By  Kars de Bruijne Clara Gehrling 

t is generally accepted that violent extremism is a problem in northern Benin. Currently, attention is overwhelmingly devoted to northern Alibori and western Atacora and this problem is viewed as a ‘spillover’ from the Sahel.
But this is only part of the story.

This report points to a number of disturbing signals which, in combination, point to a problem of violent extremism along Benin’s border with Nigeria.

1.

Suffocating canaries in coal mines indicate dangerous levels of carbon monoxide. A variety of strange signals in Northern Benin along the border with Nigeria are like these canaries: they point at dangerous liaisons between violent extremist groups. Closer relationships with bandit groups seem to facilitate this. This report makes the following observations:

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Banditry is re-emerging in JNIM’s zones of operation in Benin. Those bandits seem to have Nigerian connections.

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Violent extremists are present in Kainji Lake National Park (Nigeria) just across the border from the Borgou Department. Evidence suggests this involves Sahelian extremists (likely JNIM). Another group would be Darul Salam – a group linked to Boko Haram, if not fully affiliated – with an open attitude towards bandits.

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There has been a strong increase in the movement of unidentified armed actors along the Borgou border with Niger State and in banditry-related incidents since March 2023. The evidence suggests that there is a direct link with those operating in Kainji Lake National Park.

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Since March 2023, unidentified armed groups have had a concealed presence in the Forêt de Trois Rivières between southern Alibori and the Borgou Department.

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Bandits and unidentified armed groups are known to move towards Kebbi State from Sokoto. It is alleged that these include various Darul Salam fighters with links to the Sahel.

2.

There are deep connections between North West Nigeria and North East Benin due to longstanding social, ethnic and religious connections, particularly in the former ‘cross-border’ Borgu Empire:

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The northern-most border area (North East Alibori and Kebbi State) sees intra-ethnic cross-border connections between the Hausa and the Nigerian Zamfara Fulbe respectively. A risk in this area are ethnic tensions between the Hausa and the Fulbe.

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The area of the former Borgu Empire (Borgou Department and Niger State) has a distinct cross-border political entity. On both sides of the border, people tend to identify as one Bariba/Boo community with shared customary institutions. There are high farmer-herder tensions involving autochthonous Fulbe. There is also a fear of kidnapping by Zamfara Fulbe.

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Another risk in the former Borgu Empire concerns the Dambanga hunting groups. These groups operate cross-border in defiance of a Benin government ban but are pitched against extremists in Kainji and have been used by the Nigerian military. This discrepancy can generate tensions between the two countries.

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Two non-violent reformist movements – the Yan Izala movement and the Jama'at Tabligh – are present along the border. Their reach has grown strongly in the border area of Northern Benin during the last ten years.

3.

A well-developed cross-border trade system operates between the Nigerian and Beninese border. This system generates livelihoods for many people in the area. Livelihoods are at risk:

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There is a variety of markets and crossings connecting North West Nigeria and Northern Benin. Unidentified armed groups and Darul Salam operate in these hubs.

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People’s livelihoods are highly dependent on cross-border trade. Interviews revealed frustration and a strong sense of grievance towards both Nigerian and Beninese government policies that are perceived to put livelihoods under stress.

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On the one hand, consistent problems reported are a ban on cereal exports and soybeans, and accompanying border restrictions. Both have a negative impact on livelihoods.

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On the other hand, the end of fuel subsidies in Nigeria at the time of research for this report had a severe impact on people’s livelihoods (and on communities in general).

4.

The above three main observations suggest that a very problematic situation is emerging along the Nigerian-Benin border. Not only are there numerous indications of extremist activities and a link between bandits and extremists along the border but also there are clear social links that facilitate cross-border exchange and real livelihood needs that create vulnerabilities to recruitment. The governments of Benin and Nigeria urgently need to move into action. Three things could be done:

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Coordinate and step up the military response by: revamping regional security cooperation within ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States); bilateral security cooperation for hot-pursuit, intelligence sharing and coordination; and a joint strategy for cross-border hunting groups.

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Prioritise people’s livelihoods. This should involve cushioning livelihood effects of the ban on cereals (and cutting of fuel subsidies) to reduce vulnerability to recruitment.

