By B.C.Tefft, and L.S.. & Arnold,

Washington State Initiative 502 (I-502), effective Dec. 6, 2012, legalized possession of small amounts of cannabis for recreational use by adults aged 21 years and older. It also included a prohibition against driving with 5 or more nanograms of delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) per milliliter of blood, along with a zero tolerance prohibition for drivers younger than 21 years of age. THC is the main psychoactive component in cannabis and detection of THC in blood is suggestive of recent use. A previous study by the AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety examined data from drivers involved in fatal crashes in Washington State in years 2010-2014 and estimated that the proportion of drivers with detectable THC approximately doubled several months after I-502 became effective (Tefft et al., 2016). The research reported here updates the previous study with three additional years of data, post-legalization. Multiple imputation was used to estimate the proportion of drivers who were THC-positive among those who were not tested for drugs or whose test results were unavailable. Results indicate that five years after I-502, the proportion of fatal-crash-involved drivers who are THC-positive has remained approximately double the level observed before I-502. An estimated 21% of all drivers involved in fatal crashes in Washington State in 2017 were THC-positive, higher than in any other year in the 10-year period examined

Washington, D.C.: AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety , 2020. 6p.

By The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA)

This report is based on information provided to the EMCDDA by the EU Member States, the candidate country Türkiye, and Norway, in an annual reporting process.

The purpose of the current report is to provide an overview and summary of the European drug situation up to the end of 2022. All grouping, aggregates and labels therefore reflect the situation based on the available data in 2022 in respect to the composition of the European Union and the countries participating in EMCDDA reporting exercises. However, not all data will cover the full period. Due to the time needed to compile and submit data, many of the annual national data sets included here are from the reference year January to December 2021. Analysis of trends is based only on those countries providing sufficient data to describe changes over the period specified. The reader should also be aware that monitoring patterns and trends in a hidden and stigmatised behaviour like drug use is both practically and methodologically challenging. For this reason, multiple sources of data are used for the purposes of analysis in this report. Although considerable improvements can be noted, both nationally and in respect to what is possible to achieve in a European level analysis, the methodological difficulties in this area must be acknowledged. Caution is therefore required in interpretation, in particular when countries are compared on any single measure. Caveats relating to the data are to be found in the online Statistical Bulletin, which contains detailed information on methodology, qualifications on analysis and comments on the limitations in the information set available. Information is also available there on the methods and data used for European level estimates, where interpolation may be used.

Lisbon: EMCDDA, 2023.

By The United Nations General Assembly. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

The present report outlines human rights challenges in addressing and countering key aspects of the world drug problem. It also offers an overview of recent positive developments to shift towards more human rights-centred drug policies, and provides recommendations on the way forward in view of the upcoming midterm review of the 2019 Ministerial Declaration and to contribute to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

United Nations, 2023. 19p.

By The International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC)

In September 2023, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights released a landmark report on human rights in drug policy. Prepared at the request of the Human Rights Council as a contribution to the mid-term review of the 2019 Ministerial Declaration on drugs, this report constitutes the most ambitious and comprehensive UN document to date on the alignment of drug policies with human rights. The report consolidates existing human rights standards, develops new recommendations, and proposes a blueprint for transformative change, from a global punitive paradigm to drug policies based on health and human rights.

This IDPC advocacy note focuses on three key issues. First, the new standards and recommendations developed in the OHCHR report, which update our understanding of the human rights dimension of drug policies. Secondly, the consolidation of prior human rights standards developed by other UN bodies. Lastly, we lay down our recommendations for an effective implementation of the vision proposed by the report.

London: IDPC, 2023. 7p.

By UK Parliament, House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee

Drugs can have a significant and negative impact on people who use drugs, their loved ones and society. Trends in drugs may vary over time but this consequence is constant. Concerningly, drug misuse deaths across the UK continue to increase with opiates playing a significant role in this, and ‘street’ benzodiazepines and polydrug use also playing an increasing role. There were 250 drug misuse deaths per million population in Scotland in 2022—significantly higher than in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. In her Independent Review of Drugs, Professor Dame Carol Black estimated the total cost of drugs to society to be more than £19 billion per year—more than twice the value of the illicit drugs market (an estimated £9.4 billion).

