By Cristina Bellés-Obrero, Giulia La Mattina, Han Ye

The prevalence and determinants of intimate partner violence (IPV) among older women are severely understudied. This paper documents that the incidence of IPV remains high at old ages and provides the first evidence of the impact of access to income on IPV for older women. We leverage a Mexican reform that lowered the eligibility age for a non-contributory pension and a difference-in-differences approach. Women's eligibility for the pension increases their probability of being subjected to economic, psychological, and physical IPV. The estimated effects are found only among women in the short-term and are more pronounced for women who experienced family violence in childhood and those from poorer households. In contrast, we show that IPV does not increase when men become eligible for the non-contributory pension. Looking at potential mechanisms, we find suggestive evidence that men use violence as a tool to control women's resources. Additionally, women reduce paid employment after becoming eligible for the pension, which may result in more time spent at home and greater exposure to violent partners.

WORKING PAPER No IDB-WP-1640, Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, Gender and Diversity Division , 2024. 74p.

By Our Watch

This report summarises the findings of a survey exploring young Australians' attitudes to gender, sex, relationships and pornography. It finds that early exposure to pornography can have a significant negative impact and that young people are accessing pornographic material earlier than previously reported. The report highlights measures governments can take to reduce the harmful impacts of pornography on children and young people.

The report argues that young people will continue to access all kinds of material, both in pornography and in other forms of media, to understand sex and relationships and so argues for a harm reduction approach, ensuring that young people and communities are equipped and supported to critically engage with this material.

Findings

• The average age at which the participants have first seen porn was 13.6 years.

• For young women, the average age is 2 years younger than it was in 2018.

• 31% of young people are watching porn as a form of sexual education.

• 25% of 16 to 17 year olds see porn as realistic.

• 73% of young people (65% of men and 80% of women) agree that porn is degrading to women.

• Access to information and education about pornography has the potential to mediate the negative impacts of pornography on young people, their wellbeing and relationships.

Key recommendations

• Integrate information on the topic of pornography in age-appropriate and sequential ways into respectful relationships education (RRE) across school sectors.

• Work in partnership with experts and uses co-design processes with young people to develop information and practical resources specifically for young people on pornography.

• Partner with research organisations to collect robust nationally representative data about young people’s pornography exposure and access, to inform ongoing work and responses.

Melbourne< Our Watch, 2024. 4p.

By Heather Wolbers and Christopher Dowling

This study examines factors associated with dating app facilitated sexual violence (DAFSV) among a large, nationally representative sample of dating app or website users (n=9,987). Through the lens of routine activity theory, we examined the way in which respondents used dating platforms and how this was associated with experiences of DAFSV. Prolific dating platform users and those who share more information, who chat with people on different platforms or who paid for an online dating service were more likely to report experiencing DAFSV. Risk factors for DAFSV extending from the online sphere into the physical world were also explored. Findings give much needed context for experiences of DAFSV and provide direction for responses aimed at protecting individuals from harm facilitated by online dating platforms

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 704. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology.2024. 19p.

By The Youth Endowment Fund

In this year’s survey, 20% of teenage children told us they’ve been a victim of violence in the past 12 months. Over half (61%) of these incidents led to physical injury, equating to 440,000 children in England and Wales. For some, these experiences are not one-off. Of all teenagers who were victims of violence, 65% had it happen multiple times within the year, with nearly a third (31%) — or 5% of all 13-17-year-olds — reporting it occurred more than five times. Children commit violence in reaction to others. 16% of children have been a perpetrator of violence. Many of the 16% of children who committed violence cited reactive motivations. For instance, 36% acted out of annoyance, humiliation or feeling threatened, while 29% retaliated for previous violence. Bullying is a significant factor for 25% of respondents, and 17% report engaging in violence for self-defence or due to rivalries related to gangs, neighbourhoods or schools. Half (49%) of all children who perpetrated violence in the past year have also been a victim themselves. Experiences of violence are concentrated among the most vulnerable. This year’s report sheds new light on children at risk of exploitation, revealing even more concerning links between vulnerability and violence. Children who went missing from home were five times more likely to engage in violence, while those approached to transport or store drugs and weapons were six times more likely. Gang involvement and carrying weapons further escalated these risks, with children in gangs or those carrying weapons being seven times more likely to commit acts of violence than their peers. Children struggling in education are also particularly vulnerable. Those who are persistently absent, suspended, excluded or attending alternative education settings are far more likely to be victims of and to engage in violent behaviour than their peers. A relatively small number are driven to carry weapons. 5% of children aged 13-17 say they have carried a weapon in the past year. Although the possession, sale and supply of zombie-style knives and machetes are now illegal in the UK, only a small proportion of those who’ve carried weapons (17%) admit to carrying such knives before the ban. Kitchen and other types of knives are much more likely to be carried. Other items carried include screwdrivers or stabbing implements (25%) and sticks, clubs or hitting implements (24%). Younger teenagers aged 13-15 are more likely to carry weapons compared to those aged 16-17. Nearly half (47%) of those who carry a weapon do so for self-protection. Others cited being asked by someone else (37%), scaring others (31%) or following the behaviour of their peers (18%).

