By Diorella Islas

This thesis seeks to develop a better understanding of the transnational behaviour of drug trafficking organisations (DTOs) by documenting the role that Mexican DTOs had in the cocaine trafficking to Europe after 2008. This was the year when the Italian authorities announced their discoveries that there were business interaction between the Mexican DTOs and the Italian mafia groups. At the same time the Italian authorities were announcing their findings, my literature review showed a lack of analysis and documentation regarding the transnationalization of Mexican DTOs to Europe. While most of the literature focuses on the explanation of the cartels inside Mexico, my research question focused on clarifying whether or not the Mexican DTOs are expanding their cocaine trafficking activities to Europe. At this point I considered the reports of the Italian authorities that affirm that the Mexican DTOs are relevant drug trafficking intermediaries in the cocaine trafficking routes to Europe. To answer my research question, and to systematically describe the evolution of DTOs, a qualitative methods approach was deployed (Mohajan, 2018) with a case study design adapted from Yin (2003). My analysis was carried out through the use of multiple triangulation techniques that helped me to collect and study different types of data to understand the subject. I collected empirical information through 28 interviews with security personnel with experience in countering Mexican DTOs or in the cocaine routes to Europe. The information gathered from the security personnel, complemented by official reports and open source information, was useful to answer my research question and test my hypothesis. The analysis showed that despite Italian authorities’ claims and perceptions, the power of the Mexican cartels is very limited when talking about their presence and links in Europe, and resulted in four key findings. Firstly, that the perception of the Mexican DTOs as having trans-Atlantic powers is erroneous, because the evidence showed that there is no transatlantic expansion. Secondly, the analysis uncovered the internal, national and international variables that were observed to alter the evolution and behaviour of the Mexican DTOs. At the internal level, the variables included the loss of leadership and the grievances between groups. At the national level the identified variables were the democratic transitions, corruption and impunity networks. And at the international level the variables were the international drug demand, the changes in the international illicit world, the situation of governance and corruption in foreign countries and the geography of theregion where the illicit business are taking place. The third finding was that the transatlantic cocaine trafficking routes are not controlled by an specific actor, but they are horizontal structures that are highly adaptative. The final key finding refers to a methodological observation which I describe as the “paradox of referencing”; when many sources reference something that was true in the past –like the links between Mexican DTOs and Italian mafia discovered in 2008– they help to perpetuate the present perception of a past phenomenon.

By Carina Bruwer 

The Atlantic Ocean is a vital conduit for vessels transporting and sourcing licit and illicit commodities. Much of the focus on maritime crime has been on the North Atlantic and the Gulf of Guinea, with fragmented attention paid to illicit activities further south in the Atlantic bordering Angola, Namibia and South Africa. This paper maps transnational organised crimes facilitated by vessels, with the aim of identifying challenges and opportunities in safeguarding southwestern Africa’s coast. Key points • Various vessels transport and source illicit commodities in Africa’s South Atlantic. • The Red Sea conflict has increased vessel traffic around Southern Africa’s coast, bringing both opportunities and risks to trade. • Cocaine remains the primary drug entering Africa via the South Atlantic, but synthetic drug and precursor trafficking is increasing. • Flags of convenience facilitate illegal fishing on the Angola/Namibian border. • Limited resources constrain counter-efforts. • Mapping Africa’s South Atlantic illicit markets provides an evidence base for stakeholders working to counter them.

By: Nasreen Solomons and Harsha Gihwala

Summary - The victim–offender spectrum of human trafficking is characterised by blurred lines and complex circumstances. Recognising varying degrees of voluntariness in individual cases of women along this spectrum would allow legislators and the justice system to understand the complicated contexts in which women intersect with trafficking, where culpability is not always clear-cut. States have a responsibility to develop legislation, policy and strategies that reflect this nuance and enable more effective interventions for those who fall anywhere on this spectrum.

By José Gustavo Arocha

BOTTOM LINE UP FRONT: 

1 Tren de Aragua (TdA) has morphed from a prison gang into a paramilitary instrument of the Maduro regime, now active in at least eleven Latin American countries [1] and twenty-three U.S. states, [2] according to the U.S. House Oversight Committee (2025).

