By Sherry, Suzanna

Last October, progressive Jews were shocked by the raw antisemitism displayed by their erstwhile allies on the political left. After Hamas terrorists tortured, raped, or murdered more than 1200 Israeli civilians and took some 200 civilians hostage, some progressives – especially on college campuses – celebrated. They chanted the Palestinian mantra “from the river to the sea,” seeking to erase Israel (and Jews) from the face of the earth. The number of antisemitic incidents on campus soared, coming from both students and faculty. A Stanford lecturer forced Jewish students to the back of the classroom and labeled them “colonizers.” Jewish students had to barricade themselves inside a library at Cooper Union, and Jewish students at MIT were told by faculty to avoid the university’s main lobby for their own safety. Many university presidents who had previously sent out campus-wide emails condemning the murder of George Floyd, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the overruling of Roe v. Wade, and countless other world events suddenly discovered the Kalven Principles and claimed it would be inappropriate for them to take sides, or issued weak statements about how the situation in the Middle East was complicated. This double standard continued as some universities responded to student calls for genocide of Jews by invoking principles of free speech, principles that had been notably ignored when the speech in question was directed at other groups. Most campus DEI (diversity, equity, and inclusion) offices, especially at the most elite universities, had nothing to say about the surging antisemitism. This essay explains why no one should have been shocked, or even mildly surprised, by the progressive response to the massacre. Progressive or “woke” culture –as exemplified by critical race theory, anti-racism of the Ibram X. Kendi variety, and, especially on college campuses, the DEI juggernaut – is necessarily and inevitably antisemitic at its core. That these related movements have now exposed their antisemitism publicly is no surprise: antisemitism is bred in their bones.

FIU Law Review from Vol. 25 to Vol. 19, Vanderbilt Law Research Paper No. 24-4, 2024. 

By Rupert Horsley

This report details the key trends and developments in human smuggling in Libya in 2023. In large degree, the year was one of continuity with the patterns seen in 2022. Over the course of the year, for example, 77 470 migrants departed the Libyan coast, only marginally higher than 2022’s figure of 75 500.1 Furthermore, hybrid migration, in which migrants travel to Libya regularly or semi-regularly before attempting the sea crossing to Europe, accounted for an estimated 75% of these departures, also roughly similar to the proportion recorded in 2022. Many of the migrants involved in hybrid journeys first arrived in Libya at Benina airport in the east of the country. This indicates the increasing importance of eastern Libya to human smuggling writ large. In addition to the migrant arrivals at Benina airport, eastern Libya also saw a dramatic rise in departures from the coastal areas in and around Tobruk in 2023, with some 40% of sea crossings in the first half of the year taking place from there. Some, though not all, of the migrants leaving from the east coast had arrived in Benina. While heightened enforcement by the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) suppressed departures from the Tobruk hub in the second half of 2023, the body reportedly continued to allow Benina to be used as the main air travel arrival point for hybrid migration for the rest of the year. Thus, the LAAF clearly emerged as one of the main actors influencing hybrid migration in Libya in 2023. Following the shutdown of the Tobruk system, hybrid migration sea crossings were displaced to the west coast. By August, departures from this area had increased significantly and there were reports of migrants accumulating in warehouses in several hubs. In October, a notably large series of departures from Zuwara occurred at a remarkable rate. Increased departures from the west coast indicate that entrenched smuggling networks remain ready to seize opportunities. Given the political and security fragmentation of the region, these networks are likely to underpin the resilience of human smuggling in Libya for the foreseeable future. A notable element that remained marginal in 2023 was trans-Saharan smuggling through Libya. This was once a major route for migrants departing from Libya, but has declined significantly since 2017/18 due to insecurity and migrant abuse in Libya and law enforcement action in downstream countries. One of the few significant developments was the relatively moderate but growing number of Sudanese refugees fleeing the civil war in that country. However, this was not substantial enough to drive systematic changes in the dynamics of overland human smuggling. Similarly, Sudanese nationals did not leave the Libyan coast in large numbers. This is the latest GI-TOC monitoring report on human smuggling in Libya. It builds on the series of annual reports that has been issued since 2017, tracking the evolution of human smuggling in Libya, as well as the political, security and economic dynamics that influence it.2   

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 36p.

