By Robert Flummerfelt

The Kahuzi-Biega National Park in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a protected area and UNESCO World Heritage site that has received funding and material support from the German and US governments among other international supporters, has long been celebrated as one of the most biodiverse places on the planet. However, park authorities there have engaged in a three-year program of violent forced expulsions targeting the original human inhabitants of the park—the indigenous Batwa of Kahuzi-Biega, who are among the most marginalized groups in the country. This report, To Purge the Forest by Force, documents the highly organized, grievous and widespread human rights abuses jointly carried out by park guards and Congolese Army soldiers against Batwa between 2019 and 2021. In October 2018, after four decades of broken promises of resettlement, reparations and justice from the Congolese government and other stakeholders, segments of Batwa communities returned to the park, rebuilding villages on their ancestral lands. Their return was met with swift and devastating violence by park authorities. The report presents evidence of park guards and soldiers conducting three large-scale operations between 2019-2021, targeting at least seven highly populated Batwa-inhabited villages inside the park, along with numerous smaller-scale evictions and acts of repression. Among other abuses, dozens of Batwa have been killed, injured, arbitrarily detained or subjected to violent group rape, in what amounts to a systematic campaign of violence designed to terrorize Batwa and drive them out of the park. These large-scale operations are illustrative flashpoints in the decades-long process of marginalization and brutalization visited upon Batwa in the name of conservation. Ongoing violence is rooted in the original expulsion from their ancestral homeland to pave the way for the creation of the park in the 1970s, forcing an already marginalized indigenous community into decades of grinding impoverishment, landlessness and displacement. The story of the Batwa of Kahuzi-Biega is not an isolated incident. Instead, it is emblematic of the widespread, systemic violence inherent in the rigidly colonial conservation model widely used in East and Central Africa, funded and facilitated by a network of international entities, with deadly consequences for indigenous peoples and local communities living in the vicinity of protected areas. The tragic events detailed in this report have been made possible by a culture of impunity that devalues indigenous life in service of a highly militarized approach inherent in the ‘fortress conservation’ model, excluding the land’s original inhabitants in violation of international law.

London: Minority Rights Group International, 2022. 92p.

By Gary Risser and Camila Teixeira, with support from Bo Viktor Nylund and Jasmina Byrne.