2 Strategic Alignment. TdA’s deliberate expansion complements Venezuela’s Guerra de Todo el Pueblo asymmetric-warfare doctrine, [3] erasing boundaries between statecraft and organized crime.

3 Elastic Network. The gang’s “insurgent archipelago” [4] of semiautonomous cells, linked through encrypted channels, makes it exceptionally resilient; when joint Peruvian-U.S. raids freed more than eighty trafficking victims in January 2025, [5] replacement cells reemerged within days. [6]

4 Weaponized Migration. By monetizing migrant flows, selling “all risk” travel packages that often devolve into debt bondage, [7] TdA offloads costs onto regional adversaries; more than 520,000 migrants transited through the Darién Gap in 2023. [8]

5 Persistent Threat. Despite terrorism designations by the United States, Argentina, Ecuador, and Trinidad and Tobago—and nearly 3,500 U.S. arrests as of August 2025, [9] TdA’s franchise model is regenerating faster than law enforcement can dismantle it.

By Oluwole Ojewale and Raoul Sumo Tayo

Informal money transfer systems in the LCB facilitate trade but lack regulation, enabling terrorist financing and illicit flows despite emerging digital integration opportunities. Power for sale: the organised crime infiltration of elections in Africa.

By The International Crisis Group

Born of Port-au-Prince’s most powerful gangs, Viv Ansanm has raised the criminal threat overhanging Haiti’s state and civilians to alarming heights. The gang coalition announced itself to the world by besieging the Haitian capital in early 2024, triggering former Prime Minister Ariel Henry’s resignation. After consolidating its hold on much of the city, Viv Ansanm has expanded into neighbouring departments, tightened its grip on the main roads connecting Port-au-Prince to the rest of the country and mounted attacks on the airport, essentially cutting Haiti off. Gangs’ violent offensives have killed over 16,000 people since 2022. But a rising death toll and diversifying criminal portfolio, now including extortion, piracy and drug trafficking, have not stopped gangs from claiming to represent the country’s downtrodden, especially on social media. UN approval of a new foreign force to combat the gangs could shift the balance of power. But it is vital that plans are in place not just to overpower the gangs but also to persuade them to demobilise. Haitian business and political elites have relied on paramilitary forces to protect their interests since the 1950s dictatorship of Francois Duvalier, or “Papa Doc”. But in the wake of the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, gangs have mutated, evolving from tools in the hands of the most powerful to overlords of Haiti. Two main gang groupings – the G-9, whose most public figure was Jimmy Chérizier, alias Barbecue, and the Gpèp, under Gabriel Jean Pierre, known as “Ti Gabriel” – fought for supremacy after Moïse’s murder. Even as the two faced off, gang leaders discussed whether to strike agreements to scale down the death toll among their members and spare resources. Mediators managed to craft several pacts among local groups to divvy up coveted turf. Late in 2023, reports emerged that the country’s two main gang coalitions had merged into one platform; their first joint offensive began months later. Alongside its violent expansion, Viv Ansanm has sought to transform its public profile from that of a predatory criminal force into that of an ideological crusader. Crime bosses say their mission is to protect the poorest Haitians from rapacious elites and colonial powers that historically have oppressed this black Caribbean nation. Chérizier and other gang leaders have even announced the creation of a new political party, albeit without taking the steps needed to register it formally.While continuing to enrich themselves at the expense of Haitians rich and poor, their message has nevertheless become more overtly political: they appear intent on guaranteeing that their allies are part of the next administration, which should be formed by 7 February 2026 to replace the current transitional government. The concrete result they aspire to is a general amnesty for leaders and members. Haiti and its foreign partners are looking to beef up their ability to respond to the gangs with force. The UN Security Council has approved a new security operation, dubbed the Gang Suppression Force, to replace the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support Mission, which started up in 2024 but has never had the personnel or resources needed to check the gangs. The new force aims to incorporate 5,500 military personnel and expects to draw on reliable funding. Its mandate appears to give it more operational independence and the leeway to adopt more aggressive tactics. But until the force’s deployment, which is expected to commence around April 2026, Haiti’s authorities will have to turn to other methods. A task force, led by Haiti’s prime minister and powered by U.S. private military companies, has already used drones to hit gang members in their urban strongholds, killing over 200 people. Foreign partners are also providing training to the newly reconstituted army. Meanwhile, citizens exhausted by the threat to their neighbourhoods have established self-defence groups, provoking a brutal riposte from the gangs. A well-resourced, properly informed and expertly commanded Gang Suppression Force could help change the balance of force on the ground and push the gangs onto the back foot. Port-au-Prince and its foreign counterparts, however, must take care to mitigate the dangers of civilian casualties and violations of human rights, ensuring that robust accountability systems are in place. Once the force is up and running, the Haitian government should also overcome the coordination failures4 that have plagued previous security campaigns. In particular, the government should appoint members to the National Security Council and ask them to design a strategy that lays out each institution’s role in fighting the gangs. Even so, it remains unlikely that force alone will entirely extricate gangs from the communities they control or sever the nexus with politics that has bedevilled Haiti for over half a century. Though informal negotiations with gangs take place on a regular basis – to gain access to people in need of humanitarian aid or to keep businesses open – many Haitians oppose the idea of formal dialogue with the perpetrators of crimes they consider unforgivable. Government officials have correctly said the Haitian state cannot engage in talks from a position of weakness. But if the new multinational force and revamped Haitian security forces allow the authorities to gain the upper hand and broadcast their armed superiority, state officials should look to use dialogue as a means of convincing the gangs to cut their losses, reduce violence against civilians and, eventually, demobilise.  

