By D. Elaine Pressman

Risk factors for violent individuals have been used in risk assessment protocols for decades. Such tools and guides have been shown to be a valid and reliable way to assess risk of future violence. The risk assessment protocols currently available, however, have questionable relevance to violent extremists and terrorists because the factors used to assess risk do not relate to the background and motivations of this group of violent actors. The need was identified for a relevant tool for the population of violent ideologically motivated extremists. Approaches to risk assessment for violence are described in the document. These include unstructured clinical judgment, actuarial approaches and structured professional judgment (SPJ). Unstructured approaches have been criticized for not demonstrating high validity or good inter-rater reliability. Given the low base rate of violent extremists, it is difficult to create empirically based actuarial prediction instruments for violent extremism. The structured professional judgment approach (SPJ) has been used successfully with forensic populations and was considered appropriate for a tool to address risk assessment for the population of violent extremists. As current SPJ guides were found to be inadequate to address the specific historical and contextual features of violent extremists, a new SPJ guide was developed and is described in this document. The major goals of the project were to identify and compare the specific characteristics and factors of those who perpetrate “general” criminal violence and those who perpetrate ideologically motivated violence, to highlight the salient differences among the historical, contextual, attitudinal and protective risk factors of these types of criminal violence and to construct a new tool to assess the risk of violence in ideologically motivated extremists. ‘Political violence’, ‘radicalization’, ‘extremism’ and ‘terrorism’ were defined and elaborated in the document. The most significant risk factors relevant to violent extremism and terrorism were extracted from the literature and organized into a structured professional judgment (SPJ) protocol. Five categories were identified as risk factors and relevant items were identified for each category. These categories are modeled after other well-established SPJ tools but are item specific to violent extremism. The categories include attitude factors, contextual factors, historical factors, protective factors and demographic factors. A preliminary model for the assessment of de-radicalization and disengagement efficacy was proposed. The new SPJ protocol, Violent Extremist Risk Assessment or VERA is designed to be used with persons having a history of extremist violence or having been convicted of such offences. At this stage of development, the VERA is a conceptual “research” tool intended to generate debate and discussion.

Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2009. 44p.

By Kathryn M. Roberts

"Countering the radical Islamist narrative remains a high-profile priority of the United States in its ongoing efforts to counter domestic violent extremism. Since mid-2014, government officials have condemned the United States as unable to muster a satisfactory 'counter-narrative,' and emphasize the potentially devastating consequences of failure. Experts inside and outside the government describe the Islamic State as masters of the internet capable of reaching into the United States and turning its people into hate-filled, violently inspired terrorists at will. The idea that the United States must aggressively work to counter these messages domestically remains a given; but should it? The focus of this thesis is to examine current U.S. efforts in counter-messaging to determine why the United States believes it is failing, and what, if any, evidence supports the idea that a counter-narrative or counter-messaging should be part of domestic countering violent extremism (CVE) programs. Review of official documents found little basis to assess U.S. programs, as no meaningful published strategy, objectives, or performance data exist for current efforts. Moreover, the foundational assumptions underlying current programs suggest malalignment between what U.S. officials desire a counter-messaging effort to accomplish and what is realistically achievable. Based on these findings, it is recommended that domestic CVE programs eliminate counter-messaging from their portfolio."

Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2020. 119p.

By Tore Bjørgo and Ingvild Magnæs Gjelsvik.

This report provides an overview of Norwegian research on radicalisation and violent extremism, with an emphasis on knowledge about processes leading towards radicalization, extremism and terrorism, and how such processes can be prevented and countered. The main objective has been to identify the studies which can provide the most relevant knowledge to those whose task it is to prevent radicalization and violent extremism. This summary will address research on right-wing extremism, left-wing extremism, militant Islamism and foreign fighters, and terrorism more in general. The report will also provide a brief overview of relevant research in Denmark and Sweden as well as pointing out some of the leading European centers of research in this field. A main purpose for this overview of research is to identify holes of knowledge – areas and topics where research-based knowledge is lacking or is outdated, and where there is a need for new research. PHS Forskning 2015: 2 (This is an abridged edition, translated into English)

Oslo: Center for Research on Extremism, The Extreme Right, Hate Crime and Political Violence, University of Oslo, 2015. 25p.40p.

By Yngve Carlsson

This paper discusses the role of the Norwegian municipalities in coping with Islamic extremism – compared to how they handled right wing extremism 15-20 years ago. The main questions are: What do the municipalities actually do to prevent radicalization into militant extreme Islam? What is it reasonable to expect that the municipalities can do to prevent such activity? Such questions are highly relevant given the central position of the municipalities in the Nordic welfare states as a provider of many of the welfare services1 , and the role they play in developing vital, attractive and safe communities. It is not surprising that local authorities are expected to deal with this issue. The main argument in this paper is that preventing radicalization into Islamic extremism, dismantling groups and reintegrating individual extremists into the local community through local action, is a far more complex and difficult process compared to how right-wing extremism was handled 15-20 years ago when such groups were active in some Norwegian local communities. It is the intention of this paper to show the complexity of this issue and present some of the challenges and dilemmas that the municipalities have to face. Unless this complexity is understood, it may be difficult to find strategies and measures that can reduce the problem. It is unrealistic to believe that this problem can be completely prevented – at least by actors at the local community level.

Oslo: Center for Research on Extremism, The Extreme Right, Hate Crime and Political Violence, University of Oslo

By Michael Jones, Claudia Wallner and Emily Winterbotham

This occasional paper is part of RUSI’s Prevention Project, a multi-year effort to collate, assess and strengthen the existing knowledge base for preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) interventions across different thematic and geographic areas. The research for this project found that the evidence base for programme efficacy remains limited, with little information sharing, weak monitoring and evaluation regimes, a reliance on the same relatively small cluster of case studies, and a general lack of longitudinal analysis hampering collective understandings of P/CVE outcomes. As the conclusion to the Prevention Project series, the paper identifies cross-cutting findings and recommendations, highlighting key lessons and themes reflected in both the available literature and data collected from the research team’s fieldwork in Kenya and Lebanon

London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2021. 32p.