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Be more flexible and agile to respond to rapidly changing context by closely monitoring border markets for sudden vulnerabilities, and demanding more flexible donor programming and funding so that programming can be really flexible.

The Hague: Clingendael, 2024. 80p.

By Laura Carlson  

American criminal jurisprudence relies on confidential informants: those individuals who agree to assist police in exchange for leniency. Facing little regulation by legislatures, law enforcement has raised an informant system premised on the exploitation of vulnerabilities and free from basic safeguards that would help to mitigate the moral, mental, and physical harm informants face in the field. While this is generally problematic, the issue becomes more pronounced when considering law enforcement’s use of juveniles to combat crimes perpetrated against and among children. A juvenile’s brain is developmentally distinct from an adult’s. During late adolescence, the brain goes through major maturation processes that significantly affect a juvenile’s ability to assess risk, make forward-thinking decisions, override emotions with logic, and resist social pressures. In other words, the juvenile brain is predisposed to act adverse to self-interests. Within the context of the modern informant system, juveniles engage with police on seriously disadvantaged ground; and because agreeing to assist police has proven to be a death sentence for some, the urgency with which this must be addressed cannot be overstated. America’s tolerance of police discretion with respect to the use of juvenile informants must end. Legislatures can facilitate change by implementing safeguards aimed at mitigating the risks posed by a juvenile’s physiological predispositions. Namely, legislatures should consider implementing mandatory cooling-off periods, a statutory right to counsel, mandatory parental and judicial consent, prescribed documentation and recordkeeping requirements, and enforced training regimens. Absent empirical data that youth at large are better protected by the abolition of the use of juvenile informants, legislatures looking to implement these suggestions or otherwise restrict the practice should be careful to balance proposed legislation with the needs of law enforcement. 

Arizona Law Review, 2023. 26p.

By Christina Billhartz

In 1987, the U.S. Sentencing Commission created its first federal sentencing guideline for child pornography offenses. As Congress grappled with dynamic technological advances that changed the child pornography landscape, the Commission continually revised and amended these guidelines, creating the last significant amendment in 2009. For the past 12 years, these guidelines have been considered by federal court judges tasked with sentencing child pornography offenders, yet little has been done to determine whether or not these guidelines actually diminish the amount of children victimized by child pornography. While acknowledging that child pornography victimizes and harms children in countless ways and must be criminalized to account for these egregious harms, this Note argues that the sentencing guidelines fail to deter the production, distribution, and consumption of child pornography, and fail to fulfill congressional goals of protecting children from victimization. Rather, the guidelines have resulted in the mass incarceration of child pornography offenders and a system that punishes viewers of child pornography more severely than it does child rapists. If the government truly wants to protect children from being victimized through child pornography, then the sentencing guidelines, as written, cannot stand, and they must be replaced by a system that allows child pornography offenders to access rehabilitative resources both inside and outside of the federal prison system.

Arizona Law Review, 2021. 32p.

 By Juan Del Toro and John Roman     

  Youths’ interaction with law enforcement can have implications for their opportunities for upward social mobility. Indeed, prior studies indicate that police contact (i.e., stops and arrests) predicts lower persistence in education and higher unemployment. However, most researchers used between-individual designs to examine youth and police interactions, which limit claims of causality, as differences in life-course outcomes related to police encounters are likely biased by individual differences in genes and/or environments. Using standard within- and between-sibling analyses, we found that siblings with police contact have poorer life-course outcomes (i.e., years in school and income) across adolescence and adulthood than their sibling without police contact. The links between police contact and life-course outcomes are worse for police arrests (vs. police stops) and within Black siblings (than within Hispanic and White siblings). We believe that these results signal the need for alternative and more developmentally appropriate forms of punishment among America’s youth.

Chicago: NORC at the University of Chicago, 2023. 5p.

By Marie-Celine Schulte, et al.

