By Ruggero Scaturro | Giorgio Fruscione

In the Western Balkans, religious radicalization gained international attention in the early 2010s, with around 1 000 people travelling to Syria and Iraq to join jihadist groups between 2012 and 2016. The roots of this radicalization trace back to the Yugoslav wars, the presence of mujahideen networks in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Islamist charities spreading Salafi jihadism in the 1990s.

However, not all fighters from the Western Balkans are religiously motivated. Between 2014 and 2021, around 300 people fought in eastern Ukraine, mainly for political reasons, with Serbia being a major source of combatants supporting pro-Russian separatists. Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, this trend has resurged, with more individuals reportedly joining mercenary units like the Wagner Group.

Instability in the Western Balkans has also fuelled the spread of organized crime beyond the region, first across Europe and later to other continents. In the 1990s, the Yugo Mafia gained significant media attention in Northern Europe. Meanwhile, violent extremists from the Western Balkans maintain transnational connections through diaspora networks and using online platforms.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2025. 45p.

By VERED ANDRE’EV, OMAR MOHAMMED, LARA PORTNOY

Often referred to as the “world’s oldest hatred”, antisemitism, Jew-hatred, or Judeophobia has led to mass expulsions, pogroms, massacres, and the largest genocide in human history – the Holocaust. Hatred against the Jewish people can be traced across history and geography, evolving with global events, trends, and local cultures. Today, antisemitism is experiencing a worldwide revival, with the events of October 7th, 2023, and the resulting Israel-Hamas war serving as an impetus to major spikes in hateful rhetoric and violent action. Antisemitic incidents were already at historic highs; they have increased further. Antisemitism is an issue of serious concern that requires public attention and policy response. As stated in November 2022 by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), “antisemitic incidents and hate crimes violate fundamental rights, especially the right to human dignity, the right to equality of treatment and the freedom of thought, conscience and religion”. According to the Anti-Defamation League’s Audit of Antisemitic Incidents 2023, “In 2023, ADL tabulated 8,873 antisemitic incidents across the United States. This represents a 140% increase from the 3,698 incidents recorded in 2022 and is the highest number on record since ADL began tracking antisemitic incidents in 1979.” When assessing antisemitism in Arabic-speaking countries, the situation is even more disturbing. The ADL’s Global 100 survey, first launched in 2014, measures antisemitic beliefs across 100 countries, revealing notably high levels in Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), with index scores reaching 74% in Saudi Arabia and 93% in the West Bank and Gaza (Weiberg, 2020). Antisemitism in the Arab world has deep historical roots, intensified by figures like Muhammad Rashid Rida in the early 20th century, who used antisemitic rhetoric in response to political Zionism. This hatred has been embedded in Arab political discourse for over a century, often framed in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, where conspiracy theories portray Jews as a global malevolent force. Islamist movements, emerging in the 1920s, have perpetuated these antisemitic views, depicting Jews as historical enemies and untrustworthy partners in peace. The legacy of antisemitism includes influential texts like the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which were widely disseminated in the Arab world and continue to influence perceptions today (Winter & Link, 2024).

Washington, DC: Program on Extremism at George Washington University , 2025. 35p.

By Nafees Hamid and Cristina Ariza

Question: Are those radicalised offline or online more of a threat? Which group is harder to detect, more successful in completing attacks, and more lethal when they do so? Is the pattern different for youth versus older perpetrators and for men versus women? This report investigates these questions. Database: We created a database containing 439 perpetrators involved in 245 attacks between 1 January 2014 and 1 January 2021. It includes every publicly known completed attack and an extensive sampling of thwarted attacks. Attacks were all jihadist‑linked in eight Western countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. Type of radicalisation: In our database, radicalisation primarily happens offline; over half the individuals in our database had been radicalised via offline networks. Success and lethality: Individuals who were radicalised offline were three times more likely than individuals radicalised online to complete an attack successfully. Those radicalised offline are 18 times more lethal than individuals in the online category. Those radicalised online are almost eight times more likely to fail than to succeed. Group attacks: Individuals who were radicalised offline are almost three times more likely to attack or plot in groups than individuals radicalised online. Success of group attacks: While groups were more likely to be thwarted by the police than to succeed (regardless of how individuals had been radicalised), successful groups of people radicalised offline were more lethal than their lone actor counterparts (15%). Family and friends: Some 87% of those with radicalised friends and 74% with radicalised relatives plotted or attacked together. Foreign fighters: Foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), who were mostly radicalised offline, have the same success rate as non‑FTFs. But success rate increases if they have spent more than a year in a terrorist training location. Age: Online radicalisation is on the rise for young people (born from the 2000s onwards), although most individuals, including young people, are still radicalised offline. Gender: Women appear to be more likely to have been radicalised online. Bottom line: Those radicalised offline are greater in number, more successful in completing attacks and more deadly than those radicalised online.  

London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, King’s College London. 2022. 40p.