London: Youth Endowment Fund, 2024. 

By Drug Policy Alliance

We all want people living with addiction to get the help they need. At the Drug Policy Alliance, we believe that everyone should have access to the substance use disorder (SUD) supports that they choose to improve their physical and mental health — and that effective services should be available when and where people are ready for them, without hurdles like cost or preconditions to get help. In short, SUD support should be voluntary, effective, affordable, accessible, and appealing. Unfortunately, the United States has neither prioritized on-demand care nor ensured that available SUD supports are effective or beneficial. Having failed to provide even remotely sufficient access to the kinds of health-centered approaches that research shows are most effective (e.g., medications for opioid use disorder, or MOUD, and contingency management for stimulant use disorder, or CM), some ill-informed policymakers are advocating for expanding the power of courts to force people into existing SUD services, against their will and not of their choosing. This is not entirely new. Forced treatment has been a familiar practice in criminal courts for decades — where criminal defendants have had the “choice” to opt for court-ordered SUD services or face traditional sentencing, often including incarceration   

New York: Drug Policy Alliance, 2024. 32p.

By Cassandra Popham, Ellie Taylor and William Teager

The Youth Endowment Fund surveyed over 10,000 teenage children (aged 13-17) in England and Wales about their experiences of violence. The findings are detailed across five reports, each focusing on a different aspect. In this second report, we examine teenage children’s experiences of violence on social media. We aim to understand its prevalence, the nature of the content the children encounter and its impact on their lives. Here’s what we found. Violence is widespread on social media. Exposure to real-life violence on social media has become the norm rather than the exception for teenage children. Our findings reveal that 70% of respondents have encountered some form of real-world violence online in the past 12 months. The most frequently observed content is footage of fights involving young people, with 56% of respondents reporting that they’ve seen such videos. Other common types of violence witnessed online include threats of physical harm (43%) and content related to gang activity (33%) and weapons (35%). Notably, one in nine children who say they’ve encountered weapon-related content have seen footage involving zombie knives or machetes — a figure significantly higher than the 1% of 13–17-year-olds who’ve reported that they carry such weapons, as highlighted in our first report. This suggests that social media may amplify fear by making certain behaviours appear more widespread than they are. Sexually violent content or threats have been reported by more than a quarter of teenage children (27%). For the second year in a row, TikTok is the platform where children are most likely to witness violent content.  While the majority of teenage children encounter violent content online, few actively seek it out. In fact, only 6% of those who’ve come across such content do so intentionally. Most are exposed to it inadvertently: half (50%) have seen it via someone else’s profile or feed, and just over a third (35%) have had it shared directly with them. Alarmingly, 25% of children have reported that the social media platforms themselves promote this violent content through features like ‘Newsfeed’, ‘Stories’ and the ‘For You Page’. This underscores the significant role social media companies play in amplifying exposure to violent content beyond what users might encounter by chance. Seeing violence online has real-world impacts. Viewing violent content online has impacts that extend far beyond the screen. The vast majority (80%) of teenage children who encounter weapons-related content on social media say it makes them feel less safe in their local communities. This perceived threat has tangible consequences: two-thirds (68%) of teenagers who’ve seen weapons on social media say it makes them less likely to venture outside, and 39% admit that it makes them more likely to carry a weapon themselves. The influence of social media doesn’t stop there. Nearly two-thirds (64%) of teenagers who report perpetrating violence in the past year say that social media has played a role in their behavior. Factors like online arguments and the escalation of existing conflicts are commonly cited as catalysts for real-world violence  Children support limiting access to phones and social media. The widespread exposure to real-world violence online may partly explain why many teenagers believe that access to social media should come later than access to smartphones. Our findings highlight the responsibility of social media companies to remove or restrict harmful content. They also point to the need for effective support and education to help children navigate these dangers while still benefiting from the positive aspects that social media can offer.  

