By Iván Flores Martínez & Matthew Phillips 

Research on ‘the War on Drugs’ in Mexico finds that military interventions increase lethal violence in the country. However, these studies fail to account for other processes that may be driving the behavior of lethal violence in the Mexican municipalities. We find confirmation that these rival processes influence the relative impact that military interventions have on lethal violence. In particular, we find that seasonality in violence, competition for scarce resources and PAN’s governance in the municipalities are associated with higher levels of lethal violence, as measured by the young male homicide rate. We argue that the literature may have overestimated the effect that military interventions have in lethal violence in municipalities and that other drivers of violence should be taken into account to accurately measure the impact that military interventions have on lethal violence.

By Laurie Caron, Frank Crispino, Cyril Muehlethaler

Tobacco smuggling remains a widespread illegal activity in Canada, associated with important social and economic impacts, and often linked to organized crime. This study explores the application of forensic profiling as an intelligence tool to support the analysis of contraband cigarette production and distribution. Physical and chemical manufacturing characteristics of seized contraband cigarette packs, provided by police forces, were observed and coded using macroscopic, microscopic, and spectroscopic techniques. Multivariate statistical analyses were then conducted to compare manufacturing characteristics between packs and identify potential links. The analyses highlighted links between cigarette packs and seizures based on shared manufacturing characteristics. The results and the identified groups were also compared with seizure data provided by our collaborator. The results demonstrate the relevance of forensic profiling to formulate hypotheses regarding shared production processes or supply networks. These hypotheses provide information that contributes to understanding tobacco smuggling and aim to examine how forensic intelligence can support law enforcement and measures to prevent and disrupt this criminal activity. A preliminary optimal procedure for applying forensic profiling in operational contexts targeting contraband tobacco was finally proposed. Despite limitations in the dataset creation that were beyond our control, this study represents a starting point for applying this scientific approach to tobacco smuggling.

By Yael Anahí López Torres

Mexico is grappling with a crisis of insecurity after over 30 years since its transition to democracy. Its top-down and frequently militarised policies have been ineffective, leading to calls by scholars to alter the state’s security paradigm that has not been able to fulfil the basic right of citizens to live in a secure country. As a response to these calls, this thesis goes beyond the common state-centric perspectives on security policies and instead it focuses on the often-overlooked subnational responses to criminal violence. In particular, I perform an analysis of bottom-up responses, considering the local dynamics of institutions and civil society. My research questions are: What is the role of bottom-up approaches in responding to criminal violence? And as an extension, what are the factors that enable or constrain their responses? To achieve these objectives, I conducted micro-level analyses and comparisons of two different case studies: Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua and Monterrey, Nuevo León. These analyses explore variations in bottom-up responses, drawing on fieldwork in the form of 57 interviews with key state and societal actors and complementary documentary resources. The analysis emphasises Mexico’s subnational democratisation processes, considering its effects on the (un)rule of law and violence. My findings reveal that uneven democratisation hinders state capacity to address the security crisis, requiring organised society to intervene. In both cases, this contributed to countering and shaping the patterns of criminal violence. Local organised society pursued broader democratic goals by promoting the means for the rule of law, while high-risk collective mobilisation was fundamental in increasing political participation. The pre-existing institutions, the local actors and the alliances thatenabled these changes varied between cases, and followed waves of political urgency and electoral periods that both provided opportunities for change, but also disrupted ongoing projects. This contributes to the scholarship of criminal politics by bridging the literature of democratisation and state capacity.

By Romain Le Cour Grandmaison and Paul Frissard Martinez

The contemporary boom of global avocado consumption has drawn attention to Mexico’s industry and the expanding criminal networks that surround it. In fact, avocado production and exports – both to the United States and the European Union − display worrying signs of criminal organizations being involved in the market, human rights violations, and environmental and health impacts.

By Araceli Vázquez-Ocaña and Alan Alberto Ramírez-Guevara

This study proposes a non-linear analytical framework, inspired by phase-transition theory, to explain abrupt regime shifts in organized violence within weak institutional systems.Using Mexico (2000-2024) as a primary case, we demonstrate that criminal violence does not escalate linearly but undergoes a "phase transition" once specific thresholds are crossed. We introduce the Criminal Nucleation Framework to model the emergence and persistence of criminal cells through three dimensions: the institutional activation barrier (ΔG), the critical organizational size (r*), and the growth constant (k). Empirical validation shows a structural rupture between 2007 and 2010, where homicide rates shifted from a stable regime (8.5–10 per 100k) to a chronic state (25–29 per 100k). By operationalizing a comparative Kinetic Risk Index (R = k/ΔG), the framework classifies cities into distinct systemic states rather than providing point predictions. The findings suggest that once a system exhibits hysteresis, reactive force is structurally insufficient; instead, policy must focus on increasing the activation barrier to prevent spontaneous criminal formation.