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2025. 69p.

By Pamela Ruiz

The Mara Salvatrucha 13 (mara) and Barrio 18 (pandilla) gangs have become a major concern for the governments of the Northern Triangle of Central America (Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras) and the United States. In recent years, government officials have attributed violence and the exodus of Central Americans to the developing capacities of gangs. The Mara Salvatrucha 13(MS-13) and Barrio 18 have been identified to strategically implement violence and extortion rackets which have led to transformations in their organizational structures and increased participation in drug trafficking. Furthermore, officials insinuate that gangs have developed capacities to confront security forces that enter gang territory with an increase in confrontations. This has resulted with Northern Triangle governments reclassifying gangs as organized crime and/or terrorist organizations; but, do these gangs meet the requirements to be classified as such? The overall purpose of this study is to examine the evolution of MS-13 and Barrio 18 in the Northern Triangle of Central America using mixed methods. Crime pattern theory provided the framework to understand the crime opportunity structures to explain the concentration of violence (homicides, extortion, and confrontations). Organized crime and gang concepts were used to evaluate gangs’ evolution with regards to their use of violence, extortion rackets,transformations in organizational structures, and roles in drug trafficking with a focus on their alliances with Los Zetas and the Sinaloa cartel (Mexican DTOs). Phase I of this study used official quantitative data to map the spatial concentration of homicides, extortions, and confrontations (gang-related crimes) at the municipality level for each country from 2007-2017. Phase II gathered qualitative data through purposive, semi-structured interviews with subject matter experts (academics, law enforcement, and NGO personnel) to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of the concentration of violence and whether gangs had evolved to organized crime organizations. Triangulation of the study data provided a more concise display of where these crimes concentrate and contributing factors to the gangs’ evolution. This study concludes illicit political economic networks between corrupt officials, narcotrafficking groups, and gangs contribute to violence and impunity in the Northern Triangle of Central America. The concentration of homicides in border municipalities was often associated with drug trafficking, homicides in urban areas were often associated with gangs, and homicides in rural areas were attributed to vengeance murders. Extortion concentrated in urban centers and was described as a crime of opportunity with various “imitators” involved. Confrontations between law enforcement personnel and gangs have led to formal accusations of extrajudicial executions. Moreover, the politicization of gangs has limited attention to address criminal activities and violence that are not associated with gangs. Therefore, this study’s findings indicate violence in the Northern Triangle of Central America can be attributed tointer-and-intra gang violence, 2) inter-and-intra narcotrafficking violence, 3) state violence and 4) non-gang related violence. Lastly, it is unquestionable MS-13 and Barrio 18 have evolved, while it is premature to classify these gangs as an organized crime group; this study puts forth categorizing gangs as “organized delinquency” to best describe their capacities.