London: Youth Endowment Fund, 2024. 28p.

By Becki R. Goggins, Dennis A. DeBacco

This report summarizes the results from the seventeenth survey of criminal history information systems conducted for BJS by SEARCH, The National Consortium for Justice Information and Statistics, since 1989; it presents data on the functions and status of state criminal history files as of December 31, 2022. This report is based on the results from a survey conducted among the administrators of the state criminal history record repositories in May–July 2023. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was the source for some of the information relating to criminal history records, including state participation in the Interstate Identification Index (III) system (the national criminal records exchange system) and the number of III records maintained by the FBI on behalf of the states; the number of records in the wanted persons file; and the protection order file of the FBI’s National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database. The report found that forty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and Guam report the total number of persons in their criminal history files as 116,447,200, of which over 96% are automated records; thirty states, the District of Columbia, and Guam have fully automated criminal history files.

Sacramento, CA: SEARCH Group, Incorporated; 2024. 65p.

By Global Financial Integrity, Fedesarrollo, Transparency International Kenya and ACODE

This policy memo is a joint publication by GFI, Fedesarrollo, Transparency International Kenya and ACODE, organizations that are based in the United States, Colombia, Kenya and Uganda, respectively. The memo draws on the technical and regional expertise of each of the organizations, seeking to analyze the complex challenges of Trade Based Money Laundering (TBML) from a truly global policy perspective. Broadly speaking, illicit financial flows (IFFs) are illegal movements of money or capital from one country to another. GFI classifies this movement as an illicit flow when funds are illegally earned, transferred, and/or utilized across an international border. The global scale of IFFs is considerable. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Africa loses US$88.6 billion annually to IFFs. In the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (UN ECLAC) estimates that from 2004- 2013, illicit financial outflows represented 1.8% of regional gross domestic product (GDP) and 3.1% of regional trade, with losses totalling US$765 billion for the 10-year period. Moreover, IFFs undermine institutions, contribute to insecurity, harm communities and the environment, and deprive countries of much-needed tax revenues. One of the most prevalent channels for IFFs is through the international trade system. As of 2021, GFI estimates that the annual value of trade-related IFFs in and out of developing countries amounted to, on average, about 20 percent of the value of their total trade with advanced economies. One area of particular concern is TBML, which the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) defines as the process of disguising the proceeds of crime and moving value through the use of trade transactions in an attempt to legitimize their illegal origin or finance illicit activities.5 As FATF notes, “the aim of TBML—unlike trade-related predicate offenses—is not the movement of goods, but rather the movement of money, which the trade transactions facilitate.”6; 7 TBML involves acts designed to conceal or disguise the true origin of criminally derived proceeds so that the unlawful proceeds appear to have been derived from legitimate origins or constitute legitimate assets. It is a highly effective way of integrating large volumes of criminal proceeds with legitimate income, and is attractive to organized crime groups because it is very hard to detect, track and investigate due to its transnational nature and the complexity of the international trade system. Recent cases have highlighted the sophisticated methods used to exploit the complex supply chains of international trade to launder criminal assets. When TBML goes unchecked, it has adverse effects on economies and societies as it perpetuates criminal activities such as illicit wildlife trade, bribery, corruption, and tax evasion. It subjects legitimate business to unfair competition in areas of goods and services due to unbalanced economies as a result of artificial manipulations. Additionally, TBML results in revenue losses, especially for developing countries struggling to meet their domestic resource mobilization targets

Global Financial Integrity, 2023. 23p.

