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Posts tagged organized crime
Derailing the Tren de Aragua

Shocking videos surfaced in late August of gun-wielding Venezuelan migrants storming an apartment building in the suburban city of Aurora, Colorado. One of the migrants, a 20-year-old, confessed that he is part of a Venezuelan gang called Tren de Aragua (TdA, or “Train from Aragua”). The Aurora police department is now beefing up its budget to confront the increased crime spilling over from the sanctuary city next door in Denver.Aurora was just the beginning. In the past 11 months, there have been increasing reports of TdA activity in no fewer than 30 major cities across America. At least 100 federal investigations involving the TdA are underway, catching most of the U.S. law enforcement community by surprise. Shooting two New York City

police officers, building sex trafficking rings in Louisiana, and murdering the Georgia nursing student Laken Riley and 12-year-old Jocelyn Nungaray in Houston are just some of the high- profile violent crimes carried out by the TdA. Moreover, given that the Venezuelan government does not cooperate or provide any data on suspected criminals coming from their country into the United States, some law enforcement officers have dubbed the TdA as “ghost criminals” with little to identify them other than confessions and/ or tattoos. The Tren de Aragua has been around for more than a decade, first as a Venezuelan prison gang, then as a transnational criminal organization (TCO) spreading throughout Latin America, and now as a major street gang terrorizing cities in at least 20 states throughout America—and growing. Many comparisons have been drawn between the TdA and the transnational Salvadoran gang, La Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS-13). The TdA, however, is expanding much more quickly, likely due to its unique origin and state sponsorship in Venezuela. Unlike MS-13, which was born in Los Angeles in the 1980s, the TdA is foreign-born and was virtually nonexistent in America until 2021, distinct from other major TCOs such as MS-13 or the Mexican cartels. The TdA’s rapid expansion in the United States is a direct consequence of the Biden–Harris Administration’s failed immigration policies and lack of border enforcement.

KEY TAKEAWAYS The TdA’s goal is to establish territorial control and impose a criminal economy that connects illicit networks to penitentiaries in or near those neighborhoods. The new Trump Administration should work with Latin American partners to dismantle the TdA throughout the Western Hemisphere.

BACKGROUNDER No. 3876 | December 5, 2024

Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation, the Douglas ans Sarah Alison Center for National Security, 2024. 18p.

Troubled Transitions and Organised Crime in Ethiopia and Tunisia

By Tadesse Simie Metekia and Matt Herbert

Summary Due to their difficult political paths – Ethiopia’s stalled transition and Tunisia’s reversal – these two nations demonstrate the effects of failing transitions and democratic backsliding on rising transnational organised crime. Reversing the current trend of organised crime depends heavily on restoring stability and rule-of-law-based democracies, which could be achieved through a revived political process that embraces dialogue and transitional justice to mitigate the challenges and enable governance structures to tackle the complexities of organised crime. Key points The surge in transnational organised crime in Ethiopia and Tunisia can be seen as a consequence of their unrealised political transitions due to: • ensuing economic upheaval that has been the major driver of transnational organised crimes in both countries • porous borders and ungoverned spaces that allow criminal networks to grow • attention to pressing security challenges, such as conflicts and terrorism, that create space for criminal networks to strengthen and operate with impunity

ENACT Africa, 2024. 48p.

Estimating the Costs of Serious and Organised Crime in Australia, 2022–23

By Russell G. Smith

This report estimates the cost of serious and organised crime in Australia in 2022–23 to be between $30.4b and $68.7b. This is the fourth in a series of reports undertaken for the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission estimating the cost of serious and organised crime. It updates and improves on the methodology used in the previous report, which estimated the cost of serious and organised crime in 2020–21 to be between $24.8b and $60.1b. As with the previous research, this report considers the direct and consequential costs of serious and organised crime in Australia, as well as the costs to government entities, businesses and individuals associated with preventing and responding to serious and organised crime. The current estimate includes the cost of some additional crime types, not previously included, but even accounting for these additions it is clear that serious and organised crime continues to impose a substantial burden on the Australian economy.

  

Statistical Report no. 50. 

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2024. 87p.

