By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).  UNODC Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific

  This report presents the results of the twenty-second Myanmar opium survey, covering the 2023/2024 opium growing and harvesting season. The last three surveys in Myanmar covering the 2020/2021, 2021/2022, and the 2022/2023 seasons showed an increase at the national level in both areas under opium poppy cultivation and opium production. The 2023 survey reported an 18% increase in the area under cultivation to an estimated 47,100 hectares. For the first time in three years the 2024 survey shows a modest decline in the area under cultivation by 4% to 45,200 hectares, indicating a possible stabilization at recent high levels. Three consecutive years of expanding cultivation followed by a year of limited decline could indicate some degree of saturation in regional heroin markets supplied by Myanmar. Declining prices of fresh opium in Myanmar and declining purity adjusted prices of heroin in regional markets could have dissuaded a further increase of production in Myanmar in 2024. However, information from the field suggests that the stagnation in productivity could also be related to the ongoing internal conflict. While instability and conflict, and their impact on the rule of law have traditionally been seen as a driver of illicit crop cultivation, the expansion of the conflict and shifts in the territorial control of armed actors, especially in the growing areas of Shan and Kachin, have limited the mobility of rural population, and likely prevented farmers from accessing cultivation areas further away from their villages. The dynamics of internal conflict might also explain the uneven development across Myanmar’s states in regions, with some areas showing declines in cultivation and others continued growth. In October 2024, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated that there were some 3 million people internally displaced across the country, with Shan and Kachin in particular seeing escalating tensions and clashes in late 2023 and early 2024. The 2024 survey shows decreases in illicit opium cultivation in half of the geographic areas observed, including South Shan which traditionally experienced the most extensive opium cultivation. Eastern Shan, Chin, and Kayah had modest increases between survey years. Overall, cultivation in Shan State, which continues to be the centre of opium production in Myanmar at 88% of total cultivation area, decreased by 4% to 39,700 ha, with decreases in South and North Shan (-9% and -4% respectively) while East Shan increased by 10%. Cultivation in Kachin saw a moderate decrease of 10%, a change from past trends when above-average increases were observed. Estimates for Chin and Kayah, where the overall area remained small in comparison to other areas, showed an 18% and 8% increase, respectively. Overall potential opium production decreased at greater rates than cultivation due to a decline in opium yield. In 2024, average yield declined by 4% from 22.9 kg per hectare to 22kg per hectare, resulting in an estimated opium production of 995 (700-1,580) metric tons, or 8% less than in 2023. Nevertheless, both yield and production remain at high levels across the last decade. The decrease in cultivation and production coincided with a decrease in farmgate prices of both fresh and dry opium in USD terms, by 4% and 8%, respectively. In 2024, fresh opium traded at just over US$300 per kilogram, down from US$317 the year before, although it remained high compared to the last low point in 2021 when it stood at US$131 per kilogram. In combination with lower production, nationally farmers earned slightly less income than the previous year, between US$230 – US$518 million in 2024 (US$271 - US$613 million in 2023). The farmgate value only represents a small share of the overall opiate economy, with heroin manufacture and export making up a larger share. Wholesale prices of heroin in the region declined even more, contributing to a much larger decrease in the value of the total national opiate economy of about 40%, now ranging between US$589 million and US$1.57 billion, representing between 0.9 – 2.4% of Myanmar’s 2023 GDP  

Thailand: UNODC Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific 2024. 88p.

By The Research and Trend Analysis Branch, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC),

Now entering its second year of enforcement, the ban continues to hold. In 2024, the area under cultivation was estimated at 12,800 ha, or 19% more than in 2023 (10,800 ha) . Despite the increase, opium poppy cultivation is still far below the priorban levels. In 2022 an estimated 232,000 ha were cultivated. The increase in cultivation came with a geographical shift. The South-western provinces of the country were long the center of cultivation up to and including 2023. In 2024, this changed and now 59% of all cultivation took place in the North-east, particularly in Badakhshan. The rapid and currently sustained decline in poppy cultivation and opium production has important and wide-ranging implications for the country and opiate markets long supplied by product from Afghanistan. Questions remain as to how the country will cope with the continued reduction in opiate income and how opiate markets downstream will react. Farmers that lack sustainable alternatives face a more precarious financial and economic situation and need alternative economic opportunities to become resilient against picking up poppy cultivation in the future. Distributors and dealers closer to destination markets, as well as consumers, are likely to experience supply constraints in the coming years, should the ban remain in place. Following a major hike in 2022 and 2023, dry opium prices stabilized slightly in the first half of 2024 to around US$730. These prices are several times higher than the long-running pre-ban average of US$100 per kilogram. Extremely high farmgate prices and questions about dwindling opium stocks may encourage a resumption in poppy cultivation, especially in places outside of traditional cultivation centers, including neighboring countries. 

Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 20p.