By Marcena Hunter

While gold is often referred to as a blood mineral due to its role in conflict financing, the relationship between the gold sector, instability and violence is far more nuanced, with complex regional dynamics. In the gold production hub of West Africa, where artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM) is pervasive, an increasing tide of insecurity and violence in recent years adds to the complexity of the sector. Woven into the region’s convoluted web of actors, activity and supply chains are criminal networks that link local mines to international trade hubs, exploiting the gold sector for financial gain and power. The analysis in this report demonstrates that the reality of the relationships between gold, conflict and criminality challenges the simplistic narrative of ‘blood minerals’ used to finance conflict, offering a far more nuanced understanding of the significance of the gold sector in West Africa. Rather, gold is closely intertwined with survival, money, power and criminality. Criminality, fragility and violence While literature on the relationship between gold and instability has often focused on conflict financing, the interplay between gold, governance and criminality can contribute to instability and violence before any form of conflict financing takes place. Criminal exploitation of the gold sector is fostered by persistent and widespread informality, due in part to the significant barriers to entry in the formal sector, and the lack of support for informal miners and gold traders. As a result, corrupt and criminal elites in the political and business spheres can capture illicit gold flows, further contributing to community frustrations that can give rise to conflict. Limiting access to the gold sector by restricting access to mine deposits or conducting crackdowns on unlicensed ASGM can also undermine the legitimacy of state actors. Thus, efforts to stabilize West Africa must account for complex criminal interests while also addressing the long-standing grievances and expectations of local communities.1 Such efforts are critical in both conflict-laden areas and stable areas to reduce the risk of conflict spreading. Where the gold sector contributes to conflict financing in West Africa, it can vary significantly in form and value. In locations where conflict and gold mining overlap, armed groups may target the gold sector by taxing mining and trade activities, demanding payment from miners for providing security, or establishing checkpoints along roads to mine sites and trade hubs for payment collection. Members of armed groups may also directly engage in gold mining, either for personal financial gain or to benefit the group. Yet in many regions, gold is not the primary source of revenue for armed groups; other industries like the livestock sector are also targets. Sitting in the space between increased fragility and conflict are local self-defence and identity militia groups, which can act in cooperation or in competition with the state.2 In West Africa, these groups fall on a spectrum ranging from hybrid security institutions to mafia-style protection rackets run by ‘violent entrepreneurs’. There is a heavy overlap between these groups and the gold sector, with many instances of groups providing security at gold mine sites and along transportation routes. Yet, the origins of the different groups, their roles in local communities and the gold sector, and their role in conflict dynamics vary greatly.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2022. 61p.

By The Transnational Alliance to Combat Illicit Trade (TRACIT)

With inflation at its highest levels since 2008, the international economy finds itself amid a cost of-living crisis. In many countries, inflation has reached multi-decade highs, with both headline and core inflation continuing to rise and broaden beyond food and energy prices. Inflation has also been intensified by post-COVID economics and the Russian invasion of Ukraine – both of which have driven global commodity prices higher. Among the cascading effects of inflation on the global economy is the negative impact it has on the market dynamics that drive illicit trade. Specifically, high levels of inflation can have a disastrous impact on consumer purchasing power. In turn, reduced purchasing power coupled with increased poverty reduces consumer “product affordability,” which is widely regarded as the primary driver for illicit trade. When prices rise faster than incomes, people can afford to buy fewer goods and services and cheaper goods including illicit and black-market products become more tempting. Given these dynamics, where inflation incentivizes consumers to choose cheaper, illicit alternatives, governments will necessarily need to be more vigilant in their efforts to defend their economies from illicit trade. In this light, Turkiye presents a valuable opportunity to raise awareness on the relationship between inflation and growth in illicit trade. proTurkiye is experiencing high inflation rates. In October 2022, inflation climbed to a 25-year high of 85.5 %. Consequently, the impacts of soaring inflation leading to price increases have created a notable erosion of consumer purchasing power in Turkiye. Turkiye already faces challenges from illicit trade on multiple fronts. For example, it is an important source country for illicit plant protection products, counterfeit goods are widespread, and the country grapples with the harmful effects of illicit tobacco, alcohol and petroleum products. Moreover, the government’s goal of making Turkiye a top pharma hub by 2023 is threatened by a lucrative market for illegal pharmaceuticals. This situation is exacerbated by Turkiye’s location in the region, which makes it a key transit hub for both complete counterfeit products and counterfeit components. In principle and practice, the challenge of product “affordability” is a long-standing driver for illicit trade. Keeping that in mind, inflation amplifies a problem that usually already exists. In Turkiye’s case, inflation can be expected to intensify the problem and, consequently, requires its government to likewise intensify efforts to mitigate illicit trade. This report explores the situation of illicit trade in Turkiye, addresses its susceptibility to inflation, outlines the issues that must be addressed, and presents a set of policy recommendations that could help the government and other stakeholders fortify their efforts to control illicit trade.

The Transnational Alliance to Combat Illicit Trade (TRACIT) , 2022. 24p.