By Ingri Bøe Buer

This article reconsiders peace and security from the perspectives of community leaders, educators and activists in favelas in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 2019–2020. Through a critical lens, it argues that the urban violence in Rio de Janeiro resembles a form of new wars where the state is a major producer of insecurity. It questions the meaning of peace and top-down pacification processes in a city where the favelas, since their origin, have been considered dangerous areas needing to be pacified and controlled. The article introduces favela peace formation as a concept to describe alternative processes working to reduce the inter-sectional forms of violence in these communities: non-violent, locally legitimate peace processes working to slowly construct a positive, sustainable peace. To conclude, it discusses how favela peace formation presents a way of imagining peace as ‘care’ instead of ‘order’ in response to the state’s violent peace as ‘control’

Peacebuilding, DOI: 10.1080/21647259.2024.2354083

By Sarah Projansky

Looking at popular culture from 1980 to the present, feminism appears to be "over": that is, according to popular critics we are in an era of "postfeminism" in which feminism has supposedly already achieved equality for women. Not so, says Sarah Projansky. In Watching Rape, Projansky undermines this complacent view in her fascinating and thorough analysis of depictions of rape in U.S. film, television, and independent video. Through a cultural studies analysis of such films as Thelma and Louise, Daughters of the Dust, and She's Gotta Have It, and television shows like ER, Ally McBeal, Beverly Hills 90210, and various made-for-tv movies, Projansky challenges us to see popular culture as a part of our everyday lives and practices, and to view that culture critically. How have media defined rape and feminism differently over time? How do popular narratives about rape also communicate ideas about gender, race, class, nationality, and sexuality? And, what is the future of feminist politics, theory, and criticism with regard to issues of sexual violence, postfeminism, and popular media? The first study to address the relationship between rape and postfeminism, and one of the most detailed and thorough analyses of rape in 25 years, Watching Rape is a crucial contribution to contemporary feminism.

New York: NYU Press, 2001.

May Contain Markup

By Eliza Earle Ferguson

Crimes of Passion: The book explores how crimes of passion,particularly those involving intimate violence, were understood and treated in fin-de-siècle Paris. These acts were often seen as love stories gone wrong and were frequently acquitted.

Gender Dynamics: It highlights the gendered nature of intimate violence, showing how men and women experienced and justified violence differently, often influenced by societal norms and economic conditions.

Community and Legal Interactions: The document discusses the role of community networks and the legal system in addressing intimate violence, revealing tensions between local knowledge and state power.

Historical Context: The book situates these issues within the broader social and cultural context of 19th-century Paris, providing a detailed analysis of how intimate violence intersected with gender, class, and urban life.

JHU Press, Mar 19, 2010, 268 pages

By Ghulam Hyder Sindhi

Historical Context: The document explores the historical and cultural roots of honour killings, highlighting how these practices have evolved over time and their deep-seated presence in various societies.

Status of Women: It discusses the status of women in Pakistan,emphasizing the social, economic, and political challenges they face,including limited access to education and economic opportunities.

Violence Against Women: The document provides an in-depth analysis of different forms of violence against women, including domestic violence, psychological violence, and honour killings.

Recommendations: It offers recommendations for improving the status of women, such as legal reforms, educational initiatives, and the need for a broader social movement to raise awareness and change societal attitudes.

National Institute of Pakistan Studies, 2007, 212 pages

By Scottish Government. Safer Communities Directorate

This research reports on 22 victims' and witnesses' experiences of court since the introduction of the Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018 (DASA) in April 2019. The Act aimed to expand understandings of domestic abuse, improve the criminal justice system's ability to tackle domestic abuse effectively and increase courts' capacity to protect victims, witnesses and associated children. This in-depth qualitative study contributes to a programme of work to meet the Ministerial 3-year reporting requirement of DASA (S14(2) (f)) to provide: 'information about the experience of witnesses (including witnesses who are children) at court'. Early implementation of the Act (2019-22) coincided with the advent of COVID-19, which had an unprecedented impact on those experiencing domestic abuse and the operation of the justice system; these findings should be considered in that context.

Key findings

According to the 22 adult and child victims/witnesses involved in the research:

The new law better reflects how adult victims experience domestic abuse: participants reported a range of psychological, physical and, for some, sexual harm over time. However, there was limited awareness of what constitutes criminal behaviour under DASA amongst the public (including victims/witnesses) and the professionals that participants encountered.

Many participants felt DASA and/or its provisions were under-utilised. Most reported a continued focus on single/severe incidents of physical violence rather than ongoing abuse. Many felt the justice system struggled with prosecution of psychological abuse, particularly regarding verbal, telephone and online abusive behaviour.

Most parents/child witnesses reported that harm to children was insufficiently recognised; they felt perpetrators were not held accountable for the impact that domestic abuse had on children and that children's safety and specific needs/vulnerabilities were inadequately addressed. Many victims felt that abuse of a third party – for example, family and friends – had not been taken account of adequately throughout the process.

Although there were some positive examples of reporting to the police, this was not the experience of the majority of participants. The immediate aftermath of reporting domestic abuse was a time of particular vulnerability for victims and witnesses. Most participants felt an onus was on them to keep themselves safe during this time.