In recent years, the response by the international community and devolved nations to drugs has increasingly focused on responding to drugs through a public health lens. UK policy should ensure that an approach originally and primarily based on criminal justice principles continues to adapt to achieve a proper balance of public health interventions that may reduce illicit drug use in the longer term rather than aiming simply to disrupt demand. We believe that this approach would be best supported by making drug policy the joint responsibility of the Home Office and the Department of Health and Social Care, with a minister sitting across both departments.

The main piece of legislation controlling drugs in the UK—the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971—is more than 50 years old. It is in need of review. Further, a full review by the Advisory Council is required on whether the most commonly controlled drugs in the UK are correctly classified and scheduled (under the Misuse of Drugs Regulations 2001), based on the evidence of their harms.

The Government’s latest drugs strategy, ‘From Harm to Hope: A 10-Year drugs plan to cut crime and save lives’ (the 10-Year Drugs Strategy) signals a shift towards recognising the need for a holistic response to drugs that not only aims to tackle the illicit drug market but also supports people who use drugs, their loved ones and society. However, the Government’s response could go further by adopting a broader range of public health-based harm reduction methods in tandem with its support of law enforcement efforts to tackle the illicit drugs market.

We support the use of diamorphine assisted treatment supported by psychosocial support as a second-line treatment for people with a chronic heroin dependency. We visited a centre in Middlesbrough and saw the dramatic and positive effect this treatment had on the lives of a small group of people who had used drugs and, albeit on a small scale, to local crime reduction. Disappointingly, such treatment programmes are few and controversial, and the Middlesbrough programme lost its funding. The Government should provide centralised funding for such programmes.

Safe consumption facilities, where people who use drugs may do so in safe, secure surroundings, may also reduce harm and deaths, but the status of such facilities is uncertain because of the restrictive regime in place under the 1971 Act. We recommend that the Government support a pilot facility in Glasgow and create a legislative pathway to enable more.

A national drug checking service in England could enable people to anonymously test samples of drugs, again preventing harm and potentially death. We recommend the Government establish a drug checking service, taking into account the experience of Wales. We also recommend the expansion of on-site drug checking services at temporary events such as music festivals and in the night-time economy through the creation of a dedicated licensing scheme. The power to issue such licences could include the devolution of power to grant licences to local authorities.

These public health and harm reduction interventions must be balanced with the role of police in applying the law. The police can also have a role in aiding prevention of drug use and treatment of harms. Scotland’s pioneering programme of having all police officers carry naloxone (a nasal spray or injection that can be administered immediately to reverse the effects of an opioid overdose) should be rolled out elsewhere in the UK as a straightforward means of saving lives. The police can also play an important role in diverting young people who have committed low-level drug-related offences away from the criminal justice system. We support greater standardisation of police-led diversion across England and Wales, to avoid a ‘postcode lottery’ in the treatment of such offenders.

London: House of Commons, 2023. 98p.

By Kathii Lynn Austin and Brian Freskos

The U.S. and Mexico are grappling with daunting security crises stemming from the trafficking of hundreds of thousands of guns over the U.S. southern border every year. These weapons are empowering Mexican transnational criminal organizations and inflicting substantial suffering in both countries. This report underscores how reducing cross-border gun trafficking is crucial for achieving the goals of the U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities — a bilateral security agreement announced nearly two years ago. By implementing our recommendations, the U.S. and Mexico can more effectively combat illicit gun flows, saving lives, and improving prosperity.

California: Pacific Council on International Policy, 2023. 85p.