By The International Crisis Group

Myanmar’s Shan State and Laos’s Bokeo province, which straddle the Mekong River, have emerged as a contiguous zone of vibrant criminality, much of which is beyond the reach of national authorities. Unregulated casinos, money laundering, drug production and trafficking, online scamming operations, and illegal wildlife trade all thrive, entrenching corruption, weakening governance and damaging the bonds that create community. The criminal networks involved have regional – in some cases, global – reach and can rapidly shift from one jurisdiction to another to minimise risks to their operations. A coordinated regional approach is thus vital for tackling them. But geopolitical competition between China and the U.S. complicates coordination. Regional states continue to rely heavily on unilateral criminal justice responses, but collaborative law enforcement is needed, as are multi-state efforts to ameliorate the governance and socio-economic problems that allow these criminal syndicates to prosper. Ideally, these efforts would involve agencies with migration, development and other relevant expertise. Parts of the Mekong, particularly the 100km section that forms the Myanmar-Lao border, have long been a frontier of unregulated and illicit trade, far from centres of power and commerce. Given its importance as a conduit between China and South East Asia, in recent decades governments have aspired for the Mekong to become a major transport route. But along with physical obstacles – sandbanks, shoals and rapids – insecurity has impeded riverborne trade, most commonly in the form of piracy and extortion of boats plying the route. The situation came to a head in October 2011, when thirteen Chinese merchant mariners were murdered – the deadliest attack on Chinese nationals abroad since World War II. China pinned the blame on Myanmar pirates, whose leader it captured in Laos and executed following a complex extra-territorial police operation. (It later emerged that others may have been primarily responsible.) Beijing then initiated joint gunboat patrols with neighbouring countries, allowing it to project force down the Mekong. While these actions put an end to piracy on this key stretch of river, they did not deter other forms of crime. Since 2o11, the territories on the Myanmar and Lao sides of the Mekong have emerged as hotbeds of illegal activity, from drug production and trafficking to online gambling, money laundering and cyber-scam operations that often use captive workers from around the world. Not only do transnational criminal organisations operating in this zone benefit from lax or non-existent regulations, but they also take advantage of its multi-jurisdictional character, quickly shifting operations from one place to another to evade crackdowns. Coordinated law enforcement across the region is crucial if governments want any chance of tackling these expanding criminal activities, but other capabilities must also be brought to bear. Authorities in the region need to acknowledge that any solution to this transnational problem will involve government agencies from several jurisdictions – as opposed to the typical security or police approach that treats immediate symptoms, but not the fundamental causes of the problem, including weak governance and rampant corruption, not to mention a willingness or desire of some jurisdictions to court illicit investments.

Bangkok/Brussels, International Crisis Group, 2023. 40p. Asia Report N°332 | 18 August 2023

By The International Justice Mission and University of Nottingham Rights Lab.

In 2021 International Justice Mission (IJM), together with the University of Nottingham Rights Lab, a world-leading human trafficking research institution, launched the Scale of Harm project to develop and implement a mixed-methodology providing prevalence estimates of trafficking of children to produce CSEM, including via livestreaming, in the Philippines. This is the full report of the methodology, findings, and recommendation from the very first national survey and study. You can the Summary Report below.

International Justice Mission, 2023. 78p.

By Vivian Dedase-Escoton, Suisan Walker, Dawn Schurter, Eliezer Moreno, Nathaniel Diaz, and Shiella Silva

