By Zachary Porreca

I demonstrate the linkage between gentrification and gun violence. As the underlying mechanism, I focus on gentrification's displacement effect on local drug markets. Using two-way fixed effects differences-in-differences estimators, I show the gentrification of one block increases violence across the surrounding neighborhood. I find that some 2,400 (8%) of Philadelphia's shootings between the years 2011 and 2020 can be attributed to spillover effects from the gentrification of drug blocks. This effect is nearly ten times stronger than that observed on blocks without high levels of drug crime. This study also contributes a new empirical measurement of gentrification drawn primarily from property sales, along with building, zoning, and alteration permit issuance and utilizes a novel nearest-neighbor network approach to identify spatial spillover effects.

Unpublished Paper, 2021, 53p.

By Annelies Pauwels and Merlina Herbach

This policy brief examines the methods of firearms acquisition by right-wing extremists (RWEs) in Europe between 2019 and 2024. Based on a dataset of 118 cases, it reveals that RWEs resort to diverse legal and illegal acquisition strategies, including the use of illicit markets, legal possession, theft from military and law enforcement sources, and private manufacture, particularly 3D printing. The policy brief further discusses current EU countermeasures and their effectiveness in addressing RWE-specific acquisition methods. It identifies gaps in existing policies and enforcement, particularly regarding background checks in issuing and reviewing weapon licences, screening of military and law enforcement personnel, and regulation of emerging technologies like 3D printing. The authors call for further research to increase the understanding of the RWE-firearms nexus and to develop more targeted prevention strategies.

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), 2024, 30p.

By:Robin Joy and Monica Weeber

Domestic violence is a national and Vermont public health crisis. The Vermont Department of Health estimates that up to 16% of adult Vermonters have experienced either fear, control, or violence at the hands of an intimate partner. In Vermont, a victim may seek a Relief from Abuse Order (RFA) in the Family Division of Superior Court. As part of the process, the victim may also request that a defendant relinquish their firearms. This study examines general case processing statistics for RFAs, how often firearm relinquishment is requested, and if granted, who is the designated holder of the weapons. The report also documents the processes related to serving orders and storing and returning weapons. Methods Researchers worked with the Vermont Judiciary to create an extract of RFA cases to answer quantitative questions. They also conducted interviews with court personnel, police officers, and licensed firearms dealers. Findings • Bennington County has the highest rate of disposed RFA dockets per 1,000 of the population. Chittenden County has the lowest. • Seventy percent of denied temporary orders are not pursued to final orders. • Fifty-eight percent of all requested temporary orders are granted. • Most RFAs (59%) are between parties who are current or former household members. • Women are overrepresented as plaintiffs (74%) as compared to the general population. Men are overrepresented as defendants (75.8%). • The Judiciary does not record in the case management system whether a request to relinquish was made by the plaintiff. • The rate of relinquishment orders mirrors the estimated firearm ownership rates. • Essex and Orange Counties had the highest rate of firearm relinquishment orders. • Bennington and Rutland Counties has the lowest rate of firearm relinquishment orders. • Temporary RFAs with a relinquishment order are more likely to continue to a final hearing. Recommendations This is the first report on RFA and firearm relinquishment data in Vermont and the first report outlining the relinquishment and storage process. Based on the information CRG has developed suggestions for practice, policy, and further research 

Montpelier, VT: Crime Research Group, 2024. 22p.

By Thomas Wojciechowski

This study sought to examine the relationship between neighborhood disorder and perceptions of gun access. Further, this study focused on determining whether or not antisocial peer affiliation mediates this relationship.MethodsThe Pathways to Desistance data were analyzed. This is an 11-wave longitudinal study following 1,354 justice-involved youth across seven years post-adjudication. Generalized structural equation modeling was used to assess direct and indirect relationships of interest.ResultsGreater levels of neighborhood disorder were associated with increased perceptions of access to guns in the community. Affiliation with antisocial peers significantly mediated this relationship, accounting for about 15% of this relationship.ConclusionsAffiliation with antisocial peers may be greater in disordered neighborhoods and they may facilitate access to guns for youth living in such communities. Mentoring programs for youth living in disordered communities may have some capacity for attenuating this relationship.

Published in Injury, 2024 Aug;55(8):111701, 20p. 

By  Michael Osman, Monika Roszkowska, Murat Yildiz, Robert Muggah, et al.