  Gender-based Violence (GBV) persists as an entrenched, yet preventable, pattern of systemic human rights violations and a global public health pandemic. GBV includes not only sexual violence but also physical, psychological, and economic violence. GBV can be technology enabled and politically motivated. Multiple forms often co-occur on a continuum up to lethal violence. GBV thrives in contexts of social, economic, legal, and political gender inequality. In Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), the COVID 19 pandemic, economic crisis, democratic backsliding, labor and sex trafficking, corruption, gangs, armed groups, organized crime networks, armed conflict, and environmental disasters exacerbate these conditions. Using a political economy analytical approach, the GBV Impunity Regional Study (2021–2023) investigates the social, economic, legal, and political barriers to, and survivor-centered1 recommendations for, increasing GBV accountability in LAC. Examining eight countries, the study investigates a main research question

  This report focuses on case studies in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico that investigate factors driving GBV impunity and solutions to address it. The report synthesizes findings and recommendations across these four case studies based on qualitative, in-depth individual interviews with 106 GBV survivors,2 as well as government institutional and civil society organization (CSO) staff who provide direct services to survivors. Country case studies explore multiple forms of GBV. They pay special attention to GBV perpetrated against underserved groups, such as indigenous women, Afro-descendent women, transgender women, and gay men. In line with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) definition, this study defines GBV as encompassing any harmful act or threat against an individual or group based on biological sex, gender, gender orientation or expression, sex characteristics, sexual orientation, and/or lack of adherence to socially accepted conceptualizations of femininity and masculinity.

New York: USAID, 2023. 50p.

By: Altagracia E. Balcacer Molina, et al.

  Gender-based violence (GBV) impunity violates human rights, harms public health, and destabilizes homes and communities. GBV impunity often threatens diverse survivors’ basic security, including food, safe shelter, livelihood, and freedom from further violence.1 Impunity perpetuates GBV and denies survivors their rights not only to justice but to vital protection and recovery support services and prevention programs. It entrenches widespread lack of government transparency and accountability to uphold survivors’ legal and human rights. It further undermines broader development objectives of social inclusion, governance, and democracy. The Dominican Republic (DR) GBV Impunity case study is one of eight country case studies included in the GBV Impunity Regional Study under the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Latin America and the Caribbean Learning and Rapid Response (LACLEARN) Task Order. Each case study investigates country-specific responses to the main research question:   

Chicago: NORC at the University of Chicagom 2024. 52p.

By  Veronica Martinez-Solares, et al.

  The Mexico country case study is one of eight case studies that form the Latin America and Caribbean Learning and Rapid Response (LACLEARN) Gender-based Violence (GBV) Impunity Regional Study. Through an intersectional gender, power, and political economy approach, the Mexico case study explores: 1) the prevalence and social acceptance of femicide and transfemicide (FTF) based on literature review and secondary statistics to provide background and context for the study; and, 2) views shared in in-depth individual interviews (IDIs) with 30 respondents including institutional actors and civil society staff who work directly with GBV victims and survivors, and GBV and FTF survivors1. The case study diagnoses the state of FTF impunity in Mexico, identifies solutions to address impunity, and provides operational recommendations to USAID on changes needed to promote pathways to GBV and FTF accountability that center on survivors’ recommendations. DIAGNOSIS OF GBV AND FTF IMPUNITY IN MEXICO. Despite important progress in the past decade to address GBV and FTF in Mexico, and to develop necessary mechanisms for prevention, protection, and access to justice, the country still faces persistently high levels of GBV and impunity, particularly for cases of FTF. Widespread societal normalization of GBV, patriarchal, male-dominated social, economic, and political structures, corruption, and underlying impunity, persist as key factors that influence GBV prevalence generally, and FTF specifically. GBV prevention and protection programs are not equally available or accessible across the country. There is very little justice for cisgender and even less for transgender FTF survivors owing to inadequate or discriminatory response, or non-response by law enforcement and an absence of a gender perspective and survivor-centered, trauma-informed protocols and practices that do not re-victimize survivors.  

New York: USAID, 2023. 47p. 

By Ximena Canal Laiton

This paper explores the use of smugglers by Latin American and Caribbean migrants on their journeys to North America. It is based on responses to more than 3,000 4Mi surveys conducted in Costa Rica, Honduras and Mexico in 2022 and 2023 and includes findings on profiles of migrants who hired smugglers as well as information on the services they sought and their general perceptions of smugglers. As such, this paper provides a wealth of solid empirical evidence with a view to informing the work of policymakers and humanitarian actors.

