By David J. Knight and Vesla M. Weaver

This review integrates recent scholarship outside of criminology with primary source material from a broadened source base to trace underappreciated histories of political struggle to secure safety and address harm in Black communities. Much of the existing literature in criminology and related social science fields tends to overlook bottom-up sources and the creative safety practices and sites of safety provision that exist and, in so doing, contributes to a lopsided empirical narrative of policing in the United States. This review, however, highlights the centrality of Black-led political mobilization, formal and informal, to articulating alternate visions of safety beyond policing and building alternate structures to transform the legal system and challenge racial criminalization. Examples include community patrols, the efforts of Black police to confront violence in their own departments and stand up structures of responsiveness, and national campaigns to challenge punitive legislation and offer alternatives. Unearthing these often marginalized and misrecognized histories and sources of Black-led struggle for community safety enables an analysis of not only the forms that community-led practices and interventions can take but also the ongoing state-produced conditions—referred to in this review as safety deprivation—that give rise to them. More broadly, this review uses these histories as a lens through which to consider how empirical narratives of policing and safety are transformed when community-derived, bottom-up knowledge sources are accounted for both substantively and methodologically and offers the field a guide of available databases.

Annu. Rev. Criminol. 2025. 8:25–52

By The Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services

The Community Policing Act of 2020 (HB 1250; “the Act") mandated that the Virginia State Police (VSP) and other state and local law enforcement agencies, including police departments (PDs) and sheriff’s offices (SOs), begin collecting and reporting data on traffic stops as of July 1, 2020. State law enforcement agencies, PDs, and SOs are required to collect data on the race, ethnicity, and other characteristics of the drivers stopped, and on other circumstances of the stop such as the reason for the stop, whether any individuals or vehicles were searched, and the outcome of the stop (arrest, citation, warning, etc.). All reporting agencies are to submit this data to VSP, who maintain the data in the Community Policing Database.

The Act also mandated that the Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) periodically obtain data from the Community Policing Database and produce an annual report “for the purposes of analyzing the data to determine the existence and prevalence of the practice of bias-based profiling and the prevalence of complaints alleging the use of excessive force." Such reports shall be produced and published by July 1 of each year.

This is the third of these reports from DCJS. It contains a review of how the data was collected and analyzed as well as preliminary findings of data from 650,387 traffic stops reported in Virginia during the nine-month period between July 1, 2022, and March 31, 2023. This report also presents the findings from analyses of statewide data; aggregated data from the seven VSP Divisions; and data from each individual law enforcement agency that reported sufficient data to the Community Policing Database.

The information presented in this report is preliminary and should be interpreted with caution. Although this analysis identified disparities in traffic stop rates related to race/ethnicity, it does not allow us to determine or measure specific reasons for these disparities. Most importantly for this study, this analysis does not allow us to determine the extent to which these disparities may or may not be due to bias-based profiling or to other factors that can vary depending on race or ethnicity. These other factors include differences in locations where police focus their patrol activities, differences in underlying regional populations, differences in driving patterns among individuals, and the lack of a scientifically established baseline for determining the number of drivers in each racial/ethnic group who are on the road and subject to being stopped while driving.

The analysis of racial disparity is a complex field with a vast array of potential contributing factors. Many data elements could play influential roles in racial/ethnic patterns of traffic enforcement but are unavailable to DCJS. Factors like the race of the officer performing the stop, agency policies and community priorities driving enforcement patterns, police report narratives outlining legal justifications for stop, search, and arrest can all inform stop patterns but are not within the current purview of available Community Policing Act data. Additionally, the data presented in this report cannot reflect any stop trends from agencies which did not provide data or records that were excluded for completeness issues. As such, while the report presents stop, search, and arrest disparities based on the available data, they should not be construed as complete and final proof of disparity OR any explanation of contributing factors which drive genuine disparities which may exist.

This report does not tabulate the many positive actions that can occur for a traffic stop such as seizures of guns, confiscation of drugs, and ensuring valid and current drivers’ licenses. The Community Policing Act imposes narrow requirements for data collection and analysis, and any benefits of traffic or pedestrian stops are not within the scope of the law.

While DCJS and VSP have introduced process improvements based on lessons learned in past reporting, the Community Policing Act is still in the early stages of implementation. More and better data, as noted in the recommendations, is needed to make the observations in this report more than directional, and the costs of such data gathering need further evaluation. As the report notes, many PDs and SOs − especially smaller agencies with limited resources − continue to face challenges establishing the data collection and reporting required under the Act. The majority of local law enforcement agencies (LEAs) in Virginia (255, or 74%) employ 50 or fewer sworn officers, including 118 (or 34%) employing 10 or fewer sworn officers. Many of these agencies have faced challenges fulfilling all requirements imposed by the Act and aligning their collection practices with the changes introduced since first implementation of the Act. For this reason, some agencies were unable to report complete data responsive to the Community Policing Act for the entire year, and in some cases the quality of the data was limited. Additionally, a substantial number of smaller agencies reported so few traffic stops that it was not possible to interpret data related to driver race/ethnicity. The state may wish to consider providing additional resources to LEAs, particularly smaller agencies, to support their ability to comply with the data-related provisions of the Act.

Another important limitation to the data and findings presented in this report relates to the race/ethnicity data in the Community Policing Database itself. Because the state lacks a standardized mechanism for reporting the race or ethnicity of a given driver, law enforcement officers must either make their own determination about a driver’s race/ethnicity (which may or may not be accurate) or ask for that information in the course of the traffic stop, which could raise constitutional concerns or escalate the perception of conflict in certain situations. Virginia does not collect and store information about a driver’s race/ethnicity, whether in driver-related databases maintained by the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles or on individual driver’s licenses. Whether and to what extent the data related to driver race/ethnicity in the Community Policing Database accurately captures this information cannot be determined without further review.

The factors described above limited the ability of DCJS staff to conduct any complex statistical analysis of the data or to draw any firm conclusions about the existence and prevalence of the practice of bias-based profiling in a given agency or jurisdiction. It is anticipated that the reporting, analysis, and interpretation of Community Policing Act data will improve in the future as the program matures.

