By Ted Enamorado, Luis-Felipe López-Calva, Carlos Rodríguez-Castelán, and Hernán Winkler

The relationship between income inequality and crime has attracted the interest of many researchers, but little convincing evidence exists on the causal effect of inequality on crime in developing countries. This paper estimates this effect in a unique context: Mexico's Drug War. The analysis takes advantage of a unique data set containing inequality and crime statistics for more than 2,000 Mexican municipalities covering a period of 20 years. Using an instrumental variable for inequality that tackles problems of reverse causality and omitted variable bias, this paper finds that an increment of one point in the Gini coefficient translates into an increase of more than 10 drug-related homicides per 100,000 inhabitants between 2006 and 2010. There are no significant effects before 2005. The fact that the effect was found during Mexico's Drug War and not before is likely because the cost of crime decreased with the proliferation of gangs (facilitating access to knowledge and logistics, lowering the marginal cost of criminal behavior), which, combined with rising inequality, increased the expected net benefit from criminal acts after 2005.

Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2014. 31p.

By Patrick Guillaumont and Frédéric Puech

Relying on samples taken from developing and developed countries, several recent papers, such as those by Fajnzylber et al. (2002), Soares (2004) and Neumayer (2003, 2005), have emphasized the influence of macro-economic variables on crime. Those studies highlight the impact of the average level of income and of its growth rate. But none of them consider the impact of its instability. This paper argues that the factors corresponding to economic shocks or macro-economic instability have a significant and robust influence on crime. It suggests that this influence comes from disappointed anticipations, formed during periods of rapid increase of income, which, to some extent, generates frustration and possibly crime. It also suggests that illegal activities are used by some agents to compensate their loss of income and, in this way, smooth their consumption. It mainly deals with the direct effect of instability on crime. Nevertheless, since macro instability reduces growth, as it has been largely substantiated in literature, and growth has been found to have a negative impact on crime, it can also be supposed to have an indirect effect on crime through the growth rate.

CERDI - Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International, 2006. 26p.

By Jason Payne, Rick Brown and Roderic Broadhurst

In this study the arrest records of the 1984 and 1994 NSW birth cohorts were obtained using a data matching process facilitated by the NSW Registry of Births Deaths and Marriages and the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (BOCSAR). The aim of this research is to examine the possible causes and consequences of the Australian crime decline through a longitudinal and developmental criminological lens. To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first such comparative analysis of longitudinal data aimed at exploring the crime decline, and builds on the recent, albeit it aggregated and cross-sectional, analysis both in Australia (Weatherburn et al. 2014) and overseas (Farrell et al. 2015). Overall, the age-graded longitudinal experiences of the more recent of the two cohorts (born in 1994) confirm the declines previously identified by Weatherburn and Holmes (2013). Specifically, the results presented in this study suggest that as a proportion of each birth cohort the number of young people having contact with the criminal justice system by their 21st birthday had almost halved; down from 9.5 percent for the 1984 birth cohort to 4.8 percent for the 1994 birth cohort. But for the very young ages of between 10 and 13 years, the annualised prevalence of criminal justice contact was markedly lower for those born in 1994, although the analysis shows that these disparities are greatest in the late teenage and early adulthood years. Importantly, the otherwise non-existent or modest differences in the younger years suggests that for both cohorts the emergence and prevalence of ‘early onset’ offending was not dissimilar. Instead, the so-called crime decline appears to have been the result of fewer young people having contact with the criminal justice system as teenagers and young adults.

Canberra: Australian National University, 2018. 68p.

By Sin-ying Choi

This dissertation is a study on the relationship between crime rate and socio-economic factors (i.e. poverty, income inequality, age, education and unemployment) in Hong Kong. Although there are many such studies on crime in foreign countries, similar study in Hong Kong is rare. This dissertation examines if any functional relationship could be established by regression analysis and how this can be related to new town development.

Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 2007. 123p.