Online sexual exploitation of children is a rampantly growing global crime, particularly in the Philippines which is known as the “global hotspot” of OSEC cases (IJM, 2020, p. 60) and ranked amongst the top ten producers of child sexual exploitation material (CSEM) (UNICEF, 2017a). Online sexual exploitation of children refers to a broad category of online sex offending that includes, but is not limited to, possession or distribution of previously produced CSEM, enticing children to “self-produce” new CSEM, and grooming children for later contact abuse. The unique nature and demographics of victims and perpetrators of this form of abuse which include the very young age of children victimized, the overwhelming number of families directly involved in the crime, the acceptance and tolerance of this form of exploitation in communities involved, as well as the high-risk for potential re-victimization of victims, present challenges in aftercare support, particularly in reintegration of survivors. In addressing the issues of online child sexual abuse, the preventive, protective, and supportive interventions for children should be extended to families and communities who are the key players in perpetrating this crime (ASEAN, 2016; UNICEF East Asian Pacific Regional Office [EAPRO], 2016; United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2015). This holistic approach is fundamental to ensuring survivor’s restoration, sustained recovery, and successful reintegration. This study examined the environmental context – individual, family, community, and societal level – of the survivors to: (1) provide a comprehensive understanding of the risk factors that facilitate online sexual exploitation of children in individuals (victims), families, and communities impacted by this form of abuse, and determine gaps in the system that affect the effective delivery of interventions and support services for survivors; (2) determine the factors that contribute to successful reintegration of survivors including the interventions and support services that need to be provided at each level of system. And lastly, (3) identify alternative care options for survivors who cannot be reintegrated to their family and community. Employing a qualitative approach, key informant questionnaires were distributed to 55 respondents composed of 19 non-offending family members and 18 neighbors of selected Aftercare Participants including 18 service providers that have knowledge of and involvement with survivors of online sexual exploitation. Further, five focus group discussions among government and non-government service providers with a total of 40 participants from NCR, Region IV-A, Region III, and Region VII were conducted. These areas represent the regions with the highest number of IJM online sexual exploitation of children clients in 2018. Findings determined the following key risk factors that facilitate online sexual exploitation of children in individuals (victims), families, and communities involved in this form of abuse

International Justice Mission - IJM, 2020. 77p.

By Stephen Merchant, Greg Wilson

In 2023 the Government commissioned a ‘first principles’ independent review of the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC) and associated Commonwealth law enforcement arrangements.

The review assessed the effectiveness of the ACIC’s legislative framework and found that comprehensive reform was needed to ensure ACIC could operate effectively as Australia’s national criminal intelligence agency. The review recommended ACIC shift away from its existing law enforcement and investigative functions towards providing unique intelligence on serious and organised crime to Commonwealth, state and territory law enforcement agencies.

The independent review’s recommendations set out a blueprint to transform the ACIC in response to the significant and ongoing threat of serious and organised crime. The Government has agreed or agreed in-principle with 27 of the 29 recommendations - as set out in the government response.

Key recommendations

• Undertake robust legislative reforms to address significant deficiencies in the existing legislative frameworks and ensure the ACIC has appropriate powers for the collection of intelligence.

• Incorporate appropriate oversight and safeguards for the ACIC, including in relation to its use of coercive powers.

• Reinvigorate national governance and coordination arrangements for responding to serious and organised crime.

• Reinforce the independence of the Australian Institute of Criminology.

BARTON, ACT : Attorney-General's Department (Australia), 2024. 68p.

By Martina Prpic with Melissa Eichhorn

Children are human beings with rights and dignity. Children's rights are human rights. Owing to their fragility and vulnerability, children also require specific protection, however, which involves providing them with an environment where they are safe from any situation that could potentially expose them to abuse. Violence against children, as defined in Article 19 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, can take many forms (physical, sexual or emotional abuse or neglect) and can take place in different settings, such as at home, at school, in institutions, online, etc. Most child abusers are familiar to their victims. The short- and long-term consequences of abuse in terms of human, economic and social costs can be severe and extremely harmful. The extent of violence against children in the EU is difficult to assess, but current estimates give cause for great concern. The nature of the problem depends on various factors, including the personality profiles of victims and perpetrators as well as their surroundings. Certain categories of children, such as those with disabilities, those living in special institutions or those who are unaccompanied migrants, are particularly vulnerable. However, violence is avoidable and preventable. Effective policies to address this problem require a multi-sectoral approach involving different stakeholders at various levels. At international level, the United Nations and the Council of Europe have taken a number of measures to safeguard the rights of children, and more specifically to protect them from violence. The Convention on the Rights of the Child is crucial in this effort. According to its Article 19, children are entitled to protection from all forms of violence, and Member States are required to take all appropriate measures to ensure this protection. In recent years, the EU has been stepping up its measures to protect children. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, child protection has been recognised as a specific EU goal. While Member States are primarily responsible for child protection systems, the EU also plays an important role, since it is required to promote initiatives to protect children's rights. Its actions directly influence the relevant laws and policies implemented by the Member States in this area. Various parties are involved in raising awareness about violence against children, the importance of effective EU support for national child protection initiatives and the mainstreaming of child protection. Through its numerous initiatives, such as the continuously renewed EU strategy on the rights of the child and the 2024 Commission recommendation on integrated child protection systems, the EU continues to emphasise its commitment to protecting children and supporting Member States' actions and the exchange of best practice.