Richmond: Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, 2021. 73p.

By The College of Policing (UK)

The government’s Safer Streets mission aims to reduce serious harm and increase public confidence in policing and the wider criminal justice system. This guide supports senior police leaders and police and crime commissioners to help achieve this mission. It clearly sets out the best available evidence on public confidence in the police, as well as the policing activities that are most likely to have an impact. „ Implementing neighbourhood policing – Having a targeted visible presence in crime and anti-social behaviour hot spots or places with low trust. – Community engagement to identify the crime and anti-social behaviour issues that matter to people locally. – Carrying out effective problem-solving to tackle the issues that matter the most to local people. „ Policing with procedural and distributive justice – Making fair decisions and treating people respectfully. – Not being seen to over-police and under-protect communities. „ Improving police contact with victims – Responding to the needs and concerns of victims. – Focusing as much on the process as the end result. „ Improving police contact with suspects – Minimising the number of negative experiences. – Explaining enforcement action and preserving people’s dignity. „ Tackling police wrongdoing – Working within the law and adhering to ethical and professional standards. The guide begins by providing key definitions and trends in public perceptions over the past 20 years. It ends with a summary of what else may be important to public confidence in the police.

Coventry, UK: College of Policing Limited (2025) 23p.

By The United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division and United States Attorney’s Offices Eastern, Middle, and Western Districts of Louisiana

On the evening of May 10, 2019, near Monroe, Louisiana, a Louisiana State Police trooper tried to stop a 49-year-old Black man named Ronald Greene for speeding and running a red light. Mr. Greene drove away. For 14 minutes, officers pursued him until he lost control of his vehicle, crashing on the side of the road. According to a sergeant that LSP regarded as its in-house use-of-force expert, what happened in the ensuing hours, weeks, and months was a “catastrophic failure in a million different directions.” Multiple LSP troopers and sheriff’s deputies arrived at the scene of the crash. They tased Mr. Greene repeatedly and pulled him out of his car. They punched him, dragged him by ankle shackles, and left him face down in the road. When Mr. Greene tried to roll onto his side, a trooper put his foot on Mr. Greene’s buttocks to hold him down on his stomach. That trooper later told a supervisor, “I’m trying to keep him laying down. I was going to sit him up, but I don’t want him spitting blood all over us.” Mr. Greene pleaded, “I’m scared. I’m your brother. I’m scared.” The LSP troopers deactivated or muted their body-worn cameras. When a supervisor arrived, he casually stepped over Mr. Greene, who laid moaning on the ground, and instead asked the troopers if they were ok. None of the troopers rendered aid to Mr. Greene, who became unresponsive and died before he reached the hospital. After Mr. Greene died, troopers filed reports attributing his death to a car accident. “We investigate crashes every day,” one trooper later told us. “No way someone died from a car crash with that damage.” One trooper who was there misdated the incident in an official report. LSP’s designated use-of-force expert at the time believed that was a deliberate attempt to cover up the incident. Another trooper miscategorized camera footage in LSP’s systems. And the supervisor who stepped over Mr. Greene’s body that night signed off on all the use-of-force reports. Over 15 months passed before LSP opened an Internal Affairs investigation into Mr. Greene’s death. In the intervening days and months, LSP troopers—including one involved in Mr. Greene’s death—would go on to assault more drivers. It was not until September 2020, 16 months after the incident, that LSP fired one of the troopers involved. It would take until 2021 for LSP to suspend a second trooper and fire a third who was involved in both Mr. Greene’s death and an assault of a different Black man. Mr. Greene’s death and its aftermath demonstrated serious failures at LSP—excessive force, improper supervision, ineffective training, and breakdowns in accountability. As our civil pattern or practice investigation revealed, these failures were not isolated, but part of a larger pattern or practice of law enforcement conduct that deprives people in Louisiana of their rights under the Constitution.

Following a comprehensive investigation, the Department of Justice has reasonable cause to believe that the Louisiana State Police engage in a statewide pattern or practice of using excessive force, which violates the Fourth Amendment. Our investigation, opened in 2022, also included examining whether LSP engages in racially discriminatory policing. At this time, we make findings only as to excessive force. Though this investigation reveals systemic problems, we recognize that most LSP troopers work hard to keep the public safe. We commend LSP troopers and staff who devote their professional lives to serving the community. LSP began making much-needed reforms after video of Mr. Greene’s death became public in 2021, two years after the incident. We believe those changes may have contributed to some recent improvements in use-of-force practices. The changes include revising LSP’s use-of-force policy, creating a Force Investigation Unit to investigate serious uses of force, and updating training programs. However, more reforms are needed to remedy the unlawful conduct we found. We describe recommended changes at the end of this report. We hope to work constructively with the State and LSP to implement these reforms.

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, 2025. 32p.

By Jillian Long

Incidents of police-involved shootings resulting in the death of unarmed civilians, such as Andre Hill in 2020, Bijan Ghaisar in 2017, and Michael Brown in 2014, have raised concerns about law enforcement use of deadly force, particularly involving firearms. In light of these concerns, growing attention has been paid to less-than-lethal weapons (LLWs) and the role LLWs may play in providing law enforcement officers alternatives to the use of deadly force.

A multitude of weapons marketed as less-than-lethal alternatives to firearms are currently in use by federal, state, and local law enforcement, including batons, pepper sprays, and stun guns. There are also a number of LLWs in development, such as unmanned aircraft systems (drones) equipped with tear gas, rubber bullets, and TASERs.

Some observers contend that LLWs offer the possibility of minimizing risk of death and serious injury to citizens and officers while simultaneously providing law enforcement with effective tools to incapacitate violent or noncompliant persons. Nevertheless, there is evidence that LLWs may present a number of potential health risks, lending credence to arguments that LLWs are less-than-lethal in name, but, depending on the circumstances of their use, can be lethal in practice. For example, a team of journalists led by the Associated Press, in collaboration with the Howard Center for Investigative Journalism programs at the University of Maryland and Arizona State University, documented over 1,000 deaths that followed local and state police officers’ use of less-than-lethal force from 2012 to 2021. Similarly, a 2019 Reuters investigation of deaths related to law enforcement use of TASERs found that 1,081 individuals had died after being hit by a police TASER from 1983 to 2017.

