By Diogo G. C. Britto, Gianmarco Daniele, Marco Le Moglie, Paolo Pinotti, Breno Sampaio

We study the prevalence and effects of individuals with past criminal charges among candidates and elected politicians in Brazil. Individuals with past criminal charges are twice as likely to both run for office and be elected compared to other individuals. This pattern persists across political parties and government levels, even when controlling for a broad set of observable characteristics. Randomized anti-corruption audits reduce the share of mayors with criminal records, but only when conducted in election years. Using a regression discontinuity design focusing on close elections, we demonstrate that the election of mayors with criminal backgrounds leads to higher rates of underweight births and infant mortality. Additionally, there is an increase in political patronage, particularly in the health sector, which is consistent with the negative impacts on local public health outcomes.

Bonn:  IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2024. 60p.

By Erin Hammers Forstag, Rapporteur; Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine

Predictive policing strategies are approaches that use data to attempt to predict either individuals who are likely to commit crime or places where crime is likely to be committed, to enable crime prevention. To explore law enforcement's use of person-based and place-based predictive policing strategies, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine held a two-day public workshop on June 24 and 25, 2024.

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2024. 14 pages

Monica Schoch-Spana, Sanjana Ravi, AIshwarya Nagar, Christina Potter, and Tyrone Peterson

The Pandemic Recovery Metrics to Drive Equity – PanREMEDY project sought to give form to the least considered phase of a catastrophic outbreak of infectious disease, while applying an equity lens. The project inquired, “By what measures could local and state decision-makers know that efforts at holistic recovery were working, especially for the socially vulnerable individuals and communities hit hardest by COVID-19?”

To answer this question, the project team gathered and analyzed a wide range of evidence. They consulted disaster recovery and resilience experts, convened a scoping symposium, reviewed academic and gray literature on epidemic/pandemic recovery, and elicited input from diverse participants via listening sessions. Based upon thematic analyses of these inputs, the team generated an initial set of 44 indicators and distilled ethical and practical considerations concerning their implementation.

The PanREMEDY indicators were ordered into 2 categories—recovery system organization and operations and system outcomes, the latter of which could be thought of as community status:

Organization and Operations

• Governance and Leadership: political authority, collective action, financing structures, public face

• Planning: guiding framework, time horizons, technical expertise, aligned futures

• Data Management: actionable data, disaggregated data, extant data, community contextualization

• Public Involvement: representative bodies, feedback loops, community dashboards

Outcomes

• Human Health: epidemiological curve, disrupted care, disease sequelae, healthcare infrastructure, health insurance

• Human Development: healthy housing, adequate nutrition, safety/security, educational attainment, connectivity/mobility

• Economic Vitality: earning power, entrepreneurship, work protections, neighborhood pulse, thriving grassroots

• Political Integrity: power-sharing, equity structures, safety net, public trust, inventive policy

• Social Fabric: connectedness, collective impact, stigma repair, caretaking

• Emotional Wellbeing: truth-telling, public memorialization, psychological supports, self-medication, relief/resolution

Subsequently, a panel of practitioners, community advocates, subject matter experts, and local government leaders rated the indicators according to importance (ie, salience to holistic recovery) and feasibility (ie, ease of application).

Developed in the COVID-19 context, the PanREMEDY project’s findings can prompt further learning and actions specific to that pandemic. At the same time, the findings offer a more general framework with which to prepare communities for future pandemics. End-users are encouraged to tailor the indicators to their context, including local values, programmatic priorities, and political environments.

With the PanREMEDY indicators in hand, state and local leaders and other community members can better assess how well their jurisdictions are:

• Rebounding from the worst effects of the COVID-19 pandemic

• Targeting support to COVID-19 survivors who still need help

• Engaging in pre-event planning for future post-pandemic recovery

• Strengthening resilience to the increasing likelihood of future pandemics

• Motivating non-traditional partners to join in pandemic preparedness efforts.

Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security; 2024.