Drug Trafficking, Violence and Corruption in Central Asia

By Erica Marat and Gulzat Botoeva

Summary This research brief examines the links between illegal drug trafficking, violence, and corruption in Central Asia. We argue that drug trafficking is highly organised with major criminal and state actors participating in the illicit activity. Criminal violence is spread across the region, especially in urban areas, but the Central Asian states are capable of intercepting and preventing illicit activities. By analysing big data on violence, drug interdictions, and patterns of corruption in the region between 2015 and 2022, we explain the relationship between drug trafficking and key actors from the criminal underworld and state agencies in Central Asia. We also rely on expert interviews explaining states’ involvement in the drugs economy. Our analysis of violence and policing dynamics in the region shows how patterns of organised crime change depending on state effectiveness and the presence of competition between traffickers. Each country exhibits a unique relationship between state actors and criminal syndicates in both interdicting and facilitating drug trafficking. Our research comes at a time of an anticipated increase in drug trafficking from Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, and of growing economic uncertainty in the wider region due to Western sanctions against Russia. In the policy realm, our research findings can help develop anti-trafficking strategies in the Central Asian region and improve our understanding of how drug trafficking can be curbed more effectively by identifying the main actors involved in this highly organised criminal process

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham., 2022. 48p.

Gangsters at War: Russia’s Use of Organized Crime as an Instrument of Statecraft

By Mark Galeotti

In May 2022, Lithuanian police raided two underground factories where counterfeit cigarettes worth some €73 million were being produced.2 This happens all the time, and even the involvement of a Russian-linked organized crime group was hardly unusual. However, as the investigation extended to Belgium (where the goods would be transhipped to Britain), it became clear that behind the gangsters lay Russian intelligence officers, who were using the business – or at least part of its profits – to raise operational funds for their activities in Europe. With Putin regarding himself as ‘at war’ with the West, at a time when Europol chief Catherine de Bolle is warning that organized crime is on the rise across Europe,3 and Thomas Haldenwang, head of Germany’s counter-intelligence agency, is assessing ‘the risk of [Russian] state-controlled acts of sabotage to be significantly increased’,4 it is perhaps unsurprising that gangsters and spies would find themselves brought together in his campaign. It has, after all, become commonplace since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 to characterize the relationship between Russia and the West as some shade of war: economic, political, but typically more than just cold. Indeed, even as he insists that his invasion is not a war, just a ‘special military operation’ (SVO) – actually calling it a ‘war’ can conceivably get Russians a 15-year prison sentence5 – Putin freely uses the term when describing his country’s engagement with the West. However, it is less clearly understood just how significant and long held this view of his may be. In this context, it does seem in hindsight that Putin has considered himself as de facto at war with the West – or, more precisely, that the West has been warring against him – since at least around 2012. After stepping back from the presidency to the position of prime minister in order to observe the letter, if not the spirit, of term limits, all the while clearly still running the country, when Putin announced he would be returning to the Kremlin, this was for many the last straw. Demonstrations that became known as the Bolotnaya Protests were mastered and dispersed, but Putin seems to have been unable or unwilling to accept that they were a genuine, organic expression of dismay. Instead, he chose to see them as spurred by the US Department of State, after then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton ‘gave the signal’ to opposition leaders.6 There had been a growing school of thought within Russian security circles that the West was using ‘political technologies’ to topple hostile governments, and support for civil society, democratization and the rule of law were seen as part of this campaign. As a former Kremlin insider put it, Putin was scared, then angry. As far as he was concerned, this was it, this was a sign that the West – the Americans – were coming for him. So he was determined to fight back, and that didn’t just mean defending himself, the repressions and arrests, it meant going on the attack. He was clear, he made it clear to us all: if the West was coming to mess with him, we would mess them up worse, by whatever means necessary.

Russia’s transition from a “conscription state” to a full “mobilization state”, after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, has intensified the involvement of criminal groups in operations tied to sanctions-busting, cyber warfare, and intelligence. Organized crime networks provide Russia with access to restricted goods, such as advanced electronics for its military, and facilitate money laundering and illegal financial flows. Notably, Russian intelligence services have relied on criminal syndicates to supplement their espionage activities, including sabotage, cyberattacks, and assassinations.

The report also highlights Russia’s weaponization of migration, using smuggling networks to create political instability across Europe. Meanwhile, Putin’s regime has blurred the lines between state and criminal actors, using them as tools to evade international sanctions and expand Russian influence globally.

“Gangsters at War” reveals how Russian-based organized crime operates as a tool of Kremlin foreign policy, focusing not just on profits but on weakening geopolitical rivals. From sanctions evasion to destabilizing societies, criminal networks have become a key element in Russia’s geopolitical arsenal. The report calls for increased vigilance, international cooperation, and stronger countermeasures to address this growing threat to global stability

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.2024. 62p.