By The United Office on Drugs and Crime

  In the Sahel countries and their neighbours, the high prevalence of infectious diseases, including malaria, coupled with challenges in terms of the availability and affordability of and access to healthcare, creates an environment in which the demand for medical products and services is not fully met through formal channels. The disparity between the demand for and supply of regulated pharmaceutical products leaves room for trafficking, provides an incentive for the involvement of organized criminal groups and fuels the ongoing threat to public safety and public health in the Sahel countries. Between January 2017 and December 2021, at least 605 tons of different medical products were seized in West Africa during international operations.  While there are no reliable estimates of the overall quantities of medical products that are trafficked in different ways and forms in the Sahel countries, studies point to a percentage of substandard and falsified medicines in the medical market of between 19 and 50 per cent. Some 40 per cent of the substandard and falsified medical products reported in the Sahel countries between 2013 and 2021 was discovered in the regulated supply chain. Just as regulated medical products can be diverted, illicitly manufactured medical products can find their way into authorized pharmaceutical outlets, which shows how much the regulated (legal) and unregulated (illicit) supply chains are interconnected. The Sahel countries rely heavily on imports of medical products because their pharmaceutical industries are still in the early stages of development. Of total pharmaceutical expenditure in sub-Saharan Africa in 2019, imports represented as much as 70 to 90 per cent (roughly 14 billion United States dollars ($)). Medical products diverted from the legal supply chain often originate in the main exporting countries of medical products to the Sahel countries, in particular Belgium and France, and to a lesser extent China and India. Others are manufactured in neighbouring countries, including in North Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. The seaports in the Gulf of Guinea, Conakry (Guinea), Tema (Ghana), Lomé (Togo), Cotonou (Benin) and Apapa (Nigeria) can be identified as major entry points for medical products destined for the Sahel countries. Trafficking by air, using postal shipments or carried out by commercial air passengers, is employed for smuggling smaller quantities of medical products. Once in West Africa, trafficked medical products reach the Sahel countries through smugglers who follow traditional trafficking routes using buses, trucks and private cars. Investigations have revealed the involvement of a wide range of opportunistic actors in trafficking in medical products in the Sahel countries, from employees of pharmaceutical companies, public officials, law enforcement officers and health agency workers to street vendors, all motivated by potential financial gain. Despite terrorist groups and non-state armed groups being commonly associated with trafficking in medical products in the Sahel, most reported cases in the region show that the involvement of such groups is limited and mainly revolves around consuming medical products or levying "taxes" on them in the areas under their control. In sub-Saharan Africa, as many as 267,000 deaths per year are linked to falsified and substandard antimalarial medicines. In addition, up to 169,271 are linked to falsified and substandard antibiotics used to treat severe pneumonia in children.     

Vienna: UNODC, 2022. 28p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

The ratio of registered vehicles to people in the Sahel countries is low and per capita daily gasoline consumption is estimated to be among the lowest in the world. Nevertheless, an average at-pump price of $1 per litre would result in a combined annual total market value of at least 5 billion United States dollars ($) for both legal and illegal fuel in the region. Despite some of them producing oil, the Sahel countries rely on fuel imports from Algeria, Libya and Nigeria, where fuel is heavily subsidized. It appears that the low fuel prices in Algeria, Libya and Nigeria are among the most significant drivers of fuel trafficking in the Sahel. In addition to fuel trafficking, cheap gasoline and diesel also fuel the activities of illegal non-state armed groups, including groups deemed “terrorist” by the international community. Moreover, there are some indications that there may be deeper linkages to other forms of smuggling, such as trafficking in medical products, drugs and firearms. There are four major fuel trafficking flows into the Sahel countries: from Nigeria via Benin to Burkina Faso and Mali; from Nigeria via the Niger to Mali; from Algeria to Mali; and from Libya to the Niger and Chad. A large portion of the market for trafficked fuel in the Sahel countries appears to be informally organized. However, recent investigations have revealed the involvement of structured groups with links to prominent individuals with interests in retail fuel companies, financial institutions and corrupt law enforcement officials. This highlights the importance of the formal trade in laundering smuggled fuel. Companies associated with individuals under United Nations Security Council sanctions are also reported to be involved in fuel smuggling from the Niger to Mali. The introduction of fuel subsidies and licensing policies has led to the emergence of powerful business elites in the Sahel countries with sufficient political influence to protect fuel smuggling activities. Opportunities to earn illegal revenue indirectly from fuel trafficking through bribery and other forms of corruption compromise the level of repression that the Sahel countries can exercise on the illicit fuel trade. Issues with, and gaps in, the rule of law in some areas, owing to a combination of a high level of insecurity and vast, porous borders, constitute a key enabling

factor for fuel trafficking in the Sahel. The lack of state presence in remote areas gives room for the proliferation of criminal activities.

Vienna: UNODC, 2022. 24p.

By Natascha Eichinger, Ekaterina Spassova, Murat Yildiz, et al.

The continued global demand for opiates, and the conditions that sustain opiate production in Afghanistan, pose a threat to public health, governance, and security at regional and global

level. This is likely to continue following the change of regime in Afghanistan in August 2021. Afghan opiates are trafficked to almost every continent worldwide. In 2021, the income from opiates in Afghanistan amounted to some USD 1.8–2.7 billion: however, much larger sums are accrued by international Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) along illicit drug supply chains outside Afghanistan. While most opiates trafficked from Afghanistan are trafficked by land methods, a proportion of the opiates produced in South-West Asia are also trafficked by maritime methods to global destinations.