By Bram Ebus

In the jungle along the Colombian-Venezuelan frontier, guerrillas, criminals and shadowy state elements jostle for illicit profits. Venezuela’s campaign against one armed group has raised tensions. Bogotá and Caracas should temper their war of words and work to forestall an inadvertent bilateral escalation.

By Marisa Ross, Susan Burtner, and Andrew Papachristos

Introduction: Community violence intervention street outreach (CVI-SO) strategies are growing in popularity as non-punitive approaches to solving the public health problem of community gun violence. Evidence on the effectiveness of CVI-SO on rates of violence is mixed and faces challenges due to concerns with documentation and data privacy, intentional selection bias in program design, and variation in participant risk and needs. Effective evaluation requires methods that accurately capture the scope and delivery of services, starting with a greater understanding of the services CVI participants receive and how they vary based on individual characteristics.

Methods: This study explores the services that participants received from a coalition of Chicago CVI organizations from 2017–2023. Considering administrative and programmatic data from over 4,000 participants’ nearly 200,000 interactions with providers, the researchers examine patterns in demographics, network-based risk factors, and service provision and dosage. They then use descriptive and latent profile analyses to characterize the “typical” participant in Chicago.

Results: Results show that CVI work relies heavily on long-term mentoring relationships. Service patterns show that latent groups exist with varying dosage: higher dosage participants with higher risk for gun violence receive more frequent contacts over longer periods, demonstrating how organizations adjust their approach based on participant needs. Profiles that primarily receive behavioral or social supports-related services also emerge.

Conclusions: Findings underscore the need for evaluation frameworks that capture both the strategic variation in service delivery and the multiple pathways through which CVI programs influence participant outcomes.

By Yennesit Palacios Valencia and Ignacio García Marín

  Colombia is among the countries with the highest levels of violence and crime in the world, despite the peace agreements between the State and different armed groups, including the FARC. This is partly due to the fact that the Colombian case is complex and multifaceted because of the variety of participants in the armed conflict context and due to the mutation of new actors, under the modality of organized crime. Based on the above, the objective is to study the Colombian reality, contextually and diachronically, from theoretical and epistemological elements to demonstrate how violence and criminality factors intersect in the context of the armed conflict. The study concludes, among other findings, that in Colombia the ambiguity and the multiplicity of terms used to name the emerging criminal groups presents a legal problem because of their hybrid composition and regarding their treatment within or outside of the armed conflict

By The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime

Levels of organized crime have remained stable across Europe while increasing in most other regions, according to the 2025 Global Organized Crime Index. Europe remains the second-lowest continent for criminality after Oceania. However, this overall stability masks a dynamic situation across criminal markets and criminal actors.

Europe’s overall criminality score stands at 4.74, while its resilience score reaches 6.28 —the highest globally. Although Europe continues to outperform other continents across all 12 resilience indicators, criminality continues to expand and adapt, highlighting the need to update resilience strategies to keep pace with emerging threats.

Financial crime remains the most pervasive criminal market in Europe for the second consecutive edition of the Index. These crimes include increasingly complex and sophisticated fraud schemes, largely occurring online, such as investment fraud, business email compromise and romance scams, as well as embezzlement and tax evasion. Financial crimes are inherently transregional and are particularly facilitated by corruption.

Europe continues to be a global hotspot for cyber-dependent crimes, ranking second continentally. These crimes range from ransomware attacks to malware distribution and cryptocurrency fraud, often targeting government institutions, major corporations and critical infrastructure. Hybrid and traditional cybercrime actors are increasingly intertwined, with state-sponsored groups often disguising themselves as cybercriminals.

Drug markets remain salient. Cocaine and synthetic drugs have recorded the sharpest increases since 2023. Cocaine is a primary source of revenue for numerous organized crime groups in Europe, and the continent functions as a destination, transit hub and consumer market. Synthetic drug production is becoming increasingly dispersed across Europe, with Central and Eastern Europe registering the sharpest increase since 2021. Heroin, by contrast, is showing signs of decline, while cannabis remains the most widely consumed illicit drug.

