By David C. Brotherton, and Follow Rafael Gude

Since 2007, the Ecuadorian approach to crime control has emphasized efforts to reach higher levels of social control based on policies of social inclusion and innovations in criminal justice and police reform. One innovative aspect of this approach was the decision to legalize a number of street gangs in 2007. The government claims the success of these policies can be seen in homicide rates that have fallen from 15.35 per 100,000 in 2011 to 5 per 100,000 in 2017. However, little is understood about the factors and their combination that have produced this outcome. To explore this phenomenon, we developed a research project focusing on the impact of street gangs involved in processes of social inclusion on violence reduction. From April to October 2017, we collected multiple data sets including 60 face-to-face interviews with members from four different street subcultures in several field sites, field observations and archival materials to answer two primary questions: How has the relationship between street groups and state agencies changed in the past 10 years? How has this changed relationship contributed to a hitherto unexamined role in the homicide reduction phenomenon of Ecuador? We found that legalization helped reduce violence and criminality drastically while providing a space, both culturally and legally, to transform the social capital of the gang into effective vehicles of behavioral change. In policy terms, we argue that the social inclusion approach to street gangs should be continued and highlighted as a model of best practices of the state.

Washington, DC: IDB, 2018.

European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA)

Availability remains high across the main drugs used in Europe, evidenced by the large and in some cases increasing quantities that continue to be seized in the European Union. In addition, the market for illicit drugs is characterised by the diversification of consumer products and the widespread availability of a broader range of drugs, including new psychoactive substances, often of high potency or purity. Specialised equipment may be required to meet the detection and monitoring challenges posed by this diversification.

The recent emergence of highly potent opioids, particularly benzimidazoles (nitazenes), poses a particularly complex threat to public health due to their increased risk of life-threatening poisoning. The potential emergence of new patterns of consumption in Europe is also a key threat, due to the availability of cheap and highly potent or pure drugs. This is particularly the case for cocaine, which has seen unprecedented levels of availability

European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), 2024. 39p.

By A&A Multiprime

As part of our commitment to contribute to loss prevention in Colombia and across the region, our team regularly engages in meetings with representatives of the Colombian Highest Maritime Authority (DIMAR) and the officers in charge of anti-narcotic policies in the ports. We gather updated informa tion about new practices and precautions to be aware of, as well as relevant recommendations and measures to adopt while visiting any of our ports. This ongoing engagement has culminated in our 2024 report, which reflects the latest insights and strategies in combating the challenges faced by the maritime industry

Recent events highlight the ongoing challenges in countering cocaine trafficking. For example, on February 8, 2024, British authorities announced a historic seizure of over 12,500 pounds of cocaine concealed in a banana shipment from the Port of Turbo, Colombia, to Southampton. This incident, marking the largest single drug seizure in UK history, emphasizes the advanced techniques used by cartels to transport substantial drug quantities into Europe and the UK, thereby confirming the global impact of Colombian narcotics. This report results from our efforts and experience over the last years, successfully assisting in several drug smuggling-related incidents and administrative investigations for breaches of shipping regulations, including the ISPS Code. We trust that this report will serve as a valuable resource for all P&I Clubs, their Members, the Masters and crews, and, in general, the entire marine industry with an interest in Colombian ports to mitigate incidents associated with drug smuggling activities

Bogota: A&A Multiprime. 2024. 18p.