New York: City University of New York, 2019. 193p.

By Sou Lee 

The purpose of this study is to gain a holistic understanding of the Asian gang phenomenon through the application of a meta-synthesis, which is seldom utilized within the criminal justice and criminology discipline. Noblit and Hare’s (1988) seven step guidelines for synthesizing qualitative research informed this methodology. Through this process, 15 studies were selected for synthesis. The synthesis of these studies not only identified prevalent themes across the sample, but also provided the basis for creating overarching metaphors that captured the collective experience of Asian gang members. Through the interpretive ordering of these metaphors, a line of synthesis argument was developed in which three major inferences about the Asian gang experience were made. First, regardless of ethnic and geographic differences, the experiences of Asian gangs and their members are similar. Second, although extant literature has applied different theories to explain gang membership for individual ethnic gangs (e.g. Chinese, Vietnamese), this synthesis revealed that the dominant theory for explaining the onset and persistence of Asian gangs is Vigil’s (1988) multiple marginality theory. Finally, in comparison to the broader literature, Asian gangs are more similar than they are different to non-Asian gangs because of their overlap in values.

Thesis, 2016. 127p.

By D.J. Summers

in the past five years, Colorado’s largest cities have had very different experiences of crime.

Colorado’s violent and property crime rates rose sharply in the early 2020s, prompting varying responses from leaders at state and local levels. Some have been more successful than others, according to the most recently available Colorado Bureau of Investigation data.

CSI analyzed the violent and property crime trends of Colorado’s ten largest cities: Denver, Colorado Springs, Aurora, Fort Collins, Lakewood, Thornton, Arvada, Westminster, Pueblo, and Centennial. These ten cities represent just under half the state’s total population, with a combined population of roughly 2.3 million residents. CSI analyzed the average violent and property crime rates per 100,000 people through the first two quarters of each year between 2016 and 2025. Pueblo’s police data is not current and could not be included in the analysis.

Property and violent crime cost the state $27 billion in economic losses in 2022 between the tangible and intangible effects of reported and unreported crime. It is imperative that public leaders continually examine and understand which policies best address crime rates.

Key Findings

Denver’s violent crime rate is the highest among Colorado’s largest cities, with 235 violent crimes per 100,000 people.

 Aurora’s is second highest, with 203 violent crimes per 100,000 people.

Aurora’s violent crime has remained beneath Denver’s for three years, breaking the trend of the late 2010s and early 2020s in which Aurora’s rates were higher.

Only Colorado Springs saw an increase in the violent crime rate between 2022 and 2025.

Among the largest cities, Aurora saw the sharpest decrease in violent crime rate.

Aurora saw the second highest decrease in violent crime rate, with a 36% decrease.

Denver has the highest property crime rate of Colorado’s largest cities, with 1,122 property crimes per 100,000 people.

Lakewood has the second highest rate, with 1,099 per 100,000 people.

Aurora and Centennial had the sharpest decreases in property crime rate since 2021, at 56%, 49%, and 44%, respectively. 

By Antonio L. Mazzitelli

The 10th Parallel marine and aerial routes linking South America and West Africa harbor a long history of trade between the two continents. More recently, these routes have become one of the preferred routes used by Latin American traffickers for shipping multi-tons of cocaine destined for the growing European market. The Parallel‘s growing importance in cocaine trafficking has made it known as cocaine ―Highway 10‖ among law enforcement. Latin American cocaine trafficking organizations, particularly the Colombian ones, have established stable bases in West Africa, controlling and developing the route. West African facilitators, Nigerians as well as an increasing number of nationals from all countries where shipments are stocked, have developed a stronger capacity for taking over a more ambitious and lucrative role in the business as transporters, partners, and final buyers. In one case (Guinea), the West African partner had already started developing his own trafficking and manufacturing capacity, reproducing the patterns that made Colombia the business model of the drug industry. In this reshaped context, of particular concern is the role played by the Colombian FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) as provider of cocaine shipments to West African cocaine entrepreneurs, as well as the impact of drug trafficking money on the financing of terrorist and rebel groups operating in the Sahel-Saharan belt. 

Miami:  Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center. 2011. 22p.