Brussels: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, 2024. 31p.

By Joint Select Committee on Social Media and Australian Society

This report focusses on the impacts of social media and Australian society. It examines the influence of social media on users' health and wellbeing, particularly on vulnerable cohorts of people, but also how social media can provide users with positive connection, a sense of community, a place for expression and instant access to information and entertainment.

The Committee heard that balancing these conflicting realities is a wicked problem.

The report addresses both the need for immediate action, and the need for a sustained digital reform agenda. It supports protecting Australians through a statutory duty of care by digital platforms, education support and digital competency, greater protections of personal information, independent research, data gathering and reporting, and giving users greater control over what they see on social media.

This report puts Big Tech on notice—social media companies are not immune from the need to have a social licence to operate.

Recommendations for the Australian Government

1. Consider options for greater enforceability of Australian laws for social media platforms.

2. Introduce a single and overarching statutory duty of care onto digital platforms for the wellbeing of their Australian users.

3. Introduce legislative provisions to enable effective, mandatory data access for independent researchers and public interest organisations, and an auditing process by appropriate regulators.

4. As part of its regulatory framework, ensures that social media platforms introduce measures that allow users greater control over what user-generated content and paid content they see by having the ability to alter, reset, or turn off their personal algorithms and recommender systems.

5. Prioritise proposals from the Privacy Act review relating to greater protections for the personal information of Australians and children.

6. Any features of the Australian Government's regulatory framework that will affect young people be codesigned with young people.

7. Support research and data gathering regarding the impact of social media on health and wellbeing to build on the evidence base for policy development.

8. One of the roles of the previously recommended Digital Affairs Ministry should be to develop, coordinate and manage funding allocated for education to enhance digital competency and online safety skills.

9. Reports to both Houses of Parliament the results of its age assurance trial.

10. Industry be required to incorporate safety by design principles in all current and future platform technology.

11. Introduce legislative provisions requiring social media platforms to have a transparent complaints mechanism.

12. Ensures adequate resourcing for the Office of the eSafety Commissioner to discharge its evolving functions.

Parliament of Australia, 18 NOV 2024

By Tse Yang Lim, Huiru Dong, Erin Stringfellow, Zeynep Hasgul, Ju Park, Lukas Glos, Reza Kazemi, and Mohammad S Jalali

Fentanyl and its analogs contribute substantially to drug overdose deaths in the United States. There is concern that people using drugs are being unknowingly exposed to fentanyl, increasing their risk of overdose death. This study examines temporal trends and spatial variations in the co-occurrence of fentanyl with other seized drugs.

Methods

We identified fentanyl co-occurrence (the proportion of samples of non-fentanyl substances that also contain fentanyl) among 9 substances or substance classes of interest: methamphetamine, cannabis, cocaine, heroin, club drugs, hallucinogens, and prescription opioids, stimulants, and benzodiazepines. We used serial cross-sectional data on drug reports across 50 states and the District of Columbia from the National Forensic Laboratory Information System, the largest available database on the U.S. illicit drug supply, from January 2013 to December 2023.

Findings

We analyzed data from 11,940,207 samples. Fentanyl co-occurrence with all examined substances increased monotonically over time (Mann-Kendall p < 0.0001). Nationally, fentanyl co-occurrence was highest among heroin samples (approx. 50%), but relatively low among methamphetamine (≤1%), cocaine (≤4%), and other drug samples. However, co-occurrence rates have grown to over 10% for cocaine and methamphetamine in several Northeast states in 2017–2023.

Interpretation:

Fentanyl co-occurs most commonly with heroin, but its presence in stimulant supplies is increasing in some areas, where it may pose a disproportionately high risk of overdose.