Landing on Water: Air Interdiction, Drug-Trafficking Displacement, and Violence in the Brazilian Amazon

By Leila Pereira, Rafael Pucci, Rodrigo R. Soares

We study a Force-down/Shoot-down intervention in Brazil that led cocaine traffickers to shift from air to river routes. Using data on cocaine production, homicides, and the network of rivers in the Amazon, we provide evidence that violence increased in municipalities along river routes originating from Andean producing countries after the policy. We also show that, during the same period, violence in these municipalities became more responsive to cocaine production in origin countries. We document an instance of crime displacement over the three-dimensional space, involving sophisticated adaptations from criminals regarding transportation technologies, with dramatic side-effects for local populations.

Bonn: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2024. 55p.

Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) 2024

Europol; European Union. Publications Office

From the document: "This edition marks 10 years since the release of Europol's first IOCTA [Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment]. Throughout this time, the threats posed by cybercrime have evolved dynamically in terms of volume, intensity and harm potential. The number of cybercriminals entering the market continued to grow steadily, thanks to the adoption of new technologies as well as the increasing complexity of digital infrastructures, which expands the potential attack surface. In 2023, millions of victims across the EU were attacked and exploited online on a daily basis. Small and medium businesses were increasingly popular targets for cyber-attacks, while e-merchants experienced the most digital skimming attacks. Adults were victimised through phishing, investment and romance frauds, and more and more minors were targeted by child sexual exploitation offenders and online sexual extorters. In parallel, a number of worldwide law enforcement actions shook the cybercriminal underground through continued arrests of ransomware affiliates and operators. Law enforcement also carried out coordinated disruption operations against cybercriminals' digital infrastructures. Notwithstanding the growing presence of law enforcement in the dark web, this environment continues to function as an enabler for cybercrime, allowing offenders to share knowledge, tools and services in a more concealed way. In addition, the use of cryptocurrencies in a wider variety of crime areas has become more noticeable in 2023, alongside the growing number of requests for investigative support in cryptocurrency tracing received by Europol. Cybercriminals are keen to leverage Artificial Intelligence, which is already becoming a common component in their toolbox and is very likely to see even wider application. Law enforcement agencies are expected to build a robust capacity to counter the growing threats stemming from this, both in terms of human resources and technical skills."

Europol; European Union. Publications Office . 2024. 38p.

Gangsters at War: Russia's Use of Organized Crime as an Instrument of Statecraft

By GALEOTTI, MARK

From the webpage description: "'Since 2012, Russia has strategically used criminal networks to evade sanctions, conduct intelligence, and destabilize the West. Under Putin's 'mobilization state,' illegal activities--from smuggling to cyberattacks--are seen as essential tools of warfare. This report delves into the Kremlin's alarming integration of organized crime into statecraft.' Russia's transition from a 'conscription state' to a full 'mobilization state', after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, has intensified the involvement of criminal groups in operations tied to sanctions-busting, cyber warfare, and intelligence. Organized crime networks provide Russia with access to restricted goods, such as advanced electronics for its military, and facilitate money laundering and illegal financial flows. Notably, Russian intelligence services have relied on criminal syndicates to supplement their espionage activities, including sabotage, cyberattacks, and assassinations. The report also highlights Russia's weaponization of migration, using smuggling networks to create political instability across Europe. Meanwhile, Putin's regime has blurred the lines between state and criminal actors, using them as tools to evade international sanctions and expand Russian influence globally. 'Gangsters at War' reveals how Russian-based organized crime operates as a tool of Kremlin foreign policy, focusing not just on profits but on weakening geopolitical rivals. From sanctions evasion to destabilizing societies, criminal networks have become a key element in Russia's geopolitical arsenal. The report calls for increased vigilance, international cooperation, and stronger countermeasures to address this growing threat to global stability."

GLOBAL INITIATIVE AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME. November. 2024. 82p.

Is Rio de Janeiro preparing for war? Combating organized crime versus non-international armed conflict

By Najla Nassif Palma

The idea that Rio de Janeiro has been plunged into an actual “war” against organized crime is widely discussed and is supported by an ever-increasing number of people in Brazil. Not surprisingly, such discourse has led to less protection for the civilian population, particularly in the so-called favelas, while allowing security forces to carry out operations with even greater relative impunity. This article argues that although urban violence in Rio de Janeiro is indeed a serious problem, it does not reach the threshold required to be considered a non-international armed conflict.

