Open Access Publisher and Free Library
08-Global crime.jpg

GLOBAL CRIME

GLOBAL CRIME-ORGANIZED CRIME-ILLICIT TRADE-DRUGS

Posts in Violence and Oppression
Organized crime behavior of shell-company networks in procurement: prevention insights for policy and reform 

By J. R. Nicolás-Carlock and  Luna-Pla

In recent years, the analysis of economic crime and corruption in procurement has benefited from integrative studies that acknowledge the interconnected nature of the procurement ecosystem. Following this line of research, we present a networks approach for the analysis of shell-companies operations in procurement that makes use of contracting and ownership data under one framework to gain knowledge about the organized crime behavior that emerges in this setting. In this approach, ownership and management data are used to identify connected components in shell-company networks that, together with the contracting data, allows to develop an alternative representation of the traditional buyer-supplier network: the module-component bipartite network, where the modules are groups of buyers and the connected components are groups of suppliers. This is applied to two documented cases of procurement corruption in Mexico characterized by the involvement of large groups of shell-companies in the misappropriation of millions of dollars across many sectors. We quantify the economic impact of single versus connected shell-companies operations. In addition, we incorporate metrics for the diversity of operations and favoritism levels. This paper builds into the quantitative organized crime in the private sector studies and contributes by proposing a networks approach for preventing fraud and understanding the need for legal reforms.   

Trends in Organized Crime (2024) 27: pages 412–428

Curbing Violence in Latin America’s Drug Trafficking Hotspots 

By The International Crisis Group 

Over half a century on from the declaration of a “war on drugs”, Latin America is struggling to manage the eruption of violence tied to the narcotics trade. Though drugrelated organised crime has brought notorious peaks of violence in the past, above all in Colombia and Mexico, never has it spread so wide, and rarely has it penetrated so deeply into states and communities. Criminal groups have splintered, multiplied and diversified, adding lethal synthetics like fentanyl to the traditional plant-based supply of marijuana, cocaine and heroin, as well as moving into new rackets like extortion. Where communities are poor and unprotected, criminal groups act as employers and overlords; where state officials are present, they coerce and corrupt them. With Washington pushing for a fresh military-led crackdown on drug cartels, perhaps involving U.S. forces, Latin American leaders face difficult decisions. Despite the pressure to comply, experience suggests that a balance of improved policing, alternative livelihoods, gun control and, under specific conditions, negotiations would be more effective in reducing violence. The map of the drug trade in Latin America has been transformed in the decades since supply routes from the Andes to the U.S. first emerged. Demand for narcotics outside the region remains at record highs, with newer markets booming – particularly for cocaine in Europe and fentanyl in the U.S. At the same time, waves of U.S.- backed law enforcement, based on capture and extradition of crime bosses (known as kingpins), drug seizures and forced eradication have revolutionised the supply chain. Although Colombia and Mexico remain at the heart of the drug business, a main route to the U.S. and Europe runs down the Pacific, passing through countries that were largely untouched by illicit trafficking such as Costa Rica and Ecuador. Each of these has seen rates of violence rise sharply; in 2024, Ecuador was South America’s most violent nation. Across the region, surges of bloodshed have marked the new hubs of a fast-shifting, hyper-violent drug trade. Understanding how this rolling crime wave came about is fundamental to arresting it. Drug-related organised crime has adapted to the threat posed by law enforcement by becoming more flexible and resilient. In place of hierarchical syndicates that could be dismantled once their leaders were identified, the trade increasingly functions through networks of providers who subcontract each step of the route to lower tiers of operators. High-level financiers engage sophisticated international traffickers, who oversee drug exports to user markets. These in turn partner with national and local crime groups to meet the orders. National groups manage production or ensure safe passage of the drug along a particular trafficking corridor. At the local level, urban gangs are contracted by larger criminal allies for small-scale logistical services like smuggling drugs through ports. All the layers of these networks have learned that capturing state officials is a business asset. Using a mix of threats and payoffs, they target police officers, judges, prosecutors and politicians who can ensure that business runs smoothly, without the risk of arrest or seizure of shipments. Likewise, prisons in some of Latin America’s roughest settings are run by inmates, who manage their criminal enterprises behind bars and carry out vendettas against rivals inside and outside.

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2025. 51p.

