By Nafees Hamid and Cristina Ariza

Question: Are those radicalised offline or online more of a threat? Which group is harder to detect, more successful in completing attacks, and more lethal when they do so? Is the pattern different for youth versus older perpetrators and for men versus women? This report investigates these questions. Database: We created a database containing 439 perpetrators involved in 245 attacks between 1 January 2014 and 1 January 2021. It includes every publicly known completed attack and an extensive sampling of thwarted attacks. Attacks were all jihadist‑linked in eight Western countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. Type of radicalisation: In our database, radicalisation primarily happens offline; over half the individuals in our database had been radicalised via offline networks. Success and lethality: Individuals who were radicalised offline were three times more likely than individuals radicalised online to complete an attack successfully. Those radicalised offline are 18 times more lethal than individuals in the online category. Those radicalised online are almost eight times more likely to fail than to succeed. Group attacks: Individuals who were radicalised offline are almost three times more likely to attack or plot in groups than individuals radicalised online. Success of group attacks: While groups were more likely to be thwarted by the police than to succeed (regardless of how individuals had been radicalised), successful groups of people radicalised offline were more lethal than their lone actor counterparts (15%). Family and friends: Some 87% of those with radicalised friends and 74% with radicalised relatives plotted or attacked together. Foreign fighters: Foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), who were mostly radicalised offline, have the same success rate as non‑FTFs. But success rate increases if they have spent more than a year in a terrorist training location. Age: Online radicalisation is on the rise for young people (born from the 2000s onwards), although most individuals, including young people, are still radicalised offline. Gender: Women appear to be more likely to have been radicalised online. Bottom line: Those radicalised offline are greater in number, more successful in completing attacks and more deadly than those radicalised online.  

London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, King’s College London. 2022. 40p.

By Rebecca A. Delfino

Deepfakes—audiovisual recordings created using artificial intelligence (AI) technology to believably map one person’s movements and words onto another—are ubiquitous. They have permeated societal and civic spaces from entertainment, news, and social media to politics. And now deepfakes are invading the courts, threatening our justice system’s truth-seeking function. Ways deepfakes could infect a court proceeding run the gamut and include parties fabricating evidence to win a civil action, government actors wrongfully securing criminal convictions, and lawyers purposely exploiting a lay jury’s suspicions about evidence. As deepfake technology improves and it becomes harder to tell what is real, juries may start questioning the authenticity of properly admitted evidence, which in turn may have a corrosive effect on the justice system. No evidentiary procedure explicitly governs the presentation of deepfake evidence in court. The existing legal standards governing the authentication of evidence are inadequate because they were developed before the advent of deepfake technology. As a result, they do not solve the urgent problem of how to determine when an audiovisual image is fake and when it is not. Although legal scholarship and the popular media have addressed certain facets of deepfakes in the last several years, there has been no commentary on the procedural aspects of deepfake evidence in court. Absent from the discussion is who gets to decide whether a deepfake is authentic. This Article addresses the matters that prior academic scholarship on deepfakes obscures. It is the first to propose a new addition to the Federal Rules of Evidence reflecting a novel reallocation of fact-determining responsibilities from the jury to the judge, treating the question of deepfake authenticity as one for the court to decide as an expanded gatekeeping function under the Rules. The challenges of deepfakes—problems of proof, the “deepfake defense,” and juror skepticism—can be best addressed by amending the Rules for authenticating digital audiovisual evidence, instructing the jury on its use of that evidence, and limiting counsel’s efforts to exploit the existence of deepfakes.

Hastings Law Journal, 2023. 57p.

By Taurus Myhand

The proliferation of deepfake videos has resulted in rapid improvements in the technology used to create them. Although the use of fake videos and images are not new, advances in artificial intelligence have made deepfakes easier to make and harder to detect. Basic human perception is no longer sufficient to detect deepfakes. Yet, under the current construction of the Federal Rules of Evidence, trials judges are expected to do just that. Trial judges face a daunting challenge when applying the current evidence authentication standards to video evidence in this new reality of widely available deepfake videos. This article examines the gatekeeping role trial judges must perform in light of the unique challenges posed by deepfake video evidence. This article further examines why the jury instruction approach and the rule change approaches proposed by other scholars are insufficient to combat the grave threat of false video evidence. This article concludes with a discussion of the affidavit of forensic analysis approach, a robust response to the authentication challenges posed by deepfakes. The AFA approach preserves most of the current construction of the Federal Rules of Evidence while reviving the gatekeeping role of the trial judge in determining the admissibility of video evidence. The AFA will provide the trial judges with the tools necessary to detect and exclude deepfake videos without leaving an everlasting taint on the juries that would have otherwise seen the falsified videos.

