By George Shaler, Alison Grey, Lucy Tumavicus, Tara Wheeler, Clare Murray, Robyn Dumont

In the immediate aftermath of George Floyd’s killing four years ago, many people campaigned for police reform to hold law enforcement more accountable for their actions. At the same time, many law enforcement supporters pushed back, maintaining that in the midst of the pandemic and surge in crime that followed, a more robust law enforcement presence was needed. In response to the demand for greater accountability, various legislative and policy proposals were put forth. Most notably, in June 2020, the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act, H.R. 7120, was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives. The bill would have held law enforcement officers accountable for misconduct in court, improved transparency through data collection, and reformed police training and policies. It would have required federal uniformed officers to wear body-worn cameras (BWCs) and would have required state and local law enforcement to use existing federal funds to ensure the use of those cameras.

While this legislation passed the House in both the 116th and 117th Congress, it failed to gain passage in the Senate each time and was not enacted. Despite this failure, among police reform initiatives, the use of body-worn cameras has received the most widespread bipartisan support. While some reformers would like to quicken the pace, the adoption of BWCs by local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies continues to increase. Here in Maine, local, state, and federal funding has enabled agencies to purchase BWCs and implement their use.

Today, when high-profile events occur, there is often both an expectation that video footage exists and public pressure on law enforcement officials to release that footage. Civilians view the mere presence of a body-worn camera as the most important tool in the evaluation of allegations of use of force in police-civilian encounters. However, citizen access to BWC video depends on location. Each state has its own public records law that determines when and how the public may have access to BWC footage. Some states, like Maine, have not addressed BWC footage specifically. Therefore, the laws governing the release of BWC footage in Maine are aligned with existing public record laws and exemptions that are open to interpretation.

Maine Statistical Analysis Center, University of Southern Maine., 2024. 75p.

By Alexander Testa,  Kristin Turney,  Dylan B. Jackson,  Chae M. Jaynes  

In response to the changing nature of policing in the United States, and current climate of police–citizen relations, research has begun to explore the consequences of adolescent police contact for life outcomes. The current study investigates if and under what conditions police contact has repercussions for future orientation during adolescence and the transition into young adulthood. Using data from the Pathways to Desistance study, a multisite longitudinal study of serious offenders followed from adolescence to young adulthood, results from a series of fixed-effects models demonstrated three main findings. First, personal and vicarious police contact, compared with no additional police contact, are negatively associated with within-person changes in future orientation. Second, any exposure to police contact, regardless of how just or unjust the contact is perceived, is negatively associated with future orientation. Third, the negative association between police contact and future orientation is larger for White individuals compared with that for Black or Hispanic individuals. Considering the importance of future orientation for prosocial behavior, the findings suggest that adolescent police contact may serve as an important life-course event with repercussions for later life outcomes.

Criminology. 2022; 60: p. 263–290

By Queensland Crime and Corruption Commission

New and emerging technologies, like remote working using video and online technologies, generative artificial intelligence (AI) to speed up the delivery of services or undertake administrative tasks, and using social media to reach a wider audience are now common practice across the public sector. While advancements in technology and innovations in public service delivery are helping the public sector to deliver more efficient and effective services, they also increase fraud related risks by making it more difficult for fraudulent conduct to be detected, investigated, and prosecuted. This is because advanced technology can offer anonymity, psychological distance, speed and efficiency, and personalisation not seen before. This combined with current economic conditions, such as the rising cost of living, may increase the motivation for fraud by public sector employees or contractors. While technological advancements are changing almost all aspects of fraud, the CCC’s corruption work has identified three areas that are particularly prone to technology-related fraud threats: • procurement • recruitment • grant funding, regulation, and licensing.

State of Queensland: Queensland Crime and Corruption Commission, 2024. 4p.

In 2018, Queensland was the first Australian jurisdiction to provide police with new powers to conduct searches in cases where:

A missing person meets the definition of a ‘high-risk missing person’ because they are either: under the age of 13 or are at risk of serious harm if not found as quickly as possible

A police officer holds a reasonable suspicion that searching a particular place may locate the person or provide information relating to their disappearance, and

The occupier of the place cannot or will not give consent for the search to occur.

These provisions are contained in Chapter 7, Part 3A of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld).

Under section 879 of the Act, the CCC was required to review the provisions.

The CCC’s review identified that although the powers are rarely used, they proved to be a useful and valuable tool to progress investigations. It has made two recommendations for consideration by government.

State of Queensland, AUS: Queensland Crime and Corruption Commission: 2024. 22p.