By Colleen King

In December 2023, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) offloaded approximately 18,219 pounds of cocaine from the USCG Cutter Waesche. The estimated street value of the cocaine was more than $239 million. The offload occurred as a result of six separate maritime interdictions, performed by separate cutters, taking place over a 17-day period off the coasts of Mexico and Central and South America. The interdictions were performed as part of the USCG’s counternarcotics mission. While interdictions of this size may seem out of the ordinary, the USCG routinely interdicts a variety of vessels, including Go-Fast Vessels and semi submersibles, with massive amounts of drugs (usually cocaine), moving from the Pacific and Caribbean coasts of South America northward to Mexico, the Caribbean, and eventually the United States. One can imagine that prosecuting interdictions like these may raise a variety of questions: could the United States assert jurisdiction over the suspected traffickers; would the maritime location of the interdiction matter; and would it make a difference if the ship carrying the contraband was flagged—registered—by another country? What about the transit time to a U.S. court for an initial appearance where the interdiction occurred over a thousand miles from the United States? The dizzying array of issues confronting a federal prosecutor following a high seas interdiction may not be typical of land-based legal challenges. Fortunately, a body of both federal law and international authorities is instructive on these questions. The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) is the United States’ principal statute addressing high seas drug trafficking and has supported thousands of prosecutions for decades. The MDLEA, as it re lates to controlled substances,5 prohibits the distribution, manufacture, or possession with intent to distribute or manufacture, controlled sub stances aboard a “covered vessel.” Its prohibitions apply “outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States,” and include both attempt and conspiracy liability. And, where an interdiction occurs outside of the United States, venue may be appropriate in your district. This article is intended to serve as an MDLEA primer. It will provide a brief his tory of the MDLEA, identify the MDLEA’s core definitional provisions, discuss its key criminal prohibition, detail its jurisdiction and venue pro vision, describe the MDLEA’s position on the use of international law as a defense, and finally, address its sentencing provisions.

March 2024 DOJ Journal of Federal Law and Practice

David H. Ucko, Thomas A. Marks

Organized crime both preys upon and caters to human need. It is corrosive and exploitative, but also empowering, and therefore pervasive. Indeed, though often out of sight, organized crime is everywhere: wherever governments draw the line, criminal actors find profitable ways of crossing it; wherever governments fail to deliver on human need, criminal actors capitalize on unmet desire or despair. For those excluded from the political economy, from patronage systems or elite bargains, organized crime can offer opportunity, possibly also protection.

PRISM, Vol. 10, No. 3 (2023), pp. 92-117 (26 pages)

By David H. Ucko and Thomas A. Marks

Organised crime is not going well. According to the 2021 Global Organized Crime index, ‘the global illicit economy simply continue[s] along the upward trajectory it has followed over the past 20 years, posing an ever-increasing threat to security, development and justice – the pillars of democracy’ (Global Initiative, 2021, p. 8). Wherever governments seek to draw the line, criminal actors find profitable ways of crossing it; wherever governments fail to deliver on human need, criminal actors capitalise on citizens’ desire or despair. As of now, more than three-quarters of the world’s population ‘live in countries with high levels of criminality, and in countries with low resilience to organized crime’ (Global Initiative, 2021, p. 12). On aggregate, the associated activity amounts to an illicit form of governance, furnishing alternative services to a wide range of clients, be they the vulnerable and weak or a covetous elite. The breadth of organised crime, its clandestine nature, and its blending of creative and destructive effects make it difficult to counter. In past SOC ACE research, we argued that the response to organised crime often shares certain pitfalls with counterterrorism, at least since 9/11 (Ucko & Marks, 2022c). Both efforts have been stymied by 1) conceptual uncertainty of the problem at hand; 2) an urge to address the scourge head on (be it violence or crime), without acknowledging its socioeconomic-political context; and, therefore, 3) unquestioned pursuit of strategies that miss the point, whose progress is difficult to measure, and which may even be counterproductive. This convergence is based on the common features of the two phenomena, which are both concerned with i) collective actors, who ii) use violence and coercion among other methods; and who have iii) corrupting, or outright destructive effects on society. Though organised crime is not consciously political in its ideological motivation, it is – like terrorism – deeply political in its origins, activities, and effects. Given the conceptual overlap, and the common pathologies that undermine response, the lessons from countering terrorism are relevant also to the countering of organised crime. Focusing on the concept of ‘irregular warfare’, our past research identified six key lessons, touching upon 1) the socio-political embeddedness of the problem, 2) the tendency to militarise the response, 3) the mirror-imaging of state assistance programmes, 4) the invaluable role of community mobilisation, 5) the dearth of strategy, and 6) the need to engage more closely with questions of political will. As argued elsewhere, these challenges point to a need for greater strategic competence both in assessing the problem of organised crime and in designing a response (Ucko & Marks, 2022c).