By Flore Berger

Cattle rustling in Mali surged in 2021 and continues at unprecedented levels, with the dominant perpetrators being violent extremist groups operating in the country. The scale of cattle rustling in Mali is the climax of a decade of growth of the practice, and cattle rustling is now a central and under-reported element of the country’s security crisis variously as a driver of conflict, as a governance and intimidation mechanism, and as a key source of revenue for non-state armed groups. This has dramatic humanitarian, social and economic effects on communities. Cattle rustling has since the very start of the crisis been at the heart of Mali’s war economy, with Tuareg rebel groups (since the 1990s) and violent extremist groups (since 2012) financing themselves by looting livestock and relying on a broader network to sell it, using its proceeds to finance their operations (e.g. buying fuel, vehicles and weapons). Cattle rustling, understood in this report to mean the whole range of livestock appropriation,1 has rarely been considered as a criminal economy, yet its impacts on communities and conflict dynamics across West Africa are arguably unrivalled by other more traditional organized markets, such as high-value narcotics. It is sustained by a complex network and supply chain, and perpetrated through ever-increasing violence. Furthermore, while a range of illicit economies have been used by violent extremist groups for resourcing – including trafficking of cigarettes, fuel and drugs; artisanal gold mining; and kidnapping for ransom – cattle rustling has proven to be a particularly resilient and broadly stable source of income. Cattle rustling also stands out regarding the degree to which it intersects with a long-standing history of frustration and resentment by pastoralist communities, and is therefore integral to understanding regional conflict. Cattle rustling, and reprisals for theft, spark cycles of violence as herders protect themselves by joining armed groups and arming themselves. Other communities then respond by creating more armed groups for self-protection, many of which become predatory. Cattle rustling also operates as a mechanism wielded by armed groups to terrorize the population and deprive them of a central element of livelihoods. Hundreds of villages have been pillaged and burnt down, and cattle looted.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. 54p.

By Matt Herbert and Lucia Bird Ruiz-Benitez de Lugo i

Since the turn of the millennium, organized crime has surged from a small number of locally or regionally active organizations into a plethora of syndicates operating throughout the globe. Their operations are now often transnational, either active in multiple countries or involved with illicit commodity chains that extend across borders and interlink different regions.

Organized crime players are increasingly active in criminal markets, from human trafficking to cybercrime to illicit fuel sales. Although the value of global organized crime activity is unknown – and likely unknowable with any real precision because of its nature – it is huge. Individual markets such as drug trafficking or timber extraction are estimated to generate hundreds of billions of dollars annually.

The rising prevalence and profitability of organized crime have had a substantial impact in many of the states in which networks operate. In part, this is through the corruption and/or coercion of state officials to allow criminal activity or purchasing impunity.

Such official complicity is now the most important factor enabling the spread and operations of organized crime and also a key impediment to efforts to design solutions and build resilience to it.

Criminal groups have been important sponsors of armed groups seeking to control, in full or in part, the territory of states across the world. Increasingly, organized crime actors have developed autonomous military capacity, becoming key threats to peace and security in their own right. Impacts of organized crime on governance also manifest from the bottom up, with local communities highly vulnerable to criminal actors’ attempts to violently seize de facto control, limit access to public services or establish alternative governance structures.

Because of this profusion of impacts, the international community is devoting increasing resources to counter the phenomena of rising organized crime. At a national level, this has seen greater funding of security force and criminal justice actors, an expansion that is mirrored in international aid, with heightened donor focus on security sector reform and governance, judicial sector training and programmes to build binational and multinational coordination on security challenges, including organized crime.

The international community has also sought to build arrangements for multilateral reciprocal cooperation, such as the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), also known as the Palermo Convention. However, these have struggled to achieve the necessary effects and are often outpaced by criminal evolution, leading many states to prefer unilateral or ad hoc initiatives to address transnational organized crime. Further, many governments are shifting their approach to organized crime, assessing it as a national security threat rather than purely as a criminal justice challenge. The result has been that, while criminal justice tools such as multilateral arrangements con-tinue to be relied upon, other approaches – involving military, financial and diplomatic tools – are becoming increasingly common. The use of targeted sanctions has emerged as part of this expanding international toolkit to address organized crime.

Such sanctions can be defined as legal authorities that prohibit certain forms of otherwise licit activity, including financial access or travel, for a specific entity in order to hamper their pursuit of a specific goal. Historically, they have mostly been used against countries whose activities were interpreted as threats to peace and security or individuals who had breached international law or norms. Despite the growing use, there has been limited tracing of why and how different international actors have converged in their use of targeted sanctions, how they have developed processes to issue and implement sanctions regimes and their impact and effectiveness. This report series focuses on the use of targeted sanctions against criminal actors. The series encompasses both global reports and country-specific and thematic studies.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. 75p.