Several Caribbean countries are registering an intensification of organized crime and rising incidence of lethal violence. A combination of risk factors including surging drug production in South America, the proliferation and competition of transnational and local gangs, and high availability and use of firearms have contributed to soaring homicide rates. Countries such as Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago currently register among the highest murder rates globally. Faced with exceedingly high levels of collective and interpersonal violence, some Caribbean governments, for example that of Jamaica have declared states of emergencies to fight violent crime while simultaneously ramping up regional efforts to curb the trafficking of firearms and ammunition. There is a growing consensus among the heads of government of CARICOM countries that the crime and violence situation could deteriorate further still. The perpetrators of collective violence in the Caribbean vary, though most are connected to a diverse array of criminal markets across the region. The determination of what constitutes  a “gang ” differs across the Caribbean. The capacity of these groups vary: there is no dominant configuration of criminal groups and criminal relationships across all locations in the region. Highly organized criminal networks and street gangs are involved in multiple transnational criminal markets spanning South and Central America, North America, and Western Europe. Larger, more sophisticated gangs alternately collude and compete with state actors and a host of non-state intermediaries to procure firearms and transport, transship, and traffic in cocaine, cannabis, and to a lesser extent heroin and amphetamines. For the most part, smaller street gangs are more domestically oriented; some are politically connected and secure government contracts to provide resources and services that are historically underserved by the state. In addition to providing social welfare, these organizations often impose protection rackets within the areas they operate. These protection rackets allow these neighborhood gangs to engage in criminal activities ranging from selling drugs, trafficking in firearms, human smuggling, and contract killing to managing lottery scams, extortion, and racketeering. A small number of the region’s gangs are more organized and have expanded their criminal networks to facilitate transnational crimes,   including the transportation and protection of drug shipments as well as firearms trafficking, human smuggling, and cyber-related crimes. In larger countries in the Caribbean such as Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, aggressive state-led anti-gang measures have accelerated the fragmentation or “splintering” of gangs, further heightening inter- and intra-factional violence and demand for firearms and ammunition. While the overall number and membership of Caribbean gangs appears to have expanded, a relatively small number of them are involved in transnational trafficking of drugs, firearms, and other contraband. Only a handful of the hundreds of gangs active in countries such as Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago appear to be directly implicated in cross-border crimes such as the trafficking of cocaine and cannabis or smuggling of weapons. In many cases, well-connected gang leaders, including former inmates of US prisons, facilitate shipments by leveraging their networks from Colombia and Venezuela to North America and Western Europe. Meanwhile, local gang members may be subcontracted for “protecting” transshipment of drugs, sourcing firearms abroad (primarily from the US), and organizing local distribution and retail. However, most gangs in the Caribbean  are inward-facing and connected to local political economies ranging from disrupting elections and securing government contracts to local drug dealing, prostitution, scams, and extortion. Rather than facilitate international drug shipments or human trafficking rings, gangs throughout the region are typically parochial and focused instead on protecting their territory. (continued)

Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 62p.

By The UNODC Global Programme on Criminal Network Disruption and the Global Maritime Crime Programme (Border Management Branch).

The Republic of Yemen has been embroiled in a violent conflict since September 2014 when Houthi forces took military control of the capital city Sana’a and displaced the government of interim President Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Yemen’s protracted conflict has claimed at least 377.000 lives, most of them civilians, and plunged Yemen, already the poorest country of the Arabian Peninsula, into a complex humanitarian catastrophe. The Houthis, who call themselves Ansar Allah (Partisans of God), originally were a revivalist Zaidi Shia religious movement formed in the Sa’dah governorate in the 1990s under the leadership of prominent cleric Hussein al-Houthi. Critical of Yemen’s long-term President Ali Abdullah Saleh (in office from 1990 to 2012), an order for the arrest of their leader led to a low-level insurgency resulting in the killing of Hussein al-Houthi by government forces in September 2004. Following his death, the political leadership of the movement passed on to his brother Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. The Houthis reportedly formed close political and military ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Lebanese movement Hezbollah and continued to challenge Saleh, exploiting the frustration of large parts of the Yemeni population with his government. They succeeded in capturing parts of the mountainous north of the country before a popular uprising linked to the Arab Spring swept the old regime from power in February 2011. In the wake of this regime change, which brought Hadi to power, the Houthis increased their presence in Sana’a and formed alliances with other groups, while simultaneously clashing with tribesmen loyal to other political movements, in particular those of the Sunni Islamist Al-Islah party (“The Yemeni Congregation of Reform Party”), a Yemeni affiliate of the Muslim brotherhood. Following the ouster of President Hadi and his subsequent flight to Aden, the Houthis consolidated their dominance over large parts of northern Yemen and significantly strengthened their military power through absorbing parts of the country’s armed

forces. In March 2015, fearing a further deterioration of the security situation, a group of nine Arab countries led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia deployed military forces as part of Operation “Decisive Storm” with the aim to restore the authority of Yemen’s internationally recognized government. Meanwhile in the coastal province of Hadramawt, militants of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) exploited the political vacuum and seized control of the local capital of Mukalla in April 2015, which they held for more than one year before being forced out by military forces backed by the United Arab Emirates.4 While the Coalition reversed some of the Houthi advances, the Houthis managed to consolidate their positions in the mountainous north of the country. The period from 2016/2017 onwards, saw a significant increase in the military capabilities of the Houthis, which included the launch of ballistic missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs)5 against targets in Saudi Arabia, as well as the deployment of anti-ship missiles and waterborne improvised explosive devices (WBIED)6 against ships flying the flag of Coalition states in the Red Sea. While these attacks have done relatively little material damage, they allowed the Houthis to some extent to counterbalance the superiority of the Coalition forces and to project power beyond the immediate battlefield. (continued)

Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 30p.

