summary Armed groups’ involvement in illegal mining in Nigeria has exacerbated arms smuggling, consequently increasing insecurity and violent conflict in the country and across the Sahel. It’s also seen a rise in the kidnapping of women and girls for forced labour in the mines. Governments must deal with the socio-economic and political factors that sustain banditry in Nigeria’s North West Region, the involvement of armed groups in illegal mining and the transnational dimensions of the crime. Key points • Armed groups engage in illegal mining due to corruption by state actors and community members, as well as poverty and a lack of opportunities. • Inconsistencies in Nigeria’s mining sector regulations, specifically between the Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act, 2007, and the Land Use Act, 2004, exacerbate the problem. • Armed groups’ control of mining areas undermines government legitimacy and stability. • Militarisation has been unproductive and security forces are compromised by corruption. • Illegal mining fuels security problems and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. • The transnational criminal market for illegally mined gold extends to Chad, India, Lebanon, Niger and the United Arab Emirates. • The use of girls in mining violates international labour laws.

ENACT Africa, 2024. 24p.

By Jillian Peterson; Gina Erickson; Kyle Knapp; and James Densley

Understanding the motivation of a mass shooter’s intent to do harm can help practitioners and policy makers develop more effective intervention strategies. OBJECTIVE To examine the prevalence of communication of intent to do harm, known as leakage, in a sample of 170 mass public shooters from 1966 to 2019; the characteristics of perpetrators who do and do not leak their plans; and whether leakage is a form of fame-seeking behavior or a cry for help among individuals who are in crisis or suicidal. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS This cross-sectional study included perpetrators who killed 4 or more people in a public space from 1996 to 2019 and were included in a comprehensive database of US mass shootings. That database was built from August 2017 to December 2019, and analysis took place from January to May 2021. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES Leakage was identified and coded using publicly available records. Any communication to a third party of an intent to do harm prior to the shooting was coded as leakage. Logistic regression models were used to examine the risk factors associated with leakage. Models estimating leakage were examined to assess the 2 hypothesized pathways to leakage (the cry-for-help model and the fame-seeking model). RESULTS The 170 participants in this sample included 166 (97.7%) male perpetrators and 3 (2.3%) female perpetrators, with a mean (SD) age of 34 (12) years. Overall, 161 participants had known race and ethnicity: 11 (6.8%) Asian individuals, 35 (21.7%) Black individuals, 14 (8.7%) Latinx individuals, 7 (4.4%) Middle Eastern individuals, 3 (1.9%) Native American individuals, 89 (55.3%) White individuals, and 2 (1.2%) individuals with other race and ethnicity. Overall, 79 mass shooters (46.5%) leaked their plans. Of perpetrators who leaked their plans, 35 (44.3%) leaked specific plans about a mass shooting, and 44 (55.1%) leaked nonspecific plans about generalized violence. The study findings indicate that leakage was associated with receiving counseling (odds ratio, 7.0; 95% CI, 2.0-24.8) and suicidality (odds ratio, 3.7; 95% CI, 1.0-13.6), suggesting that leakage may best be characterized as a cry for help from perpetrators prior to their act.  

JAMA Netw Open. 2021;4(11):e2133073. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2021.33073

By Leslie M. Barnard; Erin Wright-Kelly; Ashley Brooks-Russell; et al

  Mass shootings (MS) account for less than 1% of firearm deaths in the US, but the frequency has increased.1 Risk factors for MS perpetration include societal discrimination, contagion effects, firearm access, mental illness, and substance abuse.2 Previous geographically and analytically limited studies found MS with handguns had higher fatality rates than those with rifles,3 and following an age-based assault weapons (AWs) restriction there was a reduction in firearm violence from AWs.4 Another study found that the 1994 federal AWs ban was associated with fewer MS.5 To further investigate the association between type of firearm and lethality of MS, this study examined what firearms were present at publicly targeted fatal MS and determined if AWs were associated with a higher number of injuries or deaths.

JAMA Netw Open. 2025;8(2):e2458085. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2024.58085 4p.