Participants had inadequate knowledge of decision-making processes and the rationale for decisions made throughout the investigation and court proceedings. They cited a lack of communication, collaboration and involvement/transparency in decision-making. Far from being at the centre of the justice process, they felt on the periphery and marginalised by it.

Participants reported that going to court was difficult and, for many, frightening and traumatic. Feeling uninformed, giving evidence in an adversarial process, court adjournments and delays significantly impacted on their mental health.

Participants raised the potential for court to empower and provide a sense of closure to victims and witnesses, particularly when support and advocacy was provided.

Participants had significant concerns that the investigation, prosecution and sentencing for domestic abuse offences did not adequately reflect the sustained level, severity or impact of abuse experienced.

Safety was not consistently ensured for all participants before, during or post proceedings. This was contrary to their expectations that reporting would stop abuse and provide safety for themselves, family and friends. Non-harassment orders (NHOs) offered some protection and reassurance for victims.

Advocacy and support were reported as the most significant mechanisms for minimising trauma and enhancing feelings of safety; however, participants identified gaps in provision, particularly earlier in the process and post court.

94p.

By Scottish Government, Minister for Victims and Community Safety, Justice Directorate

The former Minister for Community Safety, Ash Regan MSP, asked the Scottish Community Safety Network (SCSN) and the Scottish Government to undertake a review of antisocial behaviour (ASB). This report presents the findings from work undertaken to gather views on the current approach to antisocial behaviour in Scotland. It is based on discussions with key stakeholders across Scotland including those who have experienced antisocial behaviour, frontline staff seeking to prevent and tackle antisocial behaviour and community and equality groups including those representing minority communities in Scotland. The discussions included people from both urban and rural settings across different areas of Scotland.

The findings do not amount to a definitive statement on what people feel needs to be done to change the way we view, prevent and address antisocial behaviour. However, they do provide a qualitative evidence base given the size and breadth of engagement. It is clear from these sessions that there are no quick fixes or easy solutions here. Therefore, we need to look at how we set the path to begin the journey and identify future work activity and milestones.

Overall, 25 engagement discussions involving close to 250 people, representing a wide range of interests (Annex B - methodology summary) were held by the Scottish Community Safety Network and the Scottish Government. We are indebted to all who shared their time and their expertise. This report reflects the views, opinions and experiences from those discussions, and additional written feedback received.

The Scottish Government and its partners believe that everyone has the right to be, and feel, safe in their community and homes. Embedding change which will have a positive sustainable impact, requires a process of innovating, evaluating and building on success. We can also learn from challenging issues and sharing best practice.

What has come across very clearly during this engagement, is that prevention is better than cure and that working collaboratively in partnership is essential to finding long term solutions to address antisocial behaviour and make all of our communities safer and more welcoming places to live.

We all have a role to play in preventing and tackling antisocial behaviour and hope that this report will be used as the starting point of a much broader and deeper discussion of these issues, leading to a long-term road map of how we can work collectively to prevent and address antisocial behaviour in effective ways.

We can, and should, come together to address the mutual problems we face in our communities, but we will achieve little if we approach this in a way that is not properly considered, including the potential for unintended consequences, and therefore we need to develop structures which we can work within to achieve change and incrementally build on approaches which are proven to be successful.

As such, two recommendations arise from our assessment of the qualitative evidence:

Recommendation one

That Scottish Ministers, and statutory, non-statutory and voluntary sector service providers and communities themselves recognise that our approach to preventing and tackling antisocial behaviour needs to be a long-term approach (that recognises societal changes and evolves) and that we need to make a commitment to a programme of activity which will provide a framework that will guide us in taking forward this agenda in alignment with other linked national policies.

Recommendation two

An independently chaired group of experts, potentially including statutory, non-statutory and voluntary service providers, community representatives and other key interests should be brought together to develop a long-term framework for addressing antisocial behaviour.

This should have a strong focus on steps that can be taken to prevent antisocial behaviour from occurring as well as considering the effectiveness of current approaches to tackling the antisocial behaviour which occurs.

The findings in this and other relevant, existing reports should form the foundations of the group’s work and they should not be restricted in identifying what areas are most important to move this agenda forward, which could include considerations of the effectiveness of current legislation.

The group should be able to commission and gather evidence to support their work and have a free hand to engage with anyone who can support this agenda. Central to this work should be building broad support for any long-term work that the group proposes.

Edinburgh:

2023. 63p.