� Some of the opiates produced in Afghanistan and South-West Asia are trafficked via the southern route by maritime means. Seizures of opiates – and methamphetamine – have been increasing in the Indian Ocean, the result of sustained interdictions by national authorities and international maritime coalitions including the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and the EU Naval Force – Somalia (EUNAVFOR). � Drug packages seized in the Indian Ocean are marked with a wide range of stamps including hand pressed and hand-written markings. These stamps are made up of several elements consisting of sequential and non-sequential numbers, names, locations, and different objects. The stamps can provide some detail on the manufacturers and traffickers involved in the production and transport of drugs to international markets. � Stamps can often be used for branding purposes in a similar way to brand logos used with legitimate goods or can be used to identify or alternatively conceal the producers of a batch of heroin. The number of different stamps marked on a package of heroin can be an indicator of how many producers or traffickers were involved with that package. � Stamps are chosen by individual Drug Trafficking Organisations (DTOs). They appear to be well known amongst DTOs and usually can not be copied by other traffickers. However, in some cases a “franchising” process is possible, with smaller traffickers purchasing the right to use stamps associated with larger DTOs. � Dates printed on heroin packages generally indicate the production year. However, there is less clarity when two dates are stamped on a package. In some cases, the second year may indicate when heroin manufacture continued by the same lab, or alternatively can be the expiry date of the heroin or the date when the package was distributed to international markets. Printed dates can also be updated by hand-written markings. � Sequential and non-sequential numbers stamped on heroin packages are generally seen as being coded communications between heroin manufacturers and traffickers, although the specific messages are not known. Sequential numbers (for example 555 or 777) have been found in both the Indian Ocean between 2017 and 2021, and in Central Asia and the Russian Federation in 2012. By comparison, nonsequential numbers (for example 355 or 787) seized in the Indian Ocean are not seen in Central Asia and are only infrequently seized in the Indian Ocean. It is possible that sequential numbers may be associated with relative purity of the heroin contained in the packages stamped with these numbers. � Words stamped on heroin packages appear to be an indicator of where the heroin was produced. Heroin produced in southern Afghanistan is reportedly stamped with Pashto words, while heroin produced in northern Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran is more likely to be stamped with Farsi words. Heroin produced in eastern and western Afghanistan often has words in English, Farsi and Pashto, while heroin produced in Pakistan is labelled with words in English and Urdu. � Heroin and methamphetamine manufactured and trafficked by the same DTO may be stamped with the same or very similar stamps. In some cases, heroin packages are stamped with images of

animals which may be an indicator of relative purity of the heroin or an indicator of the location of the manufacturer. � Although some conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of heroin stamps seized in the Indian Ocean, there is still a lack of clarity on the meaning and purpose of some stamps – even among the drug traffickers interviewed in Afghanistan. Further analysis is required, including the analysis of drug stamps seized in locations outside of the Indian Ocean. It would be advantageous to develop a database of the different markings of heroin stamps to aid such analysis.

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2022. 36p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Key findings • Hawala is a Money or Value Transfer Service (MVTS) that has been used for centuries, originating in the Middle East and South Asia. It is overwhelmingly used for legitimate purposes, including personal and business financial transactions and for the sending of remittances by migrants and refugees to family members. Cultural preferences, convenience, low-threshold accessibility, low processing fees, reliability, and faster value transfer services are some of the reasons for using hawala, and customers using the service come from all walks of life. • Despite being widely used for legitimate purposes, some attributes of the hawala system also make it vulnerable to use by organised crime for the purposes of transferring illicit funds and values. This includes financial transfers by drug traffickers, migrant smugglers and other criminal actors and organisations, as well as safekeeping of funds obtained from illegal activity. The 113 hawaladars interviewed for this study do not commonly ask about the source of money or the reason for sending and receiving money. Additionally, when they did have doubts about the source of the funds, over half of the interviewed hawaladars reported that they had never refused a hawala transaction. • There is no single global regulatory framework for the hawala system. However, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has produced international standards and recommendations for countries to take measures to regulate the hawala system and ensure regular monitoring and compliance. Specific regulations and monitoring regimes vary by country, but FATF recommends countries take a risk-based approach to regulating the hawala system. Of the 18 countries covered by this study, the hawala system was regulated in most of them. However, in four countries it was not regulated, and in Afghanistan – following the events of August 2021 – the current regulatory status of the hawala system is unclear as of the time of writing. • Of the 113 hawaladars interviewed for this report, 43 per cent of hawaladars declared they had a license to operate. In jurisdictions where it is a requirement, 25 per cent operated without a license and 31 per cent preferred not to respond. 36 per cent of the interviewed hawaladars stated that they provided reports to the Central Bank or other relevant financial authorities about their hawala activities, while 64 per cent either had never reported or preferred not to answer the question. Licensed hawaladars collected more personal information from their customers and require identification documents, while for unlicensed hawaladars a name and contact number is sufficient to process a transaction. • Of the hawaladars interviewed in this

