By Kanna Hayashi , Tyson Singh Kelsall, Caitlin Shane , Zishan Cui., et al

Background

Several jurisdictions in Canada have recently considered decriminalizing possession of illicit drugs for personal use (henceforth, simple possession) as part of their responses to the ongoing drug toxicity/overdose crisis. In this context, we sought to examine an early implementation case of a de facto depenalization policy of sim‑ ple possession ofences in Vancouver, Canada, that was enacted in 2006. Specifcally, we characterized experiences of people who use drugs (PWUD) whose drugs were discretionally seized by police without arrest.

Methods

Data were derived from three prospective cohorts of community-recruited PWUD in Vancouver over 16 months in 2019–2021. We conducted multivariable generalized estimating equations analyses to determine the prevalence of and factors associated with drug seizure. Sub-analyses used data collected in 2009–2012 and examined the trends over time.

Results

Among 995 participants who were interviewed in 2019–2021, 63 (6.3%) had their drugs seized by police at least once in the past 6 months. In multivariable analyses, factors significantly associated with drug seizure included: homelessness (adjusted odds ratio [AOR]: 1.98; 95% confidence interval [CI] 1.09–3.61), working in the unregulated drug market (AOR: 4.93; 95% CI 2.87–8.49), and naloxone administration (AOR: 2.15; 95% CI 1.23– 3.76). In 2009–2012, 67.8% reported having obtained new drugs immediately after having their drugs seized by police. Odds of drug seizure were not significantly different between the two time periods (2019–2021 vs. 2009–2012) (AOR: 0.93; 95% CI: 0.64–1.35).

Conclusions

Despite the depenalization policy, the Vancouver Police Department has continued to seize illicit drugs from PWUD, even in cases where no arrest occurred. This policing practice may create health and safety risks for PWUD as it forces PWUD to increase the engagement with the unregulated illicit drug market. Our findings support calls for abolishing this often-undocumented discretionary policing practice that may exacerbate ongoing health inequities and interfere with peer-based overdose prevention efforts.

Harm Reduction Journal (2023) 20:117

By Mark Shaw

Drug seizures are widely referred to in the media and academic reporting on drug trafficking and organised crime. Everyone knows their limitations. But what if seizures represent the exact opposite of what we generally think them to be? That is, not a reflection of state efficiency, but rather cracks in systems of political protection. If that is the case, they may appear more regularly at some times rather than others. A detailed study of West African cocaine seizures in the context of periods of political instability over a twenty-year period suggest this association is worth exploring. Key findings ∙ Drug seizures in West Africa have been concentrated in two periods: 2003-2012 and more lately in the period from 2019, with a ‘seizure drought’ in between. ∙ At a regional level, increases in seizures correlated with period of declining political stability while declines in seizures occur during periods of political stability. ∙ This relationship can also be seen in countries with cycles of conflict and instability, namely GuineaBissau and Mali. Notably, seizures occur in the period just before instability increases. ∙ As there is strong evidence of political protection over the drug trafficking economy in the region, increases in seizures may align with periods when political protection systems for trafficking weaken or crack. Seizures decline again when new systems of political protection are put in place. ∙ One outlier is Nigeria which has a very stable and low level of seizures. This is a reflection of a longstanding and lower-level system of criminal protection, partly the outcome of the fact that most illicit profits are generated outside the drug sector. ∙ This suggests that seizure data is important – but not for the reasons generally accepted – and when carefully examined can be read as a reflection of changes in the political economy. If so, they may serve as ‘warning flares’ of pending political instability

ENACT-Africa, 2021. 24p.