Widener Law Review, 2023. 19p.

MAY CONTAIN MARKUP

BY DAVID S. WALL

Looking at the full range of cybercrime, and computer security he shows how the increase in personal computing power available within a globalized communications network has affected the nature of and response to criminal activities. We have now entered the world of low impact, multiple victim crimes in which bank robbers, for example, no longer have to meticulously plan the theft of millions of dollars. New technological capabilities at their disposal now mean that one person can effectively commit millions of robberies of one dollar each. Against this background, David Wall scrutinizes the regulatory challenges that cybercrime poses for the criminal (and civil) justice processes, at both the national and the international levels.

Polity, 2007, 276 pages

MAY CONTAN MARKUP

By Marcus Felson

Entertainingly written and a model for how theory develops from empirical evidence, the Second Edition of this popular book is the perfect supplementary text for introductory criminology courses. The book provides an insightful analysis of the "other side" of crime causation, examining how society encourages or inhibits crime in the routine activities of everyday life.

SAGE Publications, Apr 13, 1998, 240 pages

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By Katie Seidler

From prison interviews with violent offenders and a wealth of experience and research, psychologist Dr Katie Seidler explores the complex interaction between crime and culture. Featuring the voices of the offenders themselves, 15 convicted adult male violent offenders from various ethnic cultural communities explain their understanding, motivations and rationalisations for their actions and how these relate to questions of identity, community and responsibility within their cultural experience and values. In challenging current criminological theory, Dr Seidler suggests that offenders from group-oriented (collectivist) cultures offend for group-oriented reasons, whereas those from cultures prioritising individualism offend for individual reasons. This more nuanced understanding of crime and criminals within the context of culture adds significantly both to criminological theory, as well as providing suggestions for improvements to policing and offender management and rehabilitation within the criminal justice system.

Australian Academic Press, 2010

By Kristin M. Tennyson, Lindsey Jeralds, Julie Zibulsky

Congress requires courts to consider several factors when determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed in federal cases, among them the “history and characteristics of the defendant.” The sentencing guidelines also specifically authorize judges to consider an offender’s age when determining whether to depart from the federal sentencing guidelines. In this report, the Commission presents information on a relatively small number of offenders who were aged 50 or older at the time they were sentenced in the federal system. In particular, the report examines older federal offenders who were sentenced in fiscal year 2021 and the crimes they committed, then assesses whether age was given a special consideration at sentencing. This report specifically focuses on three issues that could impact the sentencing of older offenders: age and infirmity, life expectancy, and the risk of recidivism.

Washington, DC: United States Sentencing Commission, 2022. 68p.

By Courtney Semisch

This publication provides data on the broad variety of economic crime sentenced under §2B1.1.  The Commission undertook a project to systematically identify and classify the myriad of economic crimes sentenced under §2B1.1 using offenders' statutes of conviction and offense conduct. The Commission used this two-step methodology to assign the 6,068 offenders sentenced under §2B1.1 in fiscal year 2017 to one of 29 specific types of economic crime. This publication provides, for the first time, data from this new project as well as a brief description of the study's methodology.

Washington, DC: United States Sentencing Commission, 2019. 87p.

By Courtney Semisch

For the first time, this report provides in-depth criminal history information about federal economic crime offenders, combining the most recently available data from two United States Sentencing Commission projects. Key findings are that the application of guideline criminal history provisions differed among the different types of economic crime offenders. Also, The extent of prior convictions differed among the different types of economic crime offenders. Federal economic crime offenders did not “specialize” in economic crime. The severity of criminal history differed for offenders in the specific types of economic crime. Only about one-quarter of federal economic crime offenders with prior convictions were not assigned criminal history points under the guidelines.

Washington, DC: United States Sentencing Commission, 2020. 56p.

By Tracey Kyckelhahn, Tiffany Choi

This study expands on prior Commission research by examining the geographic mobility of federal offenders. For this report, mobility is defined as having convictions in multiple states, including the location of the conviction for the instant offense. This report adds to the existing literature on offender criminal history in two important ways. First, the report provides information on how mobile federal offenders are, as measured by the number of offenders with convictions in multiple states. Second, the report provides information on the proportion of offenders with convictions in states other than the state in which the offender was convicted for the instant offense. The report also examines the degree to which out-of-state convictions in offenders’ criminal histories contributed to their criminal history score and their Criminal History Category.

