By Andrés Cajiao | Paula Tobo | Mariana Botero Restrepo

Just how organized is organized crime? This report on the relationship between migration and organized crime along the Colombia–Panama border explores this recurring question in research on organized crime with the aim of demystifying two underexplored phenomena in Colombia. The first is the Gulf Clan (Spanish: Clan del Golfo), which calls itself the Gaitanist Self-Defence Forces of Colombia, a group that continues to control the region despite being the object of one of the most intensive intelligence and judicial operations in the country’s recent history. While the specifics of how the Clan operates are unknown, this report demonstrates that criminal governance always depends on a complex set of relationships between organized crime, local communities and the state. Violence and the threat of violence are not enough to govern. In fact, one of the main findings of this study is that the influence of organized crime means that irregular migration and the economy that arises around it do not operate through violence. The second phenomenon explored here is migrant smuggling, which is widespread in border areas. The actions taken by states and international organizations have not curbed this highly complex illicit economy. Although irregular migration is stigmatized and presents a serious humanitarian problem in the region, it has been key in reviving the economies of Urabá and the Darién Gap, along the Colombian border, which should play a central role in public policy discussions. Without a better understanding of migratory phenomena and the key players involved, there is little the state can do to guarantee people’s safety or recover territorial control where it has lost it.

Geneva: Global Initiative AGainst Transnational Organized Crime, 2022.

By Iffat Idris

Conflict in eastern Ukraine has been underway since 2014: the February 2014 ouster of pro-Russia President Yanukovych was followed in March by Russian annexation of Crimea, and its support for insurgency in the Donetz Basin (Donbas) – the latter is ongoing. This paper is a rapid literature review of the links between corruption, crime and conflict in eastern Ukraine. While Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea was rooted both in Moscow’s historic claims to the peninsula, as well as moves by Kiev to move closer to the European Union, the ongoing insurgency in the Donetz Basin (Donbas) stems from structural factors such as industrial decline. Russian support for the Donbas insurgents, alongside its failure to recognise the republics that they announced (Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic), suggests that Moscow’s real goal is to put pressure on the Ukrainian government and prevent its integration into Western structures. The paper assesses the impact of the conflict on the economy of Crimea and Donbas. Russia has tried to demonstrate the benefits to Crimea of annexation by pumping vast resources into the region, but this resource injection has been unable to overcome the effects of wide-ranging Western sanctions. Donbas’ economy has been even more badly affected by ongoing conflict, with thousands displaced and an economic blockade imposed by Kiev greatly limiting trade. Here too, Moscow has had to step in with subsidies and humanitarian assistance. The paper also looks at the involvement of organised criminal groups (OCGs) in the conflict, and the impact of the conflict on organised crime in the region. With regard to the former it finds that OCGs played a big role in Russia’s annexation of Crimea, fighting alongside Russian forces (without their insignia) and other volunteers. This highlights the complementary and symbiotic nature of the connection between criminal groups and the Russian state. OCGs in the Donbas region had strong links with the Yanukovych government in Ukraine, ousted in 2014 – hence it is no surprise that these groups were heavily involved in the Donbas insurgency. With regard to how organised crime has been affected by conflict, the paper finds that corruption was a massive problem in Ukraine long before the conflict in the east. Moreover, it involved all levels of the government system and was strongly linked to organised crime. OCGs were especially prevalent in Crimea, while Donbas was even more notorious for criminality. Post-Crimea’s annexation, links between OCGs in Crimea and in Russia became even stronger. Ironically, due to the vast influx of Russian development funds, Crimea represented an opportunity for embezzlement and corruption for Russian and Crimean OCGs. Closer ties were even forged between Russian OCGs and those in Ukraine. Since the conflict in Donbas began – and given the economic blockade, and falling Russian funding support - the region has become heavily dependent on organised crime. The paper also finds that oligarchs, with close ties to organised crime, have benefited hugely from Crimea becoming part of Russia, e.g. seizing property belonging to pro Ukraine business elites. Ties with political elites are equally strong: gangs gain protection from political patronage, in turn giving kickbacks to politicians. One final aspect explored in the paper is transnational crime. It finds that this has risen since the annexation of Crimea and conflict in Donbas, including a rise in smuggling of illicit goods into Europe, and a rise in organised crime in Ukraine. Sevastopol could potentially take over as a smuggling hub from Odesa, while Crimea and Ukraine could become a global money laundering centre. Criminality in Russia has also increased, seen in rises in drug and arms trafficking and criminal cases. The drop in cross-border cooperation to combat crime has contributed to greater criminality. The paper concludes that corruption, crime and conflict are heavily intermeshed in eastern Ukraine, with each reinforcing the other in what appears to be a downward spiral of escalation.