By Dick M. Carpenter II, Kyle Sweetland and Jennifer McDonald

Code enforcement is supposed to be about protecting the public by discouraging— via monetary sanctions—dangerous driving and other hazardous personal conduct or property conditions. But in practice, local governments may also—or instead—use their code enforcement powers to raise revenue. This is taxation by citation. It is not a new phenomenon, but only in the past few years has it become an object of national concern. Despite the fresh spotlight, little is known about cities that engage in taxation by citation, beyond a few particularly egregious examples. To gain a better understanding of taxation by citation, this study explores the phenomenon through the lens of three Georgia cities—Morrow, Riverdale and Clarkston—that have historically relied on fines and fees from traffic and other ordinance violations for large proportions of their revenues. Consistent with case study research methods, we drew upon public data, a survey of and interviews with residents, photo and video records, and direct observation of the three cities and their municipal courts, which process the cities’ citations. Our results show: Over a five-year period, Morrow, Riverdale and Clarkston generated on average 14% to 25% of their revenues from fines and fees, while similarly sized Georgia cities took in just 3%. Such high levels of fines and fees revenue account for the second largest proportion of the cities’ revenues and may indicate taxation by citation. The three cities’ fines and fees revenues peaked in 2012 before beginning to decline as tax revenues increased. These trends generally correspond to the recession of the late 2000s and early 2010s and the subsequent recovery. This suggests the cities—which are poorer than average, face uncertain economic futures and have few means of generating substantial revenues—may have seen

fines and fees as a way out of a budget crunch. The sample cities issued many of their citations for traffic and other ordinance violations that presented little threat to public health and safety. Traffic violations posed only moderate risk on average, while property code violations were primarily about aesthetics. This suggests the cities are using their code enforcement powers for ends other than public protection.

To process citations, Morrow, Riverdale and Clarkston have their own courts, which are created and funded by the cities. These courts function as highly efficient revenue collectors. They process more cases than courts in similarly sized cities, and nearly everyone coming before them pleads or is found guilty. The three cities have few legal provisions preventing them from using their code enforcement powers for reasons other than public protection—or from violating citizens’ rights in the process. Cities may pay a price for taxation by citation. Morrow, Riverdale and Clarkston residents with recent citations reported lower levels of trust in government officials and institutions than residents without, suggesting cities that use code enforcement for revenue or other non-public safety reasons may undermine trust and cooperation in their communities. Taken together, these findings suggest taxation by citation is a function of the perceived need for revenue and the ability to realize it through code enforcement. Moreover, the phenomenon may be a matter of systemic incentives. City leaders need not set out to pick the pockets of residents. Instead, they may see fines and fees revenue as the answer to their cities’ problems and, absent obstacles such as independent courts or robust legal protections for people accused of ordinance violations, find themselves able to pursue it. And once in effect, the mechanisms necessary for taxation by citation—such as supremely efficient court procedures—may stick, becoming business as usual and ensuring fines and fees remain a reliable source of revenue. Our findings also suggest taxation by citation is shortsighted. Cities may gain revenue, but they may also pay a price for it in the form of lower community trust and cooperation. To avoid this outcome, cities should find other ways of shoring up their finances and use their code enforcement powers only to protect the public—and then only with meaningful safeguards for citizens’ rights in place.

Arlington, VA: Institute for Justice, 2019. 60p.

By Shelley S. Hyland

This report describes the purpose for developing the National Law Enforcement Accountability Database (NLEAD), a centralized repository of official records documenting instances of law enforcement officer misconduct as well as commendations and awards to help inform hiring, job assignment, and promotion decisions. It also provides statistics on the NLEAD’s records, the federal law enforcement officers included, and its usage. This is the first annual report, and it covers NLEAD records for events occurring in calendar years 2018 to 2023 and usage of the NLEAD from January 1, 2024 to August 31, 2024.

Launched on December 18, 2023, the NLEAD was established in accordance with Section 5 of Executive Order 14074, Advancing Effective, Accountable Policing and Criminal Justice Practices To Enhance Public Trust and Public Safety. The Justice Management Division was given responsibility for developing and maintaining the NLEAD, and BJS was given responsibility for producing the annual report.

Highlights

● As of September 20, 2024:

○ All federal law enforcement agencies required to report to the

NLEAD (N=90) and four additional agencies voluntarily submitted records or submitted documentation that they had zero qualifying incidents for all their officers for 2018–2023.

○ There were 4,790 records of federal officer misconduct and 4,011 federal law enforcement officers in the NLEAD for 2018–2023.

● In 2018–2023, 63% (3,031) of incidents in the NLEAD were for sustained complaints or records of disciplinary action based on findings of serious misconduct.

● From January 1, 2024 to August 31, 2024, 9,985 searches were conducted on records in the NLEAD.

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2024. 15p.

By The New Jersey Office of the State Comptroller (OSC)

The New Jersey Office of the State Comptroller (OSC) examined over 500 motor vehicle stops conducted by New Jersey State Police (NJSP) that ended with no enforcement. OSC looked at body-worn camera footage of stops that are rarely, if ever, watched—stops where tickets were not given, arrests were not made, and no one was even ordered to exit their vehicle. Most of the traffic stops OSC reviewed started with the trooper briefly explaining the reason for the stop and requesting a driver’s license, registration, and insurance. But in more than one out of four stops reviewed, the motorist presented a courtesy card, asserted a personal relationship with a law enforcement officer, or even flashed a law enforcement badge. When that happened, the side-of-the-road interactions

between the motorists and the stopping troopers shifted, and in some cases, shifted dramatically.

