By Vanya Petrova

Illicit cross-border financial flows – estimated at US$1–1.6 trillion a year globally – are harming economic development on a national and global level. This is particularly true when such flows originate in heavily étatist economies, with no effective division or independence of the private from the public or state-owned sector. Autocracies have long utilized obfuscated corporate ownership structures and illicit financial flows (IFFs) for nefarious purposes such as bribery, corruption and improper lobbying to secure anything from technologies and know-how to economic and political influence on countries of interest. Russia has established a pattern of malign economic impact in Europe through its cultivation of ‘an opaque network of patronage across the region that it uses to influence and direct decision-making’ in key markets and institutions. IFFs in the Balkan region, in particular, are manifold, multi-directional and, proportionally, large as a percentage of GDP. While global illicit outflows are 3–5% of world GDP, IFFs in the Balkans are estimated at about 6% of the region’s GDP. The common denominator of the Western Balkan countries is their vulnerabilities kindled by institutional weakness and state capture. IFFs promote rent-seeking and criminal behaviour, reduce governments’ capacity to support development and inclusive growth, undermine the rule of law and jeopardize the business environment. Illicit flows drain public resources, reduce the scope and quality of public services and, thus, undermine confidence in state institutions. The Kremlin has repeatedly taken advantage of its integration into the Western financial system to exploit governance gaps through the corrosive effect of illicit finance.7 The brutal invasion of Ukraine shed a harsh light on the sobering dangers of kleptocracy and the risks to which Europe – and the world – has exposed itself by taking a lax approach to dirty money. Russia’s war in Ukraine could exacerbate these circumstances and accelerate further IFFs in the Balkan region – a crucial entry point and essential route for a plethora of illegal activities, such as drug trafficking, human smuggling, illicit trade and contraband.8 Due to imposed travel bans, Serbia is one of the few remaining routes for Russians to establish themselves in the region. Since the start of the invasion of Ukraine, Russian nationals have registered more than 5 000 companies in Serbia, over 1 000 being limited liability companies and nearly 4 000 entrepreneurial businesses.9 The establishment of so many companies in the country offers fertile ground for money laundering.10 As observed in the Serbian national risk assessment by the Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering, limited liability companies and entrepreneurs pose a particularly high degree of threat with respect to money laundering. Through such means wealthy Russians could seek investment opportunities and use existing connections to launder money in real estate and other sectors traditionally vulnerable to IFFs in the region. The primary goal of this report is to assess the major enablers and vulnerabilities of illicit finance in the eight Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia) after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. More concretely, the study aims to analyze the primary IFFs sources and channels in the region, and identify any emerging trends concerning modus operandi, routes, business models, use of information and communications technology. In addition, the study intends to inspect the pressing challenges to border control, police and anti-money laundering authorities to effectively prevent, investigate and counter organized crime involved in cash smuggling and money laundering. Finally, the report aims to suggest feasible recommendations for improvement. The analysis presented is based on information collected through mixed methods research consisting of qualitative and quantitative desk research and in-depth interviews with key professionals from different organizations and professional affiliations in the eight countries. A total of 15 semi-structured interviews were conducted with experts from regional organizations, customs agencies, national anti-money laundering authorities, national revenue agencies, national customs agencies and NGOs, as well as with journalists and academics. A guiding questionnaire with key questions and topics was shared with the field researchers to facilitate the work and to ensure consistency in the information collection process.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC)’s , 2023. 24p.