By Philip J. Cook and Audrey Vil

n Durham (of which 160 died) in 1011 distinct incidents – about 200 incidents per year on average. As a result of DPD investigations, 46% of the fatal-shooting incidents resulted in at least one arrest, compared with just a 16% arrest rate for incidents in which the victim(s) survived. The arrestees were processed in the Durham courts (although a handful of cases were transferred to federal court). While most defendants were prosecuted, some had all charges dismissed for various reasons. The remaining cases -- those that have been prosecuted – represent 42% of the fatal shooting incidents and just 11% of the nonfatal shooting incidents. For all 1011 shooting incidents combined, there have been 74 with a conviction in the Durham courts, 6 that were federally indicted, and 10 that were processed as juveniles (so that we lacked access to court records). Another 62 cases were still pending as of July 2022. If we assume that all of the federal cases and the cases pending in

Durham courts eventually result in a conviction, the fraction of shooting incidents in which there was both an arrest and conviction was about 15%. Thus when there is a criminal shooting in Durham, it is unlikely (85%) that anyone will be arrested and convicted. These results are troubling, not only because the system has failed to deliver justice, but also because of the urgent need to prevent future gun violence in Durham. An increase in the arrest and conviction rates for gun violence cases would reduce future gun violence through several mechanisms: incapacitating dangerous perpetrators from engaging in subsequent violence; deterring some would-be shooters by communicating a credible threat that shooting someone will result in legal consequences; and interrupting cycles of revenge. It is also plausible that a stronger performance by the police and courts would serve to send a clear message that the authorities are determined to help improve the quality of life in violence-impacted

communities. This report is intended to provide a data-based description of gun violence and the law enforcement response since 2017. It is not intended to explain the observed patterns, or provide guidance on how performance can be improved. Our hope is that documenting outcomes of police investigations and court processing will help motivate further inquiry and action.

Durham, NC: Duke University, 2023. 31p.

By Benjamin Jongleux and Nicolas Florquin

Prior to the recent changes to the European Union (EU) Firearms Directive, and due to inconsistent national regulations, several types of readily convertible firearms could be purchased with few restrictions in a number of EU member states, modified into lethal weapons and trafficked within the region. This situation contributed to the growing criminal use of models that were easy to convert into lethal firearms. In response, the EU adopted a number of new regulatory measures from 2017 onwards and supported joint law enforcement operations that specifically targeted trafficking in converted firearms. Based on research undertaken by the Small Arms Survey, this paper reviews these EU efforts and the evolving dynamics of firearms conversion in Europe as a whole. It argues that while EU member states are moving towards greater harmonization of their national legislation, there have been significant delays in some countries, and that the interpretation of certain standards and procedures remains inconsistent. The paper also argues that improving the strategic intelligence picture of illicit firearms trafficking in Europe remains critical for measuring the success of these efforts and for detecting emerging threats.

Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Papers , no 70, EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium 2020. 16p

By Europol

This report constitutes the first of a series of analytical products complementing the Global Study on Firearms Trafficking 2020, prepared by the UNODC Research and Trend Analysis Branch (RAB). The aim of the present report is to analyse illicit firearms trafficking and related forms of crime from a specific geographical angle, namely the European Union region, and to deepen the understanding of the illicit firearms trafficking situation in the region and its interconnection to the rest of the world. The report is based on the quantitative and qualitative data compiled by UNODC in the Illicit Arms Flows Dataset. To further enhance the evidence base on the phenomenon, this report complements the data from the Illicit Arms Flows Dataset with other qualitative and case-based data sources, in particular previously collected data by the Flemish Peace Institute, in addition to a review of existing literature on illicit firearms trafficking in Europe and to the information exchanged among practitioners during a cross-regional expert meeting on this topic organized by UNODC in October 2019. By analysing these data sources in a joint manner, the report aims to significantly improve the understanding of the scope, characteristics and dynamics of illicit firearms trafficking into, from and across the European Union and contribute to the evidence base required to efficiently combat this phenomenon both within the region and globally. Seizures of firearms, their parts and components, and ammunition in the European Union . As for the Global Study on Firearms Trafficking 2020, the present report is predominantly based on firearms seizure data, which can be considered the best proxy for developing estimates of the scope and value of illicit firearms trafficking. However, the currently available data on firearms seizures in Europe needs to be interpreted carefully because of shortcomings with regard to the quality and comprehensiveness of the available data as a result of poor registration procedures, the lack of a uniform collection and registration approach or the lack of firearms expertise among local law enforcement officials seizing firearms.. More fundamentally, it is crucial to keep in mind that firearms can be seized in very diverse contexts and that seized firearms are not necessarily trafficked firearms or even illegally held at the time of seizure. In addition, national differences in seizure data are not necessarily a reflection of different illicit gun markets in these countries but can also be attributed to differences in national legislation and procedures and to the different levels of priority given to combat illicit firearms trafficking in these countries. Close to 60 per cent of European Union Member States provided data on seized firearms to UNODC but with varying levels of details and completeness . In total 16 European Union Member States provided quantitative data on seized and trafficked firearms in 2016 - 2017 to UNODC via the Illicit Arms Flows Questionnaire (IAFQ), a new globally standardized tool developed by UNODC for enhancing the evidence base on illicit firearms trafficking and the global understanding of the firearms trafficking phenomenon. It also serves the purpose of supporting monitoring of target 16.4 of the Sustainable Development Goals. Through this target, Member States committed, among other objectives, to significantly reduce illicit arms flows by 2030. The completeness of data varies extensively among the reporting countries as many countries face challenges with providing data that goes beyond basic information on the amount and type of weapon seized. While 16 Member States submitted data on total number of firearms seizures disaggregated by