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By Tom Naylor, with the assistance of Deane Taylor and Roksana Bahramitah

For obvious reasons, the primary functions of traditional law enforcement and the criminal justice system are investigation, prosecution, and punishment of persons deemed responsible for proscribed acts. The main purpose of criminological research, whether conducted by law enforcement or academics, has been to assist those functions, directly or indirectly. To be sure, there is much research that focuses on crimes as events rather than on the criminals who cause those events. But mostly, research has been devoted to studying the social conditions that facilitate the commission of offences. It has paid much less attention to understanding the methodology by which and institutional context through which particular actions take place. The resulting deficiencies are particularly marked with respect to profit-driven offences. The type of information collected by police or prosecutors for the purposes of a particular criminal proceeding may be quite different from the type of information necessary in understanding the nature of on-going criminal markets or the modus operandi of the underworld economy as a whole. Nor is academic criminology much more helpful – generally speaking, crimes are used to define categories of offenders rather than being a subject of (more technocratic) interest in and of themselves. These shortfalls also afflict the categorization of acts. The practice of dividing criminal code offences into three broad categories – crimes against persons, crimes against property, and trafficking – provides little useful information with respect to context or process. More specifically, due to lack of systematic definition and subsequent overlap, umbrella terms such as economic, commercial, and white-collar crime are frequently used interchangeably, even by socalled “experts in the field.” The fact that some of these terms refer to acts and others to persons doesn’t seem to matter (e.g., respectively, commercial vs. white-collar crime). It is no surprise that the specified offences covered by these are similarly confusing and impractical. For example, means (e.g., telephone pitches and computerized communications) and ends (e.g., fraudulent transfers of wealth) are oftentimes confounded. All this creates problems that go beyond simple lack of terminological neatness. Without knowing just what a problem or objective is, it seems rather difficult, to say the least, to design a strategy or policy to deal with it.

Ottawa: Research and Statistics Division, Department of Justice Canada, 2002. 51p.

The International Crisis Group

What’s the issue? After fifteen years of failed security policies, the government of El Salvador is in the middle of an open confrontation. Efforts aimed at fighting gangs’ deep social roots have not produced desired results due to a lack of political commitment and social divisions that gangs use to their advantage. Why does it matter? Born in the wake of U.S. deportation policies in the late 90s, gang violence in El Salvador has developed into a national security problem that accounts for the country’s sky-high murder rate. The combination of mano dura (iron fist) policies and the U.S. administration’s approach to migration could worsen El Salvador’s already critical security situation. What should be done? All political actors should honour the government’s holistic violence prevention strategies by fully implementing them and reframing anti-gang policies. Specific police and justice reforms, as well as a legal framework for rehabilitating

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2017. 46p,

By International Crisis Group

What’s new? Violence, coca production and drug trafficking have spiked along Colombia’s Pacific coast since the 2016 peace agreement between the government and FARC guerrillas. New and old armed groups battle for control over communities, territory and illegal business, triggering ongoing displacement and low-intensity warfare. Why does it matter? Long one of Colombia’s poorest and most peripheral regions, the Pacific’s struggles highlight huge difficulties in improving security without addressing economic and political roots of armed group recruitment and the co-option of communities by organised crime. What should be done? Instead of depending on a counter-insurgency strategy or a “kill/capture” policy to dismantle armed groups, the Colombian government should prioritise building a stable, trustworthy civilian police and state presence, demobilising combatants, fulfilling its peace accord promises on local development and coca substitution, and furnishing educational opportunities for local people.

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2019. 51p.

By International Crisis Group

What’s new? The COVID-19 pandemic had an immediate impact on organised crime across Mexico and Central America’s northern countries as lockdowns slowed movement of people and goods. But criminal groups swiftly adapted to the new normal, using it to tighten or expand their control over people and territory. Why does it matter? The region’s criminal groups, many acting in collusion with rogue state actors, are largely responsible for some of the world’s highest murder rates and wield asphyxiating power in an increasing number of communities. With state budgets under huge strain, official responses are set to remain lacklustre. What should be done? Governments should combine policing to contain and deter crime with increased support to the most insecure areas and vulnerable populations. Rather than reverting to heavy-handed tactics, they should invest in programs that reduce impunity and create economic alternatives for at-risk young people, potentially with the help of COVID-19 emergency funds.

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2020. 37p.