By Mark Galeotti

In May 2022, Lithuanian police raided two underground factories where counterfeit cigarettes worth some €73 million were being produced.2 This happens all the time, and even the involvement of a Russian-linked organized crime group was hardly unusual. However, as the investigation extended to Belgium (where the goods would be transhipped to Britain), it became clear that behind the gangsters lay Russian intelligence officers, who were using the business – or at least part of its profits – to raise operational funds for their activities in Europe. With Putin regarding himself as ‘at war’ with the West, at a time when Europol chief Catherine de Bolle is warning that organized crime is on the rise across Europe,3 and Thomas Haldenwang, head of Germany’s counter-intelligence agency, is assessing ‘the risk of [Russian] state-controlled acts of sabotage to be significantly increased’,4 it is perhaps unsurprising that gangsters and spies would find themselves brought together in his campaign. It has, after all, become commonplace since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 to characterize the relationship between Russia and the West as some shade of war: economic, political, but typically more than just cold. Indeed, even as he insists that his invasion is not a war, just a ‘special military operation’ (SVO) – actually calling it a ‘war’ can conceivably get Russians a 15-year prison sentence5 – Putin freely uses the term when describing his country’s engagement with the West. However, it is less clearly understood just how significant and long held this view of his may be. In this context, it does seem in hindsight that Putin has considered himself as de facto at war with the West – or, more precisely, that the West has been warring against him – since at least around 2012. After stepping back from the presidency to the position of prime minister in order to observe the letter, if not the spirit, of term limits, all the while clearly still running the country, when Putin announced he would be returning to the Kremlin, this was for many the last straw. Demonstrations that became known as the Bolotnaya Protests were mastered and dispersed, but Putin seems to have been unable or unwilling to accept that they were a genuine, organic expression of dismay. Instead, he chose to see them as spurred by the US Department of State, after then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton ‘gave the signal’ to opposition leaders.6 There had been a growing school of thought within Russian security circles that the West was using ‘political technologies’ to topple hostile governments, and support for civil society, democratization and the rule of law were seen as part of this campaign. As a former Kremlin insider put it, Putin was scared, then angry. As far as he was concerned, this was it, this was a sign that the West – the Americans – were coming for him. So he was determined to fight back, and that didn’t just mean defending himself, the repressions and arrests, it meant going on the attack. He was clear, he made it clear to us all: if the West was coming to mess with him, we would mess them up worse, by whatever means necessary.

Russia’s transition from a “conscription state” to a full “mobilization state”, after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, has intensified the involvement of criminal groups in operations tied to sanctions-busting, cyber warfare, and intelligence. Organized crime networks provide Russia with access to restricted goods, such as advanced electronics for its military, and facilitate money laundering and illegal financial flows. Notably, Russian intelligence services have relied on criminal syndicates to supplement their espionage activities, including sabotage, cyberattacks, and assassinations.

The report also highlights Russia’s weaponization of migration, using smuggling networks to create political instability across Europe. Meanwhile, Putin’s regime has blurred the lines between state and criminal actors, using them as tools to evade international sanctions and expand Russian influence globally.

“Gangsters at War” reveals how Russian-based organized crime operates as a tool of Kremlin foreign policy, focusing not just on profits but on weakening geopolitical rivals. From sanctions evasion to destabilizing societies, criminal networks have become a key element in Russia’s geopolitical arsenal. The report calls for increased vigilance, international cooperation, and stronger countermeasures to address this growing threat to global stability

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.2024. 62p.

By Max Daly ̵ Patrick Shortis

There has been a groundbreaking shift in the global drug trade, pioneered in Russia and now spreading globally. Unlike traditional drug trafficking models, this system leverages darknet markets and cryptocurrency for anonymous transactions, allowing buyers to retrieve drugs from hidden physical locations, or “dead drops,” rather than direct exchanges. Driven by large platforms such as Kraken, Mega, and Blacksprut, Russian darknet markets control 93% of the global share, generating approximately $1.5 billion in revenue in 2023 alone. This dominance marks a new era for organized crime, with Russia’s digital drug economy vastly surpassing traditional Western darknet markets in scope and influence.

The rise of Russia’s dead drop drug trade stems from several unique national factors: restrictive anti-drug policies, strained Western trade relations, and a strong technological foundation. Enabled by these conditions, the dead drop model has reshaped how drugs are distributed in Russia. Drug transactions now involve no face-to-face interactions; instead, orders are placed online, paid for with cryptocurrency, and retrieved from secret locations across cities within hours. This system, offering convenience and anonymity, has seen synthetic drugs—especially synthetic cathinones like mephedrone—overtake traditional imported substances like cocaine and heroin in Russia. As the report highlights, these potent synthetic drugs are cheap, easy to manufacture, and readily distributed through Russia’s vast delivery networks.