SOC ACE Evidence Review Paper No. 2. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. 2022. 26p/

What’s new? Each year, hundreds of thousands of migrants cross the Darién Gap, a strip of jungle between Central and South America, on their way to the U.S. With little state presence in the area, Colombia’s Gaitanista drug syndicate is overseeing human smuggling rackets while gangs in Panama perpetrate assaults on migrants. Why does it matter? Illicit profits are soaring as the flow of migrants swells, with much of the money going to organised crime. Efforts by Colombia and Pan ama to impede the movement of people or weaken the criminal groups’ hold have so far failed to curb murder, rape and other attacks on migrants. What should be done? The days when the Darién Gap was a meaningful bar rier to mass migration are over. Enhanced law enforcement, redoubled efforts to quell crises in the main countries of departure and reinforced humanitarian assistance in the Darién could form part of regional efforts to manage irregular migration and protect the vulnerable.

Bogota; New York: Latin America Report N°102 | 3 November 2023

International Crisis Group, 2023. 46p.

By Elena Campbell, Todd Fernando, Leigh Gassner, Jess Hill, Zac Seidler, Anne Summers

The purpose of this review was to draw together advice and identify opportunities to strengthen prevention efforts and approaches across all forms of violence against women and children, including a particular focus on homicides. The report provides specific and practical advice to strengthen prevention approaches, and builds on work currently underway in the National Plan to End Violence against Women and Children 2022-2032.

The Rapid Review highlighted a number of areas of priority including:

• responding to children and young people’s experiences of domestic, family and sexual violence

• engaging with men and boys in violence prevention, including meeting them where they are at

• better understanding pathways into perpetration to improve targeting of early intervention initiatives, with the aim of preventing violence from occurring.

The report makes 21 recommendations across 6 key areas of:

• A national emergency – and an ongoing national priority

• The prevention potential

• Prevention through people

• Prevention through responses

• Prevention through systems and industries

• Prevention through learning and data.

Canberra: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (Australia), 2024. 97p.

By The Young Women’s Alliance

This report examines young people’s relationships, sex lives and experiences of disrespect and violence. The evidence reveals:

• Statistically significant disparities between young women and men. For women, heightened vulnerability snowballs into disadvantage in other life areas; for men, early sexist views compound in educational and workplace settings, and can manifest in violent behaviour.

• YWA's original psychological risk profile of young men is more highly correlated with GBV perpetration than the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI), a validated indicator of likelihood to engage in violent behaviour.1

• A stark reality exists where 90% of interviewed women see sexual violence and/or assault as inevitable in their lifetime (if it had not already occurred); a matter of ‘when’ not ‘if,’ expressing that violence is synonymous with womanhood.

• Significant gender disparities in perceptions of sexuality-related education, with men rating the education they received on sex and consent as significantly better than women, a concerning gap in preparedness prior to formative sexual experiences.

• YWA’s original Gender and Relationship Distress Score, a 12-item measure, indicates that more than 1 in 5 young women (21.8%) experience significant gendered distress in their intimate relationships.

Australia: Young Women's Alliance, 2024. 96p.

By Kate Fitz-Gibbon, Jasmine McGowan, Rebecca Stewart

This study privileges the voices of children and young people with lived experience of family violence. It seeks to extend current understandings of how child-specific risk identification, assessment and management practices can best be developed, implemented and embedded across Victoria.

Melbourne, VIC: Monash University, 2023. 52p.