Should policymakers consider examining ways to legislate on the use of LLWs, numerous issues may garner attention. Currently, there is no single, universally accepted definition of less-than-lethal weapon, and the use of the term varies greatly among U.S. federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. Conceptualizing a definition for LLWs raises a number of questions, including whether LLWs should be defined

• under a label other than less-than-lethal,

• according to a common capability,

• according to a common operational utility,

• according to an intended use to minimize risk of death and permanent injury, or

• according to a common application.

Policymakers could consider whether it is beneficial to establish a statutory definition of less-than-lethal weapon. Codifying the meaning of LLWs could be useful in terms of clarifying what weapons are (and are not) classified as less-than-lethal, which may help sharpen the focus and potential efficacy of policies. On the other hand, some may argue that law enforcement agencies and departments are better suited to define LLWs and, thereby, address LLWs in their individualized use-of-force policies, based on their organization’s specific needs, duties, and circumstances.

Moreover, there are relatively little federal data available on law enforcement officers’ use of LLWs and, consequently, few studies analyzing the health effects caused by law enforcement’s use of such weapons. Policymakers may wish to direct a federal agency or department to conduct research into LLW injury and mortality. Based on these findings, policymakers could consider legislative actions to influence law enforcement use of LLWs, such as (1) passing a bill encouraging or limiting federal law enforcement officers’ usage of LLWs and (2) placing provisions on or withholding funding from existing federal grant programs to incentivize or discourage state and local law enforcement usage of LLWs.

R48365

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 23, 2025I

27p.

By Mylan Denerstein

This is the Monitor’s 23rd report and second report focused on the compliance of the New York City Police Department’s (the “Department” or “NYPD”) Neighborhood Safety Teams (“NST”) and Public Safety Teams (“PST”) with constitutional requirements in executing stops, frisks, and searches. In March 2021, the NYPD initiated NST units in certain precincts to combat gun violence in high-crime areas. Officers in NST units engage in proactive stop, frisks, and searches, and generally they are not expected to respond to 911 calls-for-service. NST officers drive unmarked cars and wear uniforms distinct from those worn by NYPD patrol officers. In June 2023, the Monitor filed the Nineteenth Report of the Independent Monitor (the “19th Report”) with the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which contained results of the Monitor team’s 2022 audit of the NSTs. That report concluded that NST officers performed substantially below constitutional standards and had a rate of unlawful Terry stops nine percentage points higher than their counterparts in regular patrol positions. In addition, the report concluded that supervisors in the Department failed to identify and remediate unlawful reported stops. To determine Fourth Amendment compliance with the stops, frisks, and searches conducted by NSTs since the filing of the 19th Report, the Monitor began a second, more comprehensive audit of NSTs and PSTs, another specialized proactive enforcement unit, to assess their compliance with court-ordered reforms. This follow-up report audits NST, PST, and regular patrol officers based on stops, frisks, and searches conducted in 2023. It compares NST officers with their counterparts on regular patrol and in PSTs and measures compliance rates of all supervisors and officers regardless of unit assignment. Based on the 2023 audit, the Report concludes that NST and PST officers are not performing stops, frisks, and searches at constitutional levels, and that supervisors of NST, PST, and patrol officers are not appropriately overseeing their officers. Some of the key findings are below: • This 2023 audit shows that NST officers’ constitutional compliance with respect to stops, frisks, and searches did not improve since the Monitor’s 2022 audit. • In the 2023 audit, NST officers had reasonable suspicion (and thus a lawful basis) for 75% of the reported Terry stops, slightly below the NST percentage of 76% compliance in the 2022 audit. • In the 2023 audit, NST officers made lawful stops at a rate of 75%, 17 percentage points lower than their patrol counterparts’ rate of 92%. • In the 2023 audit, PST officers also made lawful stops at a rate lower than patrol officers, with only 64% of their reported stops being assessed as lawful, which is 28 percentage points lower than their patrol counterparts’ rate of 92%. • In the 2023 audit, NST officers and PST officers overwhelmingly conducted self-initiated stops (70% and 77%, respectively, were self-initiated), while officers on routine patrol primarily conducted stops based on radio runs (68% were radio runs). • In the 2023 audit, regardless of the officer’s unit assignment (NST, PST, Patrol, or other), Terry stops based on a complainant/witness (100% lawful) or a radio run (94% lawful) were nearly all constitutional, while only 65% of self-initiated stops were assessed as lawful. • In the 2023 audit, NST officers had reasonable suspicion for only 58% of the frisks assessed and had a legal basis for only 54% of the searches assessed. • In the 2023 audit, despite significant numbers of unlawful stops, frisks, and searches, command-level supervisors of NST, PST, and Patrol officers only determined that 1% of stops were unlawful and 1% of frisks and searches were unlawful. • In 95% of the stop reports in this audit in which race was identified (N=385) and 93% of the BWC videos assessed (N=697), the person stopped was identified as Black or Hispanic. Of the 397 stop reports in which gender was indicated, 97% were male. Overall, in this audit, 89% of the individuals encountered were Black or Hispanic males. The NYPD must focus on supervisors ensuring implementation of constitutionally compliant stops, frisks, and searches. The Department must improve Fourth Amendment compliance levels and NST and PST units must be better supervised. The ball is in the Department’s hands, and the NYPD can do this. The law requires no less.

New York: New York Police Department Monitor, 2025. 51p.