By Winnona DeSombre Bernsen

If the United States wants to increasingly use offensive cyber operations internationally, does it have the supply chain and acquisition capabilities to back it up—especially if its adversary is the People’s Republic of China? 

 The Cyber Statecraft Initiative’s new report from CSI nonresident fellow Winnona DeSombre Bernsen, Crash (exploit) and burn: Securing the offensive cyber supply chain to counter China in cyberspace,  is the first to conduct a comparative study within the international offensive cyber supply chain, comparing the United States’ fragmented, risk-averse acquisition model with China’s outsourced and funnel-like approach.

 Strategic competition between the United States and China has long played out in cyberspace, where offensive cyber capabilities, like zero-day vulnerabilities, are a strategic resource. Since 2016, China has been turning the zero-day marketplace in East Asia into a funnel of offensive cyber capabilities for its military and intelligence services, both to ensure it can break into the most secure Western technologies and to deny the United States from obtaining similar capabilities from the region. If the United States wishes to compete in cyberspace, it must compete against China to secure its offensive cyber supply chain.

Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2025. 44p

By Mark Button  · Vasileios Karagiannopoulos  · Julak Lee  · Joon Bae Suh  · Jeyong Jung

Introduction The nature of crime has been changing globally with technological and other societal developments fuelling a growth in fraud and cybercrime (Button and Cross 2017). The diversity and rapid evolution of a broad range of scams has led to millions across the globe becoming victims of fraud (Federal Trade Commission 2019; ONS 2023a, 2023b). A common belief often promoted in policy circles and some research is that older adults are more vulnerable to fraud (James et al. 2014). This is not so clear cut, however, as in terms of victimisation, the middle aged have been most at risk (see Fig. 1 later). This is changing and there is evidence older adults (65+) are fast becoming the one of the most at risk categories and that they also tend to lose much more than other age groups (see Table 1 later). Indeed, there are a variety of trends fuelling a potential explosion in fraud and cybercrime among older adults unless serious action is taken to reduce the risks that we will shortly explore. It is for this reason we conceived this special edition and the research project that underpins it. To set the context for this edition, it is important to examine the factors fuelling the growth in fraud and cybercrime victimisation among older age groups. We will do this using data from the UK and South Korea. The reason for the selection of these countries is simple. The funding for the project stimulating this edition came from ESRC funding aimed at developing relationships with these two countries 

  Security Journal (2025) 38:40

By Yen Zhi Yi
SYNOPSIS
In recent months, heightened media scrutiny has drawn attention to the proliferation of scam centres along Myanmar’s border towns and the subsequent crackdowns on them. Concurrently, Singapore has also witnessed a significant increase in scam-related incidents, with the government urging vigilance and taking precautionary measures to safeguard its citizens. Against this backdrop, it is imperative for ASEAN countries to work collaboratively to tackle this growing cross-border scourge. Doing so calls for stepped-up action at home to enhance awareness and enforcement collaboration abroad among regional partners to check this transnational security challenge.
 S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore, 2025. 6p.

By Bruce Wallace, Irene Shkolnikov, Collin Kielty, Derek Robinson, et al.

Background Illicit opioids, including fentanyl, are linked to unprecedented levels of overdose in Canada and elsewhere. The risks associated with illicit opioids can include high potency, unpredictable concentration and the unexpected presence in other drugs. Within this context, we examine drug checking data to better understand the presence of illicit opioids such as fentanyl in other drugs and possible ways to interpret these results. Methods Three years (2021–2023) of data (18,474 samples) from Substance Drug Checking in British Columbia, Canada were examined to investigate the risks associated with the detection of opioids in other drugs such as cocaine and methamphetamine, as well as in other drug categories. Samples were tested by paper spray mass spectrometry (PS-MS), fentanyl test strips and Fourier-Transform infrared spectroscopy (FTIR). We examine the 8889 samples not expected to include fentanyl to confirm; if the expected drug was detected, if unexpected opioids were detected, and when the unexpected opioids are in trace concentration. Results Unexpected opioids were rarely detected (2%) in other drugs (189 of 8889 samples) with most (61.4%) detected at trace concentration levels. Unexpected opioids are far more likely to be found in samples that did not contain the expected drug than in samples that were confirmed to contain the expected drug. The least common scenario (below 1%) were substances that included the expected drug plus unexpected opioid above trace concentration. These findings raise questions on how to interpret and communicate the detection of fentanyl and related opioids in other drugs. We present three potential interpretations: (1) mistaken and misrepresented samples where the expected drug was never detected, (2) cross contamination when opioids were at trace concentration levels, or (3) adulteration as the least frequent scenario where opioids were detected above trace concentrations in combination with the expected drug. Conclusions In a region where fentanyl is associated with extreme rates of overdose, it remains rare to find such opioids in other drugs. However, the risk of fentanyl in other drugs remains an ongoing threat that warrants responses by individuals and public health. We provide possible interpretations to inform such responses. Our data raises questions on how to interpret and communicate the detection of fentanyl and other opioids in other drugs.