To generate this strategic competence, this follow-on report sets out an analytical toolkit to assist planners and policymakers with the crafting of strategy. This ‘Framework of Analysis and Action’ builds upon lessons – negative and positive – learned via years of experience with irregular warfare, defined by the Department of Defense as ‘a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s)’ (U.S. Department of Defense, 2007, p. 1).1 It is a framework that finds its origins within the U.S. National Defense University’s College of International Security Affairs (CISA), where for two decades it has been used to teach strategic planning for complex and intensely political challenges (Ucko & Marks, 2022a). The framework consists of two parts: the Strategic Estimate of the Situation (which maps the problem, explores its drivers, frames, and methods, and critiques the current response) and the Course of Action (which uses the strategic estimate to design an appropriate strategy, guided by a theory of success). The framework is in this report adapted for organised crime, to enable the mapping of relevant actors and the crafting, thereby, of a viable response. By design, the framework responds to the six key lessons identified in our earlier work. This report goes through the framework and explains its adaptation to organised crime. Appendix A provides a summation of the toolkit, a ‘user’s guide’, that will facilitate application of the framework. Testing to date suggests great potential and we look forward to sustaining a dialogue with those engaged with countering organised crime to further evolve this toolkit. Indeed, since the beginning, this framework has been a living product, enriched by theoretical application in the classroom and practical use in the field.

SOC ACE Research Paper No. 19. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2023. 45p.

By Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime’s Observatory of Illicit Economies in South Eastern Europe.

In this issue, we focus on three cases where criminal groups from the region have been active in recent years: the Netherlands, Ecuador and parts of Africa.

These examples illustrate the growing involvement of Balkan criminal groups in some of the world’s hotspots for illicit activity. Research for these articles is facilitated by the Global Initiative’s network of contacts with local investigative journalists, as well as close cooperation between regional observatories of illicit economies, namely South Eastern Europe, West Africa and Latin America.

As part of the GI-TOC’s analysis of the risks of firearms trafficking from Ukraine, in this issue we show that the Western Balkans remain the main source of illegal weapons in Europe. At present, weapons are still cheap and plentiful in the region, and stockpiles have been augmented by inflows from Turkey via Bulgaria, particularly of gas and alarm guns. More on this topic can be found in a forthcoming GI-TOC report on trends in arms trafficking from the Ukraine conflict.

In this issue, we also report on a major crackdown by Serbian authorities in late 2023 on increasingly violent smugglers operating along the border between Serbia and Hungary, and examine how this has displaced migration flows towards Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Risk Bulletin No. 18. Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 25p.

By Amir Rotami

In this policy brief, based on published and forthcoming studies, author Amir Rostami outlines the changing nature of crime in Sweden, with a focus on organised crime, specifically lethal violence and fraud. What are the lessons learned from the Swedish crime paradox, namely the rise in organised crime, but not an equivalent rise in general crime, and what needs to be implemented to counter organised crime? The reaction to the question can be divided into two components: local and global/

European Liberal Forum Policy Paper . Brussels: European Liberal Forum, 2021. 19p.

By Vlado Vivoda, Ghaleb Krame and Martin Spraggon

Oil theft refers to the exploitation of crude oil or refined petroleum products for criminal purposes. In Mexico, oil theft—referred to as huachicolero—is endemic and widespread. By framing it within the energy security and transition context, this paper offers a new perspective on the problem of oil theft in Mexico. Focusing on crude oil and refined petroleum, the paper demonstrates that Mexico’s energy security—as framed around the 4As (availability, accessibility, affordability, and acceptance)—has deteriorated over the past decade. Application of the 4As framework in the Mexican context shows that the increasing frequency of oil theft has contributed to this deterioration. The proposed solution to the energy security and oil theft problems is centred on Mexico moving from gasoline and diesel to electrification in the transportation sector. The paper demonstrates that, while transport electrification in Mexico has been lagging behind other countries, recent developments in the country point to growing momentum among the country’s political and business elites, in tandem with US partners, in support for the energy transition. Areas where further emphasis should be placed to accelerate Mexico’s energy transition in the transportation sector are identified. Finally, the feasibility of and potential limitations associated with implementing the transition are evaluated.