Throughout much of history, organizations have used violence as a political weapon, exploited it for criminal gain and leveraged it for social change. Children’s involvement in organized violence has persisted equally as long. They have been used and exploited by a range of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and national armed forces to take part in combat, to commit other forms of violence in the context of armed conflict and to fulfil other purposes. They have also become members of organized criminal groups and, more recently, have been targeted by online networks that promote violence for all manner of causes. . Children in the global polycrisis: Increasing risks of their participation in organized violence? What is organized violence? This working paper uses the term ‘organized violence’ to refer to “the intentional use of physical force, threatened or actual, against another person or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation. This violent act is committed by a member of a group of three or more people at any time with a common purpose and knowledge violence will be used to pursue it.” For the purposes of this paper, only armed non-state actors are considered. In the United Nations Children’s Fund’s (UNICEF’s) programme and policy work, ‘armed non-state actors’ is used as a broad term that covers all armed groups operating in conflict and non-conflict situations. UNICEF then analyses these groups and places them in a typology based on a set of organizational and contextual characteristics. This working paper and a closed-door round table that preceded it (see Section II below), however, drew on the information and expertise of publications and experts that focus on more delineated subdivisions of armed non-state actors. The purpose of the round table was to bring these communities of experts together to share their insights on the involvement of children in these armed non-state actors, to document emerging commonalities and differences, and to identify areas for future foresight analysis and research. This working paper therefore includes three subsets of violent actors: NSAGs in armed conflict situations, including those who are designated or otherwise labelled as insurgents, terrorists and violent extremists and who usually operate in situations of armed conflict. Organized criminal groups, including street gangs and organizations that traffic in arms, drugs or people. These groups are not typically parties to armed conflict, even though some will be operating in places affected by conflict. Emerging loose networks that may have an online-only or hybrid online/offline presence, an unclear leadership hierarchy and limited rules. These are sometimes referred to as ‘post organizational’ groups. These three subcategories are not mutually exclusive. Some violent groups, for example, may be simultaneously engaged in combat against a government while producing narcotics and loosely coordinating with other branches of the group through social media applications. The vulnerability of children to involvement in organized violence may be getting more complex, or at least may be changing. The world is facing a confluence of multiple global shocks that have cascaded to affect and amplify each other. While most countries were still recovering from the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, a war in Ukraine which began in 2014 greatly escalated, exacerbating global inflation, energy shortfalls and food insecurity. The latest intensification of hostilities in Israel and the State of Palestine has led to further volatility in the Middle East. Other countries in which conflict has erupted or intensified since 2019 include Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, Myanmar and the Sudan. Meanwhile, the long-term challenge of climate change continues unabated. This convergence of global shocks – sometimes called a ‘global polycrisis’ – has had many harmful effects, some of which may present more serious risks to children. This global dynamic has created or exacerbated a number of conditions which affect children and families locally, including economic hardship, rising political tension, anger towards and fear of migrants, frustration with climate insecurity, and the use of new weapons in conflicts that might eventually spread to other crises. All of these conditions have the potential to amplify tensions that may lead to organized violence. In many cases, these shocks have also taken place in contexts with weak governance and inadequate systems to protect children and their rights, further increasing vulnerabilities. This global context is, furthermore, marked by a diversification and fragmentation of armed actors that pursue old and new causes while choosing to organize and operate in different ways. Some of these armed groups hold territory and challenge the state over governance. The Islamic State achieved this briefly in some locations in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic. Meanwhile, armed groups in Haiti and, until recently, El Salvador have continued to pose challenges to governments in particular neighbourhoods or provinces. In Afghanistan, the Taliban, a former NSAG, removed the government and took control of the country, though it is now battling an Islamic State-linked armed group itself. Territorial control can be important to group identity.6 Some armed groups rely on a networked ‘franchise’ structure, calling for different affiliated groups to form, pursue a common cause and launch attacks when advantageous but without coming under a central chain of command. Still others may orchestrate attacks while hiding among local communities or in the anonymity of the online world. Groups in the latter category may pursue this less structured type of organization when they are dispersed, unable to mobilize and hold territory, or uninterested in challenging the government for control. Some groups, including right-wing groups and the Islamic State, have declared this to be a particular strategy in their area of operation. The children involved in organized violence themselves are members of a significant new generation, Generation Z. In many countries, they are the first generation to have been born into and to have grown up in a digital world. They are also a generation that is struggling with increased mental health challenges. They must grapple with misinformation and disinformation in a ‘post-truth’ era, as well as the effects of algorithmic echo chambers that amplify opinions and trends. For some, engagement in digital realms enables greater social interaction, free from stigma or preconceptions. For others, however, the predominance of digital over in-person social interaction could lead to increased isolation and loneliness, feelings compounded by pandemic-driven lockdowns.8 Generation Alpha – people born from 2014 onwards – are the next group that could be drawn into organized violence, though how they will develop during their adolescence and what influences will predominate remains a matter of discussion. The involvement of children in acts of violence does not usually happen overnight. The diversity of individual trajectories suggests that it is necessary to understand the various manifestations of the phenomenon, from children demonstrating curiosity about ideas to their committing a violent act In addition, children’s engagement with violent groups or participation in violent acts is often not preceded by their accepting or adhering to an ideology. We must explore how these situations of child involvement in organized violence unfold through various pathways.   

Florence, Italy:  UNICEF Innocenti – Global Office of Research and Foresight , 2024. 40p.

By WHO - The World Health Organization

There is growing global recognition of the intersections between violence against women and violence against children. The current evidence shows intersections between intimate partner violence against women and violence against children by parents or caregivers, but limited evidence is available on the links between other forms of violence against women and violence against children. Both violence against women by their (male) intimate partners and violence against children by parents or caregivers are widespread globally. This report describes the process used to determine the priorities for research on the intersections between violence against children and violence against women, and the top 10 research questions identified.

Geneva: WHO, 2024. 41p.