Human trafficking and human smuggling remain far-reaching and widespread. Smuggling networks are entrenched along the Western Balkans route, and many European countries serve as final destinations where smuggled people may face forced labour or sexual exploitation.

The presence of criminal actors has grown steadily since 2021. Foreign actors remain the most concerning actor type, recording the largest overall increase since 2021. These groups are increasingly heterogeneous, multi-ethnic and interconnected. Private-sector actors also play a pivotal role in laundering illicit funds, while state-embedded actors, though less pervasive than elsewhere, are implicated in facilitating criminal activity in some contexts.

Europe’s resilience strengths lie in international cooperation, national policies and laws, and territorial integrity. However, government transparency and accountability consistently rank lowest among resilience indicators. Anti-money laundering and economic regulatory capacity also remain areas of concern.

While Europe demonstrates relatively strong resilience overall, certain criminal markets and actors are expanding. The findings underscore the need for more effective and tailored response mechanisms as organized crime continues to adapt across the continent.

By Nathan P. Jones and John P. Sullivan

Criminal cartels and gangs dominate the illicit economy in Mexico. These organized crime groups challenge the solvency (specifically capacity and legitimacy) of the state in Mexico. Organized crime in Mexico is involved in a range of activities including extortion, drug trafficking, human trafficking, and petroleum theft. Criminal cartels, often called drug trafficking organizations, have diversified into other illicit activities specifically petroleum theft. This paper provides an overview of the rise of a specialized organized criminal entity: huachicoleros. Huachicoleros specialize in fuel theft and like their narco counterparts use corruption and violence to protect their illicit market. The rise of Cártel de Santa Rosa Lima (CSRL) is discussed as a salient case study. The volatile mix of corruption, violence, and economic instability will be assessed, and government and national oil company (PEMEX) response is discussed

By Evan Ellis

The U.S. government threats of tariffs on the Mexican government if it did not do more to control illicit fentanyl ows into the United States have cast new attention on the growing problem of transnational organized crime that has wrought violence and corruption at all levels in Mexico. This work, based on the authors research in interviews with senior Mexican security ofcials in Mexico City in March 2025, examines the evolution of transnational organized crime in the country, and the Mexican government’s response, with the support of the United States and other partners.The principal drivers of transnational organized crime dynamics in Mexico are ows of cocaine through the country, largely destined for European and Asian markets, as well as the production of fentanyl there from Chinese and other precursors, mostly oriented toward export to the United States. In addition, other illicit activities including petroleum theft (huachicol), smuggling and exploitation of migrants transiting the country, extortion and kidnapping, illegal mining and money laundering, have also fueled Mexico’s evolving illicit economy. With respect to murders and other violence in Mexico, arms, including long arms imported from the United States, arms obtained on the black market from Central American and other global wars, drones and other military products principally from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as well as a large, welldeveloped illicit domestic industry for military vehicles and supplies all contribute to the lethality of multiple ongoing conict within the country.The organized crime dynamics in Mexico, the domestic and international groups involved, in the pattern of violence has evolved signicantly in the almost two decades since 2006 when Mexican president Felipe Calderon declared war on the drug cartels for their escalating violence and deployed federal troops into Michoacan to respond. This work analyzes of those dynamics, their evolution, and the response of the Mexican government, in conjunction with the US and other partners.

By Patricia Faraldo Cabana

In recent years the interrelation of the trafficking of cultural property with other forms of organised crime has gained prominence in EU policies on the protection of cultural heritage. This article analyses how the EU has conceptualized and operationalized this overlap in terms of describing the phenomenon and designing countermeasures. Through a content analysis, we evaluate the articulation and use of this connection in EU policy documents published from 1993 to 2023 that include both organised crime and trafficking of cultural property or similar terms (n = 58). The analysis demonstrates conceptual and organizational deficits and a correspondingly weak foundation for EU policy. Misunderstandings related to the organised nature of trafficking of cultural property and its overlaps with other forms of organised crime, particularly the financing of terrorism, may result in misguided policies with the potential to undermine law enforcement efforts. Conversely, the addition to the list of obliged entities and persons in the anti-money laundering framework of persons trading or acting as intermediaries in the trade of works of art opens new opportunities to disrupt the illicit financial flow in the art and antiquities market.