By R. Shute and M Mecray

Context Service weapon activity, including instances where an officer’s firearm is drawn, pointed, or discharged, plays an important role in understanding events transpiring during a police–public encounter. Detection, documentation, and communication of these events in a way that is accurate, timely, and dependable is vital for enhancing transparency and accountability of law enforcement service weapon use. About this Report The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) requested the Criminal Justice Technology Testing and Evaluation Center (CJTTEC) to investigate the landscape of commercially available and emerging technologies that could meet this need. CJTTEC conducted a review of technologies capable of detecting when a service weapon has been unholstered, pointed, or discharged; documenting when a law enforcement officer discharges their service weapon (or initiating documentation such as body-worn camera (BWC) recordings in such incidents); and communicating the information to dispatchers. CJTTEC’s methodology to understand this technology landscape included secondary research (e.g., reviewing patents, trade literature, press releases, news articles, and publications) and primary research with technology experts, product representatives, and researchers. This brief provides a high-level summary of technology systems capable of documenting, detecting, and communicating service weapon activity, focusing specifically on technology integrated into or onto the weapon, in a holster, in a BWC, in a wearable device, or in environmental sensing tools. Conclusion Although no single commercially available tool is capable of detecting, documenting, and communicating service weapon activity, law enforcement agencies may be able to rely on a suite of products to help them address these needs.

Research Triangle Park, NC: RTI International, 2024. 15p.

By George Shaler, Alison Grey, Lucy Tumavicus, Tara Wheeler, Clare Murray, Robyn Dumont

In the immediate aftermath of George Floyd’s killing four years ago, many people campaigned for police reform to hold law enforcement more accountable for their actions. At the same time, many law enforcement supporters pushed back, maintaining that in the midst of the pandemic and surge in crime that followed, a more robust law enforcement presence was needed. In response to the demand for greater accountability, various legislative and policy proposals were put forth. Most notably, in June 2020, the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act, H.R. 7120, was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives. The bill would have held law enforcement officers accountable for misconduct in court, improved transparency through data collection, and reformed police training and policies. It would have required federal uniformed officers to wear body-worn cameras (BWCs) and would have required state and local law enforcement to use existing federal funds to ensure the use of those cameras.

While this legislation passed the House in both the 116th and 117th Congress, it failed to gain passage in the Senate each time and was not enacted. Despite this failure, among police reform initiatives, the use of body-worn cameras has received the most widespread bipartisan support. While some reformers would like to quicken the pace, the adoption of BWCs by local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies continues to increase. Here in Maine, local, state, and federal funding has enabled agencies to purchase BWCs and implement their use.

Today, when high-profile events occur, there is often both an expectation that video footage exists and public pressure on law enforcement officials to release that footage. Civilians view the mere presence of a body-worn camera as the most important tool in the evaluation of allegations of use of force in police-civilian encounters. However, citizen access to BWC video depends on location. Each state has its own public records law that determines when and how the public may have access to BWC footage. Some states, like Maine, have not addressed BWC footage specifically. Therefore, the laws governing the release of BWC footage in Maine are aligned with existing public record laws and exemptions that are open to interpretation.

Maine Statistical Analysis Center, University of Southern Maine., 2024. 75p.

By Alexander Testa,  Kristin Turney,  Dylan B. Jackson,  Chae M. Jaynes  

In response to the changing nature of policing in the United States, and current climate of police–citizen relations, research has begun to explore the consequences of adolescent police contact for life outcomes. The current study investigates if and under what conditions police contact has repercussions for future orientation during adolescence and the transition into young adulthood. Using data from the Pathways to Desistance study, a multisite longitudinal study of serious offenders followed from adolescence to young adulthood, results from a series of fixed-effects models demonstrated three main findings. First, personal and vicarious police contact, compared with no additional police contact, are negatively associated with within-person changes in future orientation. Second, any exposure to police contact, regardless of how just or unjust the contact is perceived, is negatively associated with future orientation. Third, the negative association between police contact and future orientation is larger for White individuals compared with that for Black or Hispanic individuals. Considering the importance of future orientation for prosocial behavior, the findings suggest that adolescent police contact may serve as an important life-course event with repercussions for later life outcomes.

Criminology. 2022; 60: p. 263–290

By Queensland Crime and Corruption Commission

New and emerging technologies, like remote working using video and online technologies, generative artificial intelligence (AI) to speed up the delivery of services or undertake administrative tasks, and using social media to reach a wider audience are now common practice across the public sector. While advancements in technology and innovations in public service delivery are helping the public sector to deliver more efficient and effective services, they also increase fraud related risks by making it more difficult for fraudulent conduct to be detected, investigated, and prosecuted. This is because advanced technology can offer anonymity, psychological distance, speed and efficiency, and personalisation not seen before. This combined with current economic conditions, such as the rising cost of living, may increase the motivation for fraud by public sector employees or contractors. While technological advancements are changing almost all aspects of fraud, the CCC’s corruption work has identified three areas that are particularly prone to technology-related fraud threats: • procurement • recruitment • grant funding, regulation, and licensing.

State of Queensland: Queensland Crime and Corruption Commission, 2024. 4p.

In 2018, Queensland was the first Australian jurisdiction to provide police with new powers to conduct searches in cases where:

A missing person meets the definition of a ‘high-risk missing person’ because they are either: under the age of 13 or are at risk of serious harm if not found as quickly as possible

A police officer holds a reasonable suspicion that searching a particular place may locate the person or provide information relating to their disappearance, and

The occupier of the place cannot or will not give consent for the search to occur.

These provisions are contained in Chapter 7, Part 3A of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld).

Under section 879 of the Act, the CCC was required to review the provisions.

The CCC’s review identified that although the powers are rarely used, they proved to be a useful and valuable tool to progress investigations. It has made two recommendations for consideration by government.

State of Queensland, AUS: Queensland Crime and Corruption Commission: 2024. 22p.