Harm Reduction Journal, (2025) 22:28, 8p.

By Mostafa Soliman

The purpose of this research is to explore the domestic and international markets for small arms. Firstly, the research begins by summarizing the factors contributing to the illicit market of small arms and light weapons, including their ammunition, since their inception after World War II. Secondly, it explains the social, economic, and political aspects that impact weapons trafficking. Finally, it analyzes the attitudes of countries' policies towards the international regime for regulating small arms transfers, by comparing their national laws for acquiring and dealing with small weapons, as well as the various initiatives undertaken by either countries or non-governmental organizations to curb the illicit market of small arms.

Unpublished paper, 2023. 46p.

By Amazon Watch

This report, developed by Amazon Watch in collaboration with various Indigenous and human rights organizations, addresses the recent security crisis in Ecuador and the impacts of the repressive policies implemented by the government of Daniel Noboa. It highlights the increasing influence of organized crime and illegal mining in the Ecuadorian Amazon. This research exposes how criminal economies not only pose a threat to the livelihoods of Indigenous peoples, Afro-descendant communities, and traditional rural communities by endangering their territorial governance projects and the sustainability of their ways of life, but also severely compromises the ecological integrity of the Amazon. The conclusion contains a series of recommendations aimed at ensuring the rights of the civilian population in the context of the non-international armed conflict recently declared by the national government to address this crisis. It particularly emphasizes the need to provide protection guarantees and establish coordination mechanisms with the organizational structures of Indigenous peoples and nationalities, whose territorial governance projects are at risk. Additionally, it underscores the urgency of strengthening the government’s institutional capacity by developing coordinated actions to halt the advance of illegal economies, declaring the Amazon in a state of emergency, and taking immediate measures to prevent its destruction

Oakland, CA: Amazon Watch, 2024. 24p.

By Mercedes De Freitas , et al.