International Review of the Red Cross (2023), 105 (923), 795–827.

BEYOND BLOOD: Gold, conflict and criminality in West Africa

By Marcena Hunter

While gold is often referred to as a blood mineral due to its role in conflict financing, the relationship between the gold sector, instability and violence is far more nuanced, with complex regional dynamics. In the gold production hub of West Africa, where artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM) is pervasive, an increasing tide of insecurity and violence in recent years adds to the complexity of the sector. Woven into the region’s convoluted web of actors, activity and supply chains are criminal networks that link local mines to international trade hubs, exploiting the gold sector for financial gain and power. The analysis in this report demonstrates that the reality of the relationships between gold, conflict and criminality challenges the simplistic narrative of ‘blood minerals’ used to finance conflict, offering a far more nuanced understanding of the significance of the gold sector in West Africa. Rather, gold is closely intertwined with survival, money, power and criminality. Criminality, fragility and violence While literature on the relationship between gold and instability has often focused on conflict financing, the interplay between gold, governance and criminality can contribute to instability and violence before any form of conflict financing takes place. Criminal exploitation of the gold sector is fostered by persistent and widespread informality, due in part to the significant barriers to entry in the formal sector, and the lack of support for informal miners and gold traders. As a result, corrupt and criminal elites in the political and business spheres can capture illicit gold flows, further contributing to community frustrations that can give rise to conflict. Limiting access to the gold sector by restricting access to mine deposits or conducting crackdowns on unlicensed ASGM can also undermine the legitimacy of state actors. Thus, efforts to stabilize West Africa must account for complex criminal interests while also addressing the long-standing grievances and expectations of local communities.1 Such efforts are critical in both conflict-laden areas and stable areas to reduce the risk of conflict spreading. Where the gold sector contributes to conflict financing in West Africa, it can vary significantly in form and value. In locations where conflict and gold mining overlap, armed groups may target the gold sector by taxing mining and trade activities, demanding payment from miners for providing security, or establishing checkpoints along roads to mine sites and trade hubs for payment collection. Members of armed groups may also directly engage in gold mining, either for personal financial gain or to benefit the group. Yet in many regions, gold is not the primary source of revenue for armed groups; other industries like the livestock sector are also targets. Sitting in the space between increased fragility and conflict are local self-defence and identity militia groups, which can act in cooperation or in competition with the state.2 In West Africa, these groups fall on a spectrum ranging from hybrid security institutions to mafia-style protection rackets run by ‘violent entrepreneurs’. There is a heavy overlap between these groups and the gold sector, with many instances of groups providing security at gold mine sites and along transportation routes. Yet, the origins of the different groups, their roles in local communities and the gold sector, and their role in conflict dynamics vary greatly.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2022. 61p.

Independent review of the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission and associated Commonwealth law enforcement arrangements

By Stephen Merchant, Greg Wilson

In 2023 the Government commissioned a ‘first principles’ independent review of the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC) and associated Commonwealth law enforcement arrangements.

The review assessed the effectiveness of the ACIC’s legislative framework and found that comprehensive reform was needed to ensure ACIC could operate effectively as Australia’s national criminal intelligence agency. The review recommended ACIC shift away from its existing law enforcement and investigative functions towards providing unique intelligence on serious and organised crime to Commonwealth, state and territory law enforcement agencies.

The independent review’s recommendations set out a blueprint to transform the ACIC in response to the significant and ongoing threat of serious and organised crime. The Government has agreed or agreed in-principle with 27 of the 29 recommendations - as set out in the government response.

Key recommendations

  • Undertake robust legislative reforms to address significant deficiencies in the existing legislative frameworks and ensure the ACIC has appropriate powers for the collection of intelligence.

  • Incorporate appropriate oversight and safeguards for the ACIC, including in relation to its use of coercive powers.

  • Reinvigorate national governance and coordination arrangements for responding to serious and organised crime.

  • Reinforce the independence of the Australian Institute of Criminology.

BARTON, ACT : Attorney-General's Department (Australia), 2024. 68p.

COCA LEAF AND COCAINE LEGALIZATION IN PERU: EXPLORING THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS

By Nicolás Zevallos Trigoso, Jaris Mujica, and Christian Campos Vásquez

Coca legalization in Peru could reshape the economy, drug control policies, and even the influence of organized crime, but the implications are complex. This report explores how moving from prohibition to a regulated market affects not only the legal framework but also the ground reality for coca growers, consumers, and law enforcement. Legalization doesn’t just mean lifting restrictions; it involves constructing a regulatory structure that acknowledges coca as both a cultural staple and a consumer good.

