By Nicolás Zevallos Trigoso, Jaris Mujica, and Christian Campos Vásquez

Coca legalization in Peru could reshape the economy, drug control policies, and even the influence of organized crime, but the implications are complex. This report explores how moving from prohibition to a regulated market affects not only the legal framework but also the ground reality for coca growers, consumers, and law enforcement. Legalization doesn’t just mean lifting restrictions; it involves constructing a regulatory structure that acknowledges coca as both a cultural staple and a consumer good.

The study reveals that while legalization could reduce the criminalization of coca production, it also creates new challenges. Ensuring a legal supply chain for coca derivatives, from cultivation to sale, demands extensive state oversight—a task complicated by limited resources and a history of challenges with other legal commodities like timber and gold. Moreover, organized crime could exploit the gaps in regulation, adapting to the legal framework while maintaining parallel illegal operations.

The analysis dives into four major areas of impact: changes in drug policy, shifts in organized crime dynamics, effects on the local economy of coca growers, and potential shifts in consumer patterns. The findings suggest that legalization could reduce repressive policing but require intensified regulatory control, putting immense pressure on Peru’s state capacity. Organized crime may also adapt to the new structures, blending illegal activities with legal coca businesses.

This study also highlights lessons from other industries that have moved from illicit to regulated markets, providing a balanced view of possible outcomes. While coca legalization could offer a path away from prohibition’s punitive approach, the transition to a regulated market could mean ongoing challenges.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024 24p.

By Camilo Pardo-Herrera 

The environment is under increasing pressure from global economic dynamics and the constantly increasing demand for raw materials. In this context, environmental crimes in general, and illegal mining in particular, play a key role as they disregard any consideration for sustainable resource extraction. In the Amazon region, one of the most vital ecosystems around the world, illegal gold mining has been identified as the most critical threat to the sustainability of the life of its ecosystems. There is evidence of large quantities of illegal mining production both in Colombia (two-thirds of all production) and Peru (25 to 30 percent of all production). However, since gold is extremely valuable, and portable, it stores value —even under extreme market conditions—, it can be reshaped in any way thinkable, and is not intrinsically illegal, introducing illicitly extracted gold into official supply chains is fairly easy. Once introduced, it flows freely through national, regional, and global markets, and its proceeds do so through the international financial system. It is estimated that illegal mining accounts for up to USD 48 billion a year in criminal proceeds.1 In this context, organized crime associated with the illegal extraction of gold in the Amazon continues to grow in number, size, and scope in response to the insatiable global demand, and thanks to the possibility of laundering and reinvesting their proceeds through illicit financial flows. Thus, an efficient response to the challenges posed by illegal gold mining should be comprehensive and include not just efforts to curb illegal mining, but also, more importantly, efforts to address the illegal flows of money taking place through the gold trade. Although it only analyzes a small sample of the entire global gold market, this paper provides substantive evidence of the illegal flows of money through the gold trade from Peru and Colombia into the United States. While this report is in no position to assert the commission of crimes —since it is only analyzing data— it presents enough evidence to identify points of entry for further criminal investigations and potential judicial action. There is evidence of companies smuggling gold from Venezuela into Colombia, which is then exported to the United States. Between 2010 and 2021, a total of 68,2 tons of gold worth a total of 2.6 billion US dollars, were smuggled through the border in vicinities of Cucuta. Three companies, one in Colombia (CIJ Gutierrez) and two in the United States (Asahi Refining USA Inc., and Johnson Matthey Inc.) concentrate over 90 percent of this trade. Gold trade through this route stopped after 2018 when an Executive Order was signed targeting all parties involved in the trade of Venezuelan gold. There is also evidence of gold and mercury smuggling along the border between Peru and Bolivia and illegal gold production shifting geographies after policy decisions are made. Data show an inexplicable spike in Bolivian gold export in 2014 —with no increases in production— which coincides both, with a ban on mercury by Peru, and a decrease in Peruvian production and exports. This suggests the shifting of illegal mining from Peru into Bolivia, and also of gold smuggling in the same direction. There are clear indications of mis-invoicing of gold trade between these three countries. Peruvian data show significantly higher weight values than those reported at US destinations between 2016 and 2018. A very similar pattern can be seen in Peruvian total exports to the world. Concurrently, trade data show that 29 percent of all shipments from Peru to the US were priced at 70 percent or less than the actual international price during that same time. Although available data does not permit us to assert whether it is a case of overstating the weight of the gold or undervaluing its value, the temporal coincidence of weight and value discrepancies allows us to suggest a general case of mis-invoicing during this time. Colombian data also suggests potential cases of mis-invoicing. Between 2015 and 2016, US statistics reported weight about 50% above those reported by Colombian customs. Price data show that in nine percent of the shipments —approximately 16 tons— gold was paid at 70 percent or less of the global gold price at the time of the transaction. Only a handful of businesses on both sides of the transactions explain most of this trade and are identified — 85 percent of the undervalued shipments are executed by five Colombian firms, and six businesses on the US side concentrate 86 percent of undervalued purchases. Trade in overpriced gold is also identified. Data analysis suggests irregular patterns in the rate between net and gross weights, which could respond to fraudulent reporting and concurrent illicit flows of value. For example, while most shipments use 0.2 grams (or less) of packaging per every gram of gold sent, an important percentage report uses three and up to five times that weight. Of these irregular shipments, over 90 percent were sent by one company in Colombia —Metales Procesados Industriales— to two businesses in the US —Atomic Gold Inc., and United Precious Metal Refining Inc. The analysis also raises warnings as to how certain reports are made. This is the case of the volume of shipments reported by Colombian customs, which is not the result of a measurement, but of an estimation using the net weight of the shipment. Instead of measuring the volume of each shipment, this field is populated using the density of gold, which is a constant, derived from the net weight of the shipment. Although not the result of fraud, but a standard procedure, this hinders transparency and the possibility of monitoring the trade between Colombia and the US. There is evidence of a trend to create shell companies to engage in the trade in gold; presumably of illegal gold. Peruvian tax data shows large numbers of companies participating in the trade in a very sporadic fashion, which contradicts stable and long-lasting trade relationships usual in the international gold market. These companies have a very short legal life, and concentrate all of their commercial activity within a few months, only to cease to exist shortly after. Between 2016 and 2021, these companies traded gold for a total of 230 million USD. 

The Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center. George Mason University. Arlington, Va. 2022. 34p.

By The Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA)

In this report, EIA documents for the first time the systematic export and import of illegal wood from Peru to the United States. In many ways, this report not a new story: the system’s corruption is something of which everyone in the sector is aware. EIA’s contribution lies in having identified and patiently put together the pieces of the puzzle to reveal the mechanism that allows this trade to happen: what Peruvians call the “laundering machine”.

EIA’s investigative work focused on reconstructing the routes that timber takes from the Amazon to the warehouses of US importers, through use of official information obtained under Peru’s Transparency and Access to Public Information Law. The links in this chain are willfully obscured to perpetuate confusion about the origins of almost all timber traded in Peru. EIA was able to reconstruct the chain of custody for trade in cedar (Cedrela odorata) and bigleaf mahogany (Swietenia macrophylla) only because both species are protected under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna (CITES) and thus require specific export permit documents. The same illegal modus operandi is being applied for other species, but the even more limited information available regarding non-CITES species trade makes it virtually impossible to connect the concession of origin with the shipments being exported.

Washington, DC; London:: EIA, 2012. 72p.

By InSight Crime

Peru’s 70 million hectares of Amazon forest are being razed at an alarming rate. This investigation reveals the range of culprits behind the devastation: from illegal gold miners who leave behind pools of poisonous mercury, to poor locals coopted into harvesting valuable trees, to a complex web of front companies, agribusiness subsidiaries, corrupt officials and criminal groups that prosper from the Amazon’s destruction.

Conducted with the Igarapé Institute – a Brazil-based think tank devoted to development, security and climate issues – the six-part series also unravels the crucial links in the chain of specific environmental crimes contributing to forest loss, including illegal logging, illicit gold mining, coca cultivation, wildlife trafficking and the usurping of lands for cattle farms and booming agricultural industries.

Peru’s Amazon, which covers nearly half of the Andean country, is rich in biodiversity and critical to the capture of carbon, which mitigates global warming. Political instability and corruption, however, have made protecting it much more difficult. Meanwhile, demand from international markets for wood, gold and other forest products increases the threat to Indigenous communities, animal habitats and protected reserves.

Washington, DC: InSight Crime; IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE , 2022. 61p.

By Jorge M. Agüero

About half of Peruvian women between the ages of 15 and 49 have experienced some form of violence from their partners. Through a quantitative analysis, this report explores how violence rates against women vary by ethnic group and over time. Based on a nationally representative sample of more than 75,000 women surveyed between 2003 and 2012 and a review of the literature on ethnic classification in Peru, a typology is applied to measure ethnicity, based on women’s linguistic backgrounds, allowing for a consistent ethnic characterization throughout the period of analysis. In this typology, the first group is made up of women who speak an indigenous language at home and do not speak Spanish. A second group, called “historic” Spanish speakers, is composed of women who learned Spanish during childhood and still use it today, while the third group, called “recent” Spanish speakers, includes women who grew up speaking an indigenous language but now speak Spanish. The highest rate of all types of violence is found in this last group, with a much greater difference in sexual and severe physical violence. This is consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model developed in this study in which violence depends on the type of couple. The model finds that women who speak “recent” Spanish—and who have what is termed a lower “outside option” than their “historic” Spanish-speaking male partners—experience greater violence. The study found that the gap in rates of violence against women among these three language groupings has remained constant over time despite an overall reduction in violence. This shows that current policies to provide care for victims and prevent violence against women are insufficient because the policies do not necessarily target groups with a greater risk of violence. This is unlike other areas of public health, where interventions are directly targeted at the most vulnerable populations

Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 2018. 43p.