Sometimes, the motorist boldly handed over a courtesy card, occasionally in lieu of driving credentials, and the stop resolved relatively quickly with the trooper offering some version of “you’re good.” Other times, a driver volunteered “my dad is a lieutenant” or “my best friend works at [insert name of any law enforcement agency]” and received remarkably solicitous treatment from the trooper. This was the case even when the drivers were stopped for dangerous traffic infractions, such as driving more than 100 miles per hour or suspected drunk driving. The most serious consequence the troopers imposed in these stops was advising the motorists that they left a voicemail message for the law enforcement officer named on the courtesy card or invoked as a friend or relative. In one instance of suspected drunk driving, the trooper also warned the driver to “stay off my highway,” after reminding him how bad things would be if he crashed under the circumstances.

OSC’s Police Accountability Project initiated this investigation in response to multiple reports that New Jersey law enforcement officers’ exercise of discretion in motor vehicle stops is often influenced by improper factors, such as courtesy cards given to or purchased by motorists. OSC reviewed more than 3,000 minutes of body-worn camera footage, which included 501 traffic stops conducted by a sample of NJSP troopers over a ten-day period in late 2022. In doing so, OSC found evidence of a two-tiered system in which motorists with ties to law enforcement—no matter how tenuous—were given preferential treatment.

Among the findings:

● Courtesy cards—which are given out by police labor associations and sold by private companies online—appear to be in wide usage and function as accepted currency. Of the 501 stops OSC reviewed, 87 motorists presented courtesy cards which came from municipal police departments, county and state agencies, as well as inter-state and out-of-state law enforcement agencies. They all appeared to be equally effective at getting motorists released without enforcement.

● Motorists who asserted personal relationships with law enforcement have similarly strong social capital that often has the same effect as a courtesy card. In ten percent of the stops, the motorist did not present a courtesy card but cited a relationship to a law enforcement officer and was able to evade any consequences, even for serious motor vehicle violations. In one stop, a driver was speeding 103 miles per hour. The trooper released her after she said her father was a lieutenant. Another motorist, stopped for tailgating, speeding, and

driving over the median in a tunnel, was released promptly after he cited a friendship with a law enforcement officer.

● Many active duty law enforcement officers were observed using their official government position to get out of a ticket. Some volunteered that they were law enforcement, some flashed badges, and in one instance, a trooper sitting in the back seat of a car offered up his badge number.

● Troopers’ decisions to grant preferential treatment to motorists who have courtesy cards or asserted close personal relationships with law enforcement seem to be having a discriminatory impact. White motorists were more likely to hold a courtesy card or assert a relationship to law enforcement. Of the 87 courtesy cards observed in the sample, for instance, 69 were presented by White drivers, while Black, Hispanic/LatinX, Asian, and other drivers presented a combined 18 courtesy cards.

● NJSP policy requires troopers to request and review driving credentials (driver’s license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance) for all stopped drivers. Yet, drivers without courtesy cards or a close relationship with law enforcement were more likely to have all three driving credentials requested and verified by the trooper, more likely to have the trooper take the extra step of conducting a full motor vehicle lookup in the computer, and more likely to be given some form of a warning.

● An overall analysis of the full sample revealed racial disparities that went beyond courtesy cards. White and Asian drivers were less likely to have all three of their credentials requested and verified when compared to Black and Hispanic/LatinX drivers. And Hispanic/LatinX drivers who were stopped were generally subjected to a more thorough computerized lookup. Most striking, troopers conducted computerized lookups of Hispanic/LatinX drivers 65 percent of the time, while looking up White drivers only 34 percent of the time.

● Out of the 501 stops that resulted in no enforcement, 232 related to speeding. At least 80 of those stops were for 20 or more miles per hour over the speed limit. Speeding is one of the common causes of traffic fatalities.

In short, this two-tiered system of justice that provides differing treatment for those with law enforcement connections and those without is unethical, discriminatory, and fundamentally unfair. It also contributes to making New Jersey roads less safe. Traffic fatalities on New Jersey roads continue to rise, with fatal crashes at the end of November 2024 already well surpassing the number of fatal crashes from the prior year. Impaired driving and speeding are some of the leading causes of accidents. Millions of public dollars are allocated to law enforcement agencies throughout the state to prioritize safety

initiatives and adherence to traffic laws. Yet for some drivers, these priorities do not seem to apply.

For these reasons, and those set forth in more detail below, OSC makes 11 recommendations and has also made appropriate referrals. OSC’s findings also make clear that regular review of no enforcement stops could provide valuable insight into officer discretion and also could reveal why particular data trends persist, highlight the need for training or retraining and updates to policies, and ensure that the motor vehicle laws are being enforced fairly and equitably. While some of the drivers in this sample had courtesy cards or asserted relationships to law enforcement, many did not, and yet still avoided any consequences for often serious violations.

Trenton: New Jersey Office of the State Comptroller, 2024. 38p.