type of weapon, data on tracing requests and outcomes was submitted by only six and eight Member States, respectively. Shotguns, pistols and rifles emerge as most seized firearms within the European Union, making up almost 70 per cent of the reported seized firearms . The 16 European Union Member States that submitted seizure data via the IAFQ seized in total about 50,000 firearms in 2016 and 40,000 firearms in 2017, representing nine per cent and seven per cent of global reported seizure, respectively. Significant national differences in the number of seized firearms can be observed: while some Member States reported thousands of seized firearms annually, other Member States reported much lower seizures.

. Shotguns (30 percent) are the most widely seized firearms in these Member States, especially in Southern European countries. Also pistols (22 per cent) and rifles (15 percent) are frequently seized. Revolvers (8 per cent) and military-grade firearms (2 percent), such as machine guns and submachine guns, are seized much less frequently. In some countries, as for example in Sweden (9 per cent) and Croatia (7 per cent), the share of seized submachine guns and machine guns is however much higher and equals or surpasses the share of other types of firearms. Compared to other regions, the share of firearms seized in Europe also includes a significant proportion of pneumatic, blank-firing and gas weapons. Illicit possession ranks as number one justification for the seizure of firearms . Firearms are seized in various contexts in the European Union. In line with the findings of the UNODC Global Study on Firearms Trafficking 2020, the most frequent legal justification for firearms seizures in the European Union in 2016-2017 is ‘illicit possession’ (34 per cent)..

The share of seizures with ‘illicit trafficking’ as legal justification fluctuated between zero - four per cent in the reporting Member States. This is believed to be an underestimate as the offence of illicit possession is generally an easier and quicker way for law enforcement and other relevant agencies to justify the prohibition of a transfer than the offence of illicit trafficking. The analysis of IAFQ data further demonstrates that most firearms seizures occur within the country’s national territory. Some Member States also report a significant share of seizures at the land border or at airports. Firearms seizures on vessels or at harbours are rather exceptional in the European Union. With 79 per cent of the seized firearms within the European Union for which related data was available uniquely marked, an important foundation for tracing and identifying the illicit origin of the seized weapon exists . Ten European Union Member States reported on the markings of seized firearms. 79 per cent of the seized firearms for which data on markings was available were uniquely marked.

. This implies national authorities generally can trace seized firearms, attempt to identify their point of diversion, analyse illicit arms flows and subsequently take appropriate measures to mitigate diversion risks and combat trafficking. Six European Union Member States reported that during the most recent reporting year they had sent a total of 301 tracing requests on a total of 1,137 firearms to other countries or regional/international organizations. Most of these tracing requests were sent to other European countries. The limited availability of data on seizures of ammunition impedes an informed analysis of related crimes . Nine European Union Member States submitted data on ammunition seizures from 2016 - 2017 to the IAFQ. In total these countries seized more than 800,000 rounds of ammunition in 2016 and about 350,000 rounds of ammunition in 2017. Strong differences between these countries can be observed in the annual number of ammunition seizures. However, the limited availability of data on seizures of ammunition hinders an in-depth analysis of crimes related to this commodity. In the European

Union, the seizures of firearms and parts and components are numerically closer to each other than in other parts of the world

. Ten European Union Member States reported on seizures of firearm parts and components from 2016 - 2017 to the IAFQ. In total these countries seized almost 4,800 items in 2016 and almost 1,700 items in 2017. Strong differences can be observed between these countries in the annual number of seizures of parts and components. On a global scale the average number of seized firearms was about 20 times higher than the number of seized parts and components. This ratio was less than seven times in the reporting European Union Member States. While this relatively high share of seizures of parts and components may reflect increased attention from law enforcement authorities to the phenomenon of illicit trafficking in these items, it may also be linked to the high number of converted and reactivated firearms seized in the European Union, as access to parts and components constitutes an important prerequisite to illicit firearms manufacture. Demand for illicit firearms in the European Union The demand for illicit firearms trafficking within the European Union is largely driven by criminals . Illicit firearms trafficking in the European Union is mainly driven by criminal demand given that access to firearms enables and facilitates various criminal activities. Firearms are also acquired and possessed by criminals in Europe as tools for power or as ‘trophies’ to display reputation. Ten European Union Member States reported on the number of firearms seized in connection to other suspected offences to the IAFQ. An analysis of this data shows that firearms are often seized from criminals involved in violent crime and drug trafficking. Previous studies and other data have pointed to drugs criminals, mafia organizations, outlaw motorcycle gangs, armed robbers, terrorists and various other types of criminals such as street gangs, loan sharks, criminals involved in prostitution and criminal groups specialised in assassinations as customers on illicit gun markets in the European Union. Most criminals tend to possess and use handguns, which are relatively cheap and easy to conceal. The possession and use of automatic firearms and other types of military-grade firearms by criminals is much less common in the European Union.