The study reveals that while legalization could reduce the criminalization of coca production, it also creates new challenges. Ensuring a legal supply chain for coca derivatives, from cultivation to sale, demands extensive state oversight—a task complicated by limited resources and a history of challenges with other legal commodities like timber and gold. Moreover, organized crime could exploit the gaps in regulation, adapting to the legal framework while maintaining parallel illegal operations.

The analysis dives into four major areas of impact: changes in drug policy, shifts in organized crime dynamics, effects on the local economy of coca growers, and potential shifts in consumer patterns. The findings suggest that legalization could reduce repressive policing but require intensified regulatory control, putting immense pressure on Peru’s state capacity. Organized crime may also adapt to the new structures, blending illegal activities with legal coca businesses.

This study also highlights lessons from other industries that have moved from illicit to regulated markets, providing a balanced view of possible outcomes. While coca legalization could offer a path away from prohibition’s punitive approach, the transition to a regulated market could mean ongoing challenges.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024 24p.

The Fifth Wave: Organized Crime in 2040

By Phil Williams

By 2040, organized crime may thrive like never before, exploiting climate crises, geopolitical conflicts, and technological advancements. Our latest report reveals a chilling forecast where criminal networks operate as shadow governments, shielded by authoritarian regimes and empowered by rapid technological evolution.

This “fifth wave” of organized crime, as coined by author Phil Williams, will capitalize on scarcity markets, leveraging disruptions in essential resources like water, minerals, and energy caused by climate change. Criminal networks are expected to infiltrate legitimate markets, blurring lines between lawful and illicit activities and using scarcity as a driving force for growth.

The report suggests that by leveraging emerging tools such as artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles, and 5G technology, criminal organizations will achieve new levels of sophistication, making it difficult for law enforcement to counter their reach and resilience. Meanwhile, geopolitical tensions are likely to exacerbate the situation, as some authoritarian regimes utilize criminal networks as extensions of state power, offering them safe havens and strategic support in exchange for destabilizing activities abroad.

The findings raise urgent questions about global readiness to combat organized crime’s possible evolution. “The Fifth Wave” challenges policymakers, law enforcement agencies, and international organizations to rethink their approach to organized crime in a rapidly shifting world. It underscores the importance of proactive strategies that go beyond traditional crime-fighting tactics, advocating for comprehensive international collaboration, adaptive policy-making, and innovative technology to address this deeply entrenched threat.

As crime increasingly infiltrates legal economies, emerging as a powerful economic and social force, international collaboration and innovative strategies will be vital to mitigate this emerging threat. This threat requires an unprecedented global response.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 30p.

Money laundering as a service: Investigating business‑like behavior in money laundering networks in the Netherlands

By Jo‑Anne Kramer, Arjan A. J. Blokland·, Edward R. Kleemans, Melvin R. J. Soudijn

In order to launder large amounts of money, (drug) criminals can seek help from financial facilitators. According to the FATF, these facilitators are operating increasingly business-like and even participate in professional money laundering networks. This study examines the extent to which financial facilitators in the Netherlands exhibit business-like characteristics and the extent to which they organize themselves in money laundering networks. We further examine the relationship between business-like behavior and individual money launderers’ position in the social network. Using police intelligence data, we were able to analyze the contacts of 198 financial facilitators who were active in the Netherlands in the period 2016–2020, all having worked for drug criminals. Based on social network analysis, this research shows that financial facilitators in the Netherlands can be linked in extensive money laundering networks. Based on the facilitators’ area of expertise, roughly two main types of professional money laundering networks can be discerned. Some subnetworks operate in the real estate sector, while others primarily engage in underground banking. Furthermore, the application of regression models to predict business-like behavior using individual network measures shows that facilitators with more central positions in the net work and those who collaborate with financial facilitators from varying expertise groups tend to behave more business-like than other financial facilitators.