By Lara Trautman

Long a bit player in the growing movement to reimagine the criminal justice system, prosecutors are finally entering the spotlight. Leveraging the tremendous authority of the office, they have begun to reshape the flow of criminal cases and nudge outcomes in a more productive direction. These early successes, however, should not obscure a broader truth: they cannot do it alone. Prosecutorial efforts can only realize their lofty potential for positive change with the active and enduring support of state legislatures. With unparalleled power over everything from charging decisions to plea bargaining, it may seem as though prosecutors could bend the justice system to their will without any assistance. Yet, the reality is much more complicated. For example, expansive charging and pretrial decision-making is relatively ineffective without the provision of strong alternatives to traditional prosecutorial pathways. Likewise, low funding can stymie individualized consideration of cases while poor data collection can get in the way of evidence-based policy. And here is where the legislature can and must step in. Only they have the power to remove many of these external roadblocks to constructive and beneficial prosecutorial action. Rewriting the law and adjusting appropriations can ensure that prosecutors have the tools, authority and discretion necessary to transform prosecution. Accordingly, this brief is offered as a guide for those legislators who wish to become allies in the prosecutor-driven reform movement by proposing specific actions legislatures can take to support prosecutors who are attempting to improve the criminal justice system in their jurisdictions

R STREET SHORTS NO. 88 April 2020

Washington, DC: R Street, 2020. 5p.

By Lars Trautman

As defined by convictions, sentence lengths, and the relentless enforcement of the law, for decades, conservatives have prized “toughness” above all other attributes in assessing a prosecutor’s worth. Indeed, until recently, this same mindset permeated conservatives’ approach to nearly every other aspect of the criminal justice system. But then something interesting happened. Starting in Texas and quickly spreading to other “red” states and beyond, conservatives began to realize that mentality actually undermined the very goals they were pursuing. From public safety to fiscal probity, individual liberty to human dignity, a “smart on crime” approach that addressed underlying causes of crime proved better able to deliver than the old status quo that all too often relied on incarceration as the antidote to societal ills. Reform has followed in nearly every state2 and even managed to pass a notoriously divided Congress. The legislative focus of these conservative efforts to date, however, belies the intrinsically local nature of criminal justice. The fates of the overwhelming majority of individuals who come into contact with the criminal justice system are determined by a collection of county, town and city officials. Perhaps foremost among these is the local district attorney. After all, while a judge may act as the king in his court, only the district attorney has the ability to influence criminal proceedings in every single courtroom across her jurisdiction. The district attorney’s office is thus a natural channel for new criminal justice ideas. This realization has helped to propel a growing movement on the political left to elect “progressive prosecutors” who wield the broad powers of the office to further liberal criminal justice goals relating to decarceration and racial justice, among others.5 Plaudits have come from all corners for many of these efforts6 and the result is a coherent narrative around what it means to be a liberal-minded prosecutor in the twenty-first century. Of course, plenty of reasonable and just prosecutors have no aspirations to ever wear the “progressive” label, nor would their constituents want them to. This raises two related questions for prosecutors who reject this progressive mold, yet nevertheless yearn to be smarter and more even-handed than their predecessors: can the disruption of traditional prosecutorial practices align with a more conservative worldview and what does the center-right path toward more fair and effective prosecution look like? The answer is that a conservative prosecutor can and should challenge current prosecutorial practices by striving to become a more productive prosecutor in the broader sense of the term. This means ensuring that every prosecutorial decision is productive insofar as it produces an outcome that actually improves community wellbeing. It requires a subtle understanding that a charge, conviction or sentence is not itself the outcome, merely a factor building toward one that includes a safer community and rehabilitated defendant. Ultimately, trading a penchant for tough prosecutors for those who are productive in this manner will allow conservatives to forge a more constructive prosecutorial identity that does a better job of efficiently pursuing justice and keeping their communities secure and whole

R STREET POLICY STUDY NO. 193 January 2020

Washington, DC: R Street, 2020. 6p.

By Lars Trautman and Jonathan Haggerty

Handcuffs close about a person’s wrists and the few, simple words “you are under arrest” are spoken as the individual is placed in the back of a police car. It is a scene that plays out once every three seconds in the United States and sets into motion a criminal process that exhibits at times all of the control and potential for damage of a runaway locomotive. Indeed, regardless of whether a murder indictment or an ordinance violation spurred the arrest, the immediate aftermath is the same. The individual loses their freedom and gains a new entry in their criminal history, while the officer must spend hours transporting and processing the individual with the specter of additional court time hanging over the future. And, while arrest is warranted for many of the more serious transgressions, it is an ill-fitting and disproportionate response to myriad other situations. Yet, traditionally, the only other option officially available to officers is to do nothing.