Download here: The former Minister for Community Safety, Ash Regan MSP, asked the Scottish Community Safety Network (SCSN) and the Scottish Government to undertake a review of antisocial behaviour (ASB). This report presents the findings from work undertaken to gather views on the current approach to antisocial behaviour in Scotland. It is based on discussions with key stakeholders across Scotland including those who have experienced antisocial behaviour, frontline staff seeking to prevent and tackle antisocial behaviour and community and equality groups including those representing minority communities in Scotland. The discussions included people from both urban and rural settings across different areas of Scotland.

The findings do not amount to a definitive statement on what people feel needs to be done to change the way we view, prevent and address antisocial behaviour. However, they do provide a qualitative evidence base given the size and breadth of engagement. It is clear from these sessions that there are no quick fixes or easy solutions here. Therefore, we need to look at how we set the path to begin the journey and identify future work activity and milestones.

Overall, 25 engagement discussions involving close to 250 people, representing a wide range of interests (Annex B - methodology summary) were held by the Scottish Community Safety Network and the Scottish Government. We are indebted to all who shared their time and their expertise. This report reflects the views, opinions and experiences from those discussions, and additional written feedback received.

The Scottish Government and its partners believe that everyone has the right to be, and feel, safe in their community and homes. Embedding change which will have a positive sustainable impact, requires a process of innovating, evaluating and building on success. We can also learn from challenging issues and sharing best practice.

What has come across very clearly during this engagement, is that prevention is better than cure and that working collaboratively in partnership is essential to finding long term solutions to address antisocial behaviour and make all of our communities safer and more welcoming places to live.

We all have a role to play in preventing and tackling antisocial behaviour and hope that this report will be used as the starting point of a much broader and deeper discussion of these issues, leading to a long-term road map of how we can work collectively to prevent and address antisocial behaviour in effective ways.

We can, and should, come together to address the mutual problems we face in our communities, but we will achieve little if we approach this in a way that is not properly considered, including the potential for unintended consequences, and therefore we need to develop structures which we can work within to achieve change and incrementally build on approaches which are proven to be successful.

As such, two recommendations arise from our assessment of the qualitative evidence:

Recommendation one

That Scottish Ministers, and statutory, non-statutory and voluntary sector service providers and communities themselves recognise that our approach to preventing and tackling antisocial behaviour needs to be a long-term approach (that recognises societal changes and evolves) and that we need to make a commitment to a programme of activity which will provide a framework that will guide us in taking forward this agenda in alignment with other linked national policies.

Recommendation two

An independently chaired group of experts, potentially including statutory, non-statutory and voluntary service providers, community representatives and other key interests should be brought together to develop a long-term framework for addressing antisocial behaviour.

This should have a strong focus on steps that can be taken to prevent antisocial behaviour from occurring as well as considering the effectiveness of current approaches to tackling the antisocial behaviour which occurs.

The findings in this and other relevant, existing reports should form the foundations of the group’s work and they should not be restricted in identifying what areas are most important to move this agenda forward, which could include considerations of the effectiveness of current legislation.

The group should be able to commission and gather evidence to support their work and have a free hand to engage with anyone who can support this agenda. Central to this work should be building broad support for any long-term work that the group proposes.

Edinburgh: Scottish Government, Justice Directorate, 2023. 63p.

By Safer Communities Directorate

Executive Summary

• There is an ongoing cost of living crisis in Scotland, and the rest of the United Kingdom, which is characterised by higher energy costs, higher food and other household costs and real term pay decreases. This paper focuses on the relationship between this cost crisis and crime in Scotland.

• The academic evidence is by no means conclusive in favour of a certain economic variable having a relationship with overall or total crime. This is an important finding as it dispels the idea that worsening economic conditions will inevitably result in a rise in crime.

• Unlike the recessions of the 1980s, the 1990s and 2008 which brought periods of higher unemployment and decreasing inflation, the current cost crisis is characterised by increasing levels of inflation, combined with low levels of unemployment. Therefore, whilst the existing literature helps us to understand how previous economic shifts have impacted upon crime in the past, any attempts to use this literature to predict the impact of the cost crisis on crime is methodologically unadvisable. We must rely on present day data to monitor crime trends during this current period of cost crisis in Scotland.

• Gross Domestic Product is too broad a measure when it comes to determining the impact of the economy on crime. Therefore, we must specify and explore how changes in specific economic variables impacts upon crime.

• For example, analysis undertaken by Scottish Government statisticians explored the relationship between levels of unemployment in Scotland, all recorded crime, and some specific crime types from 1971 until the present day. The analysis found a strong positive linear correlation between unemployment and overall recorded crime, housebreaking and, theft of a motor vehicle. Considering forecasted increases in unemployment, this relationship is noteworthy.