By Dick M. Carpenter II, Kyle Sweetland and Jennifer McDonald

Code enforcement is supposed to be about protecting the public by discouraging— via monetary sanctions—dangerous driving and other hazardous personal conduct or property conditions. But in practice, local governments may also—or instead—use their code enforcement powers to raise revenue. This is taxation by citation. It is not a new phenomenon, but only in the past few years has it become an object of national concern. Despite the fresh spotlight, little is known about cities that engage in taxation by citation, beyond a few particularly egregious examples. To gain a better understanding of taxation by citation, this study explores the phenomenon through the lens of three Georgia cities—Morrow, Riverdale and Clarkston—that have historically relied on fines and fees from traffic and other ordinance violations for large proportions of their revenues. Consistent with case study research methods, we drew upon public data, a survey of and interviews with residents, photo and video records, and direct observation of the three cities and their municipal courts, which process the cities’ citations. Our results show: Over a five-year period, Morrow, Riverdale and Clarkston generated on average 14% to 25% of their revenues from fines and fees, while similarly sized Georgia cities took in just 3%. Such high levels of fines and fees revenue account for the second largest proportion of the cities’ revenues and may indicate taxation by citation. The three cities’ fines and fees revenues peaked in 2012 before beginning to decline as tax revenues increased. These trends generally correspond to the recession of the late 2000s and early 2010s and the subsequent recovery. This suggests the cities—which are poorer than average, face uncertain economic futures and have few means of generating substantial revenues—may have seen

fines and fees as a way out of a budget crunch. The sample cities issued many of their citations for traffic and other ordinance violations that presented little threat to public health and safety. Traffic violations posed only moderate risk on average, while property code violations were primarily about aesthetics. This suggests the cities are using their code enforcement powers for ends other than public protection.

To process citations, Morrow, Riverdale and Clarkston have their own courts, which are created and funded by the cities. These courts function as highly efficient revenue collectors. They process more cases than courts in similarly sized cities, and nearly everyone coming before them pleads or is found guilty. The three cities have few legal provisions preventing them from using their code enforcement powers for reasons other than public protection—or from violating citizens’ rights in the process. Cities may pay a price for taxation by citation. Morrow, Riverdale and Clarkston residents with recent citations reported lower levels of trust in government officials and institutions than residents without, suggesting cities that use code enforcement for revenue or other non-public safety reasons may undermine trust and cooperation in their communities. Taken together, these findings suggest taxation by citation is a function of the perceived need for revenue and the ability to realize it through code enforcement. Moreover, the phenomenon may be a matter of systemic incentives. City leaders need not set out to pick the pockets of residents. Instead, they may see fines and fees revenue as the answer to their cities’ problems and, absent obstacles such as independent courts or robust legal protections for people accused of ordinance violations, find themselves able to pursue it. And once in effect, the mechanisms necessary for taxation by citation—such as supremely efficient court procedures—may stick, becoming business as usual and ensuring fines and fees remain a reliable source of revenue. Our findings also suggest taxation by citation is shortsighted. Cities may gain revenue, but they may also pay a price for it in the form of lower community trust and cooperation. To avoid this outcome, cities should find other ways of shoring up their finances and use their code enforcement powers only to protect the public—and then only with meaningful safeguards for citizens’ rights in place.

Arlington, VA: Institute for Justice, 2019. 60p.

By Shelley S. Hyland

This report describes the purpose for developing the National Law Enforcement Accountability Database (NLEAD), a centralized repository of official records documenting instances of law enforcement officer misconduct as well as commendations and awards to help inform hiring, job assignment, and promotion decisions. It also provides statistics on the NLEAD’s records, the federal law enforcement officers included, and its usage. This is the first annual report, and it covers NLEAD records for events occurring in calendar years 2018 to 2023 and usage of the NLEAD from January 1, 2024 to August 31, 2024.

Launched on December 18, 2023, the NLEAD was established in accordance with Section 5 of Executive Order 14074, Advancing Effective, Accountable Policing and Criminal Justice Practices To Enhance Public Trust and Public Safety. The Justice Management Division was given responsibility for developing and maintaining the NLEAD, and BJS was given responsibility for producing the annual report.

Highlights

● As of September 20, 2024:

○ All federal law enforcement agencies required to report to the

NLEAD (N=90) and four additional agencies voluntarily submitted records or submitted documentation that they had zero qualifying incidents for all their officers for 2018–2023.

○ There were 4,790 records of federal officer misconduct and 4,011 federal law enforcement officers in the NLEAD for 2018–2023.

● In 2018–2023, 63% (3,031) of incidents in the NLEAD were for sustained complaints or records of disciplinary action based on findings of serious misconduct.

● From January 1, 2024 to August 31, 2024, 9,985 searches were conducted on records in the NLEAD.

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2024. 15p.

By The New Jersey Office of the State Comptroller (OSC)

The New Jersey Office of the State Comptroller (OSC) examined over 500 motor vehicle stops conducted by New Jersey State Police (NJSP) that ended with no enforcement. OSC looked at body-worn camera footage of stops that are rarely, if ever, watched—stops where tickets were not given, arrests were not made, and no one was even ordered to exit their vehicle. Most of the traffic stops OSC reviewed started with the trooper briefly explaining the reason for the stop and requesting a driver’s license, registration, and insurance. But in more than one out of four stops reviewed, the motorist presented a courtesy card, asserted a personal relationship with a law enforcement officer, or even flashed a law enforcement badge. When that happened, the side-of-the-road interactions

between the motorists and the stopping troopers shifted, and in some cases, shifted dramatically.

Sometimes, the motorist boldly handed over a courtesy card, occasionally in lieu of driving credentials, and the stop resolved relatively quickly with the trooper offering some version of “you’re good.” Other times, a driver volunteered “my dad is a lieutenant” or “my best friend works at [insert name of any law enforcement agency]” and received remarkably solicitous treatment from the trooper. This was the case even when the drivers were stopped for dangerous traffic infractions, such as driving more than 100 miles per hour or suspected drunk driving. The most serious consequence the troopers imposed in these stops was advising the motorists that they left a voicemail message for the law enforcement officer named on the courtesy card or invoked as a friend or relative. In one instance of suspected drunk driving, the trooper also warned the driver to “stay off my highway,” after reminding him how bad things would be if he crashed under the circumstances.

OSC’s Police Accountability Project initiated this investigation in response to multiple reports that New Jersey law enforcement officers’ exercise of discretion in motor vehicle stops is often influenced by improper factors, such as courtesy cards given to or purchased by motorists. OSC reviewed more than 3,000 minutes of body-worn camera footage, which included 501 traffic stops conducted by a sample of NJSP troopers over a ten-day period in late 2022. In doing so, OSC found evidence of a two-tiered system in which motorists with ties to law enforcement—no matter how tenuous—were given preferential treatment.