Washington, DC: United States Sentencing Commission, 2020.  24p.

By Amber Evans, Strategy & Insight Manager | Fernanda Reynoso-Serna, Analyst | Freya Smith, Analyst | Dr Ellie Brown, Head of Strategy | Sophie Davis

Most people are more worried about being affected by online fraud than other crimes, such as knife crime, burglary and sexual offences, according to a new large-scale survey – which also highlights the emotional impact of being an online fraud victim. The research, funded by the Dawes Trust, was based on a nationally representative sample of over 3,313 adults across England and Wales as part of a survey conducted by data organisation WALR. The vast majority of those polled, 92%, said online fraud was a very big or quite big problem in the UK. When asked what crimes they were most worried about being affected by, 55% said online fraud, 44% burglary and 47% knife crime. The poll also found that younger people (aged 18-34) were most likely to be affected by online fraud, with 32% reporting having been a victim in the last twelve months compared to 16% of over-35s. However, half of those questioned believed the elderly were most at risk. Of those who had been victims of online fraud: 20% said their physical health had suffered, 32% reported a psychological impact, 42% were affected financially, 47% experienced an emotional impact, including feeling embarrassed, angry or ashamed. 23% of all victims said they had experienced anxiety, 12% experienced disturbed sleep and 11% experienced depression as a result of the online fraud. The survey also shows that just over half of victims reported the fraud to either the police or Action Fraud. Victims were more likely to contact their bank (41%) than to go to the police (32%) or Action Fraud (28%), the UK’s national fraud reporting centre.

London: Crest Advisory, 2023. 32p.

By Chad Whelan, David Bright, and James Martin

The concept of organised cybercrime has been the subject of much debate over the last decade. Many researchers who have applied scholarly definitions of organised crime to cyber-criminal groups have concluded that such groups are not “organised criminal groups” and do not engage in “organised crime”. This paper adopts a different perspective to argue that certain cyber-criminal groups involved in ransomware can and should be considered organised crime if a more contemporary and flexible framework for conceptualising organised crime is adopted. We make this argument using three primary domains of organised crime first described by von Lampe: criminal activities, offender social structures, and extra-legal governance. We narrow in on the concepts of violence and extra-legal governance in particular as they have been interpreted to hold significant differences for criminal groups operating in physical and digital domains. The paper argues that it is time to move on from criminological debates regarding whether organised cybercrime can exist to focus on the many rich questions that researchers can take from organised crime scholarship and apply to cyber-criminal groups. We put forward a reconceptualisation of organised cybercrime towards this end.

Journal of Criminology, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/26338076231199793, Preprint 2023.

By John Aloysius, Ankur Arora, Viswanath Venkatesh

Purpose: Retailers are implementing technology-enabled mobile checkout processes in their stores to improve service quality, decrease labor costs and gain operational efficiency. These new checkout processes have increased customer convenience primarily by providing them autonomy in sales transactions in that store employee interventions play a reduced role. However, this autonomy has the unintended consequence of altering the checks and balances inherent in a traditional employee-assisted checkout process. Retailers, already grappling with shoplifting, with an estimated annual cost of billions of dollars, fear that the problem may be exacerbated by mobile checkout and concomitant customer autonomy. The purpose of this paper is to understand the effect of mobile checkout processes in retail stores on cybercrime in the form of shoplifting enabled by a technology transformed the retail environment. Design/methodology/approach The authors conducted an online survey of a US sample recruited from a crowdsourced platform. The authors test a research model that aims to understand the factors that influence the intention to shoplift in three different mobile checkout settings − namely, smartphone checkout settings, store-provided mobile device checkout settings, and employee-assisted mobile checkout settings − and compare it with a traditional fixed location checkout setting. Findings: The authors found that, in a smartphone checkout setting, intention to shoplift was driven by experiential beliefs and peer influence, and experiential beliefs and peer influence had a stronger effect for prospective shoplifters when compared to experienced shoplifters; in a store-provided mobile devices checkout setting, experiential beliefs had a negative effect on shoplifters’ intention to shoplift and the effect was weaker for prospective shoplifters when compared to experienced shoplifters. The results also indicated that in an employee-assisted mobile checkout setting, intention to shoplift was driven by experiential beliefs and peer influence, and experiential beliefs had a stronger effect for prospective shoplifters when compared to experienced shoplifters. Originality/value: This study is the among the first, if not first, to examine shoplifters’ intention to shoplift in mobile checkout settings. We provide insights into how those who may not have considered shoplifting in less favorable criminogenic settings may change their behavior due to the autonomy provided by mobile checkout settings and also provide an understanding of the shoplifting intention for both prospective and experienced shoplifters in different mobile checkout settings.