Beyond Ideology: Violent Extremism and Organized Crime in the Western Balkans

By Ruggero Scaturro | Giorgio Fruscione

In the Western Balkans, religious radicalization gained international attention in the early 2010s, with around 1 000 people travelling to Syria and Iraq to join jihadist groups between 2012 and 2016. The roots of this radicalization trace back to the Yugoslav wars, the presence of mujahideen networks in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Islamist charities spreading Salafi jihadism in the 1990s.

However, not all fighters from the Western Balkans are religiously motivated. Between 2014 and 2021, around 300 people fought in eastern Ukraine, mainly for political reasons, with Serbia being a major source of combatants supporting pro-Russian separatists. Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, this trend has resurged, with more individuals reportedly joining mercenary units like the Wagner Group.

Instability in the Western Balkans has also fuelled the spread of organized crime beyond the region, first across Europe and later to other continents. In the 1990s, the Yugo Mafia gained significant media attention in Northern Europe. Meanwhile, violent extremists from the Western Balkans maintain transnational connections through diaspora networks and using online platforms.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2025. 45p.

Modeling the Role of Police Corruption in the Reduction of Organized Crime: Mexico as a Case Study

By Andrés Aldana, Hernán Larralde & Maximino Aldana

Among all types of corruption, police corruption is probably the one that most directly hurts society, as those trusted with protecting the people either side with the criminals that victimize the citizens, or are themselves, criminals. However, both corruption and its effects are very difficult to measure quantitatively other than by perception surveys, but the perception that citizens have of this phenomenon may be different from reality. Using a simple agent-based model, we analyze the effect on crime rates as a result of both corruption and the perception of corruption within law-enforcement corporations. Our results show a phase transition in which crime can propagate across the population even when the majority of police officers are honest. We find that one of the parameters that strongly controls crime incidence is the probability that regular citizens become criminals. In contrast, other actions, such as arresting crime lords, or the amount of crime-associated money that is confiscated, have little impact on the long-term crime incidence. Our results suggest that in addition to combating corruption within law-enforcement institutions, to further reduce the incidence of crime, policymakers should strive to restore confidence in these institutions and the justice system.

Collusion, Co-Optation, or Evasion: The Politics of Drug Trafficking Violence in Central America

By Laura R. Blume

Why do drug traffickers sometimes decide to use violence, but other times demonstrate restraint? Building on recent work on the politics of drug violence, this article explores how Central American drug trafficking organizations’ strategies impact their use of violence. I argue that three inter-related political factors—corruption, electoral competition, and the politicization of the security apparatus—collectively determine the type of relationship between traffickers and the state that will emerge. That relationship, in turn, determines the primary strategy used by traffickers in that country. Drawing on over two years of comparative ethnographic fieldwork in key transshipment points along the Caribbean coast of Central America, I show how co-optation strategies in Honduras have resulted in high levels of violence, evasion strategies in Costa Rica have produced moderate levels of violence, and collusion strategies in Nicaragua have generated the lowest levels of drug-related violence.

Comparative Political Studies,Volume 55, Issue 8, July 2022, Pages 1366-1402

Insurgency, Organised Crime and Resource Exploitation in Cabo Delgado  

By Anneli Botha

Transnational organised crime is at the heart of the illicit extraction and smuggling of natural resources in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province. Is there evidence that insurgents are capitalising on the extraction of natural resources to radicalise and recruit new members, legitimise and justify their existence and attacks, or finance their activities? In the absence of interviews with militants, this study reflects on the views of community members living in areas where natural resources are extracted, and insurgents operate. Key points • Mozambique’s government needs to consider a more effective information campaign to get ahead of incorrect perceptions insurgents could capitalise on. • Words should be followed by action addressing the disparity between expected financial growth following the discovery of natural resources and the reality on the ground. • Despite efforts from extraction companies to build community relations, more is needed to address negative perceptions and strengthen community resilience through efforts to make locals more employable. Piecemeal efforts are not going to be enough

Research Paper  Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, 2025. 26p.