By International Crisis Group

What’s new? Crime and violence have simmered along the lengthy ColombianVenezuelan frontier for decades. But the regional spillover of Venezuela’s political conflict and economic collapse has caused ties between the two states to fray as well, amid border closures, a migrant exodus and rival military exercises. Why does it matter? Numerous armed groups clash with one another and harm citizens along a border marked by abundant coca crops and informal crossings. High bilateral tensions could spur escalating border hostilities while perpetuating the mistreatment of migrants and refugees whose movements have been restricted by COVID-19. What should be done? Colombian and Venezuelan authorities should urgently establish communication channels to resolve violent incidents along the border, possibly with international backing. They should reopen formal border crossings as planned, but also increase humanitarian aid to help ensure that migrants and refugees are healthy and can move safely.

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2020. 44p.

By International Crisis Group

What’s new? On 6 June, Mexico will stage its largest-ever election day, with 21,000 contests nationwide. Opposition forces accuse President Andrés Manuel López Obrador of planning to deepen authoritarian rule should his allies prevail in the polls. Meanwhile, criminal groups exploit electoral competition in their quest for impunity and power. Why does it matter? The country’s politics are highly polarised, and its parties are weak and opportunistic. Criminal groups can use favours and threats to gain influence over future elected officials. Entanglements between government and organised crime that have long undermined security policies help perpetuate Mexico’s high levels of violence. What should be done? Severing links between criminals and state officials will be challenging, especially given the government’s apparent reticence to act. Still, outside actors should encourage investment in independent election oversight bodies and local institutions, and a shift toward tailored and less militarised policies to curb insecurity in Mexico’s most conflict-ridden areas.

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2021. 33p.

By Jorge M. Agüero

About half of Peruvian women between the ages of 15 and 49 have experienced some form of violence from their partners. Through a quantitative analysis, this report explores how violence rates against women vary by ethnic group and over time. Based on a nationally representative sample of more than 75,000 women surveyed between 2003 and 2012 and a review of the literature on ethnic classification in Peru, a typology is applied to measure ethnicity, based on women’s linguistic backgrounds, allowing for a consistent ethnic characterization throughout the period of analysis. In this typology, the first group is made up of women who speak an indigenous language at home and do not speak Spanish. A second group, called “historic” Spanish speakers, is composed of women who learned Spanish during childhood and still use it today, while the third group, called “recent” Spanish speakers, includes women who grew up speaking an indigenous language but now speak Spanish. The highest rate of all types of violence is found in this last group, with a much greater difference in sexual and severe physical violence. This is consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model developed in this study in which violence depends on the type of couple. The model finds that women who speak “recent” Spanish—and who have what is termed a lower “outside option” than their “historic” Spanish-speaking male partners—experience greater violence. The study found that the gap in rates of violence against women among these three language groupings has remained constant over time despite an overall reduction in violence. This shows that current policies to provide care for victims and prevent violence against women are insufficient because the policies do not necessarily target groups with a greater risk of violence. This is unlike other areas of public health, where interventions are directly targeted at the most vulnerable populations

Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 2018. 43p.

By Marc Fabel and Helmut Rainer

This paper quantifies how much of violent crime in society can be attributed to football-related violence. We study the universe of professional football matches played out in Germany’s top three football leagues over the period 2011-2015. To identify causal effects, we leverage time-series and cross-sectional variation in crime register data, comparing the number of violent crimes on days with and without professional football matches while controlling for date heterogeneity, weather, and holidays. Our main finding shows that violent crime increases by 21.5 percent on a match day. In the regions and time period under consideration, professional football matches explain 8 percent of all violent assaults, and generate social costs of roughly 194 million euros. Exploring possible mechanisms, we establish that the match day effect cannot be explained by emotional cues stemming from either unsettling events during a match or unexpected game outcomes, nor is it driven by increases in domestic violence. Instead, we find that the match day effect can be attributed to violence among males in the 18-29 age group, rises to almost 70 percent on days with high-rivalry derby matches, and that a non-negligible share of it stems from violent assaults on police officers. These findings are inconsistent with frustration-aggression theories that can explain sports-related violence in the United States, but can be accommodated by social identity explanations of football hooliganism.

Munich: CESifo, 2021. 40p.