By Zachary Porreca

I demonstrate the linkage between gentrification and gun violence. As the underlying mechanism, I focus on gentrification's displacement effect on local drug markets. Using two-way fixed effects differences-in-differences estimators, I show the gentrification of one block increases violence across the surrounding neighborhood. I find that some 2,400 (8%) of Philadelphia's shootings between the years 2011 and 2020 can be attributed to spillover effects from the gentrification of drug blocks. This effect is nearly ten times stronger than that observed on blocks without high levels of drug crime. This study also contributes a new empirical measurement of gentrification drawn primarily from property sales, along with building, zoning, and alteration permit issuance and utilizes a novel nearest-neighbor network approach to identify spatial spillover effects.

Unpublished Paper, 2021, 53p.

By Annelies Pauwels and Merlina Herbach

This policy brief examines the methods of firearms acquisition by right-wing extremists (RWEs) in Europe between 2019 and 2024. Based on a dataset of 118 cases, it reveals that RWEs resort to diverse legal and illegal acquisition strategies, including the use of illicit markets, legal possession, theft from military and law enforcement sources, and private manufacture, particularly 3D printing. The policy brief further discusses current EU countermeasures and their effectiveness in addressing RWE-specific acquisition methods. It identifies gaps in existing policies and enforcement, particularly regarding background checks in issuing and reviewing weapon licences, screening of military and law enforcement personnel, and regulation of emerging technologies like 3D printing. The authors call for further research to increase the understanding of the RWE-firearms nexus and to develop more targeted prevention strategies.

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), 2024, 30p.

By:Robin Joy and Monica Weeber

Domestic violence is a national and Vermont public health crisis. The Vermont Department of Health estimates that up to 16% of adult Vermonters have experienced either fear, control, or violence at the hands of an intimate partner. In Vermont, a victim may seek a Relief from Abuse Order (RFA) in the Family Division of Superior Court. As part of the process, the victim may also request that a defendant relinquish their firearms. This study examines general case processing statistics for RFAs, how often firearm relinquishment is requested, and if granted, who is the designated holder of the weapons. The report also documents the processes related to serving orders and storing and returning weapons. Methods Researchers worked with the Vermont Judiciary to create an extract of RFA cases to answer quantitative questions. They also conducted interviews with court personnel, police officers, and licensed firearms dealers. Findings • Bennington County has the highest rate of disposed RFA dockets per 1,000 of the population. Chittenden County has the lowest. • Seventy percent of denied temporary orders are not pursued to final orders. • Fifty-eight percent of all requested temporary orders are granted. • Most RFAs (59%) are between parties who are current or former household members. • Women are overrepresented as plaintiffs (74%) as compared to the general population. Men are overrepresented as defendants (75.8%). • The Judiciary does not record in the case management system whether a request to relinquish was made by the plaintiff. • The rate of relinquishment orders mirrors the estimated firearm ownership rates. • Essex and Orange Counties had the highest rate of firearm relinquishment orders. • Bennington and Rutland Counties has the lowest rate of firearm relinquishment orders. • Temporary RFAs with a relinquishment order are more likely to continue to a final hearing. Recommendations This is the first report on RFA and firearm relinquishment data in Vermont and the first report outlining the relinquishment and storage process. Based on the information CRG has developed suggestions for practice, policy, and further research 

Montpelier, VT: Crime Research Group, 2024. 22p.

By Thomas Wojciechowski

This study sought to examine the relationship between neighborhood disorder and perceptions of gun access. Further, this study focused on determining whether or not antisocial peer affiliation mediates this relationship.MethodsThe Pathways to Desistance data were analyzed. This is an 11-wave longitudinal study following 1,354 justice-involved youth across seven years post-adjudication. Generalized structural equation modeling was used to assess direct and indirect relationships of interest.ResultsGreater levels of neighborhood disorder were associated with increased perceptions of access to guns in the community. Affiliation with antisocial peers significantly mediated this relationship, accounting for about 15% of this relationship.ConclusionsAffiliation with antisocial peers may be greater in disordered neighborhoods and they may facilitate access to guns for youth living in such communities. Mentoring programs for youth living in disordered communities may have some capacity for attenuating this relationship.