The shortcomings of this approach have not been lost on many law enforcement leaders and other crisis first responders, and in recent years, police departments from Seattle, Washington to Gloucester, Massachusetts have instituted new strategies and initiatives meant to break this old paradigm and present their officers with options beyond the binary choice to arrest or take no action. Operating under a variety of labels that usually reference ‘diversion’ in some form, these efforts have ranged from actively searching out vulnerable members of the community and connecting them with services to de-escalating potentially criminal encounters through citations or treatment opportunities. Often, it has meant law enforcement officers working in concert with other first responders; in some instances, non-law enforcement personnel may direct a response themselves—indeed, for crises without a criminal justice component, this can represent the optimal response. It has also involved turning to a set of independent crisis response procedures, such as protective custody or citations in lieu of arrest, that entail a noncriminal or deescalated enforcement response and can operate as part—or instead—of a more comprehensive diversion program. Although these strategies are often locally designed and implemented, they do not operate in a legal or political vacuum. Instead, localities are subject to a web of state laws and regulations that directly bear on their ability to institute pre-arrest diversion and other crisis response strategies effectively. Laws that grant local officials noncriminal responses to crises can propel diversion efforts or provide alternative, supplemental crisis responses. Laws that require criminal responses or otherwise circumscribe when and how non-law enforcement responders are able to intervene can impede them. In light of this, the present study dives into these problems by reviewing and analyzing the primary statewide barriers to and accelerants of pre-arrest diversion and crisis response strategies. It begins by providing an overview of pre-arrest diversion strategies. It then delves into five categories of law or regulation that most directly affect these strategies and often serve as the basis of fully-fledged crisis responses in their own right: emergency mental health hold laws, protective custody statutes, citation authority, substance abuse Good Samaritan laws and ambulance transport destination rules.

R STREET POLICY STUDY NO. 187 November 2019

Washington, DC: R Street, 2019. 34p.

By SteVon Felton

The 1991 beating of Rodney King and the subsequent acquittal of the Los Angeles police officers responsible for the attack sparked massive riots and protests across the nation. Following an investigation by the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Civil Rights Division, Congress granted the attorney general the power to investigate “a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers that violates Constitutional or federal rights.” In cases of a proven pattern or practice of police misconduct, the court may use a federal, court-enforced order, known as a consent decree, as a mechanism to force police departments to address institutional failures. Under such orders, a law enforcement agency and the Justice Department, overseen by an independent monitor, negotiate and establish concrete benchmarks to determine which reforms will constitute the successful end of the decree. Since the first consent decree in 1994, the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department has conducted over 65 investigations and entered into 40 reform agreements with police departments across the country. According to the Division, these negotiations are most effective when they can “ensure accountability, transparency and the flexibility to accomplish complex institutional reforms.” Indeed, a number of studies have now confirmed that consent decrees helped resolve management and oversight issues in cities such as Pittsburgh, Los Angeles and Cincinnati.4 However, while federal consent decrees have their place in promoting systemic policy change, they consistently fail to effect local and cultural change within departments. Several factors contribute to this phenomenon. For starters, as is often the case, centralized models like federal consent decrees cannot adequately adjust to localized systems of knowledge and regional distinctions between departments. Because they target local governments rather than individuals, the reform agreements reached by the DOJ and local law enforcement agencies often fail to sustain cultural change.5 Moreover, within some police departments, consent decrees lack the very thing that is perhaps most important to their success—the support of officers. Without buy-in from individual officers, police departments often disregard best practices that they view as externally forced upon them. And because policing is a profession that allows substantial discretion, in some departments officers openly ignore state and federal policies.6 Given the localized nature of police-citizen interactions, a top-down approach to police reform is virtually guaranteed to be unsuccessful. In light of these failures, the New Orleans Police Department’s Ethical Policing is Courageous (EPIC) program provides an alternative structure that begins with officers’ localized knowledge level and ends with systemic change. By allowing officers to police themselves, EPIC utilizes them and their experiences as resources to promote meaningful change

R STREET SHORTS NO. 70 April 2019

Washington, DC: R Street, 2019. 5p.

By The New Jersey Office of the State Comptroller (OSC)

The New Jersey Office of the State Comptroller (OSC) examined over 500 motor vehicle stops conducted by New Jersey State Police (NJSP) that ended with no enforcement. OSC looked at body-worn camera footage of stops that are rarely, if ever, watched—stops where tickets were not given, arrests were not made, and no one was even ordered to exit their vehicle. Most of the traffic stops OSC reviewed started with the trooper briefly explaining the reason for the stop and requesting a driver’s license, registration, and insurance. But in more than one out of four stops reviewed, the motorist presented a courtesy card, asserted a personal relationship with a law enforcement officer, or even flashed a law enforcement badge. When that happened, the side-of-the-road interactions between the motorists and the stopping troopers shifted, and in some cases, shifted dramatically.

Sometimes, the motorist boldly handed over a courtesy card, occasionally in lieu of driving credentials, and the stop resolved relatively quickly with the trooper offering some version of “you’re good.” Other times, a driver volunteered “my dad is a lieutenant” or “my best friend works at [insert name of any law enforcement agency]” and received remarkably solicitous treatment from the trooper. This was the case even when the drivers were stopped for dangerous traffic infractions, such as driving more than 100 miles per hour or suspected drunk driving. The most serious consequence the troopers imposed in these stops was advising the motorists that they left a voicemail message for the law enforcement officer named on the courtesy card or invoked as a friend or relative. In one instance of suspected drunk driving, the trooper also warned the driver to “stay off my highway,” after reminding him how bad things would be if he crashed under the circumstances.