Resources 2023, 12(2), 30; https://doi.org/10.3390/resources12020030

By  James B. Jacobs and Kerry T. Cooperman

In 1988, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Rudy Giuliani brought a massive civil racketeering suit against the leadership of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT), at the time possibly the most corrupt union in the world. The lawsuit charged that the mafia had operated the IBT as a racketeering enterprise for decades, systematically violating the rights of members and furthering the interests of organized crime. On the eve of trial, the parties settled the case, and twenty years later, the trustees are still on the job.

Breaking the Devil’s Pact is an in-depth study of the U.S. v. IBT, beginning with Giuliani’s lawsuit and the politics surrounding it, and continuing with an incisive analysis of the controversial nature of the ongoing trusteeship. James B. Jacobs and Kerry T. Cooperman address the larger question of the limits of legal reform in the American labor movement and the appropriate level of government involvement.

New York; London: NYU Press, 2011. 320p.

By Ian Tennant and Prem Mahadevan

Summary This briefing note summarises the GI-TOC’s research and experiences in engaging with and supporting civil society responses to organised crime. This is provided in the context of the ongoing threats and shrinking space for civil society, and a need for policymakers and officials to understand civil society’s role, value and potential. It is hoped that this briefing note can provide researchers and officials with a background briefing that could enable improved policy responses aimed at supporting civil society as part of whole-of-society efforts to prevent and counter organised crime.

Briefing Note 27

The Hague: Serious Organised Crime & Anti-Corruption Evidence (SOC ACE) 2024. 10p.

By Ana Paula Oliveira

Summary As a global challenge, organised crime is increasingly threatening the safety and security of citizens. Despite the real-world impact, there is an apparent disconnection between international human rights laws and policies, and responses to transnational organized crime. Even though the regulatory frameworks may have different objectives and scopes, human rights and responses to organised crime are not concepts at odds. Without aiming to provide an exhaustive or comprehensive account of all human rights issues deriving from the workings of organised crime, this briefing note identifies four areas that justify greater attention to the fundamental rights of natural persons, and convergence in the human rights and crime agendas. It draws on a review of Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC)’s research and programming, and the author’s own experience as a lawyer working on organised crime issues for the past five years.

Briefing Note 29

The Hague: Serious Organised Crime & Anti-Corruption Evidence (SOC ACE) , 2024. 10[p.

By Reynell Badill and Víctor M. Mijares

Why do criminal groups decide to adopt political discourses? We argue that an armed group's discursive politicisation (the public declaration of political motivations) is more likely when the state declares the organisation to be an existential threat, militarises the fight against it (securitisation), and when the leaders of the armed group have had political training. This discourse aims to reduce the state's military actions against them and gain civilian support. This argument is demonstrated through a qualitative comparative analysis of six Latin American cases: Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia and Los Rastrojos (Colombia), Militarizado Partido Comunista del Perú (Peru), Primeiro Comando da Capital (Brazil), Tren de Aragua (Venezuela), and Cartel de Sinaloa (Mexico). Three of them adopted a political discourse, and the others did not. We provide an analytical framework for criminal actors who do not necessarily fit into insurgent, paramilitary or simple criminal group typology.

October 2021Global Crime 22(4):312-335

By Reynell Badillo-Sarmiento & Luis Fernando Trejos-Rosero 

This article explores how organized criminal organizations exercise criminal governance over other organized and non-organized criminals using public messaging, lethal and extra-lethal violence. Drawing on extensive fieldwork, over 350 press reports, and an original database on inter-criminal lethal violence, we show, in line with recent literature on organized crime, that while these organizations use violence to build their reputation as actors willing to use force, they also provide benefits to other criminals such as financing and protection from state and competitors. This article contributes to the literature on criminal governance by elaborating on the mechanisms shown in recent work and by detailing an unexplored case study in Barranquilla (Colombia).

Colombia: Trends in Organized Crime, 2023. 27p.