By The Royal Commission Into Violence, Neglect and Exploitation of People with Disability

In this Royal Commission, people with disability, their families and a range of other people shared their dreams and aspirations for an inclusive Australia. These visions were diverse but rested on a common foundation: a future where people with disability live free from violence, abuse, neglect and exploitation; human rights are protected; and individuals live with dignity, equality and respect, can take risks, and develop and fulfil their potential. We heard about these dreams and aspirations in Public hearings, including Public hearing 31, ‘Vision for an inclusive Australia’, as well as from submissions, responses to issues papers, private sessions, community engagements and research projects.1 This vision summarises what we learnt from people with disability, their families and supporters about their hopes for the future. Our public hearings, and the information we gathered from other sources, have necessarily focused on violence, abuse, neglect and exploitation. But people with disability have also told us about positive changes that have made their lives better, and their confidence that together we can shape a society which recognises, empowers and values disability as part of human diversity. They rightly insist an inclusive society is better for everyone. What follows is a sample of what we have heard from people with disability and their families about their visions for the future, drawing out themes that help us to understand what inclusion is all about. We then explore the foundational significance of a human rights approach to preventing and responding to violence, abuse, neglect and exploitation. Finally, we set out critical aspects of an inclusive society, highlighting the importance of listening to the voices, and recognising the leadership, of people with disability

Australia: The Royal Commission, 2023. 356p.

By Rachel Burgin and Jacqui Tassone

This report presents the findings of a a study that aimed to understand the reasons for the high rate of attrition of reported sexual offences in the Australian Capital Territory. Through analysis of 389 police case reports, interviews with 33 victim-survivors and a review of Australian Federal Police and ACT Policing policy and procedural documents, the review found that not only are sexual offences rarely charged in the ACT, sexual offences are rarely investigated.

Failure to investigate sexual offences was driven by two key factors:

• impact of rape myths on police decision-making

• lack of understanding of the laws relating to sexual offences and the test to charge.

The report makes 17 recommendations to improve responses to sexual offences in the ACT and improve the experiences of victim-survivors in reporting to police. The findings provide insight for police forces across Australia to move towards a trauma-informed approach to policing sexual offences.

Hawthorn, VIC: Swinburne University of Technology, 2024. 129p.

By Laura Hidderley, Marni Manning, Elena Marchetti, Anne Edwards

Public opinion about sentencing is notoriously difficult to assess. In 2017, the Queensland Sentencing Advisory Council was asked to do just that in relation to sentencing for child homicide offences. Building on the existing literature on public attitudes to the criminal justice system, this study aimed to explore community views on this issue using a focus group methodology. A group of 103 participants was recruited by a market research company from a mix of urban and rural locations in Queensland. After completing a series of questionnaires, participants were assigned a ‘punitiveness score’ and assessed the seriousness of three separate child homicide vignettes. The study found that participants viewed the sentences as inadequate and not sufficiently reflective of the vulnerability and defencelessness of the child. These findings contributed to the Council’s recommendations to the Attorney-General and have since led to legislative change.

Research Report no. 21.

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2021. 58p.

By Annette Idler | Frederik Florenz | Ajmal Burhanzoi John Collins | Marcena Hunter | Antônio Sampai

This paper contributes to research on the relationship between conflict and organized crime (the crime–conflict nexus), using Afghanistan as a case study. For the past four decades, Afghanistan has been plagued by internal armed conflict, influenced by local, national, regional, and international external actors, and the intricate relationships among them. To varying degrees, power, politics, and criminality informed these relationships. Organized crime provides actors in Afghanistan with significant political power, while powerful political actors are uniquely positioned to reap the profits of the country’s criminal markets. This paper gives an account of the existing literature on Afghanistan’s crime–conflict nexus, identifying some of the key insights that this literature has revealed. To do so, it uses a four-pronged framework, exploring how conflict has fuelled organized crime in Afghanistan; how organized crime has fuelled conflict; how conflict over the control of illicit markets has resulted; and how organized crime has contributed to the erosion of the state. By assessing the literature on Afghanistan’s crime–conflict nexus, the paper identifies knowledge gaps and suggests areas for future research.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. 36p.