The report further underscores the severe social impacts of this model on Russian society, particularly among young people. Youth are drawn into this high-tech drug economy, often working as couriers or “kladmen” for online shops—a job that comes with high risks, including violence, criminal charges, and addiction. Violence has become endemic in the system, with enforcers, known as “sportsmen,” meting out harsh punishments for couriers suspected of theft or negligence. This pervasive violence, combined with the easy availability of highly addictive synthetic drugs, is fueling a public health crisis and contributing to rising incarceration rates among young Russians.

Beyond Russia, the report warns that this drug trade model is now expanding across borders, posing public health and security risks. It’s affecting Russian youth heavily, leading to violence, criminalization, and increased synthetic drug dependence. Understanding Russia’s darknet markets offers insight into the future of drug trafficking worldwide. Authorities and international bodies must adapt to address the growing influence of this high-tech, anonymous, and highly organized trade system.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 53p.

By: Alexandra Lysova

Homicide statistics are often seen as the most reliable and comparable indicator of violent deaths around the world. However, the analysis of Russian homicide statistics challenges this understanding and suggests that international comparisons of homicide levels can be hazardous. Drawing on an institutionalist perspective on crime statistics, official crime-based homicide statistics in Russia are approached as a social construct, a performance indicator and a tool of governance. The paper discusses several incentives to misrepresent official homicide data in contemporary Russia, including politicization of homicide statistics as a legacy of the Soviet’ era’s falsified crime statistics and the role of policing. Mainly, the paper identifies and describes the exact legal, statistical and country-specific substantive mechanisms that allow homicide statistics to be distorted in Russia. By considering legal mechanisms alone, the more accurate homicide rate may be at least 1.6 times higher than that reported in the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Global Study on Homicide 2013.

European Journal of Criminology 1 –21

By Kondakov, Alexander Sasha

Violent Affections uncovers techniques of power that work to translate emotions into violence against queer people. Based on an analysis of over 300 criminal cases of anti-queer violence in Russia before and after the introduction of the ‘gay propaganda’ law, the book shows how violent acts are framed in emotional language by perpetrators during their criminal trials. It then utilizes an original methodology of studying ‘legal memes’ and argues that these individual affective states are directly connected to the political violence aimed at queer lives more generally. The main aim of Violent Affections is to explore the social mechanisms and techniques that impact anti-queer violence evidenced in the reviewed cases. Alexander Sasha Kondakov expands upon two sets of interdisciplinary literature – queer theory and affect theory – in order to conceptualize what is referred to as neo-disciplinary power. Taking the empirical observations from Russia as a starting point, he develops an original explanation of how contemporary power relations are changing from those of late modernity as envisioned by Foucault’s Panopticon to neo-disciplinary power relations of a much more fragmented, fluid, and unstructured kind – the Memeticon. The book traces how exactly affections circulate from body to body as a kind of virus and eventually invade the body and respond with violence. This analytic effort draws on the arguments from memetics – the theory of how pieces of information pass on from one body to another as they thrive to survive by continuing to resonate. This work makes the argument truly interdisciplinary.

London: UCL Press, 2022.

By: Dr Erica Marat (NDU) and Dr Alexander Kupatadze (KCL).

This paper examines the practices used to evade sanctions imposed on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, focusing on the import–export operations of Russia, Belarus, Georgia, and Kazakhstan. The research finds that sanctions have not cut supplies to Russia but have instead empowered informal trade networks and intermediaries. Georgia and Kazakhstan have indirectly benefited from the increased transiting trade; however, the impact on the shadow economy and traditional organised crime has been minimal because sanctions-busting is not illegal in these countries. In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion in Ukraine, a conspicuous surge in trade anomalies and import- and export-related red flags has been observed. In many instances, these irregularities can be definitively attributed to strategies employed to circumvent sanctions. The Western focus has been on restricting the re-exports of sanctioned goods to undermine Russia’s military apparatus. However, third-party states, such as Georgia and Kazakhstan, play a significant role in enabling Russia to sustain its international trade activities, yielding substantial financial gains for the country’s military expenditure.