• We know from the academic evidence that relative falls in the wages of low wage workers increases rates of property and violent crime. This finding has present-day relevance given recent real-term falls in wages as a result of the cost crisis.

• The academic evidence also tells us that increases in inequality and poverty rates increase the rates of property crime and violent crime. However, it is not yet clear how these two economic variables are being affected by the cost crisis and therefore if, and how, they may impact upon crime.

• Non-economic factors play a significant role with regard to fluctuations in overall crime rates as well as rates of specific crime types and are impossible to precisely disentangle from the economic factors that impact upon crime. Such factors include the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of police officers, and population demographics.

• For example, analysis undertaken by Scottish Government statisticians found a strong, positive, linear correlation between the proportion of young men (16-24) in the population and overall recorded crimes of housebreaking and theft of a motor vehicle. Population forecasts tell us that over the next 10 years the size of this group is projected to steadily increase.

• This paper's case study on housebreaking further explores this phenomenon of economic and non-economic factors impacting upon the rates of specific crimes. The case study suggests that housebreaking, an acquisitive crime, may not be susceptible to the cost crisis. This contrasts with findings from the academic evidence review and suggests the presence of non-economic factors that are acting to limit any rise in housebreaking.

• That being said, analysis demonstrates a rise in overall recorded crime and Crimes of Dishonesty that may be the result of cost crisis pressures. It is unclear, however, whether crime is simply returning to pre-pandemic levels. Of particular note is the large uplift in shoplifting, which increased by 21% in the year ending June 2023, when compared to the previous year.

• With regard to next steps, a second occasional paper will be published in 2024 which will draw on the latest Police Recorded crime data and the Scottish Crime and Justice Survey data and will focus on the impact of the cost crisis on violent crime and domestic abuse in addition to revisiting the crime types identified in this paper.

Edinburgh: Scottish Government, Social Research, 2023. 28p.

By Sophia Ricono-Kaufhold, Marie Czarnietzki, Rajan Darjee, Nathan Brooks, Aleshia Nanev, Michael R. Davis

The present study examined distinctions between child (n = 30) and adult (n = 212) sexual homicide offenders (SHOs) in Australia and New Zealand, contributing to the limited international research on the subject. Data, primarily sourced from judges' sentencing comments on AustLII and New Zealand Legal Information Institute, revealed significant differences. Child SHOs displayed elevated rates of pedophilia, sexual deviance, and adverse childhood experiences, including sexual abuse. They were more likely to be married, cohabitate, and target familial victims. Their crimes were more often committed during daylight and outdoors, involving tactics such as victim conning, restraints, strangulation, and hiding victim's bodies. No significant group differences emerged regarding offenders' psychopathy or sexual sadism scores. Results were interpreted in line with child SHOs' deviant sexual preferences and the routine activity theory. The study, as the first investigating child sexual homicides in Australia and New Zealand, sets the foundation for an evidence-based approach to policy and practice.

Behavioral Sciences & the Law; 2024 Volume 42, Issue 4Jul 2024

By Nicholas Barnes

How Do Organized criminal groups (OCGs) respond to military interventions intended to weaken and subdue them? In many cases, such crackdowns have proven counterproductive as OCGs militarize, engage in violence, and confront state forces directly. Existing studies have pointed to several explanations: inter-criminal competition, unconditional militarized approaches, and existing criminal governance arrangements. Much of this work, however, has focused on national, regional, or even municipal level variation and explanations. This article takes a micro-comparative approach based on 18 months of ethnographic research in a group of Rio de Janeiro favelas (impoverished and informal neighborhoods) divided between three drug trafficking gangs and occupied by the Brazilian military from 2014 to 2015. It argues that an active territorial threat from a rival is the primary mechanism leading OCGs to respond violently to military intervention. It also demonstrates that geographic patterns of recruitment play an important role in where OCG rivalries turn violent during intervention.

Comparative Political Studies 2022, Vol. 55(5) 789–831

By: KARL DODD, PAUL M. SALMON, and COLIN SOLOMON

Background: Sporting organisations and governing bodies are facing increased pressure to prevent child sexual abuse (CSA) in sport. This has led to an increase in investigative reports into CSA that include recommendations on how sporting organisations could improve child safeguarding. Current peer reviewed literature on the prevention of CSA in sport, indicates that the majority of research has been on interventions at the levels of the victim and perpetrator, rather than on broader components of the sports system. However, it is not clear whether this is the case in investigative reports. Objective: The aim of this study was to analyse investigative reports into CSA in five Australian sports (Swimming, Cricket, Gymnastics, Football, and Tennis), to evaluate the extent to which a systems thinking approach was adopted to understand the broader systemic factors enabling CSA in sport. Method: Factors enabling CSA detailed in the reports, as well as their accompanying recommendations, were mapped to a systems thinking-based framework. The identified enabling factors and recommendations were then evaluated to determine the extent to which a whole of systems focus had been adopted in the investigative reports. Results: In total, 30 enabling factors to CSA were identified, with the majority focused at the higher levels of the sports system (e.g., Governance, Policy, Reporting/Handling issues etc.). This contrasts with the peer reviewed literature. Conclusions: The findings indicate that the identified enabling factors to CSA align with a systems thinking approach, whereas the recommendations to safeguarding partially adhere to the tenets of system thinking.