Among the findings:

● Courtesy cards—which are given out by police labor associations and sold by private companies online—appear to be in wide usage and function as accepted currency. Of the 501 stops OSC reviewed, 87 motorists presented courtesy cards which came from municipal police departments, county and state agencies, as well as inter-state and out-of-state law enforcement agencies. They all appeared to be equally effective at getting motorists released without enforcement.

● Motorists who asserted personal relationships with law enforcement have similarly strong social capital that often has the same effect as a courtesy card. In ten percent of the stops, the motorist did not present a courtesy card but cited a relationship to a law enforcement officer and was able to evade any consequences, even for serious motor vehicle violations. In one stop, a driver was speeding 103 miles per hour. The trooper released her after she said her father was a lieutenant. Another motorist, stopped for tailgating, speeding, and

driving over the median in a tunnel, was released promptly after he cited a friendship with a law enforcement officer.

● Many active duty law enforcement officers were observed using their official government position to get out of a ticket. Some volunteered that they were law enforcement, some flashed badges, and in one instance, a trooper sitting in the back seat of a car offered up his badge number.

● Troopers’ decisions to grant preferential treatment to motorists who have courtesy cards or asserted close personal relationships with law enforcement seem to be having a discriminatory impact. White motorists were more likely to hold a courtesy card or assert a relationship to law enforcement. Of the 87 courtesy cards observed in the sample, for instance, 69 were presented by White drivers, while Black, Hispanic/LatinX, Asian, and other drivers presented a combined 18 courtesy cards.

● NJSP policy requires troopers to request and review driving credentials (driver’s license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance) for all stopped drivers. Yet, drivers without courtesy cards or a close relationship with law enforcement were more likely to have all three driving credentials requested and verified by the trooper, more likely to have the trooper take the extra step of conducting a full motor vehicle lookup in the computer, and more likely to be given some form of a warning.

● An overall analysis of the full sample revealed racial disparities that went beyond courtesy cards. White and Asian drivers were less likely to have all three of their credentials requested and verified when compared to Black and Hispanic/LatinX drivers. And Hispanic/LatinX drivers who were stopped were generally subjected to a more thorough computerized lookup. Most striking, troopers conducted computerized lookups of Hispanic/LatinX drivers 65 percent of the time, while looking up White drivers only 34 percent of the time.

● Out of the 501 stops that resulted in no enforcement, 232 related to speeding. At least 80 of those stops were for 20 or more miles per hour over the speed limit. Speeding is one of the common causes of traffic fatalities.

In short, this two-tiered system of justice that provides differing treatment for those with law enforcement connections and those without is unethical, discriminatory, and fundamentally unfair. It also contributes to making New Jersey roads less safe. Traffic fatalities on New Jersey roads continue to rise, with fatal crashes at the end of November 2024 already well surpassing the number of fatal crashes from the prior year. Impaired driving and speeding are some of the leading causes of accidents. Millions of public dollars are allocated to law enforcement agencies throughout the state to prioritize safety

initiatives and adherence to traffic laws. Yet for some drivers, these priorities do not seem to apply.

For these reasons, and those set forth in more detail below, OSC makes 11 recommendations and has also made appropriate referrals. OSC’s findings also make clear that regular review of no enforcement stops could provide valuable insight into officer discretion and also could reveal why particular data trends persist, highlight the need for training or retraining and updates to policies, and ensure that the motor vehicle laws are being enforced fairly and equitably. While some of the drivers in this sample had courtesy cards or asserted relationships to law enforcement, many did not, and yet still avoided any consequences for often serious violations.

Trenton: New Jersey Office of the State Comptroller, 2024. 38p.

By Lara Trautman

Long a bit player in the growing movement to reimagine the criminal justice system, prosecutors are finally entering the spotlight. Leveraging the tremendous authority of the office, they have begun to reshape the flow of criminal cases and nudge outcomes in a more productive direction. These early successes, however, should not obscure a broader truth: they cannot do it alone. Prosecutorial efforts can only realize their lofty potential for positive change with the active and enduring support of state legislatures. With unparalleled power over everything from charging decisions to plea bargaining, it may seem as though prosecutors could bend the justice system to their will without any assistance. Yet, the reality is much more complicated. For example, expansive charging and pretrial decision-making is relatively ineffective without the provision of strong alternatives to traditional prosecutorial pathways. Likewise, low funding can stymie individualized consideration of cases while poor data collection can get in the way of evidence-based policy. And here is where the legislature can and must step in. Only they have the power to remove many of these external roadblocks to constructive and beneficial prosecutorial action. Rewriting the law and adjusting appropriations can ensure that prosecutors have the tools, authority and discretion necessary to transform prosecution. Accordingly, this brief is offered as a guide for those legislators who wish to become allies in the prosecutor-driven reform movement by proposing specific actions legislatures can take to support prosecutors who are attempting to improve the criminal justice system in their jurisdictions

R STREET SHORTS NO. 88 April 2020

Washington, DC: R Street, 2020. 5p.