By Kate McGoldrick , SallyAnne Collis , Linda Mulligan

Introduction: Femicide represents the dramatic end-point on a spectrum of violence against women and is an increasingly prevalent medico-legal issue. Whilst there is no definition of femicide in the Irish legal system, femicide can be understood as the gender-based killing of women or girls The pervasiveness of gender-based violence against women is a growing cause for concern with 2018 estimates by the World Health Organisation (WHO) revealing that 1 in 3 women have experienced Intimate Partner Violence (IPV). Femicide remains poorly defined and underreported worldwide due to enduring stigmatization, shame, and a lack of official statistics addressing national femicide rates. Aim: The aim of this study was to explore Irish cases of femicide, quantify the prevalence of femicide in Ireland, and identify any emerging trends over 12 years. Methods: All homicides referred to the Office of the State Pathologist (OSP) from 2012 to 2023 were reviewed and a total of 97 cases of femicide were identified and included in this study. Results: Femicide rates increased from 1 in 5 (19 %) homicides referred to the OSP in 2012–2020 to 3 in 10 from 2021 to 2023 (29 %). Domestic femicides accounted for 74 % of cases, with 41 % of women murdered in the home they shared with their killer. 56 % of women were killed by a current or former intimate partner and 20 % by a family member. Sharp force injuries were present in 75 % of femicides associated with a history of sexual violence. These cases had the highest average number of injuries per case (n = 30) and a significantly lower average age than that of the entire cohort (19 years versus 41 years). Conclusion: The true scale of gender-based violence against women remains largely hidden due to a lack of focused official statistics and a clear definition of femicide. As populations become more diverse, and displacement secondary to environmental, or humanitarian crises becomes more common, official data must be collected in order to understand and ultimately prevent gender-based violence in this vulnerable cohort.  

Journal of Forensic and Legal Medicine Volume 107, October 2024, 102754

By Laura Y. Calderón

Mexico had the most violent year in its history in 2019, reporting 29,406 intentional homicide cases, resulting in 34,588 individual victims.1 However, violence remains a highly focalized phenomenon in Mexico, with 23% of all intentional homicide cases concentrated in five municipalities and three major clusters of violence with homicide rates over 100 per 100,000 inhabitants. Following the national trend, the state of Guanajuato also had its most violent year in 2019, with one of its largest cities featured in the country’s top five most violent municipalities. This paper will analyze the surge in violence in Guanajuato in 2019, comparing the number of intentional homicide cases with the increasing problem of fuel theft in the state, and describing some of the state and federal government measures to address both issues. II. Background The central Mexican state of Guanajuato is a traditional agricultural-producing region, a major manufacturing hub, and a popular vacation and retirement destination for foreigners. Considered a relatively wealthy state and constituting 4.4% of the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Guanajuato boasts the sixth-largest economy in Mexico. The state also holds second place in terms of growth in the manufacturing sector, which makes up 26% of the state’s GDP. Guanajuato is home to economically important industries that attract considerable foreign direct investment to Mexico, including the automobile and chemical industries, among others.2 However, over the last several years, Guanajuato has been one of Mexico’s top 10 most violent states, and two of its largest cities —León and Irapuato— were among Mexico’s top 10 most violent municipalities in 2018 and 2019. The state of Guanajuato also had the highest number of organized crime-related homicides in 2019 with 2,673 cases,  according to Reforma. 3 Additionally, Guanajuato was featured in Milenio’s top five states with the highest number of murders every month in 2019, calculating 2,934 organized crime-related deaths. 4 Furthermore, Guanajuato was tied with Estado de México as the second most dangerous place for elected officials in 2019, according to Justice in Mexico’s Memoria dataset. 5 Guanajuato attracted media attention especially in 2019 because of a dramatic increase in violence. While few available studies are exploring the origins and source of increased violence in Guanajuato, there seems to be one factor that has not been fully studied in terms of violence trends: fuel theft. III. Huachicoleo and Organized Crime Groups Fuel theft is one of the most recent developments in Mexico’s violent crime spectrum, gaining nationwide notoriety in early 2017. Gasoline truck drivers, or chupaductos (pipeline suckers), were the first to adopt the name huachicol to refer to stolen hydrocarbons in Mexico.6 It is still complicated to track the origin of the word, as technically, it refers to an adulterated alcoholic beverage derived from cane alcohol. However, huachicol is also believed to come from the Mayan culture, where the word “huach” or “waach” means “foreigner,” and in some Mayan regions, “thief.”7 This term lead to the colloquial name huachicolero to refer to petroleum thieves. 8 The practice of huachicoleo has been an increasing problem in Mexico, with organized crime groups (OCGs) competing to control its revenues in a manner similar to the way in which they compete over drug-trafficking territories or plazas. Huachicoleo takes place in two different forms: through puncturing gas pipelines, which carry 20% of the country’s supply, or by stealing it on the go from the fuel distribution gas trucks on Mexico’s main highways.9 In socio-economic terms, the increase of fuel theft is partially attributable to the rise of oil prices in Mexico over the last few years, when gas went from an average of 5.00 Mexican pesos per liter (roughly 0.27 USD) in 2000, to 19.40 Mexican pesos per liter (roughly 1.03 USD) by December 2019 as shown in the chart below. 10 The population’s alleged inability or unwillingness to pay such high prices is believed to have created a greater demand for lower-cost gas—a demand that OCGs were willing to fulfill. Highway-side vendors started selling stolen gasoline from 5 to 10 Mexican pesos per liter (roughly 0.27 to 0.54 USD), depending on the distance from actual pipelines. 11 Networks of huachicoleros have established their vending points along major highways throughout Mexico, especially in central Mexico, where some of these vending points are disguised as legal commercial establishments such as tire shops, car repair workshops, coffee shops, restaurants, and other informal businesses.   