OSC’s Police Accountability Project initiated this investigation in response to multiple reports that New Jersey law enforcement officers’ exercise of discretion in motor vehicle stops is often influenced by improper factors, such as courtesy cards given to or purchased by motorists. OSC reviewed more than 3,000 minutes of body-worn camera footage, which included 501 traffic stops conducted by a sample of NJSP troopers over a ten-day period in late 2022. In doing so, OSC found evidence of a two-tiered system in which motorists with ties to law enforcement—no matter how tenuous—were given preferential treatment.

Among the findings:

Courtesy cards—which are given out by police labor associations and sold by private companies online—appear to be in wide usage and function as accepted currency. Of the 501 stops OSC reviewed, 87 motorists presented courtesy cards which came from municipal police departments, county and state agencies, as well as inter-state and out-of-state law enforcement agencies. They all appeared to be equally effective at getting motorists released without enforcement.

Motorists who asserted personal relationships with law enforcement have similarly strong social capital that often has the same effect as a courtesy card. In ten percent of the stops, the motorist did not present a courtesy card but cited a relationship to a law enforcement officer and was able to evade any consequences, even for serious motor vehicle violations. In one stop, a driver was speeding 103 miles per hour. The trooper released her after she said her father was a lieutenant. Another motorist, stopped for tailgating, speeding, and driving over the median in a tunnel, was released promptly after he cited a friendship with a law enforcement officer.

Many active duty law enforcement officers were observed using their official government position to get out of a ticket. Some volunteered that they were law enforcement, some flashed badges, and in one instance, a trooper sitting in the back seat of a car offered up his badge number.

Troopers’ decisions to grant preferential treatment to motorists who have courtesy cards or asserted close personal relationships with law enforcement seem to be having a discriminatory impact. White motorists were more likely to hold a courtesy card or assert a relationship to law enforcement. Of the 87 courtesy cards observed in the sample, for instance, 69 were presented by White drivers, while Black, Hispanic/LatinX, Asian, and other drivers presented a combined 18 courtesy cards.

NJSP policy requires troopers to request and review driving credentials (driver’s license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance) for all stopped drivers. Yet, drivers without courtesy cards or a close relationship with law enforcement were more likely to have all three driving credentials requested and verified by the trooper, more likely to have the trooper take the extra step of conducting a full motor vehicle lookup in the computer, and more likely to be given some form of a warning.

An overall analysis of the full sample revealed racial disparities that went beyond courtesy cards. White and Asian drivers were less likely to have all three of their credentials requested and verified when compared to Black and Hispanic/LatinX drivers. And Hispanic/LatinX drivers who were stopped were generally subjected to a more thorough computerized lookup. Most striking, troopers conducted computerized lookups of Hispanic/LatinX drivers 65 percent of the time, while looking up White drivers only 34 percent of the time.

Out of the 501 stops that resulted in no enforcement, 232 related to speeding. At least 80 of those stops were for 20 or more miles per hour over the speed limit. Speeding is one of the common causes of traffic fatalities.

In short, this two-tiered system of justice that provides differing treatment for those with law enforcement connections and those without is unethical, discriminatory, and fundamentally unfair. It also contributes to making New Jersey roads less safe. Traffic fatalities on New Jersey roads continue to rise, with fatal crashes at the end of November 2024 already well surpassing the number of fatal crashes from the prior year. Impaired driving and speeding are some of the leading causes of accidents. Millions of public dollars are allocated to law enforcement agencies throughout the state to prioritize safety initiatives and adherence to traffic laws. Yet for some drivers, these priorities do not seem to apply.

For these reasons, and those set forth in more detail below, OSC makes 11 recommendations and has also made appropriate referrals. OSC’s findings also make clear that regular review of no enforcement stops could provide valuable insight into officer discretion and also could reveal why particular data trends persist, highlight the need for training or retraining and updates to policies, and ensure that the motor vehicle laws are being enforced fairly and equitably. While some of the drivers in this sample had courtesy cards or asserted relationships to law enforcement, many did not, and yet still avoided any consequences for often serious violations.

Trenton: New Jersey Office of the State Comptroller, 2024. 38p.

By Susan Olzak

Though it has had a long history, the recent social movement aimed at stopping police violence against minorities has consistently endorsed policies designed to make police conduct more accountable. This paper analyzes the effects of protest in cities on the establishment of Citizen Review Boards (CRBs) in recent decades. It also examines whether or not the presence of a CRB influences subsequent rates of police-involved fatalities in cities.

Preprint, 2020.

By Sophia Hunt, Claudia Nmai, and Matthew Clair

This report summarizes perceptions of policing among a racially and socio-economically diverse sample of 37 people who faced criminal charges in the Hall of Justice, a courthouse in San Jose, California, between August 2021 and March 2022. A majority of criminal defendants we interviewed reported negative perceptions of personal police treatment, but a considerable minority reported positive perceptions. Among those who reported negative perceptions, two criticisms were common: (1) individual police officers’ violence, abuse, and fabrication of evidence; and (2) systemic policing practices that are overly intrusive and estrange certain disfavored groups in the Bay Area, such as the unhoused. Among those who reported positive perceptions, some believe that, despite their personal experiences of positive treatment, police do not treat everyone fairly and policing quality varies by context and the race of the policed person. Alongside these perceptions, a handful of defendants in the sample offered visions for changing policing. Two notable visions were: (1) reallocating resources from police departments toward other city services or under-resourced groups; and (2) reforming police departments in ways that reduce discrimination and abuse. While we discuss variation along demographic characteristics in our sample, we foreground how the range of experiences and visions of policing in San Jose have implications for policymakers and future research.