Youth Gangs in Liberia: Motives, Structure and Illicit Economies

By Ndubuisi Christian Ani, Feyi Ogunade and John Kamma 

Gangsterism in Liberia lies at the intersection of a society ravaged by civil war, a declining economy, social exclusion of a bulging underclass, collusion between state officials and illicit markets, and inefficient law enforcement. For youths, gang involvement offers a sense of belonging, a surrogate family structure, and a means of protection and economic benefits. Gangs are also available for hire by politicians, criminal networks and business people seeking to intimidate their opponents or protect properties. Key recommendations • A policy against gangsterism and criminal groupings is urgently needed in Liberia. A comprehensive policy would offer opportunities for a holistic response that involves the improved provision of public services, including enhanced law enforcement, in communities. • Youth-focused development is a critical priority for addressing the causes of gang violence and drug abuse in Liberia. Without discounting the importance of quick-impact youth empowerment initiatives, development programmes need to be long-term. • Schools should have drug prevention programmes. • International support could help Liberia establish treatment and rehabilitation centres to address substance abuse and criminality. • The Economic Community of West African States and African Union should establish a joint task force with Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea to disrupt kush production points Research Paper and supply chains  

ENACT Africa, 2025. 28p.

Jetway Robbery? Homeland Security and Cash Seizures at Airports

By Jennifer McDonald

Across the country, law enforcement agencies routinely seize currency from individuals using civil forfeiture—a legal process that allows agencies to take and keep property without ever charging owners with a crime, let alone securing a conviction. Studies examining civil forfeiture have found it to be a multibillion-dollar industry that punishes people without proving they have done anything wrong. This study is the first to examine how U.S. Department of Homeland Security agencies—U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the U.S. Secret Service, and the U.S. Coast Guard—use civil forfeiture to take and keep currency from often unsuspecting travelers at airports across the country. DHS agencies are just a few of the many government agencies that conduct airport seizures, but newly available data give fresh insight into their activity. This study, covering 2000 through 2016, quantifies just how often DHS agencies have seized currency at airports—and just how much currency has flowed into the federal government’s coffers as a result.

Arlington, VA: Institute for Justice, 2020. 32p.

The Rule of Dons

By Rivke Jaffe

Rivke Jaffe explains how despite Jamaica’s “dons” are associated with crime and violence, they have become figures of political authority and seen as legitimate leaders.

Throughout Kingston, Jamaica, figures known as “dons” exercise political authority and are seen as legitimate leaders despite their associations with crime and violence. In the absence of strong government support, they provide impoverished residents with access to security, conflict resolution, and various forms of welfare through their own resources and connections to Jamaica’s political parties. In The Rule of Dons, Rivke Jaffe shows how dons’ power relies on a widespread belief in their right to rule, explaining how criminal power is legitimized through a set of aesthetic, affective, and spatial mechanisms. She argues that dons must credibly embody an outlaw persona that stands outside of the political establishment while also connecting strategically to state institutions and mobilizing democratic ideals such as freedom and equality. As such, dons represent a form of authority that involves balancing an autocratic form of rule

with an established democratic order. While donmanship represents a historically and culturally specific type of political authority, Jaffe’s analysis of this phenomenon offers insights into the entanglement of violent autocratic rule and democratic institutions far beyond Jamaica.

Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2024. 217p.

Derailing the Tren de Aragua

Shocking videos surfaced in late August of gun-wielding Venezuelan migrants storming an apartment building in the suburban city of Aurora, Colorado. One of the migrants, a 20-year-old, confessed that he is part of a Venezuelan gang called Tren de Aragua (TdA, or “Train from Aragua”). The Aurora police department is now beefing up its budget to confront the increased crime spilling over from the sanctuary city next door in Denver.Aurora was just the beginning. In the past 11 months, there have been increasing reports of TdA activity in no fewer than 30 major cities across America. At least 100 federal investigations involving the TdA are underway, catching most of the U.S. law enforcement community by surprise. Shooting two New York City

police officers, building sex trafficking rings in Louisiana, and murdering the Georgia nursing student Laken Riley and 12-year-old Jocelyn Nungaray in Houston are just some of the high- profile violent crimes carried out by the TdA. Moreover, given that the Venezuelan government does not cooperate or provide any data on suspected criminals coming from their country into the United States, some law enforcement officers have dubbed the TdA as “ghost criminals” with little to identify them other than confessions and/ or tattoos. The Tren de Aragua has been around for more than a decade, first as a Venezuelan prison gang, then as a transnational criminal organization (TCO) spreading throughout Latin America, and now as a major street gang terrorizing cities in at least 20 states throughout America—and growing. Many comparisons have been drawn between the TdA and the transnational Salvadoran gang, La Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS-13). The TdA, however, is expanding much more quickly, likely due to its unique origin and state sponsorship in Venezuela. Unlike MS-13, which was born in Los Angeles in the 1980s, the TdA is foreign-born and was virtually nonexistent in America until 2021, distinct from other major TCOs such as MS-13 or the Mexican cartels. The TdA’s rapid expansion in the United States is a direct consequence of the Biden–Harris Administration’s failed immigration policies and lack of border enforcement.