By Lucy Strang, Garrett Baker, Jack Pollard, Joanna Hofman

Football is the world's most popular sport, with millions of fans annually watching professional football on their television or at public viewing places such as fan zones, or attending matches in person. Negative behaviour at football matches is a widely recognised issue that has garnered international media attention for decades. However, violent and antisocial behaviour at football matches remains an issue that needs to be better understood. To this end, RAND Europe was commissioned by Qatar University to provide a series of reports looking into the issues of violence and antisocial behaviour at major sporting events. This first report observes the key antisocial and violent behaviours that may be witnessed in relation to football events, such as verbal abuse, destruction of property, acts of vandalism and assault, while also noting that football environments can foster positive behaviours and social dynamics. In addition, it acknowledges that definitions of antisocial behaviour are to some degree subjective and contextual. It is important to acknowledge, however, that while the identified studies consider specific factors driving fan behaviour, the available evidence supports the notion that no single factor can be found to be responsible for violent or antisocial behaviour by fans at football events. Rather, multiple factors are often in play simultaneously. While the identified studies consider specific factors driving fan behaviour, the available evidence supports the notion that no single factor can be found to be responsible for violent or antisocial behaviour by fans at football events. Rather, multiple factors are often in play simultaneously. The quality of the identified literature varied significantly, and the research team rated only a handful of studies as being very high quality.

Santa Monica, CA: Cambridge, UK: RAND Europe, 2018. 42p.

By Zoe B. Cullen, Will S. Dobbie, and Mitchell Hoffman

State and local policies increasingly restrict employers’ access to criminal records, but without addressing the underlying reasons that employers may conduct criminal background checks. Employers may thus still want to ask about a job applicant’s criminal record later in the hiring process or make inaccurate judgments based on an applicant’s demographic characteristics. In this paper, we use a field experiment conducted in partnership with a nationwide staffing platform to test policies that more directly address the reasons that employers may conduct criminal background checks. The experiment asked hiring managers at nearly a thousand U.S. businesses to make incentive-compatible decisions under different randomized conditions. We find that 39% of businesses in our sample are willing to work with individuals with a criminal record at baseline, which rises to over 50% when businesses are offered crime and safety insurance, a single performance review, or a limited background check covering just the past year. Wage subsidies can achieve similar increases but at substantially higher cost. Based on our findings, the staffing platform relaxed the criminal background check requirement and offered crime and safety insurance to interested businesses.

Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2022. 42p.

By Sophus A. Reinert

The Milanese Marquis Cesare Beccaria (1738-1794) dedicated his life first to theorizing a more just and equal society grounded in individual rights, anchored in secular political economy rather than in religious dogma, then to realizing this bold vision through decades of administrative and regulatory work for the Milanese state. His project was not merely to reform the criminal system of the Old Regime but to challenge the very inequalities—legal, economic, educational, and so on—which drove crime to begin with.2 During his lifetime, however, his fame as a “friend of humanity” derived mostly from his impassioned pleas against torture and capital punishment, though on the basis of his temperament and his ideas it would also be easy to count him as part of what, for the later eighteenth century, the late Yves Bénot dubbed the “internationale abolitionniste.”3 This is, in large parts, also how he is remembered, but not only. It is of course a truism that ideas can have ironic, even sarcastic afterlives, but there is nonetheless something slightly perverse about Beccaria’s treatment in parts of American historiography.4 I have previously highlighted how his paternity has been claimed for both libertarian atheism and Catholic social democracy, but his name now appears ever more frequently in contemporary debates over “gun rights,” the “carceral state” and the rise of “racial capitalism.”5 We often hear of the “centrality of penal slavery” in Beccaria’s thought, for example, to the point where he repeatedly has been given the rather unenviable title of “father of prison slavery” and “father of penal servitude.”6 Some of these commentators are generous enough to admit that Beccaria can “be credited with voicing some humanitarian concerns,”

Boston, MA: Harvard Business School, 2021. 49p.

By Graeme R. Newman.

This vintage text, first published in 1978, on the causes, consequences and distribution of violence is as relevant today as it was over 4 decades ago.. Though limited to research of the 1970s, the explanations, exposition and reviews of data and theories of violence are staggeringly similar to the research of the 21st century. The organization of the material is unequaled, and will help any student of violence, or anyone who seeks answers and understanding, with its well organized exposition and clear, down-to-earth style. The new preface by the author identifies what he would add if he were doing a new edition, and why in the end he chose not to write one.

NY. Harrow and Heston Classic Reprint. 2021.

By Karl Steel.