San Diego:  Justice in Mexico Department of Political Science & International Relations University of San Diego, 2020. 28p,

By Mahmut Cengiz  and Oguzhan Omer Demir 

Because of supply and demand factors, human trafficking for sexual exploitation has always been a profitable industry. Turkey, as a host country for immigrants from both former Soviet countries and the Middle East, combines supply and demand, attracting illicit business. Few studies have been conducted in the previous two decades to investigate the organized criminal element of human trafficking in this region. This research is based on ethnographic research in which trafficking victims (N = 11) were interviewed, and on-site observations were made. Our findings revealed that the trafficking industry in our study area was carried out by persons who were only loosely related to one another. There was no sophisticated, long-lasting sex trafficking organization. Membership was not severely limited, and individuals did not identify themselves as members of a well-known criminal organization. We provided policy recommendations and proposals for future research to address female trafficking for sexual exploitation

Social Sciences 11: 511. 2022. 

Edited by Erica Charters, Marie Houllemare, and Peter H. Wilson

This is the first extensive analysis of large-scale violence and the methods of its restraint in the early modern world. Using examples from Asia, Africa, the Americas and Europe, it questions the established narrative that violence was only curbed through the rise of western-style nation states and civil societies. Global history allows us to reframe and challenge traditional models for the history of violence and to rethink categories and units of analysis through comparisons. By decentring Europe and exploring alternative patterns of violence, the contributors to this volume articulate the significance of violence in narratives of state- and empire-building, as well as in their failure and decline, while also providing new means of tracing the transition from the early modern to modernity.

Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press,  2020.  317p.

By Mary Allen and Cristine Rotenberg

In December, 2014, the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act (PCEPA) changed the laws related to the sex trade, shifting the focus of criminalization from those who sell their own sexual services onto those who purchase sexual services and those who benefit financially from others’ sexual services. This article examines changes in sex-trade-related crime reported by police before and after the change in legislation.Between 2010 and 2019, there was a 55% decline in sex-trade-related crime driven by a 95% decline in incidents of stopping or impeding traffic, or communicating for the purpose of offering, providing or obtaining sexual services. Most of this decline occurred prior to the adoption of the PCEPA in 2014.Fewer women were accused or charged in incidents of stopping or communicating offences after the introduction of the PCEPA. The number of men accused in incidents relating to stopping or communicating offences also dropped considerably between 2010 and 2014. Charging rates also declined for men accused in this type of incident, but not to the same extent.With the drop in charges for stopping or communicating offences, there was a large decline in the number of court cases involving these offences. Fewer women were tried in court for stopping or communicating offences in the five-year period after the new legislation than the five-year period preceding the change (-97%). In addition, far fewer women were found guilty, and, of those, none were sentenced to custody.The PCEPA placed a new focus on activities related to the purchasing of sexual services. Between 2015 and 2017, incidents of the new offence of obtaining sexual services from an adult increased sharply before declining for two consecutive years. Individuals accused in these incidents were mostly men.After the drop in the number of men accused in incidents of stopping or communicating offences prior to the PCEPA, the number of men accused increased once the new legislation was in place (obtaining sexual services from an adult). There was also an increase in men accused in incidents of obtaining sexual services from a minor. Most of the men accused of purchasing sexual services were charged. In the courts, over four in five men tried for obtaining services from a minor were found guilty, and this was the case for about one in seven cases of obtaining sexual services from an adult.The number of police-reported incidents related to profiting from the sexual services of others increased after the change in legislation, as procuring and receiving material benefit incidents reached a high point in 2019, almost double what was reported in 2010.Both before and after the change in legislation, men were more often accused in incidents related to procuring or receiving material benefit than women, even more so after the PCEPA (67% of accused were men prior to the PCEPA and 82% after). This shift was the result of the drop in women accused in these incidents, coupled with a substantial increase in the number of men accused. In the courts, among cases involving a charge related to profiting from sexual services, men were more likely than women to be convicted in the five-year period before and after the PCEPA. Most of those convicted in these cases were sentenced to custody. Though an infrequent offence in terms of the number of cases processed, advertising sexual services offences also saw high conviction rates.After the PCEPA, fewer sex-trade-related offences occurred on the street or in an open area and proportionally more took place in a home or a commercial dwelling unit such as a hotel. This was driven by a considerable decline in offences that are public by definition (i.e., stopping or impeding traffic or communicating offences). The increase in incidents occurring in a home or a commercial dwelling unit is mostly explained by the large increase in incidents of procuring or receiving material benefit as well as the creation of the new offence related to obtaining sexual services from an adult.

Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2021. 29p.

By Alan Martin

Illegal artisanal mining in South Africa is among the most lucrative and violent on the African continent, with lost production exceeding R14 billion (about USD$1 billion) a year. Current enforcement and policy responses, which criminalise illegal miners, are misguided, counterproductive and ignore the poverty and socio-economic drivers behind the phenomenon. A more holistic, nuanced and multi-faceted approach is required from government and industry to address the lack of formalisation and the marginalisation of the illegal mining sector. Key points ∙ Illegal mining in South Africa should be considered to be artisanal mining within large-scale mines, not separate from them. ∙ While Zama Zamas are members of, or associated with, criminal syndicates, they are not homogenous groupings. ∙ The violence and insecurity caused by the criminality associated with illegal mining makes some mining areas in South Africa more chaotic and conflict-ridden than those elsewhere in Africa. ∙ Rough estimates of Zama Zama outputs suggest that lost gold production may exceed R14 billion a year,2 making South Africa one of the biggest sources of illicit gold in Africa. ∙ The true cost of illegal mining activity includes damage to public and private infrastructure caused by vandalism or poor mining practices, as well as the costs of security upgrades undertaken by mining companies to address illegal breaches  

ENACT Africa, 2019. 12p.

By Cirenia Chávez, Victor Cebotari, María José Benítez, Dominic Richardson, Chii Fen Hiu and Juliana Zapata

The prevalence of school-related violence and bullying is a global issue that impacts educational outcomes negatively. Furthermore, bullying can have emotional and physical effects on the children experiencing it, both in the short- and long term. Although the evidence regarding bullying from low- and middle-income countries is less extensive in comparison to evidence on the effects of bullying from high-income countries, some findings from the Latin American and Caribbean regions show similar results connecting lower reading scores with a high prevalence of bullying victimization. This working paper uses data from UNESCO’s Third Regional Comparative and Explanatory Study to determine the correlation between bullying and learning outcomes in 15 countries of the LAC region. It also looks at ways to mitigate the impacts of violence.

Innocenti Working Paper WP-2021-02 New York: UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund, 202. 68p.

By María Victoria Llorente & Jeremy McDermott,  Raúl Benítez Manaut,  Marta Lucía Ramírez de Rincón,  John Bailey 