Lancet Reg Health Amicas, . 2024 Sep 27;39:100898. doi: 10.1016/j.lana.2024.100898

By Michael J. Rosenfeld

U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board (USMSPB) surveys document a decline of more than 50 percent between 1987 and 2016 in the percentage of women working for the federal government who have been sexually harassed (narrowly or broadly defined) in the prior two years. This decline has been underappreciated due to the infrequency of USMSPB surveys and the delayed release of the USMSPB report based on the 2016 survey. The decline in workplace sexual harassment of women has taken place across all federal agencies and at all workplace gender balances. While, in 1987, there was a strong positive correlation between male predominance in the workplace and women’s report of sexual harassment, this association was greatly diminished by 2016. The formerly substantial gender divide in attitudes toward sexual harassment was also mostly diminished by 2016. By extrapolating the USMSPB surveys of federal workers to the entire U.S. workforce, I estimate that 4.8 million U.S. women were harassed at work in 2016 (using a narrow definition of harassment) and 7.6 million U.S. women were harassed at work in 1987 when the female workforce was substantially smaller. More than 700 women were sexually harassed at work in the United States in 2016 for every sexual harassment complaint filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The observed decline in sexual harassment has implications for theories about law and social change ”

Sociological Science 11: 934-964, 2024.

By Nicolás Zevallos Trigoso, Jaris Mujica, and Christian Campos Vásquez

Coca legalization in Peru could reshape the economy, drug control policies, and even the influence of organized crime, but the implications are complex. This report explores how moving from prohibition to a regulated market affects not only the legal framework but also the ground reality for coca growers, consumers, and law enforcement. Legalization doesn’t just mean lifting restrictions; it involves constructing a regulatory structure that acknowledges coca as both a cultural staple and a consumer good.

The study reveals that while legalization could reduce the criminalization of coca production, it also creates new challenges. Ensuring a legal supply chain for coca derivatives, from cultivation to sale, demands extensive state oversight—a task complicated by limited resources and a history of challenges with other legal commodities like timber and gold. Moreover, organized crime could exploit the gaps in regulation, adapting to the legal framework while maintaining parallel illegal operations.

The analysis dives into four major areas of impact: changes in drug policy, shifts in organized crime dynamics, effects on the local economy of coca growers, and potential shifts in consumer patterns. The findings suggest that legalization could reduce repressive policing but require intensified regulatory control, putting immense pressure on Peru’s state capacity. Organized crime may also adapt to the new structures, blending illegal activities with legal coca businesses.

This study also highlights lessons from other industries that have moved from illicit to regulated markets, providing a balanced view of possible outcomes. While coca legalization could offer a path away from prohibition’s punitive approach, the transition to a regulated market could mean ongoing challenges.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024 24p.

By Max Daly ̵ Patrick Shortis

There has been a groundbreaking shift in the global drug trade, pioneered in Russia and now spreading globally. Unlike traditional drug trafficking models, this system leverages darknet markets and cryptocurrency for anonymous transactions, allowing buyers to retrieve drugs from hidden physical locations, or “dead drops,” rather than direct exchanges. Driven by large platforms such as Kraken, Mega, and Blacksprut, Russian darknet markets control 93% of the global share, generating approximately $1.5 billion in revenue in 2023 alone. This dominance marks a new era for organized crime, with Russia’s digital drug economy vastly surpassing traditional Western darknet markets in scope and influence.

The rise of Russia’s dead drop drug trade stems from several unique national factors: restrictive anti-drug policies, strained Western trade relations, and a strong technological foundation. Enabled by these conditions, the dead drop model has reshaped how drugs are distributed in Russia. Drug transactions now involve no face-to-face interactions; instead, orders are placed online, paid for with cryptocurrency, and retrieved from secret locations across cities within hours. This system, offering convenience and anonymity, has seen synthetic drugs—especially synthetic cathinones like mephedrone—overtake traditional imported substances like cocaine and heroin in Russia. As the report highlights, these potent synthetic drugs are cheap, easy to manufacture, and readily distributed through Russia’s vast delivery networks.

The report further underscores the severe social impacts of this model on Russian society, particularly among young people. Youth are drawn into this high-tech drug economy, often working as couriers or “kladmen” for online shops—a job that comes with high risks, including violence, criminal charges, and addiction. Violence has become endemic in the system, with enforcers, known as “sportsmen,” meting out harsh punishments for couriers suspected of theft or negligence. This pervasive violence, combined with the easy availability of highly addictive synthetic drugs, is fueling a public health crisis and contributing to rising incarceration rates among young Russians.

Beyond Russia, the report warns that this drug trade model is now expanding across borders, posing public health and security risks. It’s affecting Russian youth heavily, leading to violence, criminalization, and increased synthetic drug dependence. Understanding Russia’s darknet markets offers insight into the future of drug trafficking worldwide. Authorities and international bodies must adapt to address the growing influence of this high-tech, anonymous, and highly organized trade system.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 53p.