Trends in Organized Crime (2024) 27:314–341

Organised crime movement across local communities: A network approach

By Paolo Campana, Cecilia Meneghini

This paper explores the structure of organised crime movement across local communities and the drivers underpinning such movement. Firstly, it builds on network analysis to offer a novel methodological approach to empirically and quantitatively study the movement of organised crime offenders across geographical areas. The paper then applies this approach to evidence from Cambridgeshire in the United Kingdom. It reconstructs the movement of organised crime members across local areas based on a large-scale police dataset that includes 41 months of recorded crime events. It identifies organised crime “turf” and “target” areas and then explores the drivers of movement from the former to the latter using Exponential Random Graph Models. Findings confirm that geographical distance matters; however, socio-demographic, urban, economic and crime-related characteristics of communities play a key role. Organised crime group members target urban communities with higher than average illegal market opportunities (proxied by drug-related activity). The work also finds the effect of socio-demographic homophily between turf and target communities, suggesting that organised crime group members might target territories that are similar to their own. While a high level of deprivation makes a community more likely to send organised crime members, its impact on a community’s probability of being a receiver is less clear. Finally, the paper offers a way to identify communities (local areas) at risk of being targeted by criminal organisations, thus providing practitioners with a tool for early interventions

Trends in Organized Crime (2024) 27:286–313

Organized Fraud Issue Paper

By United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime - UNODC

Fraud has evolved significantly over the years, adapting to technological advancements and changes in society. It has become increasingly sophisticated, often using psychological manipulation, enabled by information and communications technologies (ICTs). The high volume and severity of fraud pose a significant risk to people, economies and prosperity worldwide, and have a negative impact on the public’s confidence in the rule of law. However, developing an accurate understanding of fraud presents several challenges. Victims often underreport fraud due to feelings of shame, self blame or embarrassment, as well as a lack of recognition that a crime has occurred. Moreover, a significant portion of fraud targets businesses, many of which choose not to report these crimes to avoid damaging their reputation. The anonymity and remoteness often associated with fraud perpetration conceal the identities of offenders from both victims and authorities, hindering efforts to assess underlying patterns, factors of vulnerability and associated risks. Furthermore, the dynamic nature of fraud — which is constantly being adapted to changes in legal, social, commercial and technological systems — means that new and innovative methods of the offence may go unnoticed within static official data. In many cases, domestic law enforcement entities do not have the capacity to investigate and uncover the offenders and the organized criminal groups behind the crime: international cooperation is required, suggesting the need to give greater prominence to fraud in the policy framework and legislation against organized crime.

The international community has recognized the worrying scale of fraud and the need for joint efforts in preventing and combating it. The General Assembly, in its resolution 78/229, reaffirmed the importance of the work of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in the fulfilment of its mandate in crime prevention and criminal justice, including providing to Member States, upon request and as a matter of high priority, technical cooperation, advisory services and other forms of assistance, and coordinating with and complementing the work of all relevant and competent United Nations bodies and offices in respect to all forms of organized crime, including fraud. Nevertheless, the intersection between fraud and organized crime is not well understood and is further complicated by overlaps with other key areas, including cybercrime, white-collar crime, money-laundering and corruption. An understanding of organized fraud is necessary to inform the decisions of policymakers and other stakeholders and drive effective responses. The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the main global legally binding instrument to prevent and fight all forms and manifestations of transnational organized crime and protect the victims thereof, provides a framework to understand the nature of organized fraud and how the response to it can be integrated into the response to the different threats presented by transnational organized crime.

Scope of the issue paper

Fraud is an expansive category of crime. One of the greatest challenges to understanding it is its scope. It encompasses a range of criminal behaviours that are bound together by the common principle of dishonesty. The opportunities to employ dishonesty for the purposes of fraud span the full range of social, commercial, financial and technological settings, which can vary in different regions of the world. These opportunities are exploited by criminals from highly diverse backgrounds, ranging from professionals exploiting a legitimate corporate position to cybercriminals from within deprived communities. In this way, fraud is distinct from many other criminal categories that cover more discrete criminal behaviours occurring in specific settings (e.g. burglary). This diversity creates challenges in terms of developing a single, cohesive and comprehensive picture of fraud. The present issue paper covers fraud perpetrated by organized criminal groups (i.e. organized fraud). The role of organized crime can vary depending on the type of fraud, although, to a greater or lesser extent, it has a footprint in nearly all types of fraud. For the purposes of containing the scope of the issue paper, the following elements are not included:

  • Other crimes in which fraud plays an enabling role, including the fraudulent use of identity to prevent a perpetrator from being traced, such as opening financial accounts to launder the proceeds of crime; fraudulent communications to enter into a relationship with a victim for the purpose of blackmailing or extorting money from them;1 and fraudulent job advertisements for recruiting and trafficking victims into forced labour and servitude.