Our research underscores the complexity and challenges of enforcing international sanctions and preventing sanctions evasion. It shows that the sanctions have not been as effective as hoped in cutting off Russia from the global economy, and that Russia has been able to find ways to circumvent them. The paper highlights the need for more concerted efforts and cooperation among Western states, private companies based in the West, and third-party states, to mitigate and prevent sanctions-busting activities.

Future research could expand to include more countries and examine the broader implications of sanctions. It could also examine the extent to which organized crime, such as cybercrime and trade-based money laundering, are linked to sanctions evasion. This research would build on the recommendations of this paper by developing more specific strategies for detecting and preventing sanctions evasion, including the use of new technologies and data analysis techniques.

Research Paper No. 18 University of Birmingham. 2023. 47p.

By Maria Nizzero

The imposition of sanctions against the ‘oligarchs’ following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has triggered a policy conversation about the potential to move ‘from freeze to seize’: achieving permanent confiscation of assets that are currently temporarily frozen under sanctions. Acting against the oligarchs’ assets represents a way for the UK government to both reaffirm its intention to support Ukraine, and to show that the UK is no longer a haven for the proceeds of patronage, bribery or corruption. However, the UK’s asset recovery mechanisms have previously fallen short when dealing with the challenges related to seizing such proceeds, such as the difficult nature of investigating alleged historical criminality and corruption at the root of the wealth, the vast resources available to those who to manage to hide their assets and, if needed, to prove their licit origin, and the provenance of wealth in uncooperative jurisdictions. In addition, while the intention to move ‘from freeze to seize’ is high on the government’s agenda and has been reflected in several parliamentary debates and the Economic Crime Bill presented in September 2022, there are concerns that such political interest and pressure to act quickly should, however, come with proposals that do not undermine the UK’s status as a rule-of-law jurisdiction and a supporter of fundamental human rights. This paper explores alternative asset recovery mechanisms that could help respond to the immediate policy goal surrounding Russian-linked sanctioned assets and contribute to strengthening the broader asset recovery framework in the UK for the longer term. It sets out the current challenges related to confiscation of proceeds of grand corruption and explores the limitations of UK civil recovery mechanisms when seeking to tackle such proceeds. Given these challenges, the research looks at examples of three alternative mechanisms across four jurisdictions – Australia, Switzerland, Ireland and Italy – weighing their potential and limitations in relation to issues such as a lower standard of proof or reversed burden of proof, as well as reframing around ‘societal danger’, and their legal applicability in UK legislation. With these factors and the broader findings of the research in mind, this paper concludes with a set of recommendations for UK policymakers, which apply equally to the global debate, when thinking about reforming the country’s asset recovery mechanisms. While it does not intend to categorically push for one model to be adopted over others, as developing legislative mechanisms to facilitate the permanent confiscation of kleptocratic proceeds is a challenge that goes well beyond the UK,1 the paper suggests considering amendments to the current asset recovery mechanisms that take account of the social damage and national security interests affected by criminals, and kleptocrats in particular. This is a key gap in UK legislation, and these concepts need to both be included in asset recovery legislation and have full buy-in from the government and law enforcement. Alongside this, some adjustments to existing legislation to include certain elements, such as a full reverse burden of proof and, most importantly, appropriate resourcing of law enforcement, will improve the odds of recovering proceeds of crime in the UK.

SOC ACE Research Paper No. 16. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham.2023. 35p.

By Joseph D. Serio

In the 1990s, the so-called Russian mafia dominated newspaper headlines, political analysis, and academic articles around the world. It was the new scourge, a threat so massive that it was believed to hold the Russian economy hostage. Former FBI Director Louis Freeh announced that the Russian mafia was a significant threat to the national security of the United States.