KEY TAKEAWAYS The TdA’s goal is to establish territorial control and impose a criminal economy that connects illicit networks to penitentiaries in or near those neighborhoods. The new Trump Administration should work with Latin American partners to dismantle the TdA throughout the Western Hemisphere.

BACKGROUNDER No. 3876 | December 5, 2024

Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation, the Douglas ans Sarah Alison Center for National Security, 2024. 18p.

Prevalence and Patterns of Substance Use in West Africa: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis

By Godwin Omokhagbo Emmanuel, Folahanmi Tomiwa Akinsolu , Olunike Rebecca Abodunrin,

Oliver Chukwujekwu Ezechi

ntroduction

Substance use is a growing public health concern in West Africa, contributing to significant morbidity, mortality, and socioeconomic challenges. Despite the increasing prevalence, comprehensive data on the patterns and factors influencing substance use in the region remain limited. This systematic review and meta-analysis aim to synthesize existing research on the prevalence and patterns of substance use in West Africa, providing critical insights for developing targeted interventions and policies.

Methodology

This study followed the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses [PRISMA] guidelines. A systematic search was performed across four major databases [PubMed, Web of Science, CINAHL, and Scopus] from January 2000 to June 2024. A total of 22 studies involving 43,145 participants met the inclusion criteria. Multiple reviewers performed data extraction and quality assessment independently, and a random-effects meta-analysis was used to estimate the pooled prevalence of various substances. Sensitivity analysis was conducted using a leave-one-out approach to evaluate the influence of individual studies on the overall prevalence.

Results

The meta-analysis revealed the pooled prevalence rates of alcohol [44%], cannabis [6%], tramadol [30%], codeine [11%], and kolanut [39%]. The analysis identified high heterogeneity across studies [I2 = 98– 99%], reflecting diverse substance use patterns and influencing factors, including peer influence, availability of substances, socioeconomic conditions, and demographic characteristics. Sensitivity analysis indicated that no single study significantly impacted the overall prevalence estimates, confirming the robustness of the findings.

Conclusion

Substance use in West Africa is widespread and influenced by complex factors. The high prevalence of alcohol and tramadol use highlights the urgent need for targeted public health interventions, including stricter regulatory frameworks, community-based prevention programs, and comprehensive public education campaigns. This study provides a critical foundation for developing effective strategies to mitigate the escalating substance use crisis in the region.

PLOS Glob Public Health 4(12): e0004019. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal. pgph.0004019

Drug Overdose Deaths in the United States, 2003–2023

By Matthew F. Garnett and Arialdi M. Miniño

Drug overdoses are one of the leading causes of injury death in adults and have risen over the past several decades in the United States (1–3). Overdoses involving synthetic opioids (fentanyl, for example) and stimulants (cocaine and methamphetamine, for example) have also risen in the past few years (1). This report presents rates of drug overdose deaths from the National Vital Statistics System over a 20-year period by demographic group and by the type of drugs involved, specifically, opioids and stimulants, with a focus on changes from 2022 to 2023. Key findings Data from the National Vital Statistics System ● The age-adjusted rate of drug overdose deaths increased from 8.9deaths per 100,000 standard population in 2003 to 32.6 in 2022; however, the rate decreased to 31.3 in 2023. ● Rates decreased between 2022 and 2023 for people ages 15–54 and increased for adults age 55 and older. ● From 2022 to 2023, rates decreased for White non-Hispanic people, while rates for other race and Hispanic-origin groups generally stayed the same or increased. ● Between 2022 and 2023, rates declined for deaths involving synthetic opioids other than methadone, heroin, and natural and semisynthetic opioids, while the rate for methadone remained the same. ● From 2022 to 2023, rates increased for deaths involving cocaine by 4.9% (from 8.2 to 8.6) and psychostimulants with abuse potential by 1.9% (10.4 to 10.6)

NCHS Data Brief No. 522, December 2024. 12p.
Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics. 2024. DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.15620/cdc/170565.

