By María Calderón

 When it comes to an understanding of political violence in Mexico, there is a risk of solely equating it with criminal groups' activities or exclusively attributing it to such groups. However, the political violence phenomenon in Mexico is complex and diverse, with a particular nexus to locally based illicit economies, for which an all-containing approach is insufficient. About half of the political violence that occurred in Mexico during the 2018 elections was directly attributed to organized crime. During such time, political figures were killed at a rate of one per week. These numbers support the growing concern about criminal groups' involvement in Mexican politics. Criminal groups have used political violence in several ways: directly manipulating and influencing elections, protecting incumbent candidates with whom they have struck an agreement, killing candidates who are perceived as a threat to their interests, intimidating poll workers, and attacking and stealing voting booths, among others. The decrease in the profitability of trafficking heroin and cannabis, the legalization of marijuana in many US states, and increased fentanyl usage have forced cartels to recalibrate strategies and markets. Nowadays, criminal groups have partially shifted towards locally based illicit economies, such as oil theft, extortion, kidnapping, and other illegal activities that require control of local territories. All these variables come into play when understanding that criminalized electoral politics is a predominantly local phenomenon in Mexico. Political violence by criminal groups in Mexico is motivated by multiple factors, including economic interests, political objectives, and vendettas. Criminal organizations often avoid open confrontation when attacking politicians or political candidates, opting for other less visible techniques to minimize the impacts on police and law enforcement agencies, such as corruption. Installing or co-opting candidates at the municipal level has afforded criminal groups direct influence over the actions of local and state police. Access to intelligence on pending arrests or other operations has also proven beneficial for criminal organizations. Political influence has allowed criminal groups to employ local security forces as appendages of their organizations to detain or kill targets and to protect the transportation of illicit goods. Moreover, criminal organizations have tapped into state finances by co