By Lars Trautman

As defined by convictions, sentence lengths, and the relentless enforcement of the law, for decades, conservatives have prized “toughness” above all other attributes in assessing a prosecutor’s worth. Indeed, until recently, this same mindset permeated conservatives’ approach to nearly every other aspect of the criminal justice system. But then something interesting happened. Starting in Texas and quickly spreading to other “red” states and beyond, conservatives began to realize that mentality actually undermined the very goals they were pursuing. From public safety to fiscal probity, individual liberty to human dignity, a “smart on crime” approach that addressed underlying causes of crime proved better able to deliver than the old status quo that all too often relied on incarceration as the antidote to societal ills. Reform has followed in nearly every state2 and even managed to pass a notoriously divided Congress. The legislative focus of these conservative efforts to date, however, belies the intrinsically local nature of criminal justice. The fates of the overwhelming majority of individuals who come into contact with the criminal justice system are determined by a collection of county, town and city officials. Perhaps foremost among these is the local district attorney. After all, while a judge may act as the king in his court, only the district attorney has the ability to influence criminal proceedings in every single courtroom across her jurisdiction. The district attorney’s office is thus a natural channel for new criminal justice ideas. This realization has helped to propel a growing movement on the political left to elect “progressive prosecutors” who wield the broad powers of the office to further liberal criminal justice goals relating to decarceration and racial justice, among others.5 Plaudits have come from all corners for many of these efforts6 and the result is a coherent narrative around what it means to be a liberal-minded prosecutor in the twenty-first century. Of course, plenty of reasonable and just prosecutors have no aspirations to ever wear the “progressive” label, nor would their constituents want them to. This raises two related questions for prosecutors who reject this progressive mold, yet nevertheless yearn to be smarter and more even-handed than their predecessors: can the disruption of traditional prosecutorial practices align with a more conservative worldview and what does the center-right path toward more fair and effective prosecution look like? The answer is that a conservative prosecutor can and should challenge current prosecutorial practices by striving to become a more productive prosecutor in the broader sense of the term. This means ensuring that every prosecutorial decision is productive insofar as it produces an outcome that actually improves community wellbeing. It requires a subtle understanding that a charge, conviction or sentence is not itself the outcome, merely a factor building toward one that includes a safer community and rehabilitated defendant. Ultimately, trading a penchant for tough prosecutors for those who are productive in this manner will allow conservatives to forge a more constructive prosecutorial identity that does a better job of efficiently pursuing justice and keeping their communities secure and whole

R STREET POLICY STUDY NO. 193 January 2020

Washington, DC: R Street, 2020. 6p.

By Lars Trautman and Jonathan Haggerty

Handcuffs close about a person’s wrists and the few, simple words “you are under arrest” are spoken as the individual is placed in the back of a police car. It is a scene that plays out once every three seconds in the United States and sets into motion a criminal process that exhibits at times all of the control and potential for damage of a runaway locomotive. Indeed, regardless of whether a murder indictment or an ordinance violation spurred the arrest, the immediate aftermath is the same. The individual loses their freedom and gains a new entry in their criminal history, while the officer must spend hours transporting and processing the individual with the specter of additional court time hanging over the future. And, while arrest is warranted for many of the more serious transgressions, it is an ill-fitting and disproportionate response to myriad other situations. Yet, traditionally, the only other option officially available to officers is to do nothing.

The shortcomings of this approach have not been lost on many law enforcement leaders and other crisis first responders, and in recent years, police departments from Seattle, Washington to Gloucester, Massachusetts have instituted new strategies and initiatives meant to break this old paradigm and present their officers with options beyond the binary choice to arrest or take no action. Operating under a variety of labels that usually reference ‘diversion’ in some form, these efforts have ranged from actively searching out vulnerable members of the community and connecting them with services to de-escalating potentially criminal encounters through citations or treatment opportunities. Often, it has meant law enforcement officers working in concert with other first responders; in some instances, non-law enforcement personnel may direct a response themselves—indeed, for crises without a criminal justice component, this can represent the optimal response. It has also involved turning to a set of independent crisis response procedures, such as protective custody or citations in lieu of arrest, that entail a noncriminal or deescalated enforcement response and can operate as part—or instead—of a more comprehensive diversion program. Although these strategies are often locally designed and implemented, they do not operate in a legal or political vacuum. Instead, localities are subject to a web of state laws and regulations that directly bear on their ability to institute pre-arrest diversion and other crisis response strategies effectively. Laws that grant local officials noncriminal responses to crises can propel diversion efforts or provide alternative, supplemental crisis responses. Laws that require criminal responses or otherwise circumscribe when and how non-law enforcement responders are able to intervene can impede them. In light of this, the present study dives into these problems by reviewing and analyzing the primary statewide barriers to and accelerants of pre-arrest diversion and crisis response strategies. It begins by providing an overview of pre-arrest diversion strategies. It then delves into five categories of law or regulation that most directly affect these strategies and often serve as the basis of fully-fledged crisis responses in their own right: emergency mental health hold laws, protective custody statutes, citation authority, substance abuse Good Samaritan laws and ambulance transport destination rules.

R STREET POLICY STUDY NO. 187 November 2019

Washington, DC: R Street, 2019. 34p.

By SteVon Felton

The 1991 beating of Rodney King and the subsequent acquittal of the Los Angeles police officers responsible for the attack sparked massive riots and protests across the nation. Following an investigation by the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Civil Rights Division, Congress granted the attorney general the power to investigate “a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers that violates Constitutional or federal rights.” In cases of a proven pattern or practice of police misconduct, the court may use a federal, court-enforced order, known as a consent decree, as a mechanism to force police departments to address institutional failures. Under such orders, a law enforcement agency and the Justice Department, overseen by an independent monitor, negotiate and establish concrete benchmarks to determine which reforms will constitute the successful end of the decree. Since the first consent decree in 1994, the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department has conducted over 65 investigations and entered into 40 reform agreements with police departments across the country. According to the Division, these negotiations are most effective when they can “ensure accountability, transparency and the flexibility to accomplish complex institutional reforms.” Indeed, a number of studies have now confirmed that consent decrees helped resolve management and oversight issues in cities such as Pittsburgh, Los Angeles and Cincinnati.4 However, while federal consent decrees have their place in promoting systemic policy change, they consistently fail to effect local and cultural change within departments. Several factors contribute to this phenomenon. For starters, as is often the case, centralized models like federal consent decrees cannot adequately adjust to localized systems of knowledge and regional distinctions between departments. Because they target local governments rather than individuals, the reform agreements reached by the DOJ and local law enforcement agencies often fail to sustain cultural change.5 Moreover, within some police departments, consent decrees lack the very thing that is perhaps most important to their success—the support of officers. Without buy-in from individual officers, police departments often disregard best practices that they view as externally forced upon them. And because policing is a profession that allows substantial discretion, in some departments officers openly ignore state and federal policies.6 Given the localized nature of police-citizen interactions, a top-down approach to police reform is virtually guaranteed to be unsuccessful. In light of these failures, the New Orleans Police Department’s Ethical Policing is Courageous (EPIC) program provides an alternative structure that begins with officers’ localized knowledge level and ends with systemic change. By allowing officers to police themselves, EPIC utilizes them and their experiences as resources to promote meaningful change

R STREET SHORTS NO. 70 April 2019

Washington, DC: R Street, 2019. 5p.