By Radha Barooah and Ana Paula Oliveira Siria Gastélum Félix

This brief aims to bring specific local perspectives to the broader global policymaking agenda, and is intended to inform government officials and policymakers, as well as civil society groups working in this field.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY People from all walks of life have disappeared during Mexico’s so-called ‘war on drugs’; many others become victims of the growing global human trafficking industry; migrants go missing as they travel to seek a better life elsewhere, often displaced by criminal groups. Vulnerable youth, particularly young boys, are co-opted by criminal interests and then ‘disappeared’ to forcibly join gangs, often groomed to provide gang ‘muscle’ or traffic drugs.1 Women and children are often trafficked for sexual exploitation and forced labour.2 Many activists, journalists, politicians and whistle-blowers who campaign against organized crime or corruption have disappeared. Disappearances – as we define the phenomenon in this paper – are deployed for various reasons: to silence the voices of social and political leaders, activists and journalists; to assert violent control over criminal territories and illicit markets; or to monetize vulnerable people as a tradeable commodity. In all these cases, criminal groups have a hand, and although organized crime-related disappearances vary in motive and scope, they disproportionately affect the most marginalized communities. Criminal groups therefore instrumentalize disappearances for different objectives. But a fundamental challenge of dealing with this widespread problem is that cases are rarely differentiated and often assumed by law enforcement authorities to be one-off isolated incidents. However, when examining this issue closely, there is a more menacing pattern behind them, namely that they are often perpetrated by organized criminal groups operating in a particular community or controlling a market territory. By not discerning this broader picture of underlying criminal intent, by focusing on the what and ignoring the why, the phenomenon tends to receive limited attention in public policy agendas. There is also inadequate institutional support and investigative work, which has the effect of impeding victims’ access to justice. The international framework designed to address enforced disappearances – the International Convention for Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances (ICPPED)3 – requires that state involvement in the act (in the form of collusion, authorization or acquiescence) is proven in order to trigger its obligations. Compounding this, the conditions of state involvement and the role of organized crime actors are not clearly set out in the wording of the convention, so cases of disappearances linked to illicit economies tend to be confined to the margins of national and international agendas. Meanwhile, the international human rights discourse on disappearances perpetrated by non-state actors (e.g. criminal groups or networks) has progressed to a certain degree, but it, too, remains ill-equipped to determine the conditions and factors of collusion between organized crime and state actors that would amount to authorization, acquiescence or omission. These imprecisions and gaps in the legal framework result in a general lack of institutional support for victims and their families. Despite this, individuals and communities affected by this crime have developed mechanisms to respond. Since 2019, the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), through its Resilience Fund, has supported over 50 community-based initiatives and activists searching for people who have disappeared, including relatives seeking justice and journalists investigating disappearances related to organized crime around the world.4 The Resilience Fund has documented first-hand experiences through interviews and dialogues and provided financial and capacity-building support.5 This brief draws from the work and perspectives of such civil society and community members who live in environments that are exposed to disappearances. It assesses this form of organized crime as a serious human rights violation. While informed by the global dynamics of this criminal market, it focuses on contexts in which disappearances occur in Latin America, analyzing in particular the cases of Mexico and Venezuela. The first setting examines how criminal groups strategically deploy disappearances to fulfill various objectives; the other considers how disappearances occur in the mining sector, which experiences a high prevalence of criminality. This policy brief therefore aims to bring these specific local perspectives to the broader global policymaking agenda, and is intended to inform government officials and policymakers, as well as civil society groups working in this field. While some of the evidence in the brief is anecdotal, the authors have corroborated it with open-source data and a literature review. The analysis is exploratory and is designed to add to a small yet growing body of literature on disappearances among vulnerable communities exposed to organized crime and amplify understanding of the pressing nature of the problem in policy circles.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2024. 28p.