By Nicolette Reyhani

From the Introduction:” Over recent years situational crime has gained considerable amount of support and recognition when determining what in society causes crime. Prior to the 1970s, the explanations for causes of crime revolved around the socio-economic effects society endured. The modern focus of criminological policy and theories began to change as attention turned to the potential environmental factors and effects they have on criminal activity (McGloin & O’Neil, 2007). The situational crime results from an offender, who under certain circumstances, commits a crime and is unlikely to repeat the offence or usually is not inclined to commit crimes, hence the emphasis on situational (Clarke, 1995). These crimes and offenders are best explained through theories that do not focus on the social causes of crime, rather the emerging prosperity of contemporary life and the rational human being.”

By Matthew A. Graham, Scarlet Neath, Kim S. Buchanan, Kerry Mulligan, Tracey Lloyd, and Phillip Atiba Solomon

A significant share of the millions of traffic stops made annually are for low-level violations,i such as a single broken taillight or tinted windows, which do not have a clear relationship to traffic safety.ii Officers may pull over drivers for these reasons because they are incentivized to generate a high volume of stops through, for example, performance metrics or grant funding. Officers also use minor violations to conduct what are known as pretextual stops, or an effort to uncover evidence of a serious crime for which they lack reasonable suspicion. Traffic stops have come under increasing scrutiny because of their role in fueling racial disparities in policing and associated harms, including distrust in police,iii financial penalties,iv and police violence. Evidence shows that Black drivers are more likely than White drivers to be pulled over, even though there is no evidence to show that they more frequently commit driving violations. Black drivers are also twice as likely to be searched once stopped–a common feature of a pretextual stop–despite the fact that they are less likely to be found in possession of contraband, such as drugs or weapons.vi This brief aims to shed light on one of the many risks to Black drivers posed by traffic enforcement: police use of force. We draw on data from two sources: CPE’s existing portfolio of work providing agency-specific analyses to local law enforcement agencies

West Hollywood California, Center for Policing Equity, 2024. 9p.

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency; United States. Federal Bureau Of Investigation; United States. Election Assistance Commission; United States. Department Of Homeland Security

From the document: "The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) prepared this overview to help partners defend against insider threat concerns that could materialize during the 2024 election cycle. For years, federal, state, local, and private sector partners nationwide have worked closely together to support state and local officials in safeguarding election infrastructure from cyber, physical, and insider threats. Because of these efforts, there is no evidence that malicious actors changed, altered, or deleted votes or had any impact on the outcome of elections. Over the past several years, the election infrastructure community has experienced multiple instances of election system access control compromises conducted by insider threats. While there is no evidence that malicious actors impacted election outcomes, it is important that election stakeholders at all levels are aware of the risks posed by insider threats and the steps that they can take to identify and mitigate these threats. This document outlines several recent examples of election security-related insider threats, discusses potential scenarios that could arise during the 2024 election cycle, and provides recommendations for how to mitigate the risk posed by insider threats."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency; , et al. 2024. 9p

United States. Department Of Justice. Office Of The Inspector General.

From the document: "The Department of Justice (Department or DOJ) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) undertook this review to examine the Department's and its law enforcement components' roles and responsibilities in responding to protest activity and civil unrest in Washington, D.C., between May 29 and June 6, 2020, following the murder of George Floyd on May 25. The report details the relevant events involving DOJ and its components during this time period, including their assistance to the U.S. Park Police (USPP) and the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) in and around Lafayette Park in connection with USPP and USSS plans to construct a fence on H Street after violence had erupted during protests on May 29; meetings attended by then Attorney General William Barr and other DOJ officials at the White House on June 1; Barr's involvement in the events at Lafayette Park on June 1; and DOJ's deployment of its law enforcement personnel on June 1 and on subsequent days. Thereafter we describe our analysis of these events, including whether Barr affected the timing of the clearing operation at Lafayette Park on June 1."

United States. Department Of Justice. Office Of The Inspector General. Jul, 2024. 168p.

