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Posts tagged smuggling
The Counterfeit Silk Road - Impact of Counterfeit Consumer Products Smuggled into the United States

By John Dunham & Associate

  The Buy Safe America Coalition represents a diverse group of responsible retailers, consumer groups, manufacturers, intellectual property advocates and law enforcement officials who support efforts at all levels of government to protect consumers and communities from the sale of counterfeit and stolen goods. One important issue facing US businesses is the massive growth in the availability and sales of illicit products, both from counterfeit imports — increasingly from China — and from products stolen from legitimate retailers and sold through online marketplaces, where the anonymity of a screenname has made it easier and more profitable to fence counterfeit and stolen goods. The Coalition asked John Dunham & Associates (JDA) to examine the data around these illicit sales to determine how they impact the US economy, federal tax revenues, and criminal activity. This is the first of a series of papers examining the issue of counterfeit and stolen goods and its effect on the United States economy. This analysis will focus on the importation of illicit products, notably counterfeits that violate producers’ intellectual property rights. Future analysis will examine the effects of domestic smuggling, the resale of stolen goods, and the effects of contraband on overall criminal activity. According to the analysis: • A large share of contraband items are delivered to US consumers by mail or by express consignment. These transactions account for over 60.8 percent of all seizures by the US customs service and over 90 percent of intellectual property rights (IPR) seizures. The growth in these types of shipments has increased along with the use of online marketplaces. Amazon, for instance, now derives more than 75 percent of their ecommerce revenue from marketplace sales. • In effect, as companies like the Chinese ecommerce marketplace Alibaba and the Amazon marketplace, have linked more consumers to more shippers, many companies producing illegitimate products have gained access to unwitting consumers in America. • The bulk of counterfeit products to the US come from China and its dependent territories, accounting for over 90.6 percent of all cargo with IPR violations. Of the $1.23 billion in total IPR violations intercepted, $1.12 billion was from China. • Examining just those data where CBP can provide an HS code, in some cases, the amount of contraband cargo is nearly equal to the entire import base. For example, imports of certain sweaters, jumpsuits and toys from China are almost 100 percent contraband, as are large amounts of handbags, jewelry and belts. • While there is substantial academic literature on the smuggling of narcotics, people and tobacco, there is very little written on counterfeit products. Using a very conservative model it is estimated that $44.3 billion in additional illicit cargo is escaping detection. • These lost sales alone mean that over 39,860 jobs in wholesaling and nearly 283,400 retail jobs are lost due to the impact of counterfeit goods skirting normal trade channels. All told, the sale of counterfeit items is expected to cost the wholesale and retail sectors of the US economy nearly 653,450 full-time equivalent jobs that pay over $33.6 billion in wages and benefits to US workers. • It is estimated that the smuggling of counterfeit goods costs the US government nearly $7.2 billion in personal and business tax revenues alone. • This analysis is based on the current level of CBP intercepts of illicit cargo. It is likely that the number of illegal imports is much larger than even estimated here.  

Washington, DC: Buy Safe America Coalition, 2021. 25p.

Illicit tobacco in Australia 2021: Full Year Report

By KPMG

This report of key findings (the 'Report') has been prepared by KPMG LLP. The Report was commissioned by Philip Morris Limited and Imperial Tobacco Australia Limited, described in this Important Notice and in this Report as together the 'beneficiaries', on the basis set out in a private contract agreed between the beneficiaries and KPMG LLP dated 29 November 2021 . This report has been prepared on the basis of fieldwork carried out between 01 December 2021 and 14 April 2022. The Report has not been updated for subsequent events or circumstances. Information sources, the scope of our work, and scope and source limitations are set out in the footnotes and methodology contained within this Report. The scope of our work, information sources used, and any scope and source limitations were fixed by agreement with the beneficiaries. We have satisfied ourselves, where possible, that the information presented in this Report is consistent with the information sources used, but we have not sought to establish the reliability of the information sources by reference to other evidence. We relied upon and assumed without independent verification, the accuracy and completeness of information available from public and third party sources. This Report is not written for the benefit any other party other than the beneficiaries. In preparing this Report we have not taken into account the interests, needs, or circumstances of any specific party, other than the beneficiaries. This Report is not suitable to be relied on by any party (other than· the beneficiaries), Any person or entity ( other than the beneficiaries) who chooses to rely on this Report (or any part of it) will do so at their own risk. To the fullest extent permitted by law, KPMG LLP does not assume any responsibility and will not accept any liability in respect of this Report other than to the beneficiaries. Without limiting the general statement above, although we have prepared this Report in agreement with the beneficiaries, this Report has not been prepared for the benefit of any other manufacturer of tobacco products nor for any other person or entity who might have ari interest in the matters discussed in this Report, including for example those who work in_ or monitor the tobacco or public health sectors or those who provide goods or services to those who operate in those sectors.

KPMG: 2022. 70p.

Rebellion As Racket: Crime and the Donbas conflict, 2014–2022

By Mark Galeotti and Anna Arutunyan.

Globally, connections between crime, war and insurrection are inescapable, and the undeclared struggle over the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine, before Russia’s open invasion in February 2022, was no exception to the rule. Since Russia first encouraged, facilitated, armed and bankrolled the rising of the rebellious pseudo-states of south-eastern Donbas in 2014, there had been a pervasive connection between crime, war and insurrection. Despite continued sporadic skirmishes, by 2015, it seemed that the conflict had largely stabilized. A violent and confused hybrid of insurrection and foreign invasion, had led to the creation of the self-proclaimed pseudo-states of the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR, respectively). Together, they controlled roughly 30% of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and had a combined population of approximately 2 to 2.3 million people. This was a status quo that not only encouraged criminalization, but was based on it. Industrial-scale smuggling of everything from coal to narcotics helped sustain the internationally unrecognized pseudo-states of Donbas; gangsters became militiamen; and money-laundering networks meanwhile bypassed sanctions

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2022. 56p.