By Luke Kelly

This annotated bibliography includes research and evidence on militarized approaches to combating serious and organized crime (SOC) in various contexts. Militarised approaches involve using military forces or methods to deter and disrupt SOC groups. These approaches have been employed in states facing high levels of violence, fragile and conflict-affected contexts, post-conflict settings, and against threats like piracy and wildlife crime. The research finds that the evidence on the effectiveness of militarised approaches is largely negative. While there are a range of militarised approaches, applied in a variety of contexts, most papers nevertheless agree that military force, or military techniques, can only address one facet of SOC at best, and need to be linked with a range of other measures such as policing, rule of law interventions and economic interventions, to effectively combat SOC. As well as drawing resources away from these other measures, militarised approaches have also been found to have a number of direct and indirect negative effects, such as human rights abuses, increases in violence, and undermining the rule of law.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2023. 44p.SOC ACE Evidence Review Paper 4.   

By Eunsik Chang, Sandra Orozco-Aleman, María Padilla-Romo:

This paper studies the effects of mothers' long-term pre-conception exposure to local violence on birth outcomes. Using administrative data from Mexico and two different empirical strategies, our results indicate that mothers' long-term exposure to local violence prior to conception has detrimental effects on infant health at birth. The results suggest that loss of women's human capital and deterioration of mental health are potential underlying mechanisms behind the adverse effects, highlighting intergenerational consequences of exposure to local violence. Our findings shed light on the welfare implications of local violence that are not captured in in-utero exposure to violence.

Bonn: Institute of Labor Economics, 2024. 

By Krstić, Igor

From Jacob Riis’ How The Other Half Lives (1890) to Danny Boyle’s Slumdog Millionaire (2008), Igor Krstić outlines a transnational history of films that either document or fictionalise the favelas, shantytowns, barrios poulares or chawls of our ‘planet of slums’.

Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016.

By Gisli Vogler

How should those profiting from injustice and violence respond to their complicity? And how can they remain responsive when faced with the many ways in which they are entangled in an unjust world? We are at a deciding moment in affluent (Western) societies when it comes to addressing these kinds of questions. On the one hand, there is cause for optimism: the last decade has seen a significant shift towards open discussion of patriarchal society, institutional racism, capitalist exploitation, and the destruction of the environment, amongst many other contemporary political problems. Social movements such as #MeToo, Black Lives Matter, Fridays for Future, and Occupy Wall Street have helped turn assuming responsibility for violence and injustice into a dominant political issue. As a consequence, unjust practices, as diverse as Amazon’s working conditions and the Oxfam sexual exploitation scandal, are met with global condemnation. Debates about how those benefiting from exploitation and expropriation can act more responsibly now pervade many aspects of everyday life, from what to eat and wear, to who has what kind of opportunities. On the other hand, societies continue to be characterized by a failure to act upon the omnipresent demands for facing up to one’s involvement in injustice. Racism, sexism and ableism, and the exploitation of minorities, poorer countries and people, and nature all remain integral parts of human existence. The re-emergence of reactionary populist forces and parties in the US and large parts of Europe, together with the consolidation of power by authoritarian leaders across the world, has exacerbated the problem. The enduring failures by complicit actors to address injustice are cause for much despair and frustration. However, they have also served as catalysts for a sustained scholarly reflection on the complexities of complicity and how to address them (Beausoleil, 2019;  Hayward, 2017; Mihai, 2022; Schaap, 2020). It is my intention in this book to contribute to this interrogation and to think further how people can appropriately respond to their complicity in injustice and violence. To this end, I begin with a constructive evaluation of recent scholarship on complicity.  

Edinburgh:  Edinburgh University Press, 2024. 194p.

Edited by Tony Roberts and Karekwaivanane, George Hamandishe

In an era when hashtag campaigns like #MeToo and #BlackLivesMatter capture global attention for victims of injustice, politicians and corporations are now spending billions employing Cambridge Analytica-type consultancies to manufacture disinformation - employing trolls, cyborgs and bots to disrupt dialogue and drown-out dissent. In the first study of its kind, this open-access book presents a range of case studies of these emerging dynamics across Africa, mapping and analyzing disinformation operations in ten different countries, and using innovative techniques to determine who is producing and coordinating these increasingly sophisticated disinformation machines. Drawing on scholars from across the continent, case studies document the actors and mechanisms used to profile citizens, manipulate beliefs and behaviour, and close the political space for democratic dialogue and policy debate. Chapters include examinations of how the Nigerian government deployed disinformation when the #EndSARS campaign focused attention on police brutality and corruption; insights into how pro-government actors responded to the viral #ZimbabweanLivesMatter campaign; and how misogynists mobilized against the #AmINext campaign against gender-based violence in South Africa. Through the documentation of episodes of unruly politics in digital spaces, these studies provide a valuable assessment of the implications of these dynamics for digital rights, moving beyond a focus on elaborations of the idea of ‘fake news’, and providing actionable recommendations in the areas of policy, legislation and practice. The ebook editions of this book are available open access under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence on bloomsburycollections.com.