CJRN Correlates of Crime eJournal, Vol. 7 No. 50, 09/11/2024

By Thomas Greminger and Nayef Al-Rodhan

Pirates have existed in different guises since ancient times, from Cilician pirates seizing olive oil cargoes from Roman ships to corsairs seeking spoils along North Africa’s Barbary Coast and buccaneers attacking Spanish treasure ships in the Caribbean. Currently the Gulf of Guinea is the world’s hotspot for maritime piracy. Over the last 15 years container ships, fishing vessels, and oil tankers in the region have been the targets of numerous armed attacks and kidnappings.

The past year has seen some positive developments regarding global maritime security. According to the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) International Maritime Bureau (IMB), global piracy and armed robbery incidents are at their lowest recorded figure in three decades. The IMB’s last annual report showed a 32% drop in overall attacks in 2021 compared to 2020. These promising trends are also evident in the Gulf of Guinea. Of the 90 global piracy and armed robbery incidents reported between January and September 2022, 13 have been reported in the Gulf of Guinea region, compared to 27 over the same period in 2021. The decline in the number of reported incidents in West African waters should be welcomed, but this progress is likely to be short-lived unless the international community increases its focus on the region.

The threat level in the Gulf of Guinea region remains high, as highlighted by United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2634 on Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Gulf of Guinea, which was unanimously adopted in May 2022. Spearheaded by Ghana and Norway, the resolution expressed the UNSC’s deep concern about the “grave and persistent threat” posed by piracy and transnational organised crime in the Gulf of Guinea. The resolution correctly stressed that unless tackled head-on, piracy will continue to impede international security and navigation, and the sustainable development of states in the region. These challenges are particularly important given the Gulf of Guinea’s geopolitical significance.

Bordering 20 countries and with 6,000 kilometres of coastline, the Gulf of Guinea is a key shipping route for a region that relies heavily on imports. This is why the costs of piracy weigh so heavily on the region’s economic and trade potential, with direct and indirect costs estimated at US$1.925 billion annually for 12 Gulf of Guinea countries. Tackling piracy in the Gulf of Guinea will require both sustained political will at the national and regional levels and deeper and more effective cooperation among members of the international community. All sea-faring nations have a stake in improving the security of the region – including Switzerland, which assumes its seat on the UNSC at the start of 2023, with the aim of promoting global peace and security.

Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2022. 12p.

By John K. Roman,  Anthony Washburn,  Sofia Rodriguez; Caterina G. Roman, .; Elena I. Navarro; Jesse T. Brey; Benjamin M. Reist

The HAVEN Project (Harms After Victimization: Experience and Needs) was launched in 2020 by researchers at NORC at the University of Chicago and Temple University with support from the National Institute of Justice1 to address three gaps in the violence literature. First, the project was designed to update the pioneering 1996 NIJ study, Victim Costs and Consequences: A New Look using data, measurement and analytic tools that were not available thirty years ago, and that is the subject of this report2. In the same spirit, the project developed an expanded taxonomy of harms from victimization and develops a survey instrument and methodology to facilitate the collection of self-reported data on the harms from violent victimization across multiple dimensions that are commonly excluded from violent crime harms measurement. Finally, advances in criminology have included a growing reliance on causal models to estimate the effectiveness of crime and justice interventions and reforms: the HAVEN project introduced a regression-based cost-benefit model that can be integrated into causal models3  

Chicago: NORC, 2023. 37p.

By The International Crisis Group

What’s new? Farmer-herder conflict in Chad has reached unprecedented levels during the political transition following the former president’s death in 2021, leaving more than 1,000 people dead and more than 2,000 injured. This violence is exacerbating the country’s perceived north-south divide.

Why does it matter? A growing number of cattle owners are from the north. The sedentary populations of the south and centre see the northerners as protected by the central authorities, fuelling resentment. The farmers’ grievances, sharpened by May’s disputed presidential election, could lead them to take the law into their own hands.

What should be done? President Mahamat Déby should make resolution of farmer-herder conflict a priority during his term. His government should provide security and impartial justice in the affected areas, involving residents in mediation efforts to help restore their confidence in the authorities.