The Public Health Risks of Counterfeit Pills

By Joseph Friedman, jofriedman@health.uDaniel Ciccarone

Synthetic illicit drugs, such as nitazenes and fentanyls, are becoming commonplace in countries around the world, including in Europe, Australia, and Latin America, which raises concern for overdose crises like those seen in North America. An important dimension of the risk represented by synthetic drugs is the fact that they are increasingly packaged in counterfeit pill form. These pills—often indistinguishable from authentic pharmaceuticals—have substantially widened the scope of populations susceptible to synthetic drug overdose in North America (eg, among adolescents experimenting with pills or tourists from the USA seeking psychoactive medications from pharmacies in Mexico). The non-medical use of diverted prescription medications is relatively more common, and less stigmatised, than the use of powder drugs. Many consumers of counterfeit pills are unaware that they contain synthetic illicit drugs, believe them to be authentic pharmaceuticals, and would be unlikely to consume those drugs knowingly or if in powder form. Given these issues, we recommend the expansion of educational and awareness campaigns, pill testing programmes to help consumers shift demand to safer products, increased monitoring in routine clinical scenarios and overdose death toxicology, and expanding medically managed safer alternatives to counterfeit pill use.\

The Lancet Public Health, Volume 10, Issue 1, e58 - e62 2025.

Understanding the new geographies of organised crime: Empirical studies into the spatialities of organised criminal phenomena

By Ella Cockbain, Patricio Estévez-Soto, and Felia Allum

Organised crime – and the people, processes and structures involved – do not exist in a geographical vacuum. They have an inherent spatiality: shaped by and shaping the places they occupy in physical, virtual and hybrid spaces. Although the ‘social embeddedness’ of organised crime is relatively well-recognised, its spatiality – or ‘spatial embeddedness’ – has been neglected. This article contextualises and introduces our special issue on the new geographies of organised crime. We put forward a central argument that geographical lenses can advance and enrich understanding of organised crime, briefly review relevant literature and explain some of the foundational concepts in geographical thinking. We discuss the rationale for this special issue and highlight its papers’ main contributions. Since the geographies of the illicit are full of complexities, heterogeneities and subjectivities, we do not propose any singular approach, but rather see a plurality of possibilities for better incorporating geography into organised crime scholarship. Accordingly, the papers are theoretically and methodologically diverse, as well as covering varied topics and locations

Criminology & Criminal Justice, 25(1). 2025, 3-20 pages

Drug Trafficking, Violence and Corruption in Central Asia

By Erica Marat and Gulzat Botoeva

Summary This research brief examines the links between illegal drug trafficking, violence, and corruption in Central Asia. We argue that drug trafficking is highly organised with major criminal and state actors participating in the illicit activity. Criminal violence is spread across the region, especially in urban areas, but the Central Asian states are capable of intercepting and preventing illicit activities. By analysing big data on violence, drug interdictions, and patterns of corruption in the region between 2015 and 2022, we explain the relationship between drug trafficking and key actors from the criminal underworld and state agencies in Central Asia. We also rely on expert interviews explaining states’ involvement in the drugs economy. Our analysis of violence and policing dynamics in the region shows how patterns of organised crime change depending on state effectiveness and the presence of competition between traffickers. Each country exhibits a unique relationship between state actors and criminal syndicates in both interdicting and facilitating drug trafficking. Our research comes at a time of an anticipated increase in drug trafficking from Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, and of growing economic uncertainty in the wider region due to Western sanctions against Russia. In the policy realm, our research findings can help develop anti-trafficking strategies in the Central Asian region and improve our understanding of how drug trafficking can be curbed more effectively by identifying the main actors involved in this highly organised criminal process

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham., 2022. 48p.