By Cynthia Dion-Schwarz, Alt. Authors: Nathan Ryan, Julia A. Thompson, Erik Silfversten, Giacomo Persi Paoli

This report profiles the cybersecurity threat landscape faced by Japan as the host nation of the 2020 Summer Games and 2020 Paralympic Games of the XXXII Olympiad. The overarching objective of the study was to produce a threat actor typology, based on a risk assessment of the Tokyo 2020 threat landscape. Synthesizing multiple sources of primary and secondary data, the study team developed a visualization of the threat landscape that provides an at-a-glance overview to guide Olympic security planners, computer emergency response teams, and policy- and decisionmakers as they prioritize and address cybersecurity threats. The risk assessment also considered the motivation, sophistication, and propensity of threat actors to collude with one another. This research could be valuable to a wide variety of stakeholders and will be of particular interest to stakeholders involved in planning and ensuring the security of the Tokyo 2020 Games. The research also serves as a reference to inform ongoing policy debates on cybersecurity preparations for mega-events and as a basis for future research.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2018. 97p.

UNITED STATES. WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

From the document: "Over the last 3 years, we have more than doubled our global health partnerships--working directly with 50 countries to ensure they can more effectively prevent, detect, and control outbreaks. And we are working with partners to support an additional 50 countries to save even more lives and minimize economic losses. With strong bipartisan support from Congress, we also championed the creation of the Pandemic Fund, a new international body that has already catalyzed $2 billion in financing from 27 contributors, including countries, foundations, and philanthropies, to build stronger global health security capabilities. We are working to make life-saving medicines and vaccines more rapidly available in health emergencies, including through supporting Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance and the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations. And we are leading efforts to ensure international financial institutions, such as the World Bank Group, scale up lending for pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response because health security, economic security, climate security, and national security are all related. This new Global Health Security Strategy lays out the actions the United States will take over the next 5 years to ensure we continue this progress[.]"

United States. White House Office. APR, 2024. 64p.

NOWRASTEH, ALEX

From the document: "This policy analysis is an update and simplification of three previous Cato policy analyses on the same topic that were published in 2016, 2019, and 2023. It differs from the 2016 and 2019 editions because it does not include the total number of visas issued during the years analyzed, does not include a cost-benefit analysis of different immigration policies intended to reduce the threat of foreign-born terrorism, and it further differs from the 2019 version because it does not include native-born terrorists. The risks of foreign-born terrorists on US soil are quantified by evaluating how many people they murdered and injured in attacks, the ideologies of the attackers, the visas on which the foreign-born terrorists entered the country, their countries of origin, and the costs of their terrorist attacks."

CATO INSTITUTE. 9 APR, 2024. 28p.

UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY. OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS; UNITED STATES. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; CANADIAN CENTRE FOR CYBER SECURITY; ESTONIAN NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY CENTRE; JAPAN COMPUTER EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM COORDINATION CENTER; NATIONAL CENTER OF INCIDENT READINESS AND STRATEGY FOR CYBERSECURITY JAPAN; FINLAND. NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY CENTRE; JAPAN. NATIONAL POLICE AGENCY; UNITED KINGDOM. NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY CENTRE

From the document: "Civil society--nonprofit, advocacy, cultural, faith-based, academic, think tanks, journalist, dissident, and diaspora organizations, communities, and individuals involved in defending human rights and advancing democracy--are considered high-risk communities. Often, these organizations and their employees are targeted by state-sponsored threat actors who seek to undermine democratic values and interests. Regularly conducted as a type of transnational repression (also referred to as digital transnational repression), state-sponsored actors compromise organizational or personal devices and networks to intimidate, silence, coerce, harass, or harm civil society organizations and individuals. According to industry reporting, state-sponsored targeting of high-risk communities predominantly emanates from the governments of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. Actors typically perform extensive pre-operational research to learn about potential victims, gather information to support social engineering, or obtain login credentials. Actors target organization networks or personal accounts (e.g., email) and devices of individuals for surveillance and monitoring, often via spyware applications--malicious software that collects data from affected devices. This guide provides recommendations for civil society organizations and individuals to mitigate the threat of state-sponsored cyber operations based on observed malicious behavior. The guide also provides recommendations for software manufacturers to improve the security posture of their customers."

UNITED STATES. CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY. 14 MAY, 2024. 19p.