Information Technology and People, April 2019, 32(5):1234-1261

By  Anna Sergi

This project involved qualitative primary research into criminality within seaports, by observing how ports, as microcosmic realities run through formal and informal relationships and have specific security vulnerabilities, which facilitate different types of illegal or deviant behaviours. Research has been carried out in two European ports (Liverpool and Genoa) and three non-European ones (Montreal, New York and Melbourne), which are either targets of, or transit zones for, criminal activities and criminal networks.  The main aim of this comparative research project was to improve policy understanding of how the complex relationships within ports act as conduits or facilitators in how criminal networks operate in the territory of and around the ports. With specific attention to the changing geopolitical conditions surrounding the port of Liverpool within the Brexit scenario, the study has looked at what could be learned in the British experience from international ones both in terms of security and in terms of transnational risk assessments. 

London: University of Essex, 2020.    230p.

By David Lewis

Despite Ukraine's ongoing counter-offensive, in September 2023 Russia still controlled around 17% of Ukrainian territory, an area roughly the size of Denmark. Russia's occupation of these Ukrainian territories relied primarily on repression and violence, but economic levers also played an important role in consolidating Russian rule. This paper details Russia's illicit economic activity in the occupied territories and calls for more international attention to this aspect of Russia's invasion. Since Russia occupied large parts of south-eastern Ukraine in March 2022, it has worked rapidly to incorporate these regions into Russia's economic and financial system. Key elements in this 'economic occupation' include: • The seizure of many Ukrainian businesses and assets. The occupation authorities 'nationalised' many companies and re-registered them as Russian businesses with new management. • The imposition of the Russian currency, financial and tax system, and the forced closure of Ukrainian banks. • The forcible takeover of farms or pressure on farmers to cooperate with the occupation authorities. Russian officials oversaw the illegal export of Ukrainian grain from the occupied territories. • The reconstruction of cities such as Mariupol, the city destroyed by Russian forces in spring 2022, in a multi-billion-dollar government programme that is profiting well-connected Russian companies. These acts were all illegal under Ukrainian law and some may constitute potential war crimes under international law. There should be more attention paid to these economic crimes internationally – with clear warnings for Russian business about the consequences under international law of seizing Ukrainian businesses and assets. Although international sanctions have targeted many officials in the Russian occupation structures, the approach should be more coordinated and systematic to raise the costs of Russian occupation. More international attention now would also assist in eventual reintegration and reconstruction of these regions. For example, a database of business seizures and economic crimes in the occupied territories would help to resolve legal issues and ensure business restitution in the aftermath of the war, while also serving as a potential basis for sanctions and eventual prosecutions. The economic aspects of occupation also raise complex questions of transitional justice for those who lived under Russian occupation. Ukrainian society is discussing how to define and respond to acts of collaboration in the occupied territories. International experience could help to inform legal and political solutions that meet the needs of justice but also seek to unite post-war Ukrainian society  

SOC ACE Research Paper No 20. 

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham , 2023. 43p.

By Jay P. Kennedy

 Nearly every type of product that has ever been produced has been counterfeited. While the most counterfeited goods tend to be footwear, luxury items, watches, and jewelry, in recent years there has been a dramatic increase in the prevalence of pharmaceutical counterfeits. The World Health Organization (WHO) defines counterfeit medicines as “medicines that are mislabeled deliberately and fraudulently”, yet counterfeit medicines are generally discussed alongside other forms of harmful medical products such as adulterated, expired, substandard, stolen, and falsified medicines. Each of these products moves through a mix of illegitimate and legitimate intermediaries and distribution channels before making their way into healthcare systems and ultimately to patients. Counterfeit pharmaceuticals harm patients, the healthcare system, legitimate companies, and society. While their presence within the legitimate supply chain is increasing, the threats posed by these illicit goods can be countered through focused action and collaboration amongst industry, healthcare, and law enforcement. This paper discusses three primary risks to consumers and the healthcare infrastructure of Texas: (1) the infiltration of counterfeit drugs into the legitimate supply chain; (2) the direct threat posed by counterfeit pharmaceuticals; and (3) the risks posed by counterfeit drugs to national security and the legitimate supply chain. The paper concludes with a discussion of policy and anti-counterfeiting strategy recommendations aimed at addressing each of the identified risks and protecting Texans, Americans, and the healthcare supply chain.   