study, over one-third reported that they ran multiple branches within the same country and more than half of them reported having offices in other countries. Regular hawala customers are likely to receive a discount on commission charges by hawaladars. • People engaging in regular and irregular migration constitute one customer base of the hawaladars interviewed in this study. Over half of reported that they had migrants as customers. The findings of this study suggest that hawaladars – knowingly and unknowingly - facilitate irregular migration and migrant smuggling by providing multiple financial services including, but not limited to, money or value transfer, safekeeping of funds and introducing migrants and refugees to migrant smugglers. • There are multiple reasons why migrants and refugees would use hawala before, during and after traveling, and these are broadly linked to the features of the system, and, for some, lack of access to any other financial system, such as banks or mobile money services. Migrants and refugees may be directed to a hawaladar by a friend or relative, smuggler, fellow traveller, shopkeeper or accommodation provider. • The interviewed hawaladars identified the following services they provided to migrants and refugees during their journeys: guiding migrants on their journey; helping with finding work upon arrival; referring migrants to support organizations; providing temporary accommodation or referring migrants to an individual who provides temporary accommodation; and finding local medical aid, as undocumented migrants may not be able to or may be reluctant to access hospitals. • Some hawaladars also assist migrants and refugees by finding, recommending or introducing them to a smuggler; and finding or directly renting out boats and trucks for transportation. • The majority of customers using the services of the 113 hawaladars interviewed for this study sent funds to countries located in the Near and Middle East/ South-West Asia sub region, followed by Western and Central Europe and South-Eastern Europe subregions. Customers in the Near and Middle Eastern sub-regions frequently sent funds to hawaladars in most of the eighteen countries where interviews were conducted. Customers of the interviewed hawaladars in the countries of the North American sub-region only sent funds to hawaladars interviewed in Afghanistan, Denmark, Nigeria, Somalia, and the United Republic of Tanzania. • Hawala is widely associated with transferring money or value - this was the most common type of service provided by the sample group in this study. However, sending and receiving money is just one among several financial services hawaladars provide. Cash savings, currency exchange, short-term lending, safekeeping of funds, and trade guarantees were other services the interviewed hawaladars provided to their customers to varying degrees. Some of them safekeep customers’ funds. The amount of funds kept for safekeeping with the interviewed hawaladars ranged from US$ 20,000 to US$ 500,000. • Hawaladars often operate additional businesses alongside their hawala business. Some of the side businesses mentioned by interviewed hawaladars were grocery store, travel agency, selling mobile top-up cards, construction company and electronics shops. • A hawala transaction does not always proceed directly from country A to country B. Depending on the source and destination, sometimes a transaction is carried out through one or more intermediary hawaladars located in at least one other country. Hawaladars interviewed for this study reported that there are multiple hawala hubs located in several regions of the world where such intermediary hawaladars operate. • Hawaladars interviewed in this study reported processing both domestic and international transactions, however, nearly three out of four processed mostly international transactions. The amount of a single hawala transaction varies substantially. Transactions handled by the interviewed hawaladars ranged from as low as US$50 and as high

as US$200,000. To keep a record of these transactions, most hawaladars interviewed in this research reported that they keep a paper (ledger book) as well as an electronic (digital) record of hawala transactions and other services provided. • Hawaladars use a variety of methods to settle their accounts including through cash, reverse transaction, bank transfer or trading in goods and services. Reverse transaction was the most often used method of account settlement among the hawaladars interviewed in this study, followed by settlement through bank transfer. Misuse of the hawala service • In addition to its widespread legitimate use, hawala is vulnerable to misuse by organized crime groups and other criminal actors. More than one-third of the interviewed hawaladars judged the hawala system to be more vulnerable to illegal transactions compared to the formal banking system, while some perceived an equal vulnerability in both systems. A lack of proper oversight by national authorities, a lack of reporting by hawaladars, a lack of regulation, policy, or guidelines for hawaladars to follow, the operation of unlicensed hawaladars, and the closed nature of the hawala system are all potential reasons for vulnerability. • There are no exact estimates as to the extent to which hawaladars, knowingly or unknowingly, facilitate the misuse of their financial services for criminal purposes. Some hawaladars interviewed for this research reported the direct involvement of other hawaladars in transferring funds associated with illegal activities. Additionally, some criminal groups have hawaladars, who may be relatives, working specifically for them for the purposes of transferring funds linked to organised crime. • Several of the interviewed hawaladars reported that they do not ask the purpose of transactions from their customers. As a result, it is possible that hawaladars involved in handling transactions of illicit proceeds are not aware of the nature and source of the money they are transferring or safekeeping. This is particularly the case with hawaladars who are dealing with smaller transactions which usually do not arouse suspicions. However, some hawaladars reported that they could not refuse a transaction from customers connected with Organized Crime Groups (OCGs) due to the risk of negative consequences for themselves and their businesses. • It remains a challenge to precisely document the degree to which hawaladars are transferring illicit funds; it is also difficult to trace illicit financial flows, to separate them from licit flows, and to establish concrete financial links to criminal activities. Law enforcement agencies face challenges in investigating crimes linked to hawala systems, because of the closed nature of the business and, in some cases, the kinship ties of the actors.