DELFORGE, DAMIEN; BELOW, REGINA; WATHELET, VALENTIN; LOENHOUT, JORIS VAN; SPEYBROECK, NIKO

From the document: "In 2023, the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) recorded a total of 399 disasters related to natural hazards. These events resulted in 86,473 fatalities and affected 93.1 million people. The economic losses amounted to US$202.7 billion. The 2023 earthquake in Türkiye and the Syrian Arab Republic was the most catastrophic event of the year in terms of mortality and economic damage, with 56,683 reported deaths and damage worth US$42.9 billion damage. This earthquake impacted an estimated 18 million people, a total for both countries, making it the second most impactful event in terms of affected individuals. The first was the 2023 Indonesian Drought, which affected 18.8 million people from June to September 2023. In the year under review there was a high level of disaster mortality, with a total of 86,473 deaths, exceeding the 20-year average of 64,148 deaths and the median value of 19,290 deaths for the same period, mainly due to the dramatic earthquake in Türkiye and Syria in February 2023, counting for two-thirds of the EM-DAT total deaths. The number of individuals affected by disasters, 93.1 million, is below the 2003-2022 annual average of 175.5 million."

CENTRE FOR RESEARCH ON THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF DISASTERS; CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF LOUVAIN (1970- : FRENCH-SPEAKING); UNITED STATES. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. 3 APR, 2024.

ByAlex Stevens, Niamh Eastwood, and Kirstie Douse

In this review article, we develop the case for the decriminalisation of drug possession in the UK by describing our ‘modest proposal’ to repeal the relevant sections of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 and its advantages. We defend this proposal against possible critiques from both conservative and radical positions. On the conservative side, these criticisms include that it would increase drug use and harm and that it would be illegal under international law. From the more radical position, we anticipate the criticisms that decriminalisation of possession would leave the harm associated with illegal drug supply to continue, that it would leave in place restrictions on the rights to use drugs, that it would forego the possible tax income from a legally regulated market, and that the drug laws would continue to act as tools of social control. In response, we argue that decriminalisation offers a feasible first step towards reducing the harm of drug control which would not increase drug-related harm.

Drug Science, Policy and Law Volume 10: 1–10

By Liam Michaud a a , b , * , Gillian Kolla c , d , Katherine Rudzinski Graduate Program in Socio-Legal Studies, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada b e , Adrian Guta

The ongoing overdose and drug toxicity crisis in North America has contributed momentum to the emergence of safer supply prescribing and programs in Canada as a means of providing an alternative to the highly volatile unregulated drug supply. The implementation and scale-up of safer supply have been met with a vocal reaction on the part of news media commentators, conservative politicians, recovery industry representatives, and some prominent addiction medicine physicians. This reaction has largely converged around several narratives, based on unsubstantiated claims and anecdotal evidence, alleging that safer supply programs are generating a "new opioid epidemic", reflecting an emerging alignment among key institutional and political actors. Employing situational analysis method, and drawing on the policy studies and social science scholarship on moral panics, this essay examines news media coverage from January to July 2023, bringing this into dialogue with other existing empirical sources on safer supply (e.g. Coroner's reports, program evaluations, debates among experts in medical journals). We employ eight previously established criteria delineating moral panics to critically appraise public dialogue regarding safer supply, diverted medication, and claims of increased youth initiation to drug use and youth overdose. In detailing the emergence of a moral panic regarding safer supply, we trace historic continuities with earlier drug scares in Canadian history mobilized as tools of racialized poverty governance, as well as previous backlashes towards healthcare interventions for people who use drugs (PWUD). The essay assesses the claims of moral entrepreneurs against the current landscape of opioid use, diversion, and overdose among youth, notes the key role played by medical expertise in this and previous moral panics, and identifies what the convergence of these narratives materialize for PWUD and healthcare access, as well as the broader policy responses such narratives activate.