Organised crime and corruption in Venezuela have become a state problem that not only keeps Venezuelans in constant danger, but their effects are already impacting a number of Latin American countries, while the United States and several European nations have witnessed how illegal operations of power groups have infiltrated their financial and real estate systems with dirty money stolen from Venezuela’s coffers. A simple explanation for the complex humanitarian emergency facing Venezuela is that the country was subjected for several years to misguided public policies and decisions by authorities, which in most cases right out aimed to steal large amounts of money from the nation’s Treasury. It was a Grand Corruption scheme,1 with systematic measures that impinged on the entire population. This context was a breeding ground for organised crime, which became stronger with substantial firepower and economic resources, to the point of collaborating—in many cases—with agencies at all levels of authority, including senior officials in the administration. In view of this situation, at the end of this investigation we propose a set of initiatives to combat this evil, which will require forceful and unprecedented actions in Venezuela, such as resorting to the support of international organisations in the search for solutions that have been effective in other countries of the hemisphere, to punish the culprits. This work encompassed a nationwide vision—as opposed to the 2019 Organised Crime and Corruption study2 focused on border issues—which shows the map of criminal organisations, the types of crimes, the regional situation in various states, the role of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB), as well as an analysis of the situation of women regarding organised crime and corruption. The most important findings of this new study can be summarised as follows: 1. The existence of at least 9 major organised crime rings in Venezuela, involving more than 13,000 criminal organisations, some of which have ties to policy makers and public officials. 2. Crimes and acts of corruption boast total impunity. 3. The lack of robust public institutions, the dismantling of some of them, as well as the existence of incentives derived from some public policies such as price controls and fuel subsidies, are a breeding ground for misdeeds, crimes, human rights violations and the theft of public funds. 4. Venezuelan migrants are victims of illegal groups. 5. The implementation of a model called garrison state, “banana republic” style, whose main characteristics include institutionalised violence, colonisation of public administration and the incorporation of members of the Armed Forces into the economic leadership of the country. 6. The differentiating aspect of organised crime and corruption among Venezuelan women In this investigation, the effort was focused on determining the institutional, social and economic aspects of criminal activity in Venezuela and is developed in 6 chapters: 1. Anatomy of crime: the 9 major crime rings controlling Venezuela 2. Corruption and crime in the regions: lawless states. 3. Military power, crime and corruption. 4. Differential impact of corruption and organised crime on women in Venezuela. 5. Crime, security agencies and human rights. 6. A proposal to desmantled organized crime in Venezuela. The general objective has been to gather and organize relevant information, with the purpose of providing sufficient data and empirical analysis for political leadership, with power to lead the country, can design the strategies and public policies that will defeat and overcome corrupt practices, incentives to corruption and the action of organized crime that, to the detriment of governance and institutional integrity, have had devastating consequences for the lives of Venezuelans with violations to the human rights, destruction of the productive apparatus, of the public services, opportunities to overcome poverty, and that have generated a process of unprecedented degradation that led to the complex humanitarian emergency that they are suffering and still waiting for solutions. The statements, opinions, and ratings present in all chapters correspond experts, witnesses, victims and affected persons, some of whom have chosen not to disclose their identity

Caracas: Transparency Venezuela, 2020.....135p.

By Maloney, William, Marcela Melendez, and Raul Morales

The report titled “Organized Crime and Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean” underscores how these issues exacerbate the region's already fragile economic landscape. Latin America and the Caribbean are projected to grow by 2.1 percent in 2025 and 2.4 percent in 2026, positioning it as the slowest-growing region globally.

The region grapples with alarmingly high levels of lethal violence linked to organized crime. Victimization rates are three times higher than the global average, with homicide rates standing at eight times the global average.

The report outlines several factors contributing to the rise in organized crime, including escalating global demand for illegal goods, government crackdowns that have reconfigured criminal networks, and the COVID-19 pandemic, which allowed these groups to solidify their power in areas where state presence is weak.

“Organized crime is rapidly proliferating across the region, transcending domestic borders and becoming a pervasive threat. This is no longer an isolated issue; it demands a regional and global dialogue to elevate solutions and mobilize our collective expertise and resources,” said Carlos Felipe Jaramillo, Vice President for Latin America and the Caribbean at the World Bank.

This proliferation has clear development consequences. The report outlines how it threatens public safety, stifles economic growth and erodes the integrity of public institutions. The uncertainty surrounding property rights, rampant extortion, and pervasive insecurity inflate transaction costs for businesses, undermining competitiveness. Moreover, the diversion of public security resources from essential services like health and education burden countries already facing high debt and fiscal challenges.

“Fighting organized crime is not merely a law enforcement issue; it’s a development priority. It undermines governance, distorts investment, and exacerbates inequality. We must address this issue head-on to prevent it from becoming a permanent drag on growth,” said William Maloney, Chief Economist for Latin America and the Caribbean at the World Bank.

To address these challenges, the report calls for a robust agenda to enhance state capacity against organized crime, including police reform, improved prison systems, and strengthened judicial processes. Well-equipped institutions are key to achieving growth and development in the region.

Economic policies also play a crucial role in combating organized crime, promoting growth and job-creating reforms while providing youth with options through improved education and training. These initiatives raise the opportunity cost of crime, reducing its labor supply.

Finally, the report stresses the need for long-term research to inform government actions, as the absence of regular, comparable surveys hampers the development of effective policies

Washington, DC: World Bank, 2025. 92p.

