By Williams Downs

An individual’s right to freedom of expression and assembly are protected by Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Together they safeguard the right to peaceful protest. However, these rights are not absolute, and the state can implement laws which restrict the right to protest to maintain public order or protect the rights and freedoms of others. In the UK several pieces of legislation provide a framework for the policing of protests. The Public Order Act 1986 provides the police with powers to restrict protests by placing conditions on them. These powers were strengthened by part 3 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. The Public Order Act 2023 established several criminal offences in relation to protest. These include offences of causing serious disruption by locking-on, being equipped to lock-on, causing serious disruption by tunnelling, obstructing major transport works, and interfering with key national infrastructure. There are also several criminal offences which are not specific to protest situations but could apply to conduct committed during a protest, such as wilful obstruction of a highway, public nuisance, and aggravated trespass. Other routes used to restrict peaceful protest There have been several examples of businesses and organisations applying for civil injunctions (court orders) against protesters to stop them from engaging in protest activity that affects their operations. The Public Order Act 2023 also provides for the Home Secretary to have the power to seek injunctions against protesters, though at the time of writing this provision has not been brought into force. Part 2 of the Public Order Act 2023 created Serious Disruption Prevention Orders (SDPOs), which are civil orders that enable courts to attach conditions or restrictions on an individual aged over 18 (such as restrictions on where they can go and when) with the view of preventing them from engaging in protest-related activity that could cause disruption. Breach of an SDPO is a criminal offence.

In some cases, local authorities have used their powers under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 to impose Public Space Protection Orders in areas outside of abortion clinics to prohibit protest activity. A provision in the Public Order Act 2023 to prohibit protest activity at all abortion clinics in England and Wales has not yet been brought into force. Legislative reform In recent years, the government initiated two major legislative reforms in response to concerns about peaceful but disruptive protests that have targeted major roads, transport networks, and other infrastructure. These were the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 and the Public Order Act 2023. Both were aimed at increasing the powers of the police to intervene and stop disruptive protests and to strengthen the criminal justice response to those engaging in disruptive protest tactics. The legislation was controversial and attracted strong opposition from campaigners who questioned the compatibility of the reforms with human rights legislation. The Joint Committee on Human Rights said that the combined measures would likely “have a chilling effect on the right to protest in England and Wales” (PDF). The government stated that its legislation aimed to “protect the public and businesses from these unacceptable actions” of “a small minority of protestors”. It said that existing human rights legislation provides appropriate safeguards for the right to protest (PDF) and that the police and prosecutors will continue to be responsible for acting “compatibly with an individual’s Convention rights” when making any decisions about arrests and charges    

London: UK Parliament, House of Commons Library, 2024. 50p,]

 By Christopher Lewis and Adaner Usmani

Since 2014, viral images of Black people being killed at the hands of the police—Michael Brown, Eric Garner, Breonna Taylor, and many, many others—have convinced much of the public that the American criminal legal system is broken. In the summer of 2020, nationwide protests against police racism and violence in the wake of George Floyd’s murder were, according to some analysts, the largest social movement in the history of the United States. 2 Activists and academics have demanded defunding the police and reallocating the funds to substitutes or alternatives. 3 And others have called for abolishing the police altogether.4 It has become common knowledge that the police do not solve serious crimes, they focus far too much on petty offenses, and they are far too heavy-handed and brutal in their treatment of Americans—especially, Black people. This is the so-called paradox ofunder-protection and over-policing that has characterized American law enforcement since emancipation.5 The American criminal legal system is unjust and inefficient. But, as we argue in this essay, over-policing is not the problem. In fact, the American criminal legal system is characterized by an exceptional kind of under-policing, and a heavy reliance on long prison sentences, compared to other developed nations. In this country, roughly three people are incarcerated per police officer employed. The rest of the developed world strikes a diametrically opposite balance between these twin arms of the penal state, employing roughly three and a half times more police officers than the number of people they incarcerate. We argue that the United States has it backward. Justice and efficiency demand that we strike a balance between policing and incarceration more like that of the rest of the developed world. We call this the “First World Balance.” Wedefendthis idea in much more detail in a forthcoming book titled What’sWrongwith Mass Incarceration. This essay offers a preliminary sketch of some of the arguments in the book. In the spirit of conversation and debate, in this essay, we err deliberately on the side of comprehensiveness rather than argumentative rigor. One of us is a social scientist, and the other is a philosopher and legal scholar. Our primary goal for this research project, and especially in this essay, is not to convince readers that we are correct—but rather to encourage a more explicit discussion of the empirical and normative bases of some pressing debates about the American criminal legal system. Even if our answers prove unsound, we hope that the combination of empirical social science and analytic moral and political philosophy we might have to look like to be sound. In fact, because much of this essay (and the underlying book project) strikes a pessimistic tone, we would be quite happy to be wrong about much of what we argue here.

American Journal of Law and Equality vol. 2, 2022.