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2023. 91p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Sahel countries are some of the largest gold producers in Africa. While gold production data can be unreliable, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania and the Niger are estimated to have produced 228 tons of gold in 2021, worth over 12.6 billion United States dollars ($). The gold sector is a major economic driver in the Sahel countries. Artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM) production is estimated at 108 tons per year in Sahel countries, although official ASGM production data is largely unreliable due to the informal nature of the sector. ASGM provides a livelihood to over 1.8 million people in areas where income-generating activities are limited. The sector is characterized by high levels of informality because it often takes place on unlicensed and undeclared mining sites. Gold mining without licenses is illegal in all Sahel countries, although Member States have taken measures to formalize ASGM. Barriers to accessing mining licences often push communities involved in ASGM into a vicious cycle of illegality. Without protection of the law, they depend on a local economy often controlled by transnational organized crime (TOC) groups to fund their operations and to sell their gold production, with limited opportunities for structural investments. These communities are potentially susceptible to

recruitment by armed groups, including violent extremist groups. Porous borders enable gold to be easily moved within the Sahel countries and smuggled out of the region, including to the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Vienna: UNODC, 2023. 36p.

By Rivke Jaffe

Rivke Jaffe explains how despite Jamaica’s “dons” are associated with crime and violence, they have become figures of political authority and seen as legitimate leaders.

Throughout Kingston, Jamaica, figures known as “dons” exercise political authority and are seen as legitimate leaders despite their associations with crime and violence. In the absence of strong government support, they provide impoverished residents with access to security, conflict resolution, and various forms of welfare through their own resources and connections to Jamaica’s political parties. In The Rule of Dons, Rivke Jaffe shows how dons’ power relies on a widespread belief in their right to rule, explaining how criminal power is legitimized through a set of aesthetic, affective, and spatial mechanisms. She argues that dons must credibly embody an outlaw persona that stands outside of the political establishment while also connecting strategically to state institutions and mobilizing democratic ideals such as freedom and equality. As such, dons represent a form of authority that involves balancing an autocratic form of rule

with an established democratic order. While donmanship represents a historically and culturally specific type of political authority, Jaffe’s analysis of this phenomenon offers insights into the entanglement of violent autocratic rule and democratic institutions far beyond Jamaica.

Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2024. 217p.

Shocking videos surfaced in late August of gun-wielding Venezuelan migrants storming an apartment building in the suburban city of Aurora, Colorado. One of the migrants, a 20-year-old, confessed that he is part of a Venezuelan gang called Tren de Aragua (TdA, or “Train from Aragua”). The Aurora police department is now beefing up its budget to confront the increased crime spilling over from the sanctuary city next door in Denver.Aurora was just the beginning. In the past 11 months, there have been increasing reports of TdA activity in no fewer than 30 major cities across America. At least 100 federal investigations involving the TdA are underway, catching most of the U.S. law enforcement community by surprise. Shooting two New York City

police officers, building sex trafficking rings in Louisiana, and murdering the Georgia nursing student Laken Riley and 12-year-old Jocelyn Nungaray in Houston are just some of the high- profile violent crimes carried out by the TdA. Moreover, given that the Venezuelan government does not cooperate or provide any data on suspected criminals coming from their country into the United States, some law enforcement officers have dubbed the TdA as “ghost criminals” with little to identify them other than confessions and/ or tattoos. The Tren de Aragua has been around for more than a decade, first as a Venezuelan prison gang, then as a transnational criminal organization (TCO) spreading throughout Latin America, and now as a major street gang terrorizing cities in at least 20 states throughout America—and growing. Many comparisons have been drawn between the TdA and the transnational Salvadoran gang, La Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS-13). The TdA, however, is expanding much more quickly, likely due to its unique origin and state sponsorship in Venezuela. Unlike MS-13, which was born in Los Angeles in the 1980s, the TdA is foreign-born and was virtually nonexistent in America until 2021, distinct from other major TCOs such as MS-13 or the Mexican cartels. The TdA’s rapid expansion in the United States is a direct consequence of the Biden–Harris Administration’s failed immigration policies and lack of border enforcement.

KEY TAKEAWAYS The TdA’s goal is to establish territorial control and impose a criminal economy that connects illicit networks to penitentiaries in or near those neighborhoods. The new Trump Administration should work with Latin American partners to dismantle the TdA throughout the Western Hemisphere.

BACKGROUNDER No. 3876 | December 5, 2024

Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation, the Douglas ans Sarah Alison Center for National Security, 2024. 18p.

By Tadesse Simie Metekia and Matt Herbert

Summary Due to their difficult political paths – Ethiopia’s stalled transition and Tunisia’s reversal – these two nations demonstrate the effects of failing transitions and democratic backsliding on rising transnational organised crime. Reversing the current trend of organised crime depends heavily on restoring stability and rule-of-law-based democracies, which could be achieved through a revived political process that embraces dialogue and transitional justice to mitigate the challenges and enable governance structures to tackle the complexities of organised crime. Key points The surge in transnational organised crime in Ethiopia and Tunisia can be seen as a consequence of their unrealised political transitions due to: • ensuing economic upheaval that has been the major driver of transnational organised crimes in both countries • porous borders and ungoverned spaces that allow criminal networks to grow • attention to pressing security challenges, such as conflicts and terrorism, that create space for criminal networks to strengthen and operate with impunity

ENACT Africa, 2024. 48p.