Vienna: UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 2020. 178p.

By Mancuso Marina and Manzi Deborah

Project ECOFIT – Options for EnhanCing Operational instruments in the area of FIrearms Trafficking (www.transcrime. it/ecofit/) is a research project co-funded by the European Union’s Internal Security Fund – Police (ISFP-2018-AG-OCFIRE). Project ECOFIT aims to enhance operational cooperation between Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) in the fight against firearms trafficking across the 27 EU Member States (MSs) and seven non-EU SELEC MSs (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey). It analyses five operational

instruments that have been selected as indicators of international cooperation, namely: mechanisms for data collection, mechanisms for data sharing, National Firearms Focal Points (NFPs), joint criminal investigations and controlled delivery procedures. Based on the findings of the Project, it provides recommendations for the EU and guidelines for LEAs concerning how to better put into action these instruments and how to more effectively reduce, prevent and tackle illicit trafficking of firearms offences. In order to achieve its objectives, Project ECOFIT conducts five impact assessments (one for each of the operational instruments included in the analysis). The methodology utilises the Better Regulation “Toolbox” of the European Commission (European Commission 2017). Besides the definition of the problem addressed by Project ECOFIT and the methodology.

mproving the intelligence picture (collection and exchange of systematic and harmonised information between LEAs, knowledge on modi operandi, tactics, new trends, etc.); • Intensifying the pressure on criminal markets (fully operational NFPs, joint actions, etc.). The five operational instruments are strongly interrelated, as also stressed by EMPACT Firearms: having fully staffed and operational NFPs will enhance both data collection and data sharing procedures as well as facilitating the standardisation of practices amongst countries.

Milano: Transcrime – Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore. 2021. 154p.

By Astrid De Schutter

KEY FINDINGS • Most European Union (EU) member states show relatively low and stable levels of family homicide. Nevertheless, a significant number of women are regularly and disproportionately victimized in incidents of firearm- and non-firearm-related family violence. • Firearms have certain characteristics that make them a convenient

modus operandi in some specific constellations of family violence. • Firearms can allow a family member to overpower a physically stronger opponent in family conflicts, which may explain their appeal to adolescents, women, and elderly family members. • Incidents of family gun violence involve legally held firearms more than those sourced from a criminal milieu, suggesting that firearms trafficking and the illicit gun market play a less important role in this context. The analysis of a randomized sample size of media reports in the EU further indicates that there is little evidence to suggest that these guns tend to be illegally held. • A firearm is often the weapon of choice in familicide–suicides, despite their low prevalence rate.

Brussels: Flemish Institute for Peace, 2023. 20p.

By Giovanna Maletta

Some European Union (EU) member states—as well as the EU, through Eurostat—collect and publish useful and gender-disaggregated information about violent crimes, intentional homicides, or domestic violence. In addition

to using different methodologies and definitions, however, available data does not always include information on the weapons used in the commission of such crimes, the relationship between victim and perpetrator, or the context in which the violence has occurred.

Available data collected at the international, regional, and national level does not allow for a comprehensive picture of the trends and dynamics of gender-based violence (GBV), including firearm violence, within the EU.

The EU is working to establish a common understanding of GBV at the EU level and among its member states, and to detail minimum standards for the criminalization of GBV against women and domestic violence—thus providing the opportunity to address the use of firearms to facilitate and commit GBV across the EU. These regulatory initiatives also have the potential to improve the availability of relevant information by promoting the collection of comparable data and the development of harmonized practices in collecting and reporting this information, which in turn will allow states to better monitor and adapt measures being taken to tackle GBV.

These EU initiatives could benefit from establishing linkages with the existing EU framework for the control of the production, trade, and possession of firearms.

KEY FINDINGS • Some European Union (EU) member states—as well as the EU, through Eurostat— collect and publish useful and gender-disaggregated information about violent crimes, intentional homicides, or domestic violence. In addition to using different methodologies and definitions, however, available data does not always include

information on the weapons used in the commission of such crimes, the relationship between victim and perpetrator, or the context in which the violence has occurred. • Available data collected at the international, regional, and national level does not allow for a comprehensive picture of the trends and dynamics of gender-based violence (GBV), including firearm violence, within the EU. • The EU is working to establish a common understanding of GBV at the EU level and among its member states, and to detail minimum standards for the criminalization of GBV against women and domestic violence—thus providing the opportunity to address the use of firearms to facilitate and commit GBV across the EU. These regulatory initiatives also have the potential to improve the availability of relevant information by promoting the collection of comparable data and the development of harmonized practices in collecting and reporting this information, which in turn will allow states to better monitor

and adapt measures being taken to tackle GBV. • These EU initiatives could benefit from establishing linkages with the existing EU framework for the control of the production, trade, and possession of firearms.

Brussels: Flemish Institute for Peace, 28p.

By Amy D. Lauger. Danielle Kaeble and Mark Motivans, etc.