By Shehryar Fazli

The Taliban’s 3 April 2022 edict prohibiting poppy cultivation and the use and trade of all types of narcotics across Afghanistan could have grave implications for a collapsing economy. Poppy is the country’s most valuable cash crop, and its labour-intensive cultivation employs several hundred thousand people, pushing up wages and living standards of those directly and indirectly involved. Requiring little water, the poppy’s resilience in adverse agricultural conditions makes it an attractive long-term investment, especially during one of the worst droughts in decades. The new ban would affect farmers in the rural southwest region, where many Taliban leaders are from, as well as influential players across the opium and heroin supply chain. In the absence of significant financial incentives to these constituencies, the risks of a major backlash probably outweigh any benefits of enforcing a poppy ban. Providing such financial incentives would be dependent on significant foreign assistance. Some prominent experts and commentators infer that international legitimacy and funding was the Taliban’s primary motivation in announcing the edict. If so, there are no signs yet that the move will generate the desired response. Afghanistan has been politically and economically isolated since the Taliban’s August 2021 forceful seizure of power. The freezing of around $9 billion in central bank foreign reserves, held mostly in the US, triggered a collapse of the local currency and major liquidity crisis, while aid cut-offs and sanctions triggered hyper-inflation and impeded trade and other business. There are indications that the international community, led by the US, is softening its position to prevent an economic collapse affecting millions of Afghans who face starvation. Without tangible Taliban commitments to basic rights and equality, however, especially of girls and women, deeper international engagement, including on counter-narcotics, is unlikely. How willing and able the Taliban will be to enforce its edict may remain unclear for several months. The ban came amid the poppy harvest in the southwestern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar, bastions of both poppy cultivation and Taliban support. Significant quantities, therefore, may have already been harvested. Transporting them up the supply chain, and to western destinations, will depend on resourceful transnational crime groups. The most important of these are arguably in Pakistan, which shares Afghanistan’s longest border and most of the routes for westward movement of illicit goods, people, and cash from Afghanistan. Criminal networks here traverse the Indian and Iranian borders, and also move their product by sea off the southern Makran coast and Karachi port, to European, African, Asian and Australian markets. These networks, and the geography in which they operate, also require close examination. By better understanding the context and trends, policy-makers will be better able to assess policy options and their implications, especially in Europe, the destination of significant volumes of heroin from Afghanistan

SOC ACE Research Paper No. 9.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. 2022. 35p.

By Ruggero Scaturro

Recent studies conducted by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) show that the war in Ukraine may displace existing drug trafficking routes from and through Ukraine and exacerbate the instability that enables drug trafficking and manufacturing, including in areas not directly connected or exposed to hostilities.

Trauma derived from the conflict might also have an impact on current and future drug use patterns in communities affected by the war, which could create new opportunities for both local and foreign drug traffickers to meet this growing demand. This becomes particularly relevant when analyzing flows of traditional opioids as well as new psychoactive substances (NPS), and stimulants used by both civilians and soldiers at the front line. Neighbouring Ukraine, the South Eastern Europe region represents a relatively small market for drug consumption and accounts for only a small amount of drug production and supply (primarily cannabis) to EU markets. However, its strategic location between East and West – and its proximity to the Ukraine conflict – might mean that it is particularly exposed to the effects of the war on traffickers’ modus operandi and trafficking routes through the region.

Since February 2022, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has caused the progressive displacement and movement of traditional drug production and trafficking hubs in southern and eastern Ukraine towards the west, around the borders with Poland, Slovakia and Romania. Similarly, in the context of criminal mobility, overwhelmed border security management between Ukraine and its neighbouring countries to the west leads to opportunities for both Ukrainian and Russian criminals to operate and manage their businesses from South Eastern Europe, thanks to the possibility to forge documents and receive ‘golden’ passports due to their investments in countries in the region.

This report assesses whether the war in Ukraine and its resulting disruption are having a significant impact on drug flows through South Eastern Europe. The research is based on the assumption that, because of an intensified military presence in Eastern Europe, traditional flows of drugs have been, at least temporarily, disrupted. This includes the northern route of opioids from Afghanistan, which supplies large markets across Central Asia, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Furthermore, other drug routes, such as for cocaine from Latin America to the port of Odesa, have atrophied. Conversely, flows along alternative routes, such as the Balkan route, appear to have intensified.

In view of these shifts, this report offers an assessment of emerging trends in drugs flows and provides an overview of data on seizures in South Eastern Europe. It also assesses the impact that the Ukraine war is having on wholesale and retail drug prices and, where assessment is possible, on levels of purity and the perceived quality of substances.