Court Listening Project, Report no. 1. Court Listening Project ((c/o Matthew Clair, Stanford University) 2022, 15p.

By John Bansemer, Greg Rattray and Franklin Lee

The R Street Institute has conducted a study of the challenges associated with improving state and municipal responses to cyber attacks. This study leverages existing reports, interviews with defenders at the state and municipal level, experts studying these challenges, as well as workshops conducted in conjunction with the New York Cyber Task Force. It describes the shape of the challenges and offers recommendations for action to improve state and municipal cyber response capabilities. Further, understanding the associated challenges and extending the work on the recommendations within this report requires significant follow-on efforts. This report seeks to engage and assist those on the front line—governors, mayors, personnel, and state and local governmental organizations. While the federal government and the private sector play key roles, they were not the specific focus of this study

R STREET POLICY STUDY NO. 229 May 2021, 13p.

By Lars Trautman and Camille Infantolino

As with so many facets of American life, the arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic hit the criminal justice system like a tsunami, upending existing practices and forcing leaders to rapidly consider new approaches. The fast-spreading, deadly contagion added new urgency to long-festering issues, especially the problems associated with the sheer number of individuals contained within and processed through the system. To protect those working within jails and prisons or those facing the prospect of becoming confined, jurisdictions adopted new policies to reduce the number of individuals entering the system altogether, or at least its correctional facilities. One of the primary ways in which jurisdictions grappled with that priority was by instituting new alternatives to arrest. Across the country, jurisdictions expanded citations in lieu of arrest, deprioritized police stops for minor transgressions, and changed how they received and responded to certain civilian complaints. In each of these instances, the policy shifts suited the COVID-19 situation especially well because of their propensity to reduce unnecessary human contact, particularly in close quarters. Of course, whether jurisdictions retain and even expand these measures, or whether additional jurisdictions follow suit, will depend on more than simply their immediate health benefits. In addition to considering how well the policies lived up to their promises of saving resources, avoiding unproductive police encounters and reducing government interference in individuals’ lives, local authorities will have to weigh the political and public reaction to their introduction. Indeed, one obstacle to alternatives to arrest that has existed since long before the pandemic is fear about how the public will respond to their adoption. Accordingly, the present brief addresses some of these concerns by delving into COVID-19- inspired shifts in alternatives-to-arrest policy and examines how these changes were received in the popular press.

R STREET SHORTS NO. 98 December 2020, 4p.

By Matthew B. Ross

 1. Introduction In November 2021, the New Jersey Attorney General’s Office of Public Integrity and Accountability (NJOPIA) engaged the author of this study for the purpose of conducting an independent analysis of traffic stops made by the New Jersey State Police (NJ-SP). Based on the author’s extensive experience working with state and local policymakers to develop early warning systems for identifying police disparities, the NJ OPIA requested that the analysis focus on the central question of whether there was disparate treatment on the part of NJ-SP towards racial and ethnic minorities.2 After cleaning and linking all of the raw data provided by the New Jersey Office of Law Enforcement Professional Standards (NJ-OLEPS), the analytical sample used in this analysis consisted of 6,177,109 traffic stops made by NJ-SP from 2009 to 2021. In the full analytical sample, 60.52 percent of traffic stops were made of White non-Hispanic motorists while 18.8 percent were Black/African-American and 13.44 percent were Hispanic/Latinx. The overall volume of minority motorists stopped by NJ-SP increased from 35.34 percent in 2009 to 46.28 percent in 2021. The overarching finding from the analysis of the NJ-SP data from 2009-21 is that there was extremely strong evidence of a large and persistent disparity both is the decision to stop as well as the decision to engage in post-stop enforcement like search, vehicular exits, use of force, and arrest. In general, the results were estimated with a very high degree of statistical confidence, survived multiple robustness tests, and were found across most years and troops/stations. In the opinion of this study’s author, these disparities represent strong empirical evidence that NJ-SP is engaged in enforcement practices that result in adverse treatment towards minority motorists. Following best practices, this study applies an ensemble of the most reliable statistical tests available in the scientific literature. The intuition of this approach is that the shortcomings of any individual test are overcome by the totality of the evidence produced by a multitude of tests examining a broad set of enforcement outcomes.

Boston: Northeastern University, 2023. 44p.