New York: International Crisis Group, 2024. 24p.

By Gaurav Verma, Rynaa Grover, Jiawei Zhou, Binny Mathew, Jordan Kraemer, Munmun De Choudhury, Srijan Kumar

Violence-provoking speech -- speech that implicitly or explicitly promotes violence against the members of the targeted community, contributed to a massive surge in anti-Asian crimes during the pandemic. While previous works have characterized and built tools for detecting other forms of harmful speech, like fear speech and hate speech, our work takes a community-centric approach to studying anti-Asian violence-provoking speech. Using data from ~420k Twitter posts spanning a 3-year duration (January 1, 2020 to February 1, 2023), we develop a codebook to characterize anti-Asian violence-provoking speech and collect a community-crowdsourced dataset to facilitate its large-scale detection using state-of-the-art classifiers. We contrast the capabilities of natural language processing classifiers, ranging from BERT-based to LLM-based classifiers, in detecting violence-provoking speech with their capabilities to detect anti-Asian hateful speech. In contrast to prior work that has demonstrated the effectiveness of such classifiers in detecting hateful speech (F1=0.89), our work shows that accurate and reliable detection of violence-provoking speech is a challenging task (F1=0.69). We discuss the implications of our findings, particularly the need for proactive interventions to support Asian communities during public health crises.

2024

By Team of Analysts at the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC)’s Observatory

In 2023, Tunisia emerged as the primary country of embarkation for irregular migrants seeking to reach Europe, eclipsing Libya, which had long been the main North African departure point. In total, some 97 306 migrants arrived in Italy from Tunisia, just over three times as many as in 2022. Tunisia’s new status as North Africa’s leading embarkation hub followed four years of constant growth in irregular migration and human smuggling. In previous years, the increase in departures had primarily involved Tunisian nationals. In 2023, however, the surge in irregular migration was largely driven by foreigners, mostly from West Africa and Sudan. While some of these migrants were long-term residents in Tunisia, the spike was fuelled by a notable and rapid rise in the arrival of sub-Saharans across the border with Algeria and, to a lesser extent, the border with Libya. The high demand for departures led to a more complex smuggling ecosystem in Tunisia, with networks offering increased and diversified services. There were also key shifts in the way foreign migrants, in particular, embarked, with a growing number forgoing engagement with smugglers and turning instead to self-smuggling. However, as in previous years, it was the worsening of the country’s complex political, social and economic problems that spurred clandestine departures and licit migration. While some aspects of the multidimensional crisis facing Tunisia improved, overall the challenges remained acute, with severe drought, uncertain financing conditions and the slow pace of reforms hampering economic recovery, while failures of governance continued to affect the delivery of public services such as water, education and health care. Moreover, a dramatic shift in Tunisia’s approach to irregular migration led to a deterioration in conditions for migrants and an acceleration in the pace of foreign migrants leaving the country. In February, President Kais Saied denounced undocumented sub-Saharan migration to Tunisia, triggering a series of events that resulted in foreign migrants being evicted from their homes, dismissed from their jobs, and threatened with arrest and violence. This growing climate of fear in turn influenced and hastened the departure of undocumented migrants from the country. In response to rising migration, the Tunisian government instituted tighter security controls, with occasional escalations in response to spikes in departures. Enforcement in maritime areas and along the land borders with Libya and Algeria intensified in the second half of the year. In addition, the Tunisian government increasingly resorted to the forced transfer of migrants – mainly to and across the borders with Libya and Algeria – in order to manage tensions among the local population and curb departures. According to public reports documenting the testimonies of deported migrants, a notable element of these forced transfers was the level of violence and abuse inflicted by the Tunisian security forces. The exceptional growth in irregular migration from and through Tunisia in 2023 marked a rapid escalation of trends observed since 2020. Given the enduring influence of the factors driving irregular movement from Tunisia and other key countries of origin, interest in departures to Europe is expected to persist further into 2024. However, volumes will be influenced by a number of variables, including the effectiveness of security forces in managing increased migratory pressures and the adaptability of smuggling networks to evolving enforcement tactics. This is the latest Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) monitoring report on human smuggling in Tunisia. It builds on the series of annual reports that has been issued since 2021, tracking the evolution of human smuggling in Tunisia, as well as the political, security and economic dynamics that influence it.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 41p.

By Felipe Botero Escobar

Cannabis is the most widely consumed illicit drug globally, with around 219 million users in 2021, according to the UNODC. It is also the illicit drug that is being legalized most rapidly for medicinal or recreational use. While Colombia has taken steps toward regulation, such as legalizing medicinal cannabis in 2015, the complete legalization of recreational cannabis is still under discussion.