Published in Injury, 2024 Aug;55(8):111701, 20p. 

By  Michael Osman, Monika Roszkowska, Murat Yildiz, Robert Muggah, et al.

Several Caribbean countries are registering an intensification of organized crime and rising incidence of lethal violence. A combination of risk factors including surging drug production in South America, the proliferation and competition of transnational and local gangs, and high availability and use of firearms have contributed to soaring homicide rates. Countries such as Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago currently register among the highest murder rates globally. Faced with exceedingly high levels of collective and interpersonal violence, some Caribbean governments, for example that of Jamaica have declared states of emergencies to fight violent crime while simultaneously ramping up regional efforts to curb the trafficking of firearms and ammunition. There is a growing consensus among the heads of government of CARICOM countries that the crime and violence situation could deteriorate further still. The perpetrators of collective violence in the Caribbean vary, though most are connected to a diverse array of criminal markets across the region. The determination of what constitutes  a “gang ” differs across the Caribbean. The capacity of these groups vary: there is no dominant configuration of criminal groups and criminal relationships across all locations in the region. Highly organized criminal networks and street gangs are involved in multiple transnational criminal markets spanning South and Central America, North America, and Western Europe. Larger, more sophisticated gangs alternately collude and compete with state actors and a host of non-state intermediaries to procure firearms and transport, transship, and traffic in cocaine, cannabis, and to a lesser extent heroin and amphetamines. For the most part, smaller street gangs are more domestically oriented; some are politically connected and secure government contracts to provide resources and services that are historically underserved by the state. In addition to providing social welfare, these organizations often impose protection rackets within the areas they operate. These protection rackets allow these neighborhood gangs to engage in criminal activities ranging from selling drugs, trafficking in firearms, human smuggling, and contract killing to managing lottery scams, extortion, and racketeering. A small number of the region’s gangs are more organized and have expanded their criminal networks to facilitate transnational crimes,   including the transportation and protection of drug shipments as well as firearms trafficking, human smuggling, and cyber-related crimes. In larger countries in the Caribbean such as Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, aggressive state-led anti-gang measures have accelerated the fragmentation or “splintering” of gangs, further heightening inter- and intra-factional violence and demand for firearms and ammunition. While the overall number and membership of Caribbean gangs appears to have expanded, a relatively small number of them are involved in transnational trafficking of drugs, firearms, and other contraband. Only a handful of the hundreds of gangs active in countries such as Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago appear to be directly implicated in cross-border crimes such as the trafficking of cocaine and cannabis or smuggling of weapons. In many cases, well-connected gang leaders, including former inmates of US prisons, facilitate shipments by leveraging their networks from Colombia and Venezuela to North America and Western Europe. Meanwhile, local gang members may be subcontracted for “protecting” transshipment of drugs, sourcing firearms abroad (primarily from the US), and organizing local distribution and retail. However, most gangs in the Caribbean  are inward-facing and connected to local political economies ranging from disrupting elections and securing government contracts to local drug dealing, prostitution, scams, and extortion. Rather than facilitate international drug shipments or human trafficking rings, gangs throughout the region are typically parochial and focused instead on protecting their territory. (continued)

Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 62p.

By The UNODC Global Programme on Criminal Network Disruption and the Global Maritime Crime Programme (Border Management Branch).