By Matthew B. Ross, Jesse J. Kalinowski, Kenneth Barone

Connecticut’s novel approach to collecting and analyz-ing traffic stop data for evidence of disparate treatment is widely considered to be a model of best practice. Here,we provide an overview of Connecticut’s framework,detail solutions to the canonical empirical challenges of analyzing traffic stops, and describe a data-driven approach to early intervention. Unlike most juris-dictions that simply produce an annual traffic stop report, Connecticut has developed an ongoing system for identifying and mitigating disparity. Connecticut's Framework for identifying significant disparities on an annual basis relies on the so-called “preponderance ofevidence” approach. Drawing from the cutting-edge of the empirical social science literature, this approach applies several, as opposed to a single, rigorous empiri-cal test of disparity. For departments identified as having a disparity, Connecticut has developed a process for intervening on an annual basis. In that process, police administrators engage with researchers to conduct an empirical exploration into possible contributing factors and enforcement policies. In Connecticut, this approach has transformed what had once been a war of anecdotes into a constructive data-driven conversation about policy. Variants of the Connecticut Model have recently been adopted by the State of Rhode Island, Oregon, and California. Connecticut’s approach provides a useful model and policy framework for states and localities conducting disparity studies of police traffic stops

Criminology & Public Policy. 2020;19 pages:1289–1303.

By Madison, Wisconsin Police Department

  In August 2023, Madison City Council passed a resolution authorizing the Implementation of the Body-Worn Camera Experiment Program. The resolution included multiple attachments that provide a history of the body worn cameras (BWC), feasibility reports, example policy, public comments, Alder amendments, legal review, and Chief Barnes’ memo requesting approval to conduct the experiment. The resolution represents a culmination of several years of effort by city residents, staff and alders. The experiment program consisted of technology, research and cost estimates. The technology portion began April 1, 2024, and was completed July 14. The BWC units were worn by officers in the North District. The first two weeks consisted of setting up and assigning units to officers, testing, and training. The use of body worn cameras began in the field on April 15. The BWC units were loaned by MPD’s existing dash camera vendor for the duration of experiment. The research was conducted by an outside researcher; Dr. Broderick Turner at Virginia Tech. Police Director Eleazer Hunt and members of the BWC Committee met with Dr. Turner multiple times to identify needed data and survey questions. This report includes Dr. Turner’s findings (Appendix A) and a budget estimate for implementation (Appendix B). Estimates are based on full deployment of BWC across MPD, the acquisition of hardware, operations/storage needs, peripherals, personnel, and support several years of operation. During the experiment, an interim Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) guided the use of BWC (Appendix C). This SOP is informed by the Police Body-Worn Camera Feasibility Review Committee, MPD’s current SOP for dash cameras and audio microphones , and a review of model policies developed by the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the U.S. Department of Justice. Findings from the experiment: 1- Officers did not change behavior while wearing a BWC 2- Charges were not added when officers reviewed video 3- Technical issues related to battery life and uploading video were evident in the first half of the experiment and resolved 4- Specific situational use of BWC required clarification of the SOP 5- The limitations of the experiment included a short duration, a small number of officers participated, there was limited time for analysis (interviews), and no post-experiment analysis 6- BWC may help with trust building, legitimacy, and transparency  7- Public Records requests impacted staff time to research, redact, and provide videos to requestors  

Madison, WI: City Police Department, 2024. 47p.

By Holly Bird, Jodie Bradshaw, Roger Grimshaw, Habib Kadiri and Helen Mills

The Labour government came into office earlier this year, with an ambitious ‘aim to halve knife crime in a decade’. Early moves have included, in September, the launch of a ‘Coalition to Tackle Knife Crime’, aiming, as the press release put it, to ‘bring together campaign groups, families of people who have tragically lost their lives to knife crime, young people who have been impacted and community leaders, united in their mission to save lives and make Britain a safer place for the next generation’. This was followed, in November, with proposals to fine senior executives of online companies if they market illegal weapons, along with moves to ban the sale of so-called ninja swords. The government is also proposing both ‘rapid intervention and tough consequences’ for those caught in possession of a knife and a network of ‘Young Futures hubs’, to improve access to support for young people at risk of criminalisation. The second of these proposals, which prioritise prevention and support for young people at risk, has a strong evidence-based underpinning it. ‘Decades of research and evidence gathering’, this briefing points out, ‘has shown that the drivers of serious violence are insecure employment prospects, poverty, substance misuse, mental health issues, volatile drug markets, experience of violence’. The same cannot be said of the ‘rapid intervention and tough consequences’ proposals, which tend to prioritise often short-term enforcement over longer-term prevention. One recent example of such action, the subject of this briefing, is the Serious Violence Reduction Order (SVRO), currently being piloted in four police areas in England. At its simplest, the imposition of an SVRO on an individual in effect gives the police carte blanche to stop and search them, at any time and in any place, and without the police having to demonstrate ‘reasonable suspicion’. Previous research on so-called suspicion-less stops and searches, cited in this briefing, found no evidence that they had any impact on the levels of violent crime. Indeed, there is scant evidence that stop and search in general has much of an impact on underlying crime levels (Bradford and Tiratelli, 2019). This is not an argument for no police enforcement. The police clearly perform important public order functions. But it is an argument for the importance of effective, evidenced-based policing. The roll-out of the SVRO pilots are shrouded in secrecy, with information hard to come by. While they are subject of an evaluation, there are some questions over whether it will provide the rigorous evidence of impact (or not) required, or, indeed, whether it will ever be published.

London: Centre for Crime and Justice Studies , 2024. 18p.