Huntsville, TX: Institute for Homeland Security, Sam Houston State University, 2023. 18p.

By Jack Whittaker and Mark Button

Advance fee and non-delivery frauds have become very common with the growing preference for online shopping and the new opportunities this brings for online offenders. This article uses unique access to a volunteer group’s database focused on preventing pet scams to explore this type of crime. Distances, among other factors, make the purchase of pets online common in countries such as the USA, Australia and South Africa. This modality of purchase has been exploited by organized criminals largely based in Cameroon to conduct advance fee and non-delivery frauds. The article uses data from the volunteer group Petscams.com to provide unique insights on the techniques of the offenders with particular reference to the strategies used to maximize victimization by using real accounts of victims of such frauds. It also briefly notes how the COVID-19 crisis has been used to adapt this type of scam. The article’s discussion identifies the need for a more nuanced assessment into the role of victim-oriented voluntary organizations.

Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 2020, Vol. 53(4) 497–514

By Michael Levi and Russell G Smith

This report seeks to draw out the common characteristics of frauds associated with pandemics, and to identify any risks unique to pandemics and financial crises, beginning with the Spanish flu pandemic of 1918, as the closest to COVID-19 in the modern era. It summarises the general influence of the internet or remote intrusions on contemporary frauds and allied corporate/ organised crimes against individuals, businesses and government, using plausibly reliable data from Australia and the United Kingdom as indicative of more general trends. The report identifies some novel crime types and methodologies arising during the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 that were not seen in previous pandemics. These changes may result from public health measures taken in response to COVID-19, the current state of technologies and the activities of law enforcement and regulatory guardians. The report notes that many frauds occur whatever the state of the economy, but that some specific frauds occur during pandemics, especially online fraud. Similarly, some previously occurring frauds are revealed by economic crises, while frauds arising from and causing insolvencies are stimulated by economic crises. The report concludes with a discussion of the policy implications for prevention, resilience and for private and public policing and criminal justice in Australia. It stresses the need for plans for future pandemics and economic crises to include provisions for better early monitoring and control of fraud and procurement corruption. Research Report no. 19.

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2021. 74p.

By Marianne Junger*, Victoria Wang, Marleen Schlömer

This study analyses 300 cases of fraudulent activities against Dutch businesses, 100 from each of the following three categories: CEO-fraud, fraudulent contract, and ghost invoice. We examine crime scripts, key characteristics of targeted businesses, and the relationship between input criminal effort and output financial benefit. Results indicate that whilst all CEO-frauds are conducted online, most of the fraudulent contracts and ghost invoices are undertaken via offline means. Both Routine Activity Theory and Rational Choice Model are evidenced-fraudsters clearly take the business size and seasonality into account, and the input criminal effort and output criminal benefit are positively correlated. Having vigilant employees is evidenced as the most effective way of fraud prevention, both online and offline.

Crime Science 9(1): 1–15. 2020.

By: Catherine Emami, Russell G Smith and Penny Jorna

Online fraud includes dating or romance scams, deceptive sales of products and services, dishonest investment schemes, lottery or inheritance scams, working from home scams or lottery fraud involving false prize draws or sweepstakes. These frauds are costly not only in their financial impact on business and government, but also because of the detrimental impact they have on victims. To gain a better understanding of online consumer fraud, the Australian Institute of Criminology worked with the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission to compare a matched sample of victims and non-victims. This study aimed to identify and quantify the factors that make some individuals more vulnerable to consumer fraud than others. It was found that greater familiarity with online activities resulted in a reduced likelihood of victimization and that victims were more likely to have used money wire transfers and electronic funds transfers to send money in response to scam invitations than other forms of payment. These findings support the development of targeted awareness-raising campaigns focusing on the online behaviour most likely to lead to fraud victimization. It offers policymakers and consumer affairs organisations opportunities to better target fraud prevention and education initiatives.

Research Report no. 16. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2019. 98p.