Center for the Study of Democracy; Global Initiative Against Organized Crime, 2023. 28p.

Edited by Gian Ege, Andreas Schloenhardt ,Christian Schwarzenegger and Monika Stempkowski

Debates about decriminalising or even legalising certain narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances have gained much momentum in recent years. On the surface, it appears that more and more jurisdictions are exploring the introduction of measures to permit, albeit in very controlled ways, the use of some narcotic drugs, if only for medical purposes. Others further agree that the so-called ‘war on drugs’ has failed to produce any meaningful success and that new ways to prevent the abuse of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances need to be explored. Nevertheless, most jurisdictions continue to impose near-complete bans on the production, manufacturing, trade, transport, supply, sale, and possession of illicit drugs. National authorities, along with international organisations, point out that any move to decriminalise narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances is inconsistent with international law.

Berlin: Carl Grossman Verlag 2023. 250p.

By Felber J. Arroyave, Alexander M. Petersen, Jeffrey Jenkins & Rafael Hurtado

Illicit wildlife trafficking poses a threat to the conservation of species and ecosystems, and represents a fundamental source of biodiversity loss, alongside climate change and large-scale land degradation. Despite the seriousness of this issue, little is known about various socio-cultural demand sources underlying trafficking networks, for example the forthright consumption of endangered species in different cultural contexts. Our study illustrates how wildlife trafficking represents a wicked problem at the intersection of criminal enforcement, cultural heritage and environmental systems management. As with similar network-based crimes, institutions are frequently ineffective at curbing wildlife trafficking, partly due to the lack of information detailing activities within illicit trading networks. To address this shortcoming, we leverage official government records documenting the illegal trade of reptiles in Colombia. As such, our study contributes to the understanding of how and why wildlife trafficking persists across robust trafficking networks, which are conduits for a broader range of black-market goods. Leveraging geo-spatial data, we construct a multiplex representation of wildlife trafficking networks, which facilitates identifying network properties that are signatures of strategic trafficker behavior. In particular, our results indicate that traffickers’ actions are constrained by spatial and market customs, a result which is apparent only within an integrated multiplex representation. Characteristic levels of sub-network coupling further indicate that traffickers strategically leverage knowledge of the entire system. We argue that this multiplex representation is essential for prioritizing crime enforcement strategies aimed at disrupting robust trade networks, thereby enhancing the effectiveness and resources allocation of institutions charged with curbing illicit trafficking. We develop a generalizable model of multiplex criminal trade networks suitable for communicating with policy makers and practitioners, thereby facilitating rapid translation into public policy and environmental conservation efforts.

Applied Network Science volume 5, Article number: 20 (2020)

By Tanya Wyatt, Daan van Uhm & Angus Nurse

Historically, the poaching of wildlife was portrayed as a small-scale local activity in which only small numbers of wildlife would be smuggled illegally by collectors or opportunists. Nowadays, this image has changed: criminal networks are believed to be highly involved in wildlife trafficking, which has become a significant area of illicit activity. Even though wildlife trafficking has become accepted as a major area of crime and an important topic and criminologists have examined a variety of illegal wildlife markets, research that specifically focuses on the involvement of different criminal networks and their specific nature is lacking. The concept of a ‘criminal network’ or ‘serious organized crime’ is amorphous – getting used interchangeably and describes all crime that is structured rather than solely reflecting crime that fits within normative definitions of ‘organized’ crime. In reality, criminal networks are diverse. As such, we propose categories of criminal networks that are evidenced in the literature and within our own fieldwork: (1) organized crime groups (2) corporate crime groups and (3) disorganized criminal networks. Whereas there are instances when these groups act alone, this article will (also) discuss the overlap and interaction that occurs between our proposed categories and discuss the complicated nature of the involved criminal networks as well as predictions as to the future of these networks.

Trends in Organized Crime (2020) 23:350–366

By Meredith L. Gore , Robert Mwinyihali , Luc Mayet Gavinet Duclair, Makaya Baku-Bumb , etc.