By Russell G. Smith

This report estimates the cost of serious and organised crime in Australia in 2022–23 to be between $30.4b and $68.7b. This is the fourth in a series of reports undertaken for the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission estimating the cost of serious and organised crime. It updates and improves on the methodology used in the previous report, which estimated the cost of serious and organised crime in 2020–21 to be between $24.8b and $60.1b. As with the previous research, this report considers the direct and consequential costs of serious and organised crime in Australia, as well as the costs to government entities, businesses and individuals associated with preventing and responding to serious and organised crime. The current estimate includes the cost of some additional crime types, not previously included, but even accounting for these additions it is clear that serious and organised crime continues to impose a substantial burden on the Australian economy.

Statistical Report no. 50. 

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2024. 87p.

By Erica Marat and Gulzat Botoeva

Summary This research brief examines the links between illegal drug trafficking, violence, and corruption in Central Asia. We argue that drug trafficking is highly organised with major criminal and state actors participating in the illicit activity. Criminal violence is spread across the region, especially in urban areas, but the Central Asian states are capable of intercepting and preventing illicit activities. By analysing big data on violence, drug interdictions, and patterns of corruption in the region between 2015 and 2022, we explain the relationship between drug trafficking and key actors from the criminal underworld and state agencies in Central Asia. We also rely on expert interviews explaining states’ involvement in the drugs economy. Our analysis of violence and policing dynamics in the region shows how patterns of organised crime change depending on state effectiveness and the presence of competition between traffickers. Each country exhibits a unique relationship between state actors and criminal syndicates in both interdicting and facilitating drug trafficking. Our research comes at a time of an anticipated increase in drug trafficking from Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, and of growing economic uncertainty in the wider region due to Western sanctions against Russia. In the policy realm, our research findings can help develop anti-trafficking strategies in the Central Asian region and improve our understanding of how drug trafficking can be curbed more effectively by identifying the main actors involved in this highly organised criminal process

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham., 2022. 48p.

By Mark Galeotti

In May 2022, Lithuanian police raided two underground factories where counterfeit cigarettes worth some €73 million were being produced.2 This happens all the time, and even the involvement of a Russian-linked organized crime group was hardly unusual. However, as the investigation extended to Belgium (where the goods would be transhipped to Britain), it became clear that behind the gangsters lay Russian intelligence officers, who were using the business – or at least part of its profits – to raise operational funds for their activities in Europe. With Putin regarding himself as ‘at war’ with the West, at a time when Europol chief Catherine de Bolle is warning that organized crime is on the rise across Europe,3 and Thomas Haldenwang, head of Germany’s counter-intelligence agency, is assessing ‘the risk of [Russian] state-controlled acts of sabotage to be significantly increased’,4 it is perhaps unsurprising that gangsters and spies would find themselves brought together in his campaign. It has, after all, become commonplace since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 to characterize the relationship between Russia and the West as some shade of war: economic, political, but typically more than just cold. Indeed, even as he insists that his invasion is not a war, just a ‘special military operation’ (SVO) – actually calling it a ‘war’ can conceivably get Russians a 15-year prison sentence5 – Putin freely uses the term when describing his country’s engagement with the West. However, it is less clearly understood just how significant and long held this view of his may be. In this context, it does seem in hindsight that Putin has considered himself as de facto at war with the West – or, more precisely, that the West has been warring against him – since at least around 2012. After stepping back from the presidency to the position of prime minister in order to observe the letter, if not the spirit, of term limits, all the while clearly still running the country, when Putin announced he would be returning to the Kremlin, this was for many the last straw. Demonstrations that became known as the Bolotnaya Protests were mastered and dispersed, but Putin seems to have been unable or unwilling to accept that they were a genuine, organic expression of dismay. Instead, he chose to see them as spurred by the US Department of State, after then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton ‘gave the signal’ to opposition leaders.6 There had been a growing school of thought within Russian security circles that the West was using ‘political technologies’ to topple hostile governments, and support for civil society, democratization and the rule of law were seen as part of this campaign. As a former Kremlin insider put it, Putin was scared, then angry. As far as he was concerned, this was it, this was a sign that the West – the Americans – were coming for him. So he was determined to fight back, and that didn’t just mean defending himself, the repressions and arrests, it meant going on the attack. He was clear, he made it clear to us all: if the West was coming to mess with him, we would mess them up worse, by whatever means necessary.

Russia’s transition from a “conscription state” to a full “mobilization state”, after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, has intensified the involvement of criminal groups in operations tied to sanctions-busting, cyber warfare, and intelligence. Organized crime networks provide Russia with access to restricted goods, such as advanced electronics for its military, and facilitate money laundering and illegal financial flows. Notably, Russian intelligence services have relied on criminal syndicates to supplement their espionage activities, including sabotage, cyberattacks, and assassinations.