London: Zed Books, 2024. 256p.

By Daniel O'Connell,  Christy Visher,  Lin Liu

This Article reviews what is known from the field of criminology about the nature of crime patterns in general, focusing particularly on violence, violent people, and how violence manifests in the lives of individuals who commit crime. Broad consensus exists in the research community that offending careers of individuals who commit crimes vary substantially from person to person. Most people tend to commit non-violent crimes and while many violent offenders recidivate after being released from prison, the majority do not. Moreover, the type of violent crime committed—expressive versus instrumental—may be an important distinction. We draw several conclusions from the research on violence and violent recidivism and what it can mean for policymakers and their decision-making. Armed with accurate information about violent offending, policymakers, and practitioners may be able to propose appropriate policy changes and make more informed decisions about the likelihood of violent offending and recidivism among persons who commit crimes.  

103 Marq. L. Rev. 983 (2020). 

By The New South Wales Crime Commission

Tracking devices are a growing enabler of serious and organized crime in NSW. Accessible, inexpensive, and easily concealed – they are used by organized crime networks to monitor, locate, and ultimately attack their rivals. An initial review of joint operations between the Commission and partner agencies identified frequent and increasing use of tracking devices to facilitate murders, public place shootings, kidnappings, violent drug thefts, and drug trafficking, and tracking devices are extensively being used by high-risk domestic and family violence offenders. 

By matching sales data against criminal histories and intelligence records, Project Hakea identified that:

• 37% of customers who had purchased tracking devices were adversely known to police

• 25% of customers had a history of domestic and family violence

• 15% had a history of serious and organized crime

•  9% of customers had a history of both domestic and family violence and serious and organized crime.

In addition to the extensive use of tracking devices by organized criminals, their widespread use by domestic and family violence offenders creates an urgent need to address the issue. 

By Katherine Verdery

Surveillance and Identity: The author, Katherine Verdery, explores how being under surveillance by Romania's secret police during the Cold War affected her sense of identity and her work as an anthropologist.

Ethnography and Spying: The book delves into the similarities and differences between ethnographic research and spying, questioning the ethical implications of both practices.

Impact of Surveillance: Verdery reflects on the emotional and psychological impact of discovering her secret police file, which contained extensive surveillance records and accusations of espionage.

Historical Context: The narrative provides a detailed account of life în Romania under Nicolae Ceausescu's regime, highlighting the pervasive nature of state surveillance and its effects on individuals and society.

Duke University Press, 2018, 323 pages

By Svetlana Stephenson

Historical Context: The book explores the evolution of gangs in Russia, particularly during the 1990s when radical market reforms led to the rise of street gangs that evolved into sophisticated organized crime networks.

Gang Structure: Russian gangs are described as male-dominated, violent alliances that are deeply embedded in society, often overlapping with legitimate structures and mainstream institutions.

Economic Influence: Gangs transitioned from street-level extortion to more complex economic activities, including protection operations for large companies and involvement in the shadow economy.

Social Integration: Despite their criminal activities, gang members often maintain legitimate jobs and social ties, reflecting a unique"double helix" model of social incorporation in Russia.

Cornell University Press, 2015, 277 pages

By David M. Hart

Hobsbawm Thesis: Eric Hobsbawm's analysis of banditry as a form of political protest is applied to the Islamic world by David Hart, examining cases from Morocco, Algeria, and Pakistan.

Case Studies: The document includes detailed case studies of banditry in North Western Morocco, the Moroccan Central High Atlas, Colonial Algeria, and the North West Frontier of Pakistan.

Bandit Behavior: The analysis reveals that while elements of political protest were present, bandit behavior was influenced by various other factors, making the Hobsbawm thesis not always applicable.

Historical Context: The document provides historical context and examples of banditry, highlighting the complex interplay between bandits and political power in different regions.

Middle East & North African Studies Press, 1987, 86 pages