Transnational criminal organizations trafficking drugs from Mexico to the United States have existed since the Prohibition era in the United States. But the violence associated with this trafficking—and related movements of other illicit goods as well as undocumented migrants—increased exponentially beginning in the mid-2000s, threatening Mexico’s national security. During the six-year administration of President Felipe Calderón (2006-12) estimates of those killed in drug-related violence reached 70,000, with an additional 20,000 “disappeared.” The upsurge in violence in many areas of the country reflected a combination of fighting between rival drug trafficking organizations seeking territorial control of criminal markets and dominance of lucrative trafficking corridors, as well as clashes between the traffickers and government security forces. By 2010, some Mexican cities registered homicide rates that were among the highest in the world and the public began to seriously doubt the government’s strategy and its ability to guarantee public safety. The scope of the violence and its frequently gruesome and shocking character, and the government’s seeming inability to bring it under control, brought forth memories of an earlier period in Latin America, when Colombia was besieged by the violence of the Medellín and Cali drug trafficking cartels. The Colombian crisis of the 1980s and ’90s involved multiple ways the state was losing ground to guerrilla and paramilitary groups in addition to drug traffickers. But like Mexico, the cost in human lives and government legitimacy was huge Over the course of more than a decade, Colombia’s security situation has improved dramatically. With significant international cooperation, the guerrillas have been weakened militarily and coca cultivation and cocaine production have been reduced. Most analysts agree that at least some of the security crisis in Mexico (as well as Central America) is due to ways that security advances and improvements in state capacity in Colombia forced traffickers to search for new smuggling routes and ways to market their illicit product. This is true even though, as several chapters in this publication indicate, organized criminal groups remain an important source of instability in Colombia, having mutated and fragmented in response to government pressure. Former paramilitary fighters, who demobilized in the early 2000s as a result of peace talks with the government, are important actors in the new manifestations of organized crime. Colombia is now a major player in South-South security cooperation, offering training to over 2,500 Mexican military and police officials between 2010 and 2012, as well as to over 5,000 members of the security forces from Central America and the Caribbean and over 2,000 from South America during the same time period.1 A former director of the Colombian National Police, General Óscar Naranjo, served as an adviser to the administration of Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto. The United States funds some of Colombia’s programs abroad and U.S. officials have expressed satisfaction and pride in Colombia’s success. In a May 2013 visit to Colombia, Vice President Biden paid “personal tribute” to President Santos and “the people of Colombia for the remarkable, remarkable progress you’ve made…” in dealing with the country’s security concerns. Biden went on to mention Colombia’s training of “thousands of law enforcement officers and security officers from over 40 countries since 2009.”  But precisely what aspects of Colombia’s strategy and tactics for fighting organized crime in its own territory offer useful lessons for Mexico? What might Colombia’s steps and missteps offer by way of example or counter example? What is unique about each case such that comparisons are misleading? What do current security challenges in Colombia suggest about the threat posed by organized crime more generally? To reflect on these questions, the Latin American Program commissioned a series of papers from international experts with a wealth of experience on issues of security, violence, and transnational criminal organizations. This publication includes two chapters analyzing the usefulness of comparing Colombia and Mexico’s experiences in combatting organized crime, as well as the potential for using Colombia’s successes as lessons for Mexico’s security strategy. Maria Victoria Llorente of Fundación Ideas para la Paz and Jeremy McDermott of Insight Crime argue that Colombia does not represent a ready template for Mexico’s fight against violence and organized crime, although its long experience may provide insight into Mexico’s future. The second paper, by Raúl Benítez Manaut, a researcher at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), contends that Colombia does offer positive lessons about how reform of the defense sector and professionalization of the police can yield measurable results for Mexico. Commentaries by Marta Lucía Ramírez de Rincón, former Minister of Defense of Colombia, and John Bailey of Georgetown University, deepen and take issue with the analyses provided by Llorente and McDermott and Benítez. .     

,Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2014. 128p. Scholars

By  Chelsea Estancona and Luca Tiscornia

Most of what we know about organized criminal violence comes from research about illicit narcotics markets. Yet, these groups also fight to capture markets for licit commodities, as evidenced by Sicilian lemons and South African abalone. When do criminal groups violently expand into markets for licit goods? We argue that rapid increases in the share of a good’s export value create opportunities for immediate profit and future market manipulation. This provokes violence as groups expand their territorial holdings and economic portfolios. We test our argument cross-nationally using the Atlas of Economic Complexity, V-Dem, and UNODC. Increases in a country’s share of global export value for agricultural goods are associated with more homicides– but only where criminal groups are present. We then provide subnational evidence of our mechanism using data on avocado exports from Mexico and address reverse causality with Google Trends data about the popularity of avocado toast searches. 

Present at the UNU Wider Development Conference, October 2022. 55p.

By Romain Le Cour Grandmaison

This article explores the construction – or reconstruction – of brokerage channels by violent actors in Mexico. It focuses on the construction of the Autodefensas de Michoacán (Self Defense Groups of Michoacán) and studies the process that put illegal armed leaders in active dialogue with the Mexican federal government, but also how they became brokers capable of controlling access to strategic political resources, economic markets, and the connections that tie local citizens and the central state. Through the concept of political inter-mediation, I investigate how coercion, as a skill and resource, has become central to governance in Mexico; and how this leads to consolidating intermediaries that participate in reproducing local, violent political order. This article shall contribute to the understanding of brokerage in contexts of violence, and shed new light on the political logic fueling the dynamics of violence in Mexico’s war on drugs. Keywords: drug cartels, brokerage, Mexico, war on drugs, state, violence.   