The report also highlights Russia’s weaponization of migration, using smuggling networks to create political instability across Europe. Meanwhile, Putin’s regime has blurred the lines between state and criminal actors, using them as tools to evade international sanctions and expand Russian influence globally.

“Gangsters at War” reveals how Russian-based organized crime operates as a tool of Kremlin foreign policy, focusing not just on profits but on weakening geopolitical rivals. From sanctions evasion to destabilizing societies, criminal networks have become a key element in Russia’s geopolitical arsenal. The report calls for increased vigilance, international cooperation, and stronger countermeasures to address this growing threat to global stability

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.2024. 62p.

By Leila Pereira, Rafael Pucci, Rodrigo R. Soares

We study a Force-down/Shoot-down intervention in Brazil that led cocaine traffickers to shift from air to river routes. Using data on cocaine production, homicides, and the network of rivers in the Amazon, we provide evidence that violence increased in municipalities along river routes originating from Andean producing countries after the policy. We also show that, during the same period, violence in these municipalities became more responsive to cocaine production in origin countries. We document an instance of crime displacement over the three-dimensional space, involving sophisticated adaptations from criminals regarding transportation technologies, with dramatic side-effects for local populations.

Bonn: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2024. 55p.

Europol; European Union. Publications Office

From the document: "This edition marks 10 years since the release of Europol's first IOCTA [Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment]. Throughout this time, the threats posed by cybercrime have evolved dynamically in terms of volume, intensity and harm potential. The number of cybercriminals entering the market continued to grow steadily, thanks to the adoption of new technologies as well as the increasing complexity of digital infrastructures, which expands the potential attack surface. In 2023, millions of victims across the EU were attacked and exploited online on a daily basis. Small and medium businesses were increasingly popular targets for cyber-attacks, while e-merchants experienced the most digital skimming attacks. Adults were victimised through phishing, investment and romance frauds, and more and more minors were targeted by child sexual exploitation offenders and online sexual extorters. In parallel, a number of worldwide law enforcement actions shook the cybercriminal underground through continued arrests of ransomware affiliates and operators. Law enforcement also carried out coordinated disruption operations against cybercriminals' digital infrastructures. Notwithstanding the growing presence of law enforcement in the dark web, this environment continues to function as an enabler for cybercrime, allowing offenders to share knowledge, tools and services in a more concealed way. In addition, the use of cryptocurrencies in a wider variety of crime areas has become more noticeable in 2023, alongside the growing number of requests for investigative support in cryptocurrency tracing received by Europol. Cybercriminals are keen to leverage Artificial Intelligence, which is already becoming a common component in their toolbox and is very likely to see even wider application. Law enforcement agencies are expected to build a robust capacity to counter the growing threats stemming from this, both in terms of human resources and technical skills."

Europol; European Union. Publications Office . 2024. 38p.

By GALEOTTI, MARK

From the webpage description: "'Since 2012, Russia has strategically used criminal networks to evade sanctions, conduct intelligence, and destabilize the West. Under Putin's 'mobilization state,' illegal activities--from smuggling to cyberattacks--are seen as essential tools of warfare. This report delves into the Kremlin's alarming integration of organized crime into statecraft.' Russia's transition from a 'conscription state' to a full 'mobilization state', after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, has intensified the involvement of criminal groups in operations tied to sanctions-busting, cyber warfare, and intelligence. Organized crime networks provide Russia with access to restricted goods, such as advanced electronics for its military, and facilitate money laundering and illegal financial flows. Notably, Russian intelligence services have relied on criminal syndicates to supplement their espionage activities, including sabotage, cyberattacks, and assassinations. The report also highlights Russia's weaponization of migration, using smuggling networks to create political instability across Europe. Meanwhile, Putin's regime has blurred the lines between state and criminal actors, using them as tools to evade international sanctions and expand Russian influence globally. 'Gangsters at War' reveals how Russian-based organized crime operates as a tool of Kremlin foreign policy, focusing not just on profits but on weakening geopolitical rivals. From sanctions evasion to destabilizing societies, criminal networks have become a key element in Russia's geopolitical arsenal. The report calls for increased vigilance, international cooperation, and stronger countermeasures to address this growing threat to global stability."

GLOBAL INITIATIVE AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME. November. 2024. 82p.

By Najla Nassif Palma

The idea that Rio de Janeiro has been plunged into an actual “war” against organized crime is widely discussed and is supported by an ever-increasing number of people in Brazil. Not surprisingly, such discourse has led to less protection for the civilian population, particularly in the so-called favelas, while allowing security forces to carry out operations with even greater relative impunity. This article argues that although urban violence in Rio de Janeiro is indeed a serious problem, it does not reach the threshold required to be considered a non-international armed conflict.

International Review of the Red Cross (2023), 105 (923), 795–827.