Urban wildmeat consumption can contribute to significant declines in wildlife populations, ecosystem function, and food insecurity security. Describing types of individuals involved in illegal urban wildmeat trafficking can help distinguish ordinary citizens from members of criminal organizations and urban vs. rural dimensions of the activity. This research aimed to: (1) create and apply a typology for urban wildmeat traffickers and sellers; and (2) explore linkages between types of urban wildmeat traffickers and sellers. We used focus groups with experts in the Republic of the Congo, February 2019 (N = 2, n = 7–10) to achieve objectives and focused on pangolins, great apes, and dwarf crocodiles. Participants generated risk rankings for each species, typology and city; data was encoded and indexed. Results illustrate heterogeneity in actors involved in the illegal supply chain. Business sideliner and trading charity trafficker types were associated with the highest total risk to wildlife trafficking. A similar pattern of divergence was detected for seller typologies; hidden and casual sellers were associated with the greatest total risk in Pointe Noire and Brazzaville, respectively. Differentiating but not stove piping stakeholders involved in urban wildmeat trafficking will help clarify stages of illegal supply chains as well and promote thinking about new sectors to involve in interventions and solutions, particularly in urban ecosystems thought to be outside the scope to wildlife crime.

Global Ecology and Conservation. Volume 27, June 2021, e01557

By Michelle Anagnostou

The intensified illegal trade of wildlife has contributed to the unsustainable decline of wildlife populations, the destabilization of ecosystems, and threatens economic development and human security. Though often lacking empirical evidence, convergence theory has emerged recently as a topic of interest among researchers, practitioners, and the media to explain the growing overlap of criminal activities in an increasingly globalized world. In this paper, I explain the interdisciplinary theoretical foundations for the interconnectivity of criminal networks, including connections between illegal wildlife trade networks and non-state armed groups. I also outline and discuss various perspectives on the convergence of the illegal wildlife trade with other organized crime activities. I conclude by highlighting the urgent need for a better understanding of the role of the organized criminal groups involved in the illegal wildlife trade, and of how these groups converge with other types of criminal activities. The policy implications of filling in this knowledge gap are twofold: firstly, understanding how criminal networks converge can facilitate the implementation of more effective law enforcement and investigations that target high-profile offenders, as opposed to focusing on low-level poachers; and secondly, this understanding can foster more cooperation across agencies and jurisdictions to address multiple crime types and crime in convergence settings

Environmental Challenges. Volume 5, December 2021, 100222

By Earth League International and John Jay College of Criminal Justice

Environmental crime convergence, the focal point of this report, poses an imminent threat to our planet’s delicate ecosystems. To address this urgent issue, ELI, and John Jay College present ELI’s revolutionary 4-Type Environmental Crime Convergence paradigm to comprehensively understand and combat the intricate web of transnational organized crime operations that perpetuate environmental degradation.

The foundation of this report is built upon the fieldwork and intelligence analysis of ELI’s investigators and crime analysts, who have gathered first-hand evidence of Environmental Crime Convergence directly from some of the world’s most notorious environmental criminals and their networks. Drawing on years of investigative fieldwork in the Americas, Europe, Africa, and Asia, over two dozen case studies have emerged from ELI’s work as primary sources of data.

This report highlights five (5) case studies of the transnational criminal networks in Latin America identified by ELI that illustrate the convergence of environmental and wildlife crime with other serious crimes and expose the severity of the issue at a global scale.

Los Angeles: Earth League International, 2023. 83p.

By Nancy Frank

FROM CHAPTER 1: “OVER THE LAST ten to fifteen years, a number of tragic episodes have elevated public consciousness of crimes against health and safety. The Love Canal disaster, in which an entire neighborhood had to be permanently evacuated because it had been built on an abandoned chemical dump, became only a prelude to a growing awareness of hazardous waste disposal problems. In the Pinto case the Ford Motor Company was indicted on charges of reckless homicide for selling the Pinto even though the company allegedly was aware that the car had a tendency to explode when involved in rear-end collisions. The accident at Three Mile Island, in which a nuclear reactor started to melt down before technicians were able to bring it under control, dramatically illustrated the risks that are created and managed by profit-seeking firms.”

NY. Harrow and Heston. 1985. 112p.