Gangsters at War: Russia’s Use of Organized Crime as an Instrument of Statecraft

By Mark Galeotti

In May 2022, Lithuanian police raided two underground factories where counterfeit cigarettes worth some €73 million were being produced.2 This happens all the time, and even the involvement of a Russian-linked organized crime group was hardly unusual. However, as the investigation extended to Belgium (where the goods would be transhipped to Britain), it became clear that behind the gangsters lay Russian intelligence officers, who were using the business – or at least part of its profits – to raise operational funds for their activities in Europe. With Putin regarding himself as ‘at war’ with the West, at a time when Europol chief Catherine de Bolle is warning that organized crime is on the rise across Europe,3 and Thomas Haldenwang, head of Germany’s counter-intelligence agency, is assessing ‘the risk of [Russian] state-controlled acts of sabotage to be significantly increased’,4 it is perhaps unsurprising that gangsters and spies would find themselves brought together in his campaign. It has, after all, become commonplace since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 to characterize the relationship between Russia and the West as some shade of war: economic, political, but typically more than just cold. Indeed, even as he insists that his invasion is not a war, just a ‘special military operation’ (SVO) – actually calling it a ‘war’ can conceivably get Russians a 15-year prison sentence5 – Putin freely uses the term when describing his country’s engagement with the West. However, it is less clearly understood just how significant and long held this view of his may be. In this context, it does seem in hindsight that Putin has considered himself as de facto at war with the West – or, more precisely, that the West has been warring against him – since at least around 2012. After stepping back from the presidency to the position of prime minister in order to observe the letter, if not the spirit, of term limits, all the while clearly still running the country, when Putin announced he would be returning to the Kremlin, this was for many the last straw. Demonstrations that became known as the Bolotnaya Protests were mastered and dispersed, but Putin seems to have been unable or unwilling to accept that they were a genuine, organic expression of dismay. Instead, he chose to see them as spurred by the US Department of State, after then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton ‘gave the signal’ to opposition leaders.6 There had been a growing school of thought within Russian security circles that the West was using ‘political technologies’ to topple hostile governments, and support for civil society, democratization and the rule of law were seen as part of this campaign. As a former Kremlin insider put it, Putin was scared, then angry. As far as he was concerned, this was it, this was a sign that the West – the Americans – were coming for him. So he was determined to fight back, and that didn’t just mean defending himself, the repressions and arrests, it meant going on the attack. He was clear, he made it clear to us all: if the West was coming to mess with him, we would mess them up worse, by whatever means necessary.

Russia’s transition from a “conscription state” to a full “mobilization state”, after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, has intensified the involvement of criminal groups in operations tied to sanctions-busting, cyber warfare, and intelligence. Organized crime networks provide Russia with access to restricted goods, such as advanced electronics for its military, and facilitate money laundering and illegal financial flows. Notably, Russian intelligence services have relied on criminal syndicates to supplement their espionage activities, including sabotage, cyberattacks, and assassinations.

The report also highlights Russia’s weaponization of migration, using smuggling networks to create political instability across Europe. Meanwhile, Putin’s regime has blurred the lines between state and criminal actors, using them as tools to evade international sanctions and expand Russian influence globally.

“Gangsters at War” reveals how Russian-based organized crime operates as a tool of Kremlin foreign policy, focusing not just on profits but on weakening geopolitical rivals. From sanctions evasion to destabilizing societies, criminal networks have become a key element in Russia’s geopolitical arsenal. The report calls for increased vigilance, international cooperation, and stronger countermeasures to address this growing threat to global stability

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.2024. 62p.

Landing on Water: Air Interdiction, Drug-Trafficking Displacement, and Violence in the Brazilian Amazon

By Leila Pereira, Rafael Pucci, Rodrigo R. Soares

We study a Force-down/Shoot-down intervention in Brazil that led cocaine traffickers to shift from air to river routes. Using data on cocaine production, homicides, and the network of rivers in the Amazon, we provide evidence that violence increased in municipalities along river routes originating from Andean producing countries after the policy. We also show that, during the same period, violence in these municipalities became more responsive to cocaine production in origin countries. We document an instance of crime displacement over the three-dimensional space, involving sophisticated adaptations from criminals regarding transportation technologies, with dramatic side-effects for local populations.

Bonn: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2024. 55p.