By Marcena Hunter

While gold is often referred to as a blood mineral due to its role in conflict financing, the relationship between the gold sector, instability and violence is far more nuanced, with complex regional dynamics. In the gold production hub of West Africa, where artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM) is pervasive, an increasing tide of insecurity and violence in recent years adds to the complexity of the sector. Woven into the region’s convoluted web of actors, activity and supply chains are criminal networks that link local mines to international trade hubs, exploiting the gold sector for financial gain and power. The analysis in this report demonstrates that the reality of the relationships between gold, conflict and criminality challenges the simplistic narrative of ‘blood minerals’ used to finance conflict, offering a far more nuanced understanding of the significance of the gold sector in West Africa. Rather, gold is closely intertwined with survival, money, power and criminality. Criminality, fragility and violence While literature on the relationship between gold and instability has often focused on conflict financing, the interplay between gold, governance and criminality can contribute to instability and violence before any form of conflict financing takes place. Criminal exploitation of the gold sector is fostered by persistent and widespread informality, due in part to the significant barriers to entry in the formal sector, and the lack of support for informal miners and gold traders. As a result, corrupt and criminal elites in the political and business spheres can capture illicit gold flows, further contributing to community frustrations that can give rise to conflict. Limiting access to the gold sector by restricting access to mine deposits or conducting crackdowns on unlicensed ASGM can also undermine the legitimacy of state actors. Thus, efforts to stabilize West Africa must account for complex criminal interests while also addressing the long-standing grievances and expectations of local communities.1 Such efforts are critical in both conflict-laden areas and stable areas to reduce the risk of conflict spreading. Where the gold sector contributes to conflict financing in West Africa, it can vary significantly in form and value. In locations where conflict and gold mining overlap, armed groups may target the gold sector by taxing mining and trade activities, demanding payment from miners for providing security, or establishing checkpoints along roads to mine sites and trade hubs for payment collection. Members of armed groups may also directly engage in gold mining, either for personal financial gain or to benefit the group. Yet in many regions, gold is not the primary source of revenue for armed groups; other industries like the livestock sector are also targets. Sitting in the space between increased fragility and conflict are local self-defence and identity militia groups, which can act in cooperation or in competition with the state.2 In West Africa, these groups fall on a spectrum ranging from hybrid security institutions to mafia-style protection rackets run by ‘violent entrepreneurs’. There is a heavy overlap between these groups and the gold sector, with many instances of groups providing security at gold mine sites and along transportation routes. Yet, the origins of the different groups, their roles in local communities and the gold sector, and their role in conflict dynamics vary greatly.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2022. 61p.

By Stephen Merchant, Greg Wilson

In 2023 the Government commissioned a ‘first principles’ independent review of the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC) and associated Commonwealth law enforcement arrangements.

The review assessed the effectiveness of the ACIC’s legislative framework and found that comprehensive reform was needed to ensure ACIC could operate effectively as Australia’s national criminal intelligence agency. The review recommended ACIC shift away from its existing law enforcement and investigative functions towards providing unique intelligence on serious and organised crime to Commonwealth, state and territory law enforcement agencies.

The independent review’s recommendations set out a blueprint to transform the ACIC in response to the significant and ongoing threat of serious and organised crime. The Government has agreed or agreed in-principle with 27 of the 29 recommendations - as set out in the government response.

Key recommendations

• Undertake robust legislative reforms to address significant deficiencies in the existing legislative frameworks and ensure the ACIC has appropriate powers for the collection of intelligence.

• Incorporate appropriate oversight and safeguards for the ACIC, including in relation to its use of coercive powers.

• Reinvigorate national governance and coordination arrangements for responding to serious and organised crime.

• Reinforce the independence of the Australian Institute of Criminology.

BARTON, ACT : Attorney-General's Department (Australia), 2024. 68p.

By Nicolás Zevallos Trigoso, Jaris Mujica, and Christian Campos Vásquez

Coca legalization in Peru could reshape the economy, drug control policies, and even the influence of organized crime, but the implications are complex. This report explores how moving from prohibition to a regulated market affects not only the legal framework but also the ground reality for coca growers, consumers, and law enforcement. Legalization doesn’t just mean lifting restrictions; it involves constructing a regulatory structure that acknowledges coca as both a cultural staple and a consumer good.

The study reveals that while legalization could reduce the criminalization of coca production, it also creates new challenges. Ensuring a legal supply chain for coca derivatives, from cultivation to sale, demands extensive state oversight—a task complicated by limited resources and a history of challenges with other legal commodities like timber and gold. Moreover, organized crime could exploit the gaps in regulation, adapting to the legal framework while maintaining parallel illegal operations.

The analysis dives into four major areas of impact: changes in drug policy, shifts in organized crime dynamics, effects on the local economy of coca growers, and potential shifts in consumer patterns. The findings suggest that legalization could reduce repressive policing but require intensified regulatory control, putting immense pressure on Peru’s state capacity. Organized crime may also adapt to the new structures, blending illegal activities with legal coca businesses.

This study also highlights lessons from other industries that have moved from illicit to regulated markets, providing a balanced view of possible outcomes. While coca legalization could offer a path away from prohibition’s punitive approach, the transition to a regulated market could mean ongoing challenges.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024 24p.