International Journal of Drug Policy 127 (2024) 104423

By European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) to Correlation – European Harm Reduction Network (C-EHRN)

Drug consumption rooms (DCRs) are fixed or mobile spaces in which people who use drugs are provided with sterile drug use equipment and can use illicit drugs under the supervision of trained staff. They exist in several European countries, Australia, Canada, Mexico and the USA, and are usually located in areas where there is an open drug scene and injecting in public places is common. Their primary goal is to reduce morbidity and mortality by providing a safer environment for drug use and training clients in safer forms of drug use. Other explicit objectives may be providing a conduit to other care services and reducing public nuisance. A main aim of this report is to inform discussions on DCRs by examining the available evidence, as well as reviewing the various models being adopted and their characteristics. Two operational models are typically used in Europe: (1) integrated DCRs, operating within low-threshold facilities, where the supervision of drug use is just one of several services offered; and (2) specialised DCRs, which provide a narrower range of services directly related to supervised consumption. Services typically available within DCRs include: provision of a supervised environment for drug use; clean drug use equipment, including sterile syringes; and rapid interventions if overdose occurs. In addition, DCRs may offer counselling services; primary medical care; training for clients in safer forms of drug use, overdose awareness and the use of naloxone; and referral to social, healthcare and treatment services. Access to consumption facilities may be restricted to registered service users, and often certain conditions have to be met, for example minimum age and local residency. Typically, drugs used in these facilities must be obtained prior to entry. Drug dealing and drug sharing are not allowed within the facilities (staff may be required to call in the police if necessary), and staff can advise but do not directly assist clients in administering their drugs. As frontline, low-threshold services, drug consumption rooms are often among the first places where insights can be gained into new drug use patterns, and, thus, they also can have a role to play in the early identification of new and emerging trends among high-risk populations using their services. The operation and functioning of DCRs has adapted to changes in the profiles and needs of their target groups, and to new patterns of use, as well as to new types of drugs emerging on the market. DCRs may also therefore be well placed to identify and inform strategies to mitigate harms related to developments in the illicit drug market that present new health challenges.

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2023. 52p.

UNITED STATES. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; UNITED STATES. OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL CYBER DIRECTOR

From the document: "The '2024 Report on the Cybersecurity Posture of the United States' assesses the cybersecurity posture of the United States, the effectiveness of national cyber policy and strategy, and the status of the implementation of national cyber policy and strategy by Federal departments and agencies. Additionally, this report highlights cybersecurity threats and issues facing the United States, including new or emerging technologies that may affect national security, economic prosperity, and the rule of law. This is the first edition of the report and covers calendar year 2023, with additional consideration of developments in 2024 preceding the publication of this report. Over the past year, U.S. national cybersecurity posture improved, driven by steady progress towards the 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy's (NCS) vision of a defensible, resilient, and values-aligned digital ecosystem achieved through fundamental shifts in the underlying dynamics that shape cyberspace. The Administration has successfully begun implementation of the NCS Implementation Plan, which coordinates actions by departments and agencies across the Federal Government to make the President's affirmative vision a reality. These initial implementation actions set the foundation for further investment and sustained commitment by stakeholders across the digital ecosystem."

United States. Executive Office of the President. United States. Office of the National Cyber Director. 2024. 37p.

ELLISON, TOM; HUGH, BRIGITTE

From the document: "Climate change and policy responses provide new opportunities for state and non-state actors to engage in mis- and disinformation across a wide range of scales and topics. Traditionally, analysis of climate change and misinformation has focused most on the problem of climate change denialism and politicization of emissions reductions. However, misinformation, disinformation peddling, and malign influence campaigns are increasing around a broader range of climate-related issues, such as blame for climate hazards, backlash to climate-driven displacement, disputes over clean energy policies, polarization over climate protests, and competition for influence in climate-vulnerable states. Such efforts have security implications across the political, economic and societal spheres, and warrant more holistic and proactive policy attention, drawing lessons from analogous efforts around the COVID-19 pandemic and security of elections. This report provides a baseline on the intersection of climate security risks and mis- and disinformation challenges."

CENTER FOR CLIMATE AND SECURITY. COUNCIL ON STRATEGIC RISKS. 2024. 14p.