The Combat Human Trafficking Act of 2015 (CHTA) (34 U.S.C. § 20709(e)) requires the director of the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) to prepare an annual report on human trafficking. The report must include information on the following: „ arrests by state law enforcement officers for human trafficking offenses „ prosecutions of individuals in state courts for human trafficking offenses „ convictions of individuals in state courts for human trafficking offenses „ sentences imposed on individuals convicted in state courts for human trafficking offenses. BJS obtains information on human trafficking through several data collections, including those on victim service providers, law enforcement, prosecution and adjudication, and corrections. For each collection, these data are available for some combination of the federal, state, local, and tribal levels. The information in each data collection contributes to a general profile of human trafficking in the United States. Some differences exist across collections due to varying definitions of human trafficking, data availability, and other factors. At the federal level, human trafficking offenses are defined according to federal statutes that include peonage, slavery, forced labor, sex trafficking, sexual exploitation and other abuse of children, and transportation for illegal sexual activity and related crimes. The classification of human trafficking offenses varies among state and local jurisdictions. This report describes the BJS data collections and activities across various jurisdictional levels that include various offenses that may be categorized as human trafficking, and it presents the most recent statistical findings.

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics , 2024. 7p.

By Graham Farrell and Toby Davies

Knife crime has become a prominent and seemingly intractable problem in England & Wales. Theory and evidence indicate that reducing crime opportunities is an effective means of crime control, including restrictions on lethal weapons. While public debate has centred on zombie and other ‘status’ knives, the most prevalent homicide weapon is a kitchen knife. Here we argue that replacing lethal pointed-tip kitchen knives with safer round-tip knives would reduce knife crime with little or no displacement. Drawing on the approach to remove fossil-fuel vehicles from roads, we propose a phased removal of lethal kitchen knives that we estimate will cut knife-related homicide in half, reduce other knife crime and criminality, and prevent thousands of non-criminal knife-related injuries

Crime Science (2024) 13:44

U.S.Court of Appeals 5th Circuit. No. 23-30033

700 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2012) (“NRA I”), this court upheld those provisions. But that decision, which was criticized at the time, see National Rifle Ass’n, Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 714 F.3d 334, 341 (5th Cir. 2013) (“NRA II”) (Jones, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), preceded two recent clarifying Supreme Court opinions on the methodology by which we construe gun regulations under the Second Amendment. We are now compelled to focus intently on the evidence of firearm access and ownership by eighteen-to-twenty-year-olds near and at the founding, and we conclude that (1) NRA I is incompatible with the Bruen and Rahimi decisions of the Supreme Court, and (2) these provisions are inconsistent with the Second Amendment. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s contrary judgment and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion..

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana USDC No. 6:20-CV-1438. 29p.

By Everytown Research & Policy

Executive Summary Hateful rhetoric and violence against transgender people has become a feature of society and politics across the globe in recent years, but in the US—where there are more guns than people —it often turns lethal. To better understand the risk factors for violence against transgender people, and the role firearms play, Everytown Research analyzed over 200 homicides of transgender and gender-expansive people in the United States and Puerto Rico from 2017 to 2022. The findings from this research warrant renewed calls for strong gun violence prevention policies that keep guns out of the wrong hands, such as laws that require background checks on all gun sales, raise the age to purchase a gun, and disarm domestic abusers. They also highlight the need to combat discrimination against trans people and to manage upstream risk factors, like housing insecurity, inequality, and poverty in order to help save trans lives. Key Findings Our analysis of the 228 known homicides of transgender people in the United States and Puerto Rico from January 2017 through December 2022 revealed the following: laws that require background checks on all gun sales, raise the age to purchase a gun, and disarm domestic abusers. They also highlight the need to combat discrimination against trans people and to manage upstream risk factors, like housing insecurity, inequality, and poverty in order to help save trans lives. 4 5 6 A gun was used in more than seven in 10 transgender homicides. Sixty-five percent of transgender victims of gun homicide were Black trans women. Yet among the general US population, only 7 percent of gun homicide victims are Black women. Nearly six in 10 trans victims of homicide were under the age of 30. More than one in three identified gun homicide perpetrators were legally prohibited from possessing a firearm due to prior felony convictions or other prohibiting factors. One-third of transgender victims of homicide experienced housing insecurity or homelessness. The majority of those victims were killed with a gun. Trans people killed with a gun were nearly twice as likely to be killed by a family member or intimate partner than were gun homicide victims generally. A disproportionate number of gun homicides of trans people took place in the South, and Florida and Texas together were home to nearly one out of every five trans gun homicides

New York: Everytown Research & Policy, 2024. 31p.

By Everytown Research & Policy

he intersection of gun violence and domestic violence has a devastating impact on families and communities across the country, with an average of 76 women in the United States shot and killed by an intimate partner every month, and many more shot and wounded. It is therefore crucial for law enforcement to be vigilant about recognizing warning signs of potential lethal violence by abusers, and to implement policies that help prevent this violence rather than only responding after a tragedy occurs.

One key piece of information that law enforcement should take seriously as a potential warning sign of future violence is a report that an individual who is barred from gun possession because of a disqualifying domestic violence-related conviction or restraining order has attempted to purchase a gun in violation of the law. As the result of a new federal law enacted in 2022, the NICS Denial Notification Act, state and local law enforcement are now notified—within 24 hours—every time a prohibited domestic abuser attempts to buy a gun and fails a background check. But in most states, there is no policy in place to follow up in these cases to investigate whether the survivor of abuse is in imminent danger.