By Sjoukje van Deuren, Marianne F. H. Hirsch Ballin, Edward R. Kleemans & Arjan A. J. Blokland

The Dutch criminal law system is based on individual liability, yet part of the crime and violence Outlaw Motorcycle Gang (OMCG) members commit is collective in nature. This study examines the criminal law approach towards collective criminal behavior of OMCG members. The study analyzes police files and court judgements of criminal law cases that were filed against members of Dutch OMCGs. Additionally, interviews were carried out with public prosecutors involved in these criminal cases. The results show that it is often difficult to legally address OMCGs as criminal organizations or weigh the mere symbolic contribution of fellow club members to crime, such as the use of the OMCGs’ violent reputation. Furthermore, the results suggest that in order to circumvent legal difficulties in addressing group symbolism and OMCGs as collectives via criminal law, the Dutch Public Prosecution Office has recently opted for a stronger interplay between criminal and civil law, targeting both individual OMCG members and the structural aspects of OMCGs. Future research is needed to establish which (interplays between) legal instruments are most effective in responding to collective criminal behavior.

Trends in Organized Crime (2025) 28:79–99

By Huma Haider

Organised crime actors can be spoilers in peace processes or partners in peace. Policymakers and practitioners have in some cases engaged in a strategic trade-off – accepting organised crime as part of the political settlement to achieve short-term stability. However, the relationship between illicit markets and conflict can deepen over time, entrenching criminal structures in the post-conflict state. As Kemp and Shaw (2014, p. 16) argue, ‘failure to integrate issues of organised crime into mediation strategies and peace processes will leave the international community with a potentially dangerous blind spot.’ Negotiating with organised crime groups and addressing criminal agendas in peace processes has become a reality in practice. There is, however, limited research on negotiating with criminal actors in peace processes. In seeking to address this gap, this paper reviews scholarly and practitioner literature across a wide range of research disciplines. 1 Key findings from this evidence review include: • Confrontation approaches have failed to resolve the problem of serious organised crime (SOC) and, in some cases, have fuelled more violence and criminality. • Organised crime groups that have strong internal cohesion and hierarchical leadership are more likely to be considered potential partners in negotiation. • Negotiation can be a necessary approach when criminal groups have strong territorial control – serving as de facto authorities that fill governance gaps. • Socio-economic and financial opportunities, and legal leniency, can encourage criminal actors to come to the negotiating table and agree on a deal. • A criminal group’s demand for legal leniency tends to be higher when they are expected to make larger concessions, such as to disarm and demobilise. • It is challenging to determine an ‘end state’ to a criminal group and to achieve complete resolution of the criminal agenda. • Lack of political will, inadequate resources, and weak long-term planning constrain positive outcomes of negotiation processes and deal implementation. • Negotiators and mediators need to mitigate the risks of moral hazard and strengthening of criminal groups. • The lack of broad public support for negotiating with SOC actors can undermine and destroy such processes. • A balance is needed between satisfying the interests of victims and of perpetrators to avoid alienating victims and producing public backlash for negotiated deals. • Many negotiations tend to occur in secret, yet lack of transparency can undermine the legitimacy and sustainability of outcomes. This review demonstrates the importance of creating a framework for engaging with criminality and organised crime groups that extends beyond confrontation – allowing for accommodation and incorporating a wider societal change agenda through transformation. This requires an understanding of when to address SOC and engage criminal groups in peace processes; how to motivate actors to negotiate, conclude and implement deals; how to increase the likelihood of positive outcomes; and how to mitigate risks associated with negotiation. Drawing on a wide breadth of interdisciplinary literature, this paper aims to provide insights into these crucial questions. The case studies illustrate key themes and findings from this review (see Appendix 1). In El Salvador, ineffective confrontation, the internal cohesion of gangs, and an opportune moment contributed to the the successful conclusion of a gang truce. It ultimately failed, however, due in large part to public outrage that translated into political pullback. In Colombia, negotiations with the FARC2 produced an innovative transitional justice mechanism that, alongside security guarantees, served as an effective inducement for disarmament. In contrast, the absence of a requirement to disarm and demobilise was a key criticism of negotiations with gangs in Jamaica, where violence has continued. In Mali and in Kosovo, international actors were initially hesitant to address organised crime in peace processes, yet this was subsequently recognised as contributing to longer-term instability, resulting in new strategies to address SOC actors.

SOC ACE Evidence Review Paper No. 3.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. 2023. 88p.