By Alexandra Gannoni , Alexandra Voce, Sarah Napier, Hayley Boxall and Dana Thomsen

This study reviews initiatives that aim to prevent child sexual abuse material (CSAM) offending, including evidence of effectiveness. Information was sourced via a literature search and input from an international expert advisory group. The study identified 74 initiatives in 16 countries, and 34 eligible studies measuring implementation and effectiveness.

The CSAM offending prevention initiatives identified in the study include helplines, therapeutic treatment and psychoeducation, online self-management courses, education and awareness campaigns, and other forms of support. Importantly, findings indicate that media and social media campaigns have successfully reached large numbers of offenders, both detected and undetected. While outcomes of programs are mixed, findings indicate that prevention initiatives can encourage help-seeking, reduce risk factors for offending, enhance protective factors, and reduce contact sexual offending against children. Findings also suggest that initiatives aimed at contact child sexual abuse offenders are not necessarily effective in reducing CSAM offending. Evaluations of initiatives aimed specifically at CSAM offending show promise but are limited methodologically. Further and more robust evaluations are required to determine their effect on CSAM use.

Research Report no. 28. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology.2023. 125p.

By Geoffrey Carney-Knisely , Marquianna Griffin , Alaxandria Crawford , Kamesha Spates and Parvati Singh

The suicide rate for Black youth has increased by 60% between 2007 and 2020. Direct or vicarious racial trauma experienced through exposure to police brutality may underlie these concerning trends.MethodsWe obtained nationally aggregated monthly counts of suicides for non-Hispanic Black and White youth (age ≤ 24 years) and adults (age > 24 years) from the National Mortality Vital Statistics restricted-use data files provided by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, from 2013 to 2019. Monthly counts of Black youth suicides constituted our main outcome. We defined our exposure as the monthly counts of police killings of unarmed Black persons over 84 months (2013 to 2019), retrieved from the Mapping Police Violence database. We used ARIMA (AutoRegressive Integrated Moving Average) time-series analyses to examine whether Black youth suicides increased within 0 to 3 months following police killings of unarmed Black persons, controlling for autocorrelation and corresponding series of white youth suicides.ResultsSuicides among Black youth increase by ~1 count within three months following an increase in police killings of unarmed Black persons (coefficient=0.95,p<0.05), which approximates to about 267 suicides among Black youth over our study period. The observed increase in suicides concentrates among Black male youth.

Annals of Epidemiology. Volume 94, June 2024, Pages 91-99. June 2024.

By Ben Grunwald, John Rappaport and Michael Berg

Private security officers outnumber police by a wide margin, and the gap may be growing. As cities have claimed to defund the police, many have quietly expanded their use of private security, reallocating spending from the public to the private sector. It is difficult to know what to make of these trends, largely because we know so little about what private security looks like on the ground. On one prevalent view of the facts, a shift from public to private security would mean little more than a change of uniform, as the two labor markets are deeply intertwined. Indeed, academics, the media, popular culture, and the police themselves all tell us that private security is some amalgam of a police retirement community and a dumping ground for disgraced former cops. But if, instead, private officers differ systematically from the public police—and crossover between the sectors is limited—then substitution from policing to private security could drastically change who is providing security services.

We bring novel data to bear on these questions, presenting the largest empirical study of private security to date. We introduce an administrative dataset covering nearly 300,000 licensed private security officers in the State of Florida. By linking this dataset to similarly comprehensive information about public law enforcement, we have, for the first time, a nearly complete picture of the entire security labor market in one state. We report two principal findings. First, the public and private security markets are predominantly characterized by occupational segregation, not integration. The individuals who compose the private security sector differ markedly from the public police; they are, for example, significantly less likely to be white men. We also find that few private officers, roughly 2%, have previously worked in public policing, and even fewer will go on to policing in the future. Second, while former police make up a small share of all private security, roughly a quarter of cops who do cross over have been fired from a policing job. In fact, fired police officers are nearly as likely to land in private security as to find another policing job, and a full quarter end up in one or the other. We explore the implications of these findings, including intersections with police abolition and the future of policing, at the paper’s close.

Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Forthcoming . U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 850. University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 1004. Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2024-24