By The New Jersey Office of the State Comptroller (OSC)

The New Jersey Office of the State Comptroller (OSC) examined over 500 motor vehicle stops conducted by New Jersey State Police (NJSP) that ended with no enforcement. OSC looked at body-worn camera footage of stops that are rarely, if ever, watched—stops where tickets were not given, arrests were not made, and no one was even ordered to exit their vehicle. Most of the traffic stops OSC reviewed started with the trooper briefly explaining the reason for the stop and requesting a driver’s license, registration, and insurance. But in more than one out of four stops reviewed, the motorist presented a courtesy card, asserted a personal relationship with a law enforcement officer, or even flashed a law enforcement badge. When that happened, the side-of-the-road interactions between the motorists and the stopping troopers shifted, and in some cases, shifted dramatically.

Sometimes, the motorist boldly handed over a courtesy card, occasionally in lieu of driving credentials, and the stop resolved relatively quickly with the trooper offering some version of “you’re good.” Other times, a driver volunteered “my dad is a lieutenant” or “my best friend works at [insert name of any law enforcement agency]” and received remarkably solicitous treatment from the trooper. This was the case even when the drivers were stopped for dangerous traffic infractions, such as driving more than 100 miles per hour or suspected drunk driving. The most serious consequence the troopers imposed in these stops was advising the motorists that they left a voicemail message for the law enforcement officer named on the courtesy card or invoked as a friend or relative. In one instance of suspected drunk driving, the trooper also warned the driver to “stay off my highway,” after reminding him how bad things would be if he crashed under the circumstances.

OSC’s Police Accountability Project initiated this investigation in response to multiple reports that New Jersey law enforcement officers’ exercise of discretion in motor vehicle stops is often influenced by improper factors, such as courtesy cards given to or purchased by motorists. OSC reviewed more than 3,000 minutes of body-worn camera footage, which included 501 traffic stops conducted by a sample of NJSP troopers over a ten-day period in late 2022. In doing so, OSC found evidence of a two-tiered system in which motorists with ties to law enforcement—no matter how tenuous—were given preferential treatment.

Among the findings:

Courtesy cards—which are given out by police labor associations and sold by private companies online—appear to be in wide usage and function as accepted currency. Of the 501 stops OSC reviewed, 87 motorists presented courtesy cards which came from municipal police departments, county and state agencies, as well as inter-state and out-of-state law enforcement agencies. They all appeared to be equally effective at getting motorists released without enforcement.

Motorists who asserted personal relationships with law enforcement have similarly strong social capital that often has the same effect as a courtesy card. In ten percent of the stops, the motorist did not present a courtesy card but cited a relationship to a law enforcement officer and was able to evade any consequences, even for serious motor vehicle violations. In one stop, a driver was speeding 103 miles per hour. The trooper released her after she said her father was a lieutenant. Another motorist, stopped for tailgating, speeding, and driving over the median in a tunnel, was released promptly after he cited a friendship with a law enforcement officer.

Many active duty law enforcement officers were observed using their official government position to get out of a ticket. Some volunteered that they were law enforcement, some flashed badges, and in one instance, a trooper sitting in the back seat of a car offered up his badge number.

Troopers’ decisions to grant preferential treatment to motorists who have courtesy cards or asserted close personal relationships with law enforcement seem to be having a discriminatory impact. White motorists were more likely to hold a courtesy card or assert a relationship to law enforcement. Of the 87 courtesy cards observed in the sample, for instance, 69 were presented by White drivers, while Black, Hispanic/LatinX, Asian, and other drivers presented a combined 18 courtesy cards.

NJSP policy requires troopers to request and review driving credentials (driver’s license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance) for all stopped drivers. Yet, drivers without courtesy cards or a close relationship with law enforcement were more likely to have all three driving credentials requested and verified by the trooper, more likely to have the trooper take the extra step of conducting a full motor vehicle lookup in the computer, and more likely to be given some form of a warning.

An overall analysis of the full sample revealed racial disparities that went beyond courtesy cards. White and Asian drivers were less likely to have all three of their credentials requested and verified when compared to Black and Hispanic/LatinX drivers. And Hispanic/LatinX drivers who were stopped were generally subjected to a more thorough computerized lookup. Most striking, troopers conducted computerized lookups of Hispanic/LatinX drivers 65 percent of the time, while looking up White drivers only 34 percent of the time.

Out of the 501 stops that resulted in no enforcement, 232 related to speeding. At least 80 of those stops were for 20 or more miles per hour over the speed limit. Speeding is one of the common causes of traffic fatalities.

In short, this two-tiered system of justice that provides differing treatment for those with law enforcement connections and those without is unethical, discriminatory, and fundamentally unfair. It also contributes to making New Jersey roads less safe. Traffic fatalities on New Jersey roads continue to rise, with fatal crashes at the end of November 2024 already well surpassing the number of fatal crashes from the prior year. Impaired driving and speeding are some of the leading causes of accidents. Millions of public dollars are allocated to law enforcement agencies throughout the state to prioritize safety initiatives and adherence to traffic laws. Yet for some drivers, these priorities do not seem to apply.

For these reasons, and those set forth in more detail below, OSC makes 11 recommendations and has also made appropriate referrals. OSC’s findings also make clear that regular review of no enforcement stops could provide valuable insight into officer discretion and also could reveal why particular data trends persist, highlight the need for training or retraining and updates to policies, and ensure that the motor vehicle laws are being enforced fairly and equitably. While some of the drivers in this sample had courtesy cards or asserted relationships to law enforcement, many did not, and yet still avoided any consequences for often serious violations.

Trenton: New Jersey Office of the State Comptroller, 2024. 38p.

By Susan Olzak

Though it has had a long history, the recent social movement aimed at stopping police violence against minorities has consistently endorsed policies designed to make police conduct more accountable. This paper analyzes the effects of protest in cities on the establishment of Citizen Review Boards (CRBs) in recent decades. It also examines whether or not the presence of a CRB influences subsequent rates of police-involved fatalities in cities.

Preprint, 2020.