European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies / Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe, No. 112 (July-December 2021), pp. 137-158  

By María Calderón 

When it comes to an understanding of political violence in Mexico, there is a risk of solely equating it with criminal groups' activities or exclusively attributing it to such groups. However, the political violence phenomenon in Mexico is complex and diverse, with a particular nexus to locally based illicit economies, for which an all-containing approach is insufficient. About half of the political violence that occurred in Mexico during the 2018 elections was directly attributed to organized crime. During such time, political figures were killed at a rate of one per week. These numbers support the growing concern about criminal groups' involvement in Mexican politics. Criminal groups have used political violence in several ways: directly manipulating and influencing elections, protecting incumbent candidates with whom they have struck an agreement, killing candidates who are perceived as a threat to their interests, intimidating poll workers, and attacking and stealing voting booths, among others. The decrease in the profitability of trafficking heroin and cannabis, the legalization of marijuana in many US states, and increased fentanyl usage have forced cartels to recalibrate strategies and markets. Nowadays, criminal groups have partially shifted towards locally based illicit economies, such as oil theft, extortion, kidnapping, and other illegal activities that require control of local territories. All these variables come into play when understanding that criminalized electoral politics is a predominantly local phenomenon in Mexico. Political violence by criminal groups in Mexico is motivated by multiple factors, including economic interests, political objectives, and vendettas. Criminal organizations often avoid open confrontation when attacking politicians or political candidates, opting for other less visible techniques to minimize the impacts on police and law enforcement agencies, such as corruption. Installing or co-opting candidates at the municipal level has afforded criminal groups direct influence over the actions of local and state police. Access to intelligence on pending arrests or other operations has also proven beneficial for criminal organizations. Political influence has allowed criminal groups to employ local security forces as appendages of their organizations to detain or kill targets and to protect the transportation of illicit goods. Moreover, criminal organizations have tapped into state finances by coopting government employees.

Washington, DC:  Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2024  6p.   

By Garan Ho/mqvist 

Crime is an increasingly worrying social phenomenon in the developing world in general and in Latin America in particular. As shown in Figure 1~, the crime rate (measured by homicide lOO 000, as reported to the UN crime surveys by national police authorities) has virtually exploded since the mid-1980s in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Eastern Europe. Latin America stands out as an exceptional case. Annually in Latin America, approximately 140,000 people are murdered (Londono & Guerrero 1999:27). Using other sources does not change this picture. Figure 2 confirms the exceptional position of Latin America, where the source in mortality statistics is collected from national health authorities instead of the police. Indicators of crime other than homicide are less reliable for international comparison, but estimates point in the direction of Latin America being way above the average for any other region of the world (Bourguignon 1999, Table 1). It has been estimated that 28 million Latin American families are victims of theft or robbery every year (Londono & Guerrero 1999:3). Crime and violence are now viewed as a development issue of importance, which was probably not the case two decades ago. Development agencies such as the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) have quite recently initiated ambitious research projects on crime and violence. Projects directed to the judicial system or police authorities have increased their share in the project portfolio of multilateral as well as bilateral development cooperation agencies. More importantly, crime is becoming a major concern in the daily lives of an increasing number of citizens in the developing world, manifesting itself in national political agendas, in higher crime-related expenditures, and, not the least, in human suffering. There are several reasons to regard crime as a social phenomenon with strong and complex ties to the development process in general. In Latin America, crime is a potential threat to what most people would regard as encouraging development trends, especially after ''the lost decade" of the 1980s, in terms of democratization and resumed growth. The following examples may illustrate how continuous progress in these areas is being made more difficult by the increasing crime levels: 

 Iberoamericana. Nordic Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies Vol. XXX: 2 2000,pp. 23-53

By Jane Shim, and Alison Leal Parker

  Drug laws are being reformed across the United States to move away from the harsh punitive approaches of the war on drugs, but federal immigration law continues to treat drug offenses, including decades-old offenses, as grounds for deportation of immigrants. Those harmed, authorized and unauthorized immigrants alike, often have deep connections to the country, where they have formed families, attained education, and built their lives. “Disrupt and Vilify” analyzes new federal government data from 2002 to 2020, finding the US has deported 500,000 people whose most serious offense was drug-related. Of these, 240,000 were deported between 2013 and 2020, amounting to about one of every five deportations of immigrants with a criminal conviction for that period. A conviction for even minor drug offenses—for example, drug possession (including marijuana)—can carry devastating immigration consequences that far outstrip the criminal sentence imposed. Some would not be criminal offenses if committed today or involve conduct that is now legal under state law. There are significant racial disparities in the imposition of immigration penalties. One out of five noncitizens facing deportation on criminal grounds is Black. Human Rights Watch and the Drug Policy Alliance call on the US Congress to reform federal law to ensure that immigrants with criminal convictions, including drug offenses, are not subject to “one-size-fits-all” deportations. Instead, immigration judges should have the discretion to make individualized decisions. Congress should impose a statute of limitations on deportations for past offenses. Drug policy reforms should prioritize evidence-based policies rooted in public health and human rights to address the root causes of the overdose crisis and problematic drug use, and not continue the vilification of immigrants.  