By The U.K. Home Office

Purpose - This note provides country of origin information (COI) and analysis of COI for use by Home Office decision makers handling particular types of protection and human rights claims (as set out in the Introduction section). It is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of a particular subject or theme. It is split into 2 parts: (1) an assessment of COI and other evidence; and (2) COI. These are explained in more detail below. Assessment This section analyses the evidence relevant to this note - that is information in the COI section; refugee/human rights laws and policies; and applicable caselaw - by describing this and its inter-relationships, and provides an assessment of, in general, whether one or more of the following applies:

• A person is reasonably likely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm

• That the general humanitarian situation is so severe that there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of serious harm because conditions amount to inhuman or degrading treatment as within paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules/Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)

• That the security situation is such that there are substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk of serious harm because there exists a serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in a situation of international or internal armed conflict as within paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules

• A person is able to obtain protection from the state (or quasi state bodies)

• A person is reasonably able to relocate within a country or territory

• A claim is likely to justify granting asylum, humanitarian protection or other form of leave, and

• If a claim is refused, it is likely or unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Decision makers must, however, still consider all claims on an individual basis, taking into account each case’s specific facts.

London: Assets Publishing Service, 2022. 84p.

By Patrick Naef

This article provides a picture of the political economy of tourism and violence in Medellín. It analyses the way criminal actors and tourism entrepreneurs share a territory, by shedding light on the extortion of tour guides, street performers and business owners in some of its barrios populares (poor neighbourhoods). The main objective is to demonstrate how intimate relationships – between and among kin, friends, long-term acquaintances – impact what is considered the criminal governance of tourism. This contribution shows that extortion in Medellín meets only limited resistance from tourism entrepreneurs. It also emphasises how criminals, tourism actors and tourists themselves contribute to the creation of fragile secured spaces in the developing tourist-scapes of Colombia's second city.

Journal of Latin American Studies (2023), 55, 323–348

By Reynell Badillo-Sarmiento, Luis Fernando Trejos-Rosero

This article investigates why organised criminal organisations opt for dismemberment, a costly and resource-intensive practice compared to targeted killings. We argue that dismemberment serves two functions for OCGs: first, it demonstrates OCGs' willingness to use gruesome violence against those who challenge their territorial hegemony, and second, it sustains criminal governance regimes by punishing individuals who violate OCGs' regulations. To demonstrate this argument, we analyse 25 cases of dismemberment in Colombia that we compiled during more than four years of fieldwork, review of press archives and databases provided by local authorities. This article contributes to extending the concept of extra-lethal violence to organised crime studies

Working Paper, 2023.

By Teun van Ruitenburg, Sjoukje van Deuren & Robby Roks

The impact of organized crime measures remains largely unknown. Moreover, for practical and ethical reasons, the perspectives of the individuals who are subjected to organized crime policies are often not included in research. Based on semi-structured interviews with 24 current members of the Dutch Hells Angels Motorcycle Club (HAMC), this study fills this knowledge gap by examining how HAMC members reacted to the multi-agency approach to outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMCGs) in the Netherlands. The results of this study illustrate that the reactions of HAMC members can be divided into four categories: (1) conforming, (2) adapting, (3) resisting, and (4) continuing. The analysis furthermore shows that a variety of different reactions to the OMCG approach coexist within the same club, charter, and even within the same individual member. These findings indicate that crime policies can spark different, sometimes contradicting reactions, within a group that from the outside appears to be a uniform and top-down coordinated organization. Future evaluation studies should take the multifaceted nature of reactions to crime policies into consideration.

Eur J Crim Policy Res (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10610-023-09566-6

By Federico Bertola

Drug trafficking on darknet based marketplaces has become a highly concerning topic in law enforcement activities, recently. Even though Darkmarkets represent only a tiny fraction of the global drug trade, they are changing the drug markets social networks, introducing a new paradigm of the link between vendors and buyers of drugs. The aim of this study is to critically review the darkmarkets’ ecosystem and the previous literature regarding these new marketplaces, trying to investigate how the drug trade is changing with these new technologies, and the role of organised crime (OC) in these new illegal markets. And trying to understand how and whether is it involved OC on these cyber drug markets and the chain behind them. Despite opinions of part of the academy, the results show that there are no empirical evidences of direct involvement of OC as vendors in darkmarkets. However, there are evidences of an indirect role of OC in darknet drug trafficking, as supplier of illegal drugs to the online-vendors.

AM J QUALITATIVE RES, Volume 4, Issue 2 (Special Issue), pp. 27-34, 2020.