This report draws on experiences from countries like Uruguay, Canada, and the United States, which have already implemented cannabis legalization, to explore the possible outcomes for Colombia. It concludes that while legalization could reduce the size of the illegal cannabis market, a grey market supplying both local and international demands is likely to persist.

A key focus is on how criminal control over cannabis production areas could hinder the transition of growers to a legal market. The report emphasizes the need for coordinated cannabis regulatory and security policies to protect small-scale and traditional growers and integrate them into the legal market. Furthermore, the potential for reduced violence is explored, though the report notes that this is unlikely to happen immediately. Criminal groups may resist the establishment of a legal market, leading to short-term increases in violence as they compete for control over remaining illicit markets.

Another significant finding is the potential transformation of Colombia’s criminal justice system. Legalization could free up resources, allowing law enforcement to prioritize more serious public safety issues and reducing low-level cannabis prosecutions and prison overcrowding.

This report offers crucial insights for policymakers, emphasizing that while cannabis legalization is not a cure-all for crime and violence in Colombia, it is a critical step toward more effective drug policy reform and organized crime reduction.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 35p.

By Washington State Statistical Analysis Center

This project seeks to discover whether exclusionary discipline and later criminal justice system involvement are associated, and to determine whether race, sex, and homelessness are confounding factors.

The Washington Statistical Analysis Center (SAC) applied for and received the 2018 State Justice Statistics Grant from BJS. Among other projects, the SAC sought the grant to evaluate the connection between a student’s exclusionary discipline and their future justice system involvement in Washington. This evaluation connects data from schools and the courts to assess the strength of this relationship and examine the influence of other factors (such as race, sex, and homelessness).

Here are some of the main takeaways from this report:

• Students identified as male were more than two times as likely to be associated with postgraduate convictions as compared to their female counterpart.

• Students with any homelessness were 1.7 times as likely to be associated with a post graduate conviction than student with no record of homelessness.

• Students identified as American Indian or Alaskan Native were more than two times more likely to have a post-graduate conviction than students identified as other races

• Students identified as Black/African American had at least one exclusionary discipline event (25.1%) at nearly twice the proportion of the cohort average (13.6%), with students identified as American Indian/Alaskan Native and Hispanic/Latino not far behind.

• Results should be interpreted with caution.

Olympia, WA: Washington State Statistical Analysis Center, 2022. 11p.

By Piotr Bąkowski and Martina Prpic

Drawing on diverse underlying rationales, policies on prostitution – in the EU and elsewhere – vary both in their objectives and in their strategies for achieving those objectives. These distinctions manifest in the terminology used, with 'prostitution' typically favoured by stakeholders aiming to curb or eradicate the practice, and the term 'sex work' embraced by those who view prostitution as a legitimate form of employment. Formulating policies on prostitution presents numerous challenges, including a lack of comprehensive statistical data. However, these policies often lack emphasis on the importance of evidence-based approaches – shaped instead by ideological beliefs and moral perspectives. While discussions on prostitution transcend feminism, feminist ideologies have had a particularly strong impact on policy formulation. Academic classification of prostitution policies into national models or regimes is subject to ongoing debate, with criticism directed towards the 'model approach' for oversimplifying the complexities of these policies and failing to capture regional and local variations. Traditionally, policies have been categorised into overarching ideological approaches: 'prohibitionism', which seeks to outlaw all aspects of prostitution; and 'abolitionism', which focuses on criminalising the facilitation and purchase, but not the sale of sexual services. However, there is a growing tendency towards classifying policies as falling under criminalisation (of purchase or sale), legalisation (regulation) or decriminalisation. Given the EU's lack of explicit authority to regulate prostitution, which falls within the exclusive competence of individual Member States, stakeholders both within and outside EU institutions advocate framing prostitution as a problem linked to areas where the EU does have competence; these include gender equality, violence against women, human trafficking, and the free movement of services. With the European Commission and the Council largely silent on the issue, debates predominantly occur within the European Parliament, and are marked by strong disagreements between Members subscribing to opposing approaches. Prostitution is subject to varying regulations across the EU, leading to a diverse array of national legislative and policy frameworks. Member States differ as to how they address the sale or purchase of sex, as well as the exploitation of prostitution. This variety is due not only to EU Member States' different historical and cultural backgrounds, but also to the current local state of affairs, especially as regards the situation in the field, and the priorities of the governments in power. In some Member States, there is a strong concern that prostitution constitutes violence against women. Those States usually tend to penalise buyers of sexual services. By contrast, some other Member States recognise that 'sex work' is a voluntary choice for some and tailor their legal frameworks accordingly.

Brussels: European Parliamentary Research Service, 2024. 39p.