  Key findings • Smuggler use is far from the norm: two out of every five survey respondents hired smugglers during their migration journey. • The demand for smuggling services in Latin America andtheCaribbeanisdrivenbygeographicandpolitical barriers to mobility between countries, including the lack of safe and regular pathways to migrate and the absence of formal services and infrastructure (such as transportation and accommodation) along the migratory routes. • Respondents surveyed in 2022 and 2023 reported using smugglers at rates of 49% and 34% respectively. This decline could be the consequence of an increase in the overall number of people on the move in the region, the greater use and sharing of maps by people on the move, and the reopening of the border between Colombia and Venezuela. • A fifth of respondents (20%) who used smugglers identified them as potential perpetrators of abuse that may occur in the most dangerous locations on their migration journey. • Just 6% of respondents said they saw smugglers as a potential source of protection during their migration journey. • Respondents who reported using smugglers mostly identified them as service providers who helped them to cross borders irregularly and to travel within transit countries. More than half said smugglers had helped them achieve their migration goals. • Despite marketing their services widely on social networks, smugglers  

Geneva, SWIT: Mixed Migration Centre, 2024. 14p.

By Jennifer Avila, et al.

  The Honduras country case study is one of eight case studies that comprise the Latin America and Caribbean Learning and Rapid Response (LACLEARN) Gender-based Violence (GBV) Impunity Regional Study. Applying an intersectional gender and political economy approach, this case study explores impunity for femicide and transfemicide among transgender women and Garifuna women in Honduras. Transgender and Garifuna women (both cisgender and transgender1) are disproportionately affected by GBV impunity, and face catastrophic consequences of impunity in the near and long term. These women have the least resources to access justice, protection, or recovery support services, are socioeconomically marginalized, and are politically targeted for their gender and ethnic identities and as human rights defenders. Garifuna women as environmental and land rights defenders, and transgender women as members of a minority gender identity and transgender rights defenders face extraordinary discrimination, intimidation, and violence as documented by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), the Global Protection Cluster, investigative journalists, and in data that civil society organizations collect. The Honduras case study involved collection and analysis of data from: 1) a review of available scholarly and grey literature and secondary statistics on structural gender inequalities, such as poverty, unemployment, and social and political disparities, that create the conditions within which high levels of GBV and impunity persist, especially towards transgender women and Garifuna women (cisgender and transgender); and 2) views shared in 30 in-depth individual interviews (IDIs) with GBV survivors and their representatives among transgender women and Garifuna women, relevant institutional actors, and civil society organization service providers that interact with GBV survivors or victims’ representatives in their work in Honduras. The team used an adapted qualitative data analysis Framework Method with integrated thematic analysis to identify, analyze, and interpret key themes emerging from the interview transcripts. The case study first diagnoses the state of GBV impunity in Honduras, then identifies solutions to address impunity, and finally provides practical recommendations to USAID on strategies for operationalizing changes needed to promote pathways to GBV accountability that survivors recommend.   

New York: USAID, 2022. 54p. 

By Michel Misse

The article comments on a new generation of researchers studying the illegal markets in Brazil. In doing so, I summarize the interpretative model of ‘social accumulation of violence’. Initially applied to Rio de Janeiro, several researchers have now expanded it to other Brazilian states as well as to countries with high violence rates, such as Colombia and Mexico. The model is both historical and social. It combines three main factors that have been feeding one another throughout times and expanded across several places: (1) social accumulation of disadvantages; (2) criminal subjection; and (3) expansion of acquisition strategies across networks of informality and illicit markets, for which the offer of political merchandise is decisive. As proposed in previous works, political merchandise means political assets originated from the privatization of segments of the State’s pretension to sovereignty over the monopoly of violence by different agents, who negotiate these assets in exchange for economic assets or other political goods.

  Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 1(2), pp. 177–182. 