Everytown for Gun Safety obtained data from the FBI that reveals a stunning reality: every year thousands of prohibited abusers attempt to purchase guns and are prevented from doing so because of the background check system: From 2018 through 2022, 135,243 background checks were denied because the purchaser was a prohibited domestic abuser. While this is an example of the background check system working as designed to prevent gun sales to prohibited individuals, each of these cases also raises a new red flag about a potential risk of violence and presents an opportunity to intervene and prevent future homicides of women by an intimate partner.

In light of the significant risk of future violence by domestic abusers with firearms, federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies should implement a policy of investigating each of these cases as part of a proactive approach to preventing gun violence. This type of investigation should include assessing whether there are other risk factors of imminent violence, determining whether the individual has unlawfully obtained firearms through other means, following up with the individual to reiterate that they are prohibited from buying and possessing firearms, and working with victims’ services staff and local domestic violence service providers to notify the survivor that the abuser has attempted to purchase a gun and offer assistance with safety planning. In addition, appropriate cases should be referred to prosecutors for further investigation into whether criminal charges should be pursued for the unlawful attempted gun purchase.

New York: Everytown Research & Policy, 2024 11p.

By David Bruce

Mapping gun crimes can ensure that police resources are used in a targeted way to reduce violent offences.

Firearm crime is rife in South Africa. Mapping it can help ensure police resources are used in a targeted way to reduce firearm-related offences. This policy brief illustrates how firearm crime can be mapped by using police data. It focuses on Gauteng province, which has high levels of gun use by criminals.

Key findings Firearms make a major contribution to crime-related death, injury and fear in South Africa. In areas with high firearm crime levels, there are seven main gun-related crime categories: murder, attempted murder, robbery with aggravating circumstances, carjacking, residential robbery, nonresidential robbery and illegal possession of guns and ammunition. South Africa’s highest gun-related crime levels are in the following provinces: Gauteng, Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and parts of the Eastern Cape. Recommendations The SAPS should develop a focused strategy to reduce levels of firearm crime and violence. The SAPS should use crime data to identify the areas where firearm crime is most concentrated. This will support the targeted use of resources to reduce firearm crime. Targeted evidence-based strategies are more likely to have a measurable impact on levels of violent crimes associated with firearm use. As an initial step, the SAPS should use available information on ‘instruments’ used in crime from the Crime Administration System (CAS), or docket analysis, to assess levels of firearm crime in each police station area. The results will show the provinces, metropolitan In these provinces, police station areas with the highest levels of crime in the seven main gun-related crime categories are also high firearm-use areas. South African Police Service (SAPS) data on Gauteng police stations with high levels of these seven crimes highlights 41 high firearm crime police stations. Although data collection standards differ between stations, SAPS Crime Administration System data generally includes details on weapons used and can be used to map gun crime more precisely. areas and districts, and stations where firearm crime is most concentrated. Docket quality, data collection, recording, mapping and analysis on all crimes related to firearms and ammunition should be improved. Dedicated firearm crime reduction units with adequate intelligence support should be established. Their key performance measure must be a reduction in murders, attempted murders and robberies involving firearms. Police measures to reduce firearm crime must be aligned with efforts to lessen the overall problem of firearm proliferation in South Africa.

Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2024. 16p.

By Alexandra Punishill

Nowhere is the discussion surrounding gun violence more prominent than in the United States, with the impacts of our gun-friendly culture being felt around the world. This thesis analyzes the dynamics of gun trafficking from the United States to Mexico and sheds light on its role in fueling the epidemic of gun violence south of the border. It is argued that the particular system of federalism adopted by the United States has led to a variety of state-level gun regulations that have shaped domestic gun policy and have had an international impact. Despite Mexico’s persistent efforts to combat the gun violence orchestrated by powerful organized crime networks, success remains elusive. Central to this discourse is Mexico’s legal action against U.S. gun companies, signaling a significant shift in its approach to addressing the root causes of the crisis. However, it is argued that without substantive changes to gun laws in the United States, gun violence in Mexico will continue to have a devastating impact on both sides of the border.

Claremont McKenna College, CMC Senior Theses. 3577. 2024. 66p.