The Republic of Yemen has been embroiled in a violent conflict since September 2014 when Houthi forces took military control of the capital city Sana’a and displaced the government of interim President Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Yemen’s protracted conflict has claimed at least 377.000 lives, most of them civilians, and plunged Yemen, already the poorest country of the Arabian Peninsula, into a complex humanitarian catastrophe. The Houthis, who call themselves Ansar Allah (Partisans of God), originally were a revivalist Zaidi Shia religious movement formed in the Sa’dah governorate in the 1990s under the leadership of prominent cleric Hussein al-Houthi. Critical of Yemen’s long-term President Ali Abdullah Saleh (in office from 1990 to 2012), an order for the arrest of their leader led to a low-level insurgency resulting in the killing of Hussein al-Houthi by government forces in September 2004. Following his death, the political leadership of the movement passed on to his brother Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. The Houthis reportedly formed close political and military ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Lebanese movement Hezbollah and continued to challenge Saleh, exploiting the frustration of large parts of the Yemeni population with his government. They succeeded in capturing parts of the mountainous north of the country before a popular uprising linked to the Arab Spring swept the old regime from power in February 2011. In the wake of this regime change, which brought Hadi to power, the Houthis increased their presence in Sana’a and formed alliances with other groups, while simultaneously clashing with tribesmen loyal to other political movements, in particular those of the Sunni Islamist Al-Islah party (“The Yemeni Congregation of Reform Party”), a Yemeni affiliate of the Muslim brotherhood. Following the ouster of President Hadi and his subsequent flight to Aden, the Houthis consolidated their dominance over large parts of northern Yemen and significantly strengthened their military power through absorbing parts of the country’s armed

forces. In March 2015, fearing a further deterioration of the security situation, a group of nine Arab countries led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia deployed military forces as part of Operation “Decisive Storm” with the aim to restore the authority of Yemen’s internationally recognized government. Meanwhile in the coastal province of Hadramawt, militants of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) exploited the political vacuum and seized control of the local capital of Mukalla in April 2015, which they held for more than one year before being forced out by military forces backed by the United Arab Emirates.4 While the Coalition reversed some of the Houthi advances, the Houthis managed to consolidate their positions in the mountainous north of the country. The period from 2016/2017 onwards, saw a significant increase in the military capabilities of the Houthis, which included the launch of ballistic missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs)5 against targets in Saudi Arabia, as well as the deployment of anti-ship missiles and waterborne improvised explosive devices (WBIED)6 against ships flying the flag of Coalition states in the Red Sea. While these attacks have done relatively little material damage, they allowed the Houthis to some extent to counterbalance the superiority of the Coalition forces and to project power beyond the immediate battlefield. (continued)

Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 30p.

By Philip J. Cook and Audrey Vil

n Durham (of which 160 died) in 1011 distinct incidents – about 200 incidents per year on average. As a result of DPD investigations, 46% of the fatal-shooting incidents resulted in at least one arrest, compared with just a 16% arrest rate for incidents in which the victim(s) survived. The arrestees were processed in the Durham courts (although a handful of cases were transferred to federal court). While most defendants were prosecuted, some had all charges dismissed for various reasons. The remaining cases -- those that have been prosecuted – represent 42% of the fatal shooting incidents and just 11% of the nonfatal shooting incidents. For all 1011 shooting incidents combined, there have been 74 with a conviction in the Durham courts, 6 that were federally indicted, and 10 that were processed as juveniles (so that we lacked access to court records). Another 62 cases were still pending as of July 2022. If we assume that all of the federal cases and the cases pending in

Durham courts eventually result in a conviction, the fraction of shooting incidents in which there was both an arrest and conviction was about 15%. Thus when there is a criminal shooting in Durham, it is unlikely (85%) that anyone will be arrested and convicted. These results are troubling, not only because the system has failed to deliver justice, but also because of the urgent need to prevent future gun violence in Durham. An increase in the arrest and conviction rates for gun violence cases would reduce future gun violence through several mechanisms: incapacitating dangerous perpetrators from engaging in subsequent violence; deterring some would-be shooters by communicating a credible threat that shooting someone will result in legal consequences; and interrupting cycles of revenge. It is also plausible that a stronger performance by the police and courts would serve to send a clear message that the authorities are determined to help improve the quality of life in violence-impacted

communities. This report is intended to provide a data-based description of gun violence and the law enforcement response since 2017. It is not intended to explain the observed patterns, or provide guidance on how performance can be improved. Our hope is that documenting outcomes of police investigations and court processing will help motivate further inquiry and action.

Durham, NC: Duke University, 2023. 31p.