By Omar García-Ponce 

Organized criminal groups (OCGs), ranging from local gangs to powerful drug cartels that operate across national boundaries, represent the single most important security threat in Mexico and Central America. A growing body of research in political science and other disciplines has examined the political and socioeconomic roots of these organizations, as well as the mechanisms underlying the production of organized criminal violence. The unprecedented wave of organized criminal violence that has been affecting the region in recent years can be traced back to political transformations and policy changes that disrupted the social and political order at the local level, redefining the organization of illicit markets, and undermining the rule of law. On these issues there is a particularly rich literature that focuses on understanding the outbreak of violence and criminal rivalry in Mexico. Several studies have emphasized the role of state-criminal group relationships as a key factor to understand the challenges that organized crime poses in terms of peacebuilding and democratic rule. Within this framework, the existing literature has identified various forms of criminal governance prevalent in Mexico and Central America, and shed light on how communities respond to crime and violence in contexts of low state capacity. Some of these responses include social mobilization, vigilantism, and support for extralegal violence. The use of violence by OCGs in electoral contexts has also received particular attention in the literature, since they often target candidates or intimidate voters, affecting political preferences and patterns of political participation. Finally, a series of studies has rigorously investigated the impact of organized criminal violence on a number of outcomes, including political attitudes and behavior, trust in institutions, and health and education, among others.

By Omar García-Ponce

The study of criminal violence has received increasing attention in political science over the past 15 years, as organized criminal groups have grown and diversified worldwide, unleashing unprecedented waves of violence. This article presents a critical assessment of the current state of political science scholarship on criminal violence. It discusses the sources and dynamics of organized criminal violence, emphasizing the reconceptualization of state–criminal group relationships in the literature, shifts in illegal markets, and the political incentives fueling criminal wars. It also examines how states and societies respond to criminal violence. State responses include punitive approaches, institutional reform, and community-based interventions, while societal responses can be examined through the lenses of exit (e.g., migration, disengagement), voice (e.g., political participation, collective resistance), and loyalty (i.e., compliance with state authorities or criminal groups). The article also addresses conceptual and methodological challenges, policy implications, and ethical considerations inherent in this field of study and identifies promising pathways for future research.

By Jan Slobodník

This study examines the militarised approach of the Mexican government in its struggle against organised crime between 2001 and 2016, focusing on the deployment of the armed forces and the implementation of the so-called kingpin strategy. It argues that the removal of cartel leaders, rather than weakening criminal networks, produced fragmentation, diversification, and militarisation within Mexico’s underworld—a process defined here as zetafication. The thesis uses the rise and evolution of Los Zetas as a case study to analyse how a criminal organisation born from army deserters introduced military tactics, hierarchical discipline, and extreme violence into organised crime, transforming the conflict’s character and the state’s response. Drawing on government reports, interviews with Mexican military officers and civilians, and contemporary scholarship, the study situates this phenomenon within Mexico’s political, legal, and socio-economic context, including the influence of U.S. security policy. It concludes that the use of the military as a policing tool produces short-term tactical gains but undermines long-term state stability, erodes public trust, and perpetuates cycles of violence.

By Daniel Brombacher, Ruggero Scaturro and Sarah Fares

 Africa-linked organised crime is a growing threat for Europe. The phenomenon embraces a broad array of organised crime groups, criminal networks and criminal markets. Debate on the topic is highly polarised and marked by knowledge gaps. This paper seeks to shed light on the challenge, drawing on field research and case studies from Italy, France, Germany and the Netherlands. Key points • Africa-linked organised crime is deeply intertwined with the social and economic marginalisation of African immigrant communities within Europe. • Africa-based organised crime groups in Europe show high levels of adaptability to local conditions, resulting in different criminal patterns across countries. • Nigerian organised crime groups maintain hierarchical, financial and operational links to Nigeria, often using legal covers in Europe. • African diaspora networks in Europe maintain few ties to North Africa, are heavily involved in retail and wholesale drug markets and maintain operational flexibility. • Effective countermeasures require improved evidence gathering, intelligence sharing and targeted disruption of financial flows.