By Jennifer M. Reingle Gonzalez,  Rebecca Molsberry, Jonathan Maskaly, and Katelyn K. Jetelina

COVID-19 has caused a wave of research publications in academic and pre-print outlets which have resulted in several high-profile retractions. While the breadth of emerging research has been instrumental in understanding and curbing the global pandemic in near real-time, unfortunately manuscripts with major methodological challenges have fallen through the cracks. In this perspective, we illustrate this issue in light of a recent manuscript by Piquero et al. (2020). In the study, a statistically significant association between stay-at-home orders and family violence was not detected; however, the authors widely disseminated a “12.5% increase in family violence” offenses to a variety of media outlets. This negligent dissemination of inaccurate research findings has important implications for policy and the virus mitigation efforts, which might urge policymakers to terminate stay-at-home orders in an effort to reduce family violence and other social risk factors. Changes may ultimately result in more COVID-related deaths as stay-at-home orders are prematurely and inappropriately lifted to prevent purported injuries in the home. Therefore, the widespread propagation of these claims in the absence of scientific evidence of an increase has great potential to cause harm.

American Journal of Criminal Justice, 2022. 11p.

By John H. Boman IV & Owen Gallupe 

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, state-level governments across the United States issued mandatory stay-at-home orders around the end of March 2020. Though intended to stop the spread of the COVID-19 virus, the lockdowns have had sweeping impacts on life in ways which were not originally planned. This study’s purpose is to investigate the extent to which governmental responses to COVID-19 have impacted crime rates in the U.S. Compared to the pre-pandemic year of 2019, crime – as measured by calls for service to law enforcement – has decreased markedly. However, there are multiple indications that the crime drop is being driven by decreases in minor offenses which are typically committed in peer groups. At the same time, serious crimes which are generally not committed with co-offenders (namely homicide and intimate partner violence) have either remained constant or increased. As such, the crime drop appears to be hiding a very disturbing trend where homicides remain unchanged and intimate partner batteries are increasing. Since many offenders would presumably be committing less serious crimes in a non-pandemic world, we raise attention to the possibility that mandatory lockdown orders may have taken minor offenders and placed them into situations where there is rampant opportunity for intimate partner violence, serious batteries, and homicides. While crime in the U.S. appears to be down overall, this good news should not blind us to a troubling co-occurring reality – a reality that paints a dim picture of unintended consequences to public health and criminal justice finances as a result of COVID-19 lockdowns.

American Journal of Criminal Justice, 2020. 9p.

By Steven James Lee and  Daniel Augusto

  In the latter half of 2020, Los Angeles was dubbed by the media and academicians as the latest epicenter of COVID-19 in the United States. Using time-series analysis on Los Angeles Police Department crime data from 2017 through 2020, this paper tests the economic theory of crime, routine activities theory, social isolation theory, and structural vulnerability theory to determine whether they accurately predicted specifc crime rate movements in the wake of COVID-19 in the city of Los Angeles. Economic theory of crime was supported by the data, and social isolation theory and structural vulnerability theory were partially supported. Routine activities theory was not supported. Implications for policymakers and academics are also discussed.  

Crime Prevention and Community Safety, 2022. 21p.

By J. Andrew Hansen, Gabrielle L Lory 

Rural criminal justice organizations have been overlooked by researchers and underfunded in the United States, exacerbating problems caused by the coronavirus pandemic. Access to victims' services has been a longstanding issue in rural communities, but has become more difficult due to stay-at-home orders and changes in daily activities. Requirements such as social distancing, necessitated by COVID-19, have increased the risk of domestic violence and rural service providers are less prepared than those in more populated areas. Rural law enforcement agencies, on the other hand, have traditionally operated with smaller budgets and staffs-conditions that have complicated the response to the unprecedented event. Many of the recommended practices for policing during a pandemic have been more applicable to larger urban and suburban departments with more resources and officers extended across many units. The strain on rural victims' services and law enforcement has been felt only a few months into the coronavirus pandemic, while the long-term effects are not yet known.

Southern Criminal Justice Association, 2020. 12p.