  • Fraud targeting the financial interests of the State (e.g. tax regimes), such as missing trader intra-community fraud (otherwise known as MTIC or VAT fraud); excise fraud, in which duties on imported products are not paid (e.g. fuel); public procurement fraud; and fraudulent applications for government grants and subsidies. The policy and response landscape for addressing these types of fraud can be distinct, being made up of various agencies and regulatory powers beyond law enforcement (e.g. the tax authority). The links between these types of fraud and organized crime are more well established in the literature.

The focus of the issue paper is organized fraud that targets individual members of the public or private institutions for the purposes of obtaining a financial or other material benefit.

Vienna: UNODC< 2024. 82p.

The terrible trade-off: How the hidden cost of organised crime harms cities, and what can be done about it

By Christopher Blattman, Benjamin Lessing, and Santiago Tobón

Organised crime poses one of the greatest threats to national security and development in the 21st century. Despite this, most policy, data collection, and scholarly research focuses on individuals and disorganised violence. Our work addresses several critical gaps in knowledge:

  • What are the incentives for gangs to engage in violence and socially costly behaviour?

  • Which are the trade-offs that practitioners face when deciding how to engage with organised violence?

  • What type of information do relevant decision-makers need to inform their policies?

  • Which are the most relevant tools for tracking down gang behaviour and use of violence?

We address these questions in the context of Medellín, Colombia’s second largest and most important city. Over the past six years, our work has covered a broad methodological spectrum, including:

  • qualitative data collection through interviews with dozens of criminals and criminal justice experts;

  • quantitative data collection from thousands of citizens in surveys representative at highly localised levels;

  • active collaboration with local relevant stakeholders such as the city administration and the local police department;

  • quasi-experimental evaluations of long-running policies dating back to the 1980s; and

  • experimental evaluations of marginal improvements in state presence in violent and gang controlled areas.

Our preliminary findings point to terrible trade-offs, where authorities face plausibly impossible questions when balancing short-term gains in violence reduction and sacrifices in state legitimacy, with long-term uncertainty concerning both violence and state legitimacy. We highlight preliminary recommendations for guiding policy decisions.

Birmingham, UK: The Serious Organised Crime & Anti-Corruption Evidence (SOC ACE) 2022. 9p.

Information Manipulation & Organised Crime: Examining the Nexus

By Tena Prelec

The research paper that this briefing note summarises introduces a new framework for assessing the relationship between information manipulation and organised crime. Through applied real-world case studies from Russia, Ukraine, Moldova (Transnistria), and Albania, the framework reveals diverse patterns in these relationships, and the varying intensity of the information manipulation employed at a granular level. An emerging hypothesis emerging from the research suggests that authoritarian states may wield greater freedom in misusing information when they have intermediate – rather than high – levels of integration with the organised crime groups (OCG’s) executing disinformation campaigns on their behalf. The paper also identifies several areas for further research, including public receptivity to information manipulation, the mercurial nature of ties between elite actors and the use of information manipulation by elites, to create confusion amongst the public rather than to change their minds.

SOC ACE Research Paper. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. 2024. 7p.

Addressing Organised Crime and Security Sector Reform and Governance: Linkages, processes, outcomes and challenges

By Huma Haider

Organised criminal actors can extend their influence over security sector officials through corruption, paying them to selectively enforce the law. In some cases, the rise of organised crime (OC) has eroded the state’s capacity to deliver security and justice. In other contexts, criminality is associated with a strong state that can protect corrupt officials and criminal actors. Strengthening the capabilities of corrupt security institutions can, in turn, be counterproductive in the fight against OC. The linkages between corruption, OC, the functioning of security and justice institutions, and their reform processes, call for integrated analysis, planning and implementation of initiatives to achieve security sector reform and governance (SSR/G) and to counter OC. There is, however, a gap in scholarship analysing connections between SSR/G and OC. In seeking to address this gap, this paper adopts an inter-disciplinary approach, reviewing scholarly and practitioner literature across a wide range of research disciplines. Key findings from the evidence review include:

  • Delayed or weak implementation of security sector reform (SSR) in transitional contexts can result in the entrenchment of corruption in security sectors, alongside new forms of corruption (for example, from privatisation processes), which in turn risks the rise of illicit activities.

  • OC can thrive where state institutions are absent or weak and where they are present or strong. A binary focus on strong versus weak states, with inadequate attention to context, has led at times to counterproductive interventions aimed at strengthening state institutions and the capabilities of security forces.