By Everytown for Gun Safety 

 Deaths due to firearm violence occur in alarming numbers in the United States (U.S.) each year. In 2023, over 43,000 people died from a firearm-related injury, and the majority (55%) of these deaths were from suicide (Gun Violence Archive, 2024). Young people are at heightened risk, with firearms being the leading cause of death for youth ages 13-24, and the cause of half of all suicide deaths in this age group as well (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2024; National Violent Death Reporting System, 2024). Only in the last five years did Congress allocate federal resources for firearm violence research, and the prior decades-long ban on this research has stymied information that could have been used to prevent these deaths (Hellman, 2019). This lack of research has had wide-reaching effects, including the limited understanding of how firearm violence impacts specific vulnerable populations, such as LGBTQ+ individuals. Although much progress has been made, systematic data collection efforts that assess LGBTQ+ identity and experiences have long been a challenge in the U.S., similarly limiting available research on LGBTQ+ health and wellness (Healthy People 2030, 2023). One of the most consistent findings we do know from available research, however, is that LGBTQ+ young people experience higher rates of considering and attempting suicide compared to their peers. The Trevor Project’s 2024 U.S. National Survey on the Mental Health of LGBTQ+ Young People found that 39% of all LGBTQ+ young people seriously considered attempting suicide in the past year. This finding is important in the context of what we know about firearms: they are the most lethal means used in suicide attempts; nearly 9 in 10 (89.6%) suicide attempts with a firearm result in death (Conner, Azrael, & Miller, 2019). Furthermore, though mass shootings constitute a small fraction (1.5%) of firearm deaths in the U.S., the public nature of this violence, often targeted toward members of oppressed groups, still have noteworthy impact. Mass shootings are defined by The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as any incident in which four or more people are shot and wounded or killed, excluding the shooter. Many LGBTQ+ people across the country identified with the victims of two widely publicized mass shootings that occurred at LGBTQ+ nightclubs in recent years: the Pulse shooting in 2016, and the shooting at Club Q in 2022. The mental health of survivors and directly impacted geographic communities are adversely affected by mass shootings (Lowe & Galea, 2017), and individuals not directly affected by mass shooting events can  also experience post-traumatic stress through media exposure (Thompson et al., 2019). In the instance of the Pulse shooting, those who identified as LGBTQ+ responded more strongly to media coverage and, in turn, experienced more post-traumatic stress (First et al., 2023). Everytown for Gun Safety states that not only is addressing firearms essential to any strategy to reduce suicide, but also that the effect of mass shootings extends to survivors, families, and communities. Despite the elevated risk of suicide attempts among LGBTQ+ young people, the fact that the majority of firearm deaths in the U.S. are suicides, and the high lethality of suicide attempts involving firearms, little is known about how many LGBTQ+ young people own or have access to firearms, or how experiences of mass shooting events impact suicide risk. Using data from the 2024 U.S. National Survey on the Mental Health of LGBTQ+ Young people, this brief examines relationships between access to firearms, the impact of mass shootings, and suicide risk among LGBTQ+ young people. Results Access to Firearms Overall, 40% of LGBTQ+ young people reported that there was a firearm in their home. The majority (92%) of those with a firearm in the home reported that it was not theirs. Additionally, of those who reported the presence of a firearm in their home, 63% reported that the firearm was kept in a locked place, 22% reported that it was not kept in a locked place, and 15% reported that they did not know whether it was kept in a locked place. Demographics LGBTQ+ young people ages 13-17 reported higher rates of having a firearm in their home (44%), compared to their LGBTQ+ young people ages 18-24 (36%). LGBTQ+ young people living in the South reported the highest rates of having a firearm in their home (48%), followed by LGBTQ+ young people living in the Midwest (43%), West (37%), and Northeast (25%). Cisgender boys and men reported the highest rates of living in a home with a firearm (46%), followed by transgender girls and women (43%), transgender boys and men (42%), nonbinary youth (38%), youth questioning their gender identity (38%), and cisgender girls and women (36%). Native and Indigenous LGBTQ+ young people reported the highest rates of living in a home with a firearm (58%), followed by White LGBTQ+ young people (45%), Multiracial LGBTQ+ young people (38%), Black LGBTQ+ young people (31%), Latinx LGBTQ+ young people (29%), Middle Eastern and North African LGBTQ+ young people (22%), and Asian American and Pacific Islander LGBTQ+ young people (21%). No significant differences were found in rates of having a firearm in the home when comparing LGBTQ+ youth based on their socioeconomic status  LGBTQ+ young people who reported the presence of a firearm in their home reported higher rates of having seriously considered suicide in the past year (43%), compared to their LGBTQ+ peers who did not report a firearm in their home (37%). Reporting the presence of a firearm in the home was associated with 19% higher odds of seriously considering suicide in the past year (adjusted odds ratio [aOR] = 1.19, 95% Confidence Interval [CI] = 1.11-1.28, p < 0.001), compared to LGBTQ+ young people who did not report the presence of a firearm in the home. LGBTQ+ young people who reported having a firearm in their home had higher rates of attempting suicide in the past year (13%), compared to their LGBTQ+ peers who did not report having a firearm in their home (11%). The presence of a firearm in the home was associated with 17% higher odds of reporting a suicide attempt in the past year (aOR = 1.17, 95% CI = 1.05-1.30, p < 0.01), Among LGBTQ+ young people who reported having a firearm in their home, 48% of those who did not keep it in a locked place and 46% of those who did not know if it was kept in a locked place seriously considered suicide in the last year, compared to the 40% who said the firearms were kept in a locked place (p<.001). Similarly, among those LGBTQ+ young people who reported the presence of a firearm in their home, 14% of those who did not keep it in a locked place and 15% of those who did not know if it was kept in a locked place attempted suicide in the last year, compared to the 12% who said the firearms were kept in a locked place (p<.001).

New York: Everytown for Gun Safety, 2024. 11p.