By Huma Haide

Organized crime actors can be spoilers in peace processes or partners in peace. Policymakers and practitioners have in some cases engaged in a strategic trade-off – accepting organized crime as part of the political settlement to achieve short-term stability. However, the relationship between illicit markets and conflict can deepen over time, entrenching criminal structures in the post-conflict state. As Kemp and Shaw (2014, p. 16) argue, ‘failure to integrate issues of organized crime into mediation strategies and peace processes will leave the international community with a potentially dangerous blind spot.’ Negotiating with organized crime groups and addressing criminal agendas in peace processes has become a reality in practice. There is, however, limited research on negotiating with criminal actors in peace processes. In seeking to address this gap, this paper reviews scholarly and practitioner literature across a wide range of research disciplines.1 Key findings from this evidence review include: • Confrontation approaches have failed to resolve the problem of serious organized crime (SOC) and, in some cases, have fuelled more violence and criminality. • Organised crime groups that have strong internal cohesion and hierarchical leadership are more likely to be considered potential partners in negotiation. • Negotiation can be a necessary approach when criminal groups have strong territorial control – serving as de facto authorities that fill governance gaps. • Socio-economic and financial opportunities, and legal leniency, can encourage criminal actors to come to the negotiating table and agree on a deal. • A criminal group’s demand for legal leniency tends to be higher when they are expected to make larger concessions, such as to disarm and demobilize. • It is challenging to determine an ‘end state’ for a criminal group and to achieve a complete resolution of the criminal agenda. • Lack of political will, inadequate resources, and weak long-term planning constrain positive outcomes of negotiation processes and deal implementation. • Negotiators and mediators need to mitigate the risks of moral hazard and strengthen criminal groups. • The lack of broad public support for negotiating with SOC actors can undermine and destroy such processes. • A balance is needed between satisfying the interests of victims and of perpetrators to avoid alienating victims and producing public backlash for negotiated deals. • Many negotiations tend to occur in secret, yet lack of transparency can undermine the legitimacy and sustainability of outcomes. This review demonstrates the importance of creating a framework for engaging with criminality and organized crime groups that extend beyond confrontation – allowing for accommodation and incorporating a wider societal change agenda through transformation. This requires an understanding of when to address SOC and engage criminal groups in peace processes; how to motivate actors to negotiate, conclude, and implement deals; how to increase the likelihood of positive outcomes; and how to mitigate risks associated with negotiation. Drawing on a wide breadth of interdisciplinary literature, this paper aims to provide insights into these crucial questions. The case studies illustrate key themes and findings from this review (see Appendix 1). In El Salvador, ineffective confrontation, the internal cohesion of gangs, and an opportune moment contributed to the successful conclusion of a gang truce. It ultimately failed, however, due in large part to public outrage that translated into political pullback. In Colombia, negotiations with the FARC2 produced an innovative transitional justice mechanism that, alongside security guarantees, served as an effective inducement for disarmament. In contrast, the absence of a requirement to disarm and demobilize was a key criticism of negotiations with gangs in Jamaica, where violence has continued. In Mali and in Kosovo, international actors were initially hesitant to address organized crime in peace processes, yet this was subsequently recognized as contributing to longer-term instability, resulting in new strategies to address SOC actors.   

SOC ACE Evidence Review Paper No. 3. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham.2023. 88p.