Before the end of the decade, Director Freeh reversed himself, saying that in reality the magnitude of the danger from the Russian mafia had been overestimated. Heading into the new millennium, the international hue and cry about gangsters from the former Soviet Union subsided dramatically, particularly after the terrorist attacks of September 11. Al-Qaeda shifted the spotlight from organized crime to terrorism and U.S. homeland security. Has the Russian mafia been eradicated or has it simply fallen below the radar?

Countless books and articles have reported on the Russian mafia in breathless terms bordering on hysteria. Casting a broad net, Serio brings a different, more analytical approach to his exploration of the subject. In Investigating the Russian Mafia, Part I begins by asking a series of basic questions: What did the Soviets understand 'mafia' to mean? Was this a Russian phenomenon or more broadly-based, multi-ethnic groups? How did the media influence the perception of the Russian mafia? What does a close examination of the official statistics reveal about the nature of crime groups in the former Soviet Union?

In Part II, Serio discusses an overview of attitudes and practices of the criminal world, business, and policing, among others, in Russian history. He demonstrates that many of the forces at work in the 1990s did not originate in the Communist era or arise because of the collapse of the USSR. Part III presents a discussion of the crime groups that developed in the post-Soviet era, the challenges that faced the business world, and the law enforcement response.

Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2008. 324p.

By Stephen P. Frank

This book is the first to explore the largely unknown world of rural crime and justice in post-emancipation Imperial Russia. Drawing upon previously untapped provincial archives and a wealth of other neglected primary material, Stephen P. Frank offers a major reassessment of the interactions between peasantry and the state in the decades leading up to World War I. Viewing crime and punishment as contested metaphors about social order, his revisionist study documents the varied understandings of criminality and justice that underlay deep conflicts in Russian society, and it contrasts official and elite representations of rural criminality—and of peasants—with the realities of everyday crime at the village level.

Berkeley, CA: London: University of California Press, 1999.

By Jonathan Daly; Jonathan Smele; Michael Melancon

Crime and Punishment in Russiasurveys the evolution of criminal justice in Russia during a span of more than 300 years, from the early modern era to the present day. Maps, organizational charts, a list of important dates, and a glossary help the reader to navigate key institutional, legal, political, and cultural developments in this evolution. The book approaches Russia both on its own terms and in light of changes in Europe and the wider West, to which Russia's rulers and educated elites continuously looked for legal models and inspiration. It examines the weak advancement of the rule of the law over the period and analyzes the contrasts and seeming contradictions of a society in which capital punishment was sharply restricted in the mid-1700s, while penal and administrative exile remained heavily applied until 1917 and even beyond. Daly also provides concise political, social, and economic contextual detail, showing how the story of crime and punishment fits into the broader narrative of modern Russian history. This is an important and useful book for all students of modern Russian history as well as of the history of crime and punishment in modern Europe.

London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018. 258p.

By Nancy Kollmann

This is a magisterial new account of the day-to-day practice of Russian criminal justice in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Nancy Kollmann contrasts Russian written law with its pragmatic application by local judges, arguing that this combination of formal law and legal institutions with informal, flexible practice contributed to the country's social and political stability. She also places Russian developments in the broader context of early modern European state-building strategies of governance and legal practice. She compares Russia's rituals of execution to the 'spectacles of suffering' of contemporary European capital punishment and uncovers the dramatic ways in which even the tsar himself, complying with Moscow's ideologies of legitimacy, bent to the moral economy of the crowd in moments of uprising. Throughout, the book assesses how criminal legal practice used violence strategically, administering horrific punishments in some cases and in others accommodating with local communities and popular concepts of justice.

Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 506p.

By Mark Galeotti

Mark Galeotti is the go-to expert on organized crime in Russia, consulted by governments and police around the world. Now, Western readers can explore the fascinating history of thevory v zakone, a group that has survived and thrived amid the changes brought on by Stalinism, the Cold War, the Afghan War, and the end of the Soviet experiment.