By R. Nishino and T. Kitade  

 TRAFFIC conducted online surveys to track changes after voluntary ivory bans were introduced from November 2019 on Yahoo Shopping and Yahoo Auction, Japan’s largest platforms for online ivory trade, following similar voluntary bans already implemented by Rakuten-Ichiba, Rakuma and Mercari. The trading practices of a major auction house, Mainchi Auction, and trends in illegal ivory exports were also examined to understand better the domestic ivory market in Japan. The COVID-19 pandemic has made it difficult to assess physical markets. RESULTS: Effective measures by companies The number of shops selling ivory on Yahoo Shopping and Rakuten-Ichiba as B2C (business to consumer) trade and the volume of ivory trade on Yahoo Auction, a mixture of B2C and C2C (consumer to consumer) trade, have reduced by almost 100% and more than 99%, respectively as a result of the platform-wide voluntary ivory ban. There was no observable shift in either B2C or C2C trade to other platforms after the introduction of the ivory ban on Yahoo’s platforms. Monitoring of ivory bans by companies such as Mercari and Rakuma was seen to have been effective 

TRAFFIC, Japan Office, Tokyo, Japan., 2020. 30p.

By USAID Wildlife Asia

USAID Wildlife Asia is a five-year, US$24.5 million, regional counter wildlife trafficking (CWT) initiative addressing the trafficking of pangolins, tigers, elephants and rhinos in Southeast Asia and China. The USAID Wildlife Asia Activity works to address wildlife trafficking as a transnational crime. The project aims to reduce consumer demand for wildlife parts and products, strengthen law enforcement, enhance legal and political commitment and support regional collaboration to reduce wildlife crime in Southeast Asia, particularly Cambodia, China, Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR), Thailand, and Vietnam. TRAFFIC is a leading non-governmental organization working globally on trade in wild animals and plants in the context of both biodiversity conservation and sustainable development. TRAFFIC collaborated with USAID and many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) when researching and writing this report. This report is the third in a series, which builds on the previous USAID digests, Counter Wildlife Trafficking Digest: Southeast Asia and China, 2017, and Counter Wildlife Trafficking Digest: Southeast Asia and China, 2018. This report covers the period January to December 2019 with a focus on pangolins, tigers, elephants, and rhinos, and highlights the key developments in legislation on conservation, outlines some of the innovative social and behavior change communication (SBCC) research projects and campaigns, and then explores the seizures made in 2019. USAID Wildlife Asia and TRAFFIC regularly collect and update documentation on the current state of wildlife trafficking of these species through a compilation of secondary sources to report on and analyze trends and changes in patterns of trade. This information provides an evidence base to support decision-making about priority interventions in policy, law enforcement, and consumer demand reduction. SBCC covers the range of campaigns and the research that provides information on demand for illegal wildlife products, as well as reducing consumer demand for these goods. A wide range of remarkable SBCC projects have been implemented since the previous digest, with new collaborations between NGOs and the travel industry, and with government agencies taking an active role in reducing demand for wildlife products. This report highlights some of these SBCC campaigns along with the gaps remaining to be filled. As with previous issues, this third issue of the digest is based on a compilation of documentation, news articles, and reports that are readily available in the English language. Unlike previous digests, some information is also drawn from translated documents held in TRAFFIC’s Wildlife Trade Information System (WiTIS). Nevertheless, it is possible that some data are still missing; therefore, USAID Wildlife Asia does not assume the figures included provide a complete data set. The recommendations provided target not only USAID Wildlife Asia directly but also the broader counter wildlife trafficking community and include a focus on social behavior change, improved law enforcement, increased government commitment, political will, and effective regional coordination.

Bangkok: USAID Wildlife Asia, 69p.

By USAID Wildlife Asia

This report is the fourth in a series of USAID Counter Wildlife Trafficking Digests (2017- 2020). This issue covers the period from January 1 to December 31, 2020 and focuses on pangolins, tigers, elephants, and rhinos. It highlights major developments in conservation legislation, outlines some of the innovative social and behavior change communication (SBCC) research projects and campaigns, and explores enforcement efforts and seizures made in 2020. It is intended that this analysis will provide a helpful summary for individuals interested in recent developments in the illegal wildlife trade, and more importantly, catalyze further actions to counter the illegal and unsustainable wildlife trade. USAID regularly collects and updates documentation on the current state of wildlife trafficking through a compilation of direct observations, published material and secondary data sources. This data is then evaluated and publicized in order to keep stakeholders and the general public informed. This information also provides an evidence base to support policy reformation, enforcement actions, consumer behavior changes, and conservation interventions.

Bangkok: United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 2022. 80p.