 New York: Human Rights Watch, 2024. 97p.

By Mohamed Osman, and Laetitia Bader  

  Since conflict broke out in Sudan’s capital Khartoum in April 2023, between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), both sides, particularly the RSF, have committed widespread sexual violence against women and girls, which are war crimes. Both warring parties, in violation of international humanitarian law, have attacked local responders, and obstructed aid, doubly victimizing survivors. Based on 42 interviews conducted between September 2023 and February 2024 with service providers to survivors of sexual violence, including healthcare workers, within and outside of the local responders, as well as aid workers, “Khartoum is not Safe for Women!” documents conflict-related sexual violence in Khartoum and its sister cities of Bahri and Omdurman, since April 2023. Service providers described how the warring parties have subjected women and girls, aged 9 through 60 to rape, gang rape, as well as forced and child marriages. Men and boys have also been victims of sexual violence. Despite the serious harm to the health of survivors described in the report, it finds that the actions of both warring parties have prevented survivors from accessing critical and comprehensive emergency health care. SAF has restricted humanitarian supplies imposing a de facto blockade on drugs entering RSF-controlled areas of Khartoum since October 2023, in violation of international humanitarian law. The RSF has pillaged medical supplies and occupied medical facilities. Both warring parties have intimidated and arbitrarily arrested doctors, nurses, and volunteers because of their work. The United Nations and African Union should deploy a civilian protection mission to Sudan tasked with monitoring human rights abuses, including conflict-related sexual violence and willful aid obstruction, and ensure that those responsible for rape and attacks on healthcare and local responders are held to account.   

New York: Human Rights Watch, 2024. 100p.

By Patricia Gossman  

The 26-page report, “Double Betrayal: Abuses against Afghan Policewomen Past and Present,” documents threats from Taliban authorities since August 2021 that have forced many former policewomen to go into hiding out of fear of being identified. Since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021, Taliban authorities have threatened Afghan women who had served in the police under the previous government. As Taliban forces carried out hundreds of revenge killings of those who had served in the former government’s security forces, many former policewomen went into hiding out of fear of being identified. Several have been killed, either by relatives who opposed their work as “shameful” or under unclear circumstances. The Taliban have not conducted credible investigations into these murders. While employed by the former government, many policewomen experienced sexual harassment and assault by their male supervisors. They described abuses including rape as well as demands from superiors for sex in exchange for promotion or avoiding dismissal. The widespread nature of these abuses was well-known since at least 2013, including among countries supporting the ngovernment, but police officers responsible for abuse were not held accountable. Women reported mental health effects from this abuse and their fear of the Taliban, but have been unable to find or afford psychosocial support. Human Rights Watch calls on the Taliban to cease all threats and abuse of policewomen and others who worked for the former government. The US and other countries that supported programs to train and hire women in the police should ensure that those seeking protection are deemed eligible on the same level as other vulnerable categories. The US, UK, Canada, and the European Union and its member states should increase Afghan refugee resettlement places, prioritizing women at risk.   

New York: Human Rights Watch, 2024. 34p.

By Dorothy Kronick 

Some theories predict that profits facilitate peace in illegal markets, while others predict that profits fuel violence. I provide empirical evidence from drug trafficking in Venezuela. Using original data, I compare lethal violence trends in municipalities near a major trafficking route to trends elsewhere, both before and after the counternarcotics policy in neighboring Colombia increased the use of Venezuelan transport routes. For thirty years before this policy change, lethal violence trends were similar; afterward, outcomes diverged: violence increased more along the trafficking route than elsewhere. Together with qualitative accounts, these findings illuminate the conditions under which profits fuel violence in illegal markets. 

Journal of Conflict Resolution 2020, Vol. 64(7-8) 1499-1523 ª The Author(s) 2020 

By Juan Camilo Castillo and Dorothy Kronick

Drug traffickers sometimes share profits peacefully. Other times they fight. We propose a model to investigate this variation, focusing on the role of the state. Seizing illegal goods can paradoxically increase traffickers’ profits and higher profits fuel violence. Killing kingpins makes crime bosses short-sighted, also fueling conflict. Only by targeting the most violent traffickers can the state reduce violence without increasing supply. These results help explain empirical patterns of violence in the drug war, which is less studied than interstate or civil war but often as deadly 

American Political Science Review (2020) 114, 3, 874–887