How to Make a Human: Animals and Violence in the Middle Ages tracks human attempts to cordon humans off from other life through a wide range of medieval texts and practices, including encyclopedias, dietary guides, resurrection doctrine, cannibal narrative, butchery law, boar-hunting, and teratology. Karl Steel argues that the human subjugation of animals played an essential role in the medieval concept of the human. In their works and habits, humans tried to distinguish themselves from other animals by claiming that humans alone among worldly creatures possess language, reason, culture, and, above all, an immortal soul and resurrectable body. Humans convinced themselves of this difference by observing that animals routinely suffer degradation at the hands of humans. Since the categories of human and animal were both a retroactive and relative effect of domination, no human could forgo his human privileges without abandoning himself.Medieval arguments for both human particularity and the unique sanctity of human life have persisted into the modern age despite the insights of Darwin. How to Make a Human joins with other works in critical animal theory to unsettle human pretensions in the hopes of training humans to cease to project, and to defend, their human selves against other animals.

Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 2011. 292p.

By Raimo Lahti.

This collection of essays on criminal law, criminology and criminal policy includes a selection of my articles from the year of 1972 to the year of 2020, i.e., from a period of 49 years. The writings – in all 32 – chosen for the compilation are written in English and 30 of them have been published earlier. The main aim with this anthology is to crucially widen the access of my writings for comparative purposes. The articles are divided into seven chapters. Chapters I–VI cover a large spectrum of criminal sciences, and they are – in particular, in Chapters IV–VI – written rather from a Nordic (Scandinavian) than from a narrower Finnish perspective. The title of the anthology expresses its main message: towards an efficient, just and humane criminal justice. Chapter VII includes five articles related to bio-ethics and (criminal) law. The reason for that chapter’s attachment is to present some of my contributions to the new discipline entitled ‘Medical law and biolaw’.

The intensified internationalization and Europeanization of criminal law and justice have changed the role of comparative law and criminal sciences in general. There is much more need for comparison of legal orders due to the emergence of European criminal law and international criminal law and due to the increased interaction between European and global legal regulations and the national legal orders. We also need more evidence-based criminological research to be utilized in criminal-policy planning and as a foundation for rational policy decisions.

Helsinki: Suomalainen lakimiesyhdistys, 2021. 554p.

By Coleman Phillipson.

THE following three essays are not intended to be considered as separate, independent studies; they are meant to be taken together as supplementing each other, and as constituting one whole. With this intention in view, the author has been able to avoid a good deal of overlapping and repetition, which would otherwise have been inevitable. Though three men and their works are here discussed, we are concerned with but one epoch, one movement, one phase in legal evolution, which represents in many respects a turning-point in European history, and is of the utmost importance in the development of our modern civilisation. Beccaria, Bentham and Romilly are among the greatest law reformers of modern times. In their assault on the folly, injustice and cruelty of the then existing criminal jurisprudence, in their trenchant criticism of outworn codes, obscurantist traditions, blind superstitions, dogmatic technicalities, oppressive fictions, and useless relics of the past, in their proposal of rational substitutes, in their pointing the way to the light, they were intimately united. Their resemblances, like their differences, are as striking in their work as they are in their personal characteristics. In the case of Beccaria—a diffident Italian youth, shrinking from the struggles _ of men, whose small work was almost forcibly extracted from . him by his friends, and whose guarded oracular utterances soon arrested the attention of the world—we shall see vital conceptions and principles of penology in the process of germination and crystallisation; we shall see them in their triumphant conflict with the prevailing régime of sanguinary laws and barbarous methods of procedure. In the case of Bentham—that myriad-minded man, the dauntless explorer of institutions, the arch-legislator ever ready, in his jealously guarded “‘hermitage,”’ to make laws for all the nations of the earth—we shall see a prodigious multitude of ideas, schemes and systems, lavishly given to the world from a rich mine that could, surely, never be exhausted; we shall see this prolific progenitor scattering them broadcast, infusing new life into many barren places…

London: J.M. Dent, 1923. 344p.

By Louis Proal.

A Legal and Literary Study. Translated by Alfred Richard Allinson. From the preface: “…How comes it that affection may turn to hate, and lovers become the bitterest of foes — that the transition is so easy from love to loathing, from the transports of the most exalted tenderness to frenzies of the most savage anger? How is it foun so fond a feeling may grow so cruel and lead to commission of so many barbarous murders…?”

Paris. Carrington (1901) 707 pages.