 By David Yerger, Brandon Vick, Robert Orth, and Charles Gartside, 

The project’s primary goal was to investigate whether shocks stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic either triggered or heightened human suffering in two crimerelated areas: murder and abuse. A secondary goal was to identify rural-urban differences in these outcomes both before and during the pandemic. An analysis of homicides and protection from abuse orders over time provided valuable insights regarding crime trends and rural-urban differences, but it did not suggest large, long-term effects due to the COVID-19 pandemic throughout the state. The statewide homicide rate rose 21 percent from 2019 to 2020, but the increase was specific to a certain group and location: Black, male victims in Philadelphia County, murdered with a firearm, with most of these incidents being homicides, with no known relationship between the victim and offender (Philadelphia County’s murder rate increased 36 percent in 2020). In rural counties, the 2020 murder rate rose 24 percent, and in non-Philadelphia urban counties, there was a 3 percent increase. It should be noted that these upward trends came after homicides steadily rose from 2014 to 2018, before falling significantly in 2019, and then rising in 2020. The exploratory analysis on county-levels of COVID case and death rates found no statistical evidence that high COVID-rate counties were more likely to experience high levels of protection from abuse orders or homicides. However, the analysis found that counties with higher unemployment rates and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) participation also experienced higher murder rates and protection from abuse order prevalence in 2020 (a relationship that holds when tested across other years). 

Harrisburg, PA: Center for Rural Pennsylvania, 2022.  42p.

By Brandon Vick, Robert Orth, Charles Gartside

Information on the prevalence and cost of firearm injury is difficult to find and typically lacks important details. Using a rich dataset from the Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4), researchers from PCCD/IUP performed a statistical analysis of non-fatal firearm injuries from 2016 to 2021, finding the following: • Initial injury totals and costs: Over the five-year timeframe, an estimated 10,640 new, non-fatal firearm injuries occurred in Pennsylvania for which patients received treatment. The medical cost of initial treatment for these injuries was $308.4 million, or over $51 million per year. The average cost of treatment was $34,837 in 2020. • Rising medical costs and injuries: The number of total injuries increased by 20 percent and the medical cost for these injuries increased by 107 percent from 2016 to 2020. The number of accidental injuries increased by 46 percent (to over 1,000 per year in 2020), with a cost increase of 195%. Assault injuries increased by 5%, with the medical costs of these injuries increasing by 81%. • Rises with COVID: The number of firearm injuries rose dramatically immediately after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and resulting shutdowns. Both accidental and assault injuries rose to their highest levels over the timeframe studied. • Economic and Racial Disparities: The poorest one-fifth of zip codes incurred nearly 60 percent of the total medical costs of firearm injuries. Two-thirds of all patients of firearm injuries were Black, although Black people make up only 11 percent of the Pennsylvania population. • Long-term costs: 16 percent of new injuries require additional hospital visits and incur nearly four times the medical costs, averaging over $70,000 per patient. Over 3 percent of new firearm injuries result in paralysis, increasing costs over the first year to over $100,000. • Full Economic Losses: If values are placed on lost work and lower quality of life, the total economic losses of firearm injury increase by six-fold to an estimated $300 million per year and $1.5 billion. Estimates here should be considered conservative, as they do not consider full costs to society (i.e. disability and unemployment payments) and are limited to costs only incurred during the time of visits for treatment (i.e. not counting long-term rehabilitation). Additionally, they do not include fatal injuries or shootings – for instance, over 600 people are victims of homicide by firearm and at least double that number die by firearm suicide per year. The nonfatal injury findings here are in line with estimates for U.S. injuries made separately by the Government Accountability Office and the Center for Disease Control. 

Harrisburg:  Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency , 2022.  48p.

By The Joint State Government Commission (PA) and the Pennsylvania  the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency (PCCD) 

The specific statute under review by the TFCP is the section relating to “Sexual Abuse of Children” and is codified at 18 Pa.C.S. § 6312. 9 There are three subsections within that offense and each address a different type of behavior perpetrated by the offender: Subsection (b) of § 6312 relates to “Photographing, videotaping, depicting on computer or filming sexual act” and may be described as manufacturing or creating child pornography. This subsection criminalizes individuals who cause or knowingly permit a child under 18 to engage in a prohibited sexual act10 or simulation of said act, knowing or intending the act to be photographed or filmed. Manufacturing child pornography under subsection (b) is generally a felony of the second degree11 but is graded as a felony of the first degree12 if indecent contact13 with a child is depicted or the child is under the age of 10 or prepubescent. Subsection (c) of § 6312 relates to “Dissemination of photographs, videotapes, computer depictions and films” and may be described as distributing or selling child pornography. This subsection criminalizes individuals who knowingly sell, distribute, deliver, disseminate, transfer, display or exhibit to others images depicting a child under 18 engaged in or simulating a prohibited sexual act. Distributing child pornography under subsection (c) is generally a felony of the third degree; 14 however, it is graded a felony of the second degree if it is a second or subsequent offense, or if the images depict indecent contact with a child or the child is under the age of 10 or prepubescent. Subsection (d) of § 6312 relates to “Child Pornography” and may also be described as possession of child pornography. Subsection (d) criminalizes individuals who intentionally view, knowingly possess or control images depicting a child under 18 engaged in a prohibited sexual act or simulation of such act. Possessing child pornography is generally a felony of the third degree however, it is graded a felony of the second degree if it is a second or subsequent offense, or if the images depict indecent contact with a child or the child is under the age of 10 or prepubescent. 

Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency, 2022. 284p.

By David Bruce

The South African per-capita murder rate has steadily escalated since 2011/12, when it was at its lowest since 1994. The 2022/23 rate of 45 per 100 000 is the highest in 20 years. But focusing on national murder trends is misleading as trends vary greatly across the nine provinces. The current high per-capita murder rate is driven by high rates in the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, the Western Cape and Gauteng. Key findings: South African murder trends vary considerably across provinces. The Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, the Western Cape and Gauteng have the highest per-capita murder rates. In 2022/23, the Eastern Cape had the highest murder rate (71 per 100 000), followed by KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape, both with annual murder rates of 56. The four provinces with the most murders have also recorded the highest per-capita murder rate increases in the last 10 years. Since 2011/12, rates have increased most dramatically in KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape. The increase has been greatest from 2017/18 to 2022/23. The per-capita murder rate in the Western Cape decreased over the last five years. Recommendations The government and society must prioritise reducing murder rates, which are high and increasing. The collection of data about murder, and the analysis thereof, must be improved. ‘One-size-fits-all’ approaches to addressing murder are unlikely to be effective. Responses should be adapted to respond to the drivers of murder focusing on high-murder localities. Priority should be given to understanding and addressing murder in the four provinces with the highest per-capita murder rates. KwaZulu-Natal and, to a lesser degree, Gauteng experienced major surges in murder in 2021/22, with increases continuing in 2022/23. These have taken them well above their rates in the year before the COVID-19 pandemic and national lockdown. Deaths during the July 2021 unrest were not a major contributor to the increases in murder in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng in 2021/22. Many experts believe that the entrenchment and growth of organised crime has played a major role in the increasing number of murders. More in-depth provincially focused research and analysis is required to better understand the factors and circumstances driving murder trends. 

Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2023. 12p.

Child, early and forced marriage and unions are a reality in Latin America and the Caribbean, albeit not a highly visible one. This is a complex phenomenon associated with gender inequalities, violence, poverty, school dropout, adolescent pregnancy and inadequate, limited or non-existent legal and political frameworks, and it puts the present and future of girls and adolescent girls in jeopardy.
These practices are both the cause and the consequence of women’s limited physical, economic and decision-making autonomy, and they disproportionally affect girls and adolescent girls in rural areas and those in poor households with less access to education. In some countries, they are also associated with a notably greater prevalence among indigenous peoples.
This document seeks to turn a spotlight on this harmful practice, particularly as a detonator and aggravator of gender inequalities for girls and adolescent girls. It draws on statistical and qualitative information to offer an innovative contribution by presenting gaps in different dimensions of development, including the time that girls and adolescent girls who are married or in union spend on domestic and care tasks, and it recommends actions to address this situation at the regional level and in the countries.

Santiago, Chile: 

38p.

Violence against women and girls and its most extreme expression, femicide, feminicide, or the gender-related killing of women and girls,1 dramatically bring to light the persistence of the structural challenges of gender inequality and gender-based discrimination and violence against women and girls in Latin America and the Caribbean. The deep historical and structural roots of patriarchal, discriminatory and violent cultural patterns, grounded in a culture of privilege, have proven among the most difficult to dismantle. Gender-based violence against women and girls is systemic and persistent in the region. It knows no borders, affects women and girls of all ages and happens everywhere, from the domestic setting to public places. It happens in workplaces, within the framework of political and community participation, on public transportation and in the street, in schools and other educational institutions, in cyberspace and certainly in the home. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, António Guterres, has called it a “shadow pandemic