Thevory—as the Russian mafia is also known—was born early in the twentieth century, largely in the Gulags and criminal camps, where they developed their unique culture. Identified by their signature tattoos, members abided by the thieves’ code, a strict system that forbade all paid employment and cooperation with law enforcement and the state. Based on two decades of on-the-ground research, Galeotti’s captivating study details thevory’s journey to power from their early days to their adaptation to modern-day Russia’s free-wheeling oligarchy and global opportunities beyond.

New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018. 344p.

By Mark Burnett, Natalia Dronova, Maren Esmark, Steve Nelson, Asle Rønning, and Vassily Spiridonov

The high northern latitudes support rich biological diversity, including expansive fish stocks, large colonies of seabirds, benthic communities, and a wide variety of marine mammals. Arctic biodiversity and biological productivity is of great international economic importance. About 70 per cent of the world’s total white fish supply comes from arctic waters. This marine resource is also extremely significant to arctic regional and coastal communities. Illegal fishing for Atlantic cod and Alaska pollock in the Arctic threatens the health of these globally important fisheries and their resilience to climate change. It undermines all efforts to build sustainable fisheries management regimes – a pressing objective in the Arctic, where temperatures are rising at twice the global average. Extensive data for the Barents Sea contrasts with the limited information available about estimated illegal fishing in the Russian Far East. As well as providing alarming illustrations of how widespread IUU fishing can become when adequate measures are not taken, the Arctic also gives encouraging examples of how IUU fishing can be greatly reduced. In the Barents Sea region, Norway and Russia have cooperated on fisheries management for several decades. Experience working together has resulted in concrete measures to control, regulate and monitor fishing. These measures have borne fruit recently with the reduction in illegal fishing in the Barents Sea. This achievement shows how coordinated efforts among governments, industry and non-governmental organisations can make a real difference in stopping criminal fishing activities. The current challenge is to keep up the momentum, learn from positive experiences, and leverage our commitment and knowledge to expand the fight against illegal fishing.

Oslo, Norway: World Wildlife Fund, International Arctic Programme, 2008. 52p

By Alexander Fedorov, Alexei Babko, Alexander Sukharenko, Valentin Emelin

Transnational organized environmental crime is a rapidly growing threat to the environment, to revenues from natural resources, to state security and to sustainable development. It robs developing countries of an estimated US$ 70 billion to US$ 213 billion annually or the equivalent of 1 to 2 times global Official Development Assistance. It also threatens state security by increasing corruption and extending into other areas of crime, such as arms and drug smuggling, and human trafficking. Russia possesses enormous forest resources (over 83 billion m³), representing a quarter of the world’s timber reserves. However, illegal logging and forest crime result in enormous monetary losses from the state budget According to data from the Russian Federal Forestry Agency (Rosleshoz), in 2014 alone there were 18,400 cases of the illegal logging of forest plantations—a total volume of 1,308,400 m³—with an estimated value of 10.8 billion rubles. However other estimates vary from 10-20% (Prime Minister’s office) to 50% (Prosecutor General’s office) of total timber harvest. While there has been a reduction in the amount of illegal logging in some regions of the Russian Federation, illegal logging has increased in other regions. Presently, no effective methods have been adopted for assessing the amount of illegal logging in the Russian Federation. The damage caused to forests is not only economic, but also ecological. The report reveals the scale of illegal logging in Russia based on the best available, most up-to-date, expert data. It is hoped that governments will take note and take action.

Arendal, Norway: GRID-Arendal, 2017, 38p.

By Tian Yanfang

Since the end of the 1990s, the Sino-Russian border regions have witnessed a dramatic, unprecedented increase in cross-border timber trade that has made Russia the largest log supplier for China's expanding wood industry sector. Driving factors include: severe constraints in China's domestic wood supplies, the availability of rich forest resources in the Russian Far East and Siberia, liberalised trade policies and demand from both domestic and European, Japanese and US markets for low cost Chinese wood products. This study provides a contextual description and analysis of the cross-border timber trade boom and the actors involved. It examines the current challenges faced by a largely inefficient Russian forestry sector and decentralised Russian forest administration in the context of illegal logging and unsustainable forestry practices, both widely viewed as having reached serious dimensions.