By Diorella Islas

This thesis seeks to develop a better understanding of the transnational behaviour of drug trafficking organisations (DTOs) by documenting the role that Mexican DTOs had in the cocaine trafficking to Europe after 2008. This was the year when the Italian authorities announced their discoveries that there were business interaction between the Mexican DTOs and the Italian mafia groups. At the same time the Italian authorities were announcing their findings, my literature review showed a lack of analysis and documentation regarding the transnationalization of Mexican DTOs to Europe. While most of the literature focuses on the explanation of the cartels inside Mexico, my research question focused on clarifying whether or not the Mexican DTOs are expanding their cocaine trafficking activities to Europe. At this point I considered the reports of the Italian authorities that affirm that the Mexican DTOs are relevant drug trafficking intermediaries in the cocaine trafficking routes to Europe. To answer my research question, and to systematically describe the evolution of DTOs, a qualitative methods approach was deployed (Mohajan, 2018) with a case study design adapted from Yin (2003). My analysis was carried out through the use of multiple triangulation techniques that helped me to collect and study different types of data to understand the subject. I collected empirical information through 28 interviews with security personnel with experience in countering Mexican DTOs or in the cocaine routes to Europe. The information gathered from the security personnel, complemented by official reports and open source information, was useful to answer my research question and test my hypothesis. The analysis showed that despite Italian authorities’ claims and perceptions, the power of the Mexican cartels is very limited when talking about their presence and links in Europe, and resulted in four key findings. Firstly, that the perception of the Mexican DTOs as having trans-Atlantic powers is erroneous, because the evidence showed that there is no transatlantic expansion. Secondly, the analysis uncovered the internal, national and international variables that were observed to alter the evolution and behaviour of the Mexican DTOs. At the internal level, the variables included the loss of leadership and the grievances between groups. At the national level the identified variables were the democratic transitions, corruption and impunity networks. And at the international level the variables were the international drug demand, the changes in the international illicit world, the situation of governance and corruption in foreign countries and the geography of theregion where the illicit business are taking place. The third finding was that the transatlantic cocaine trafficking routes are not controlled by an specific actor, but they are horizontal structures that are highly adaptative. The final key finding refers to a methodological observation which I describe as the “paradox of referencing”; when many sources reference something that was true in the past –like the links between Mexican DTOs and Italian mafia discovered in 2008– they help to perpetuate the present perception of a past phenomenon.

By Carina Bruwer 

The Atlantic Ocean is a vital conduit for vessels transporting and sourcing licit and illicit commodities. Much of the focus on maritime crime has been on the North Atlantic and the Gulf of Guinea, with fragmented attention paid to illicit activities further south in the Atlantic bordering Angola, Namibia and South Africa. This paper maps transnational organised crimes facilitated by vessels, with the aim of identifying challenges and opportunities in safeguarding southwestern Africa’s coast. Key points • Various vessels transport and source illicit commodities in Africa’s South Atlantic. • The Red Sea conflict has increased vessel traffic around Southern Africa’s coast, bringing both opportunities and risks to trade. • Cocaine remains the primary drug entering Africa via the South Atlantic, but synthetic drug and precursor trafficking is increasing. • Flags of convenience facilitate illegal fishing on the Angola/Namibian border. • Limited resources constrain counter-efforts. • Mapping Africa’s South Atlantic illicit markets provides an evidence base for stakeholders working to counter them.

By: Nasreen Solomons and Harsha Gihwala

Summary - The victim–offender spectrum of human trafficking is characterised by blurred lines and complex circumstances. Recognising varying degrees of voluntariness in individual cases of women along this spectrum would allow legislators and the justice system to understand the complicated contexts in which women intersect with trafficking, where culpability is not always clear-cut. States have a responsibility to develop legislation, policy and strategies that reflect this nuance and enable more effective interventions for those who fall anywhere on this spectrum.

By José Gustavo Arocha

BOTTOM LINE UP FRONT: 

1 Tren de Aragua (TdA) has morphed from a prison gang into a paramilitary instrument of the Maduro regime, now active in at least eleven Latin American countries [1] and twenty-three U.S. states, [2] according to the U.S. House Oversight Committee (2025).

2 Strategic Alignment. TdA’s deliberate expansion complements Venezuela’s Guerra de Todo el Pueblo asymmetric-warfare doctrine, [3] erasing boundaries between statecraft and organized crime.

3 Elastic Network. The gang’s “insurgent archipelago” [4] of semiautonomous cells, linked through encrypted channels, makes it exceptionally resilient; when joint Peruvian-U.S. raids freed more than eighty trafficking victims in January 2025, [5] replacement cells reemerged within days. [6]

4 Weaponized Migration. By monetizing migrant flows, selling “all risk” travel packages that often devolve into debt bondage, [7] TdA offloads costs onto regional adversaries; more than 520,000 migrants transited through the Darién Gap in 2023. [8]

5 Persistent Threat. Despite terrorism designations by the United States, Argentina, Ecuador, and Trinidad and Tobago—and nearly 3,500 U.S. arrests as of August 2025, [9] TdA’s franchise model is regenerating faster than law enforcement can dismantle it.