New Frontiers: The Use of Generative Artificial Intelligence to Facilitate Trafficking in Persons

Bennett, Phil; Cucos, Radu; Winch, Ryan

From the document: "The intersection of AI and transnational crime, particularly its application in human trafficking, represents an emerging and critically important area of study. This brief has been developed with a clear objective: to equip policymakers, law enforcement agencies, and the technology sector with the insights needed to anticipate and pre-emptively address the potential implications of AI on trafficking in persons. While we respond to the early instances of the use of AI by transnational criminal organisations, such as within Southeast Asia's cyber-scam centres, a more systemic approach is required. The potential for transnational criminal organisations to significantly expand their operations using AI technologies is considerable, and with it comes the risk of exponentially increasing harm to individuals and communities worldwide. It is imperative that we act now, before the most severe impacts of AI-enabled trafficking are realised. We have a unique time-limited opportunity--and indeed, a responsibility--to plan, train, and develop policies that can mitigate these emerging threats. This report aims to concretise this discussion by outlining specific scenarios where AI and trafficking could intersect, and to initiate a dialogue on how we can prepare and respond effectively. This document is not intended to be definitive, but rather to serve as a foundation for a broader, ongoing discussion. The ideas presented here are initial steps, and it will require innovative thinking, adequate resourcing, and sustained engagement from all sectors to build upon them effectively."

Organization For Security And Co-Operation In Europe. Office Of The Special Representative And Co-Ordinator For Combating Trafficking In Human Beings; Bali Process (Forum). Regional Support Office .NOV, 2024

Gangsters at War: Russia's Use of Organized Crime as an Instrument of Statecraft

By GALEOTTI, MARK

From the webpage description: "'Since 2012, Russia has strategically used criminal networks to evade sanctions, conduct intelligence, and destabilize the West. Under Putin's 'mobilization state,' illegal activities--from smuggling to cyberattacks--are seen as essential tools of warfare. This report delves into the Kremlin's alarming integration of organized crime into statecraft.' Russia's transition from a 'conscription state' to a full 'mobilization state', after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, has intensified the involvement of criminal groups in operations tied to sanctions-busting, cyber warfare, and intelligence. Organized crime networks provide Russia with access to restricted goods, such as advanced electronics for its military, and facilitate money laundering and illegal financial flows. Notably, Russian intelligence services have relied on criminal syndicates to supplement their espionage activities, including sabotage, cyberattacks, and assassinations. The report also highlights Russia's weaponization of migration, using smuggling networks to create political instability across Europe. Meanwhile, Putin's regime has blurred the lines between state and criminal actors, using them as tools to evade international sanctions and expand Russian influence globally. 'Gangsters at War' reveals how Russian-based organized crime operates as a tool of Kremlin foreign policy, focusing not just on profits but on weakening geopolitical rivals. From sanctions evasion to destabilizing societies, criminal networks have become a key element in Russia's geopolitical arsenal. The report calls for increased vigilance, international cooperation, and stronger countermeasures to address this growing threat to global stability."

GLOBAL INITIATIVE AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME. November. 2024. 82p.

Femicidal Violence in Figures. Latin America and The Caribbean Urgent Action to Prevent and Eliminate Femicides

By The  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)

Gender-based violence against women and girls and its most extreme manifestation —femicides, feminicides, or gender-related killings of women and girls—1 are a dramatic illustration of the persistent structural challenges of gender inequality that affect women and girls in Latin America and the Caribbean. Bulletin No. 3 on feminicide violence presents the official statistics submitted by the region’s countries to the Gender Equality Observatory for Latin America and the Caribbean on cases of femicides, feminicides and gender-related killings of women reported in 2023. This bulletin is part of the UNiTE by 2030 to End Violence against Women campaign of the Secretary General of the United Nations, aimed at preventing and eliminating gender-based violence against women and girls worldwide. The campaign calls on governments, civil society organizations, women’s organizations, youth, the private sector, the media, and the entire United Nations system to join forces and tackle the global pandemic of violence against women and girls. The publication of this third bulletin coincides with the commemoration of two key milestones in the process of garnering commitments from States to guarantee the human rights of women and girls and the right to a life free of violence: the thirtieth anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995, and the thirtieth anniversary of the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women (Convention of Belém do Pará), the first human rights treaty to establish the right of women to a life free of violence in both the public and private sphere, and to identify gender-based violence against women as a violation of human rights. The standards and commitments established in these instruments are also reflected in the Regional Gender Agenda, which consolidates agreements signed by governments at different sessions of the Regional Conference on Women in Latin America and the Caribbean since 1977 (see diagram 1). Another key instrument in the region is the Montevideo Consensus, adopted at the first meeting of the Regional Conference on Population and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Consensus is a robust road map to promote the safeguarding of sexual and reproductive rights, gender equality and a rights-based approach (ECLAC, 2013).   

Bulletin No, 3 Santiago de Chile; Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) , 2024. 20p.