This study focuses on the involvement and role of Chinese actors throughout the supply chain. Chinese companies have entered the Russian forestry sector, introduced greater efficiency and proved competitive. This involvement has also opened doors for Chinese actors to inadvertently or intentionally participate in illegal activities throughout the supply chain. In addition to timber harvesting, Chinese actors are involved as intermediaries in the commercial log depots and control the wholesale timber market in some parts of Russia. Chinese actors have also increasingly invested in wood processing in Russia, partly in response to the adjustment of the Russian export tax on logs. Most recently, there has been a trend towards vertical integration for Chinese companies, with intermediaries and wood importers attempting to extend their business to every node of the trading network. On the Chinese side of the border, preferential tax policies and infrastructure investment have spurred a rapid development of the timber processing industry with private sector processing mills replacing state-owned timber processing factories.

Hayama, Japan, Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, 2008. 58p.

By Anatoly Lebedev

The preservation and sustainable use of Siberian and Russian Far East (RFE) forests is of global importance for a number of reasons. Yet, these forests, which are the traditional environments of many endangered species and indigenous tribes, are now supplying timber to nearby regions and countries that have largely destroyed their own forests. The vast forests of Asian Russia act as reservoirs for oneseventh of the global carbon pool. Russia holds 75 percent of the carbon stored by all of the world’s boreal forests, such that deforestation, after fossil fuel combustion, is the second largest source of carbon dioxide emissions in Russia, as it is worldwide. Properly conserved, Russian forests act as a critical green “lung” for the Earth, second to Brazil’s Amazon. The atmospheric carbon sink process, however, occurs much more slowly in taiga than in the tropical rainforest, as does the process of carbon exportation from organic changes. As a result, this source of carbon storage, after broad-scale commercial logging or forest fires, will also be more slowly restored to its initial function than would be tropical forests.. All across Russia, the past five years have witnessed a revival in domestic timber production, following the collapse of the 1990s, and a drive to achieve the level of volumes extracted during the Soviet period. In the RFE's Primorye Krai (Province), for example, roundwood production rose from 2.2 million cubic meters in 1998 to 3.3 million cubic meters in 2002 and to 3.7 million cubic meters in 2003, and seems to be increasing further under the pressure of growing Chinese and domestic demand. The same trend is exhibited in Khabarovski Krai. Its roundwood production grew from 5 million cubic meters in 1999 to approximately 6.5 million cubic meters in 2002. Iin both Krais there is a clear trend to harvest in formerly reserved, inaccessible, or roadless areas. Not only is the industry, then, launching a sort of "last attack" on formerly used, exhausted, and burnt forests, it is also aggressively pursuing the intact ones, which are already suffering from illegal operations. Expansion of logging and processing capacity over the last 3 to 4 years has not demonstrated a new and improved strategy, but, rather, has resulted in the poor condition found in the remaining commercially available forests and in the constant reduction of timber quality and price.

Washington, DC: Forest Trends, 2005. 48p.

By D.Y. Smirnov, (ed.), A.G. Kabanets, E.A. Lepeshkin, and D.V. Sychikov

Illegal logging of valuable temperate hardwoods has reached crisis proportions in the Russian Far East. Comparative analysis conducted by WWF Russia shows that from the period 2004-2011 the volume of Mongolian oak (the most valuable hardwood species) logged for export to China exceeded authorized logging volumes by 2-4 times. Much of this illegal logging takes place in the habitats of the Amur tiger and leads to their degradation. The materials included in this report are pertinent in the context of new legislation in the European Union, United States and other countries aimed at the exclusion of illegally sourced wood products, given that a signifi cant proportion of the illegal timber logged in the Russian Far East enters such markets in the form of Chinese-manufactured furniture and flooring. This report is applicable for use by public forest agencies, forest industry, NGOs, students and academics and all those who are not indifferent to the fate of Russian forests.

Moscow: World Wildlife Fund Russia, 2013. 43p.