  • The political context in which SSR and initiatives to counter OC take place can have a significant influence on outcomes. Such reforms and initiatives require political will and support. Elites in authoritarian contexts may block reforms that could hold them accountable and undermine their ability to profit from OC.

  • Many SSR studies indicate that programming often prioritises less politically sensitive capacity building interventions. Yet, reforms that increase deterrent capacity can reinforce militarisation and increase violent crime by OC actors.

  • Higher levels of popular trust in the military have often been accompanied by greater state reliance on the military to perform civilian law enforcement and/or militarisation of the police to address OC and restore public order.

  • The militarisation of law enforcement has typically failed to counter OC, producing greater violence and criminality in many fragile and violent contexts.

  • Relying on armed forces to counter OC has often reduced incentives and resources for strengthening police institutions

  • Community-oriented policing is often employed to improve public trust in the police, yet there is limited systematic or comparative evidence that this is achieved.

  • Mass incarceration, from law and order approaches, has frequently strengthened the cohesion of organised crime groups (OCG), giving them a territorial base for power projection.

  • Overcrowded prison facilities and insufficient state staffing levels have often resulted in the rise of criminal governance and prisoner syndicates as parallel powers.

  • Inadequate reintegration of ex-combatants, or gang members in situations of urban violence, can encourage their involvement in criminal activities.

  • Conventional approaches to investigating and prosecuting criminal activity can be ineffective against complex OC networks. A proactive approach is required that seeks to disrupt and dismantle such networks, beyond arresting individual criminals.

  • Criminal justice actors need to recognise that women can be both victims and perpetrators in the context of OC, possibly allowing for legal leniency.

  • Judicial reforms tend to be more effective when they produce institutional change and empower new personnel to push through reforms.

  • Special courts, established to tackle OC and corruption, may divert resources from elsewhere in the judicial sector. It can also be challenging to reconcile accountability for past gross human rights violations and the need to counter contemporary OC.

  • Transitional trials, selective prosecutions and vetting, which remove officials guilty of corruption, OC and/or human rights violations from security and justice institutions, can help to reform abusive institutions and build trust.

  • There is evidence that failure to properly vet military officials and ex-combatants prior to their entry into a civilian police force has resulted in corrupt police forces with links to criminality.

  • There is debate as to whether transitional justice activities enable institutional reform and rule of law programming that can help to counter OC, or whether they are isolated from domestic capacity building.

  • Developing accountability and oversight of security sector institutions (for example, anti-corruption mechanisms and civilian oversight) can help to reduce OC infiltration.

  • Citizen security, a concept that extends to non-security sectors (for example, education, infrastructure and livelihoods), can be a helpful lens in designing more comprehensive interventions required to counter OC.

  • Where gender-responsive SSR is advocated, it is often reduced to adding women to programming and institutions, without addressing the structural, institutional and cultural barriers to meaningful engagement.

  • An effective system for combatting transnational OC requires the development of entities and mechanisms aimed at building operational cooperation and coordination among the security agencies of different states.

This Evidence Review Paper demonstrates the importance of adopting an OC-informed perspective in SSR/G and a SSR/G-informed perspective in addressing OC. By exploring the interlinkages, complementarities and trade-offs between security and justice sectors and their reforms, on the one hand, and countering OC, on the other, this paper seeks to provide insights into these perspectives.

SOC ACE Evidence Review Paper No. 05. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham 2024. 97p.

The Logic of Criminal Territorial Control: Military Intervention in Rio de Janeiro

By Nicholas Barnes

How Do Organized criminal groups (OCGs) respond to military interventions intended to weaken and subdue them? In many cases, such crackdowns have proven counterproductive as OCGs militarize, engage in violence, and confront state forces directly. Existing studies have pointed to several explanations: inter-criminal competition, unconditional militarized approaches, and existing criminal governance arrangements. Much of this work, however, has focused on national, regional, or even municipal level variation and explanations. This article takes a micro-comparative approach based on 18 months of ethnographic research in a group of Rio de Janeiro favelas (impoverished and informal neighborhoods) divided between three drug trafficking gangs and occupied by the Brazilian military from 2014 to 2015. It argues that an active territorial threat from a rival is the primary mechanism leading OCGs to respond violently to military intervention. It also demonstrates that geographic patterns of recruitment play an important role in where OCG rivalries turn violent during intervention.

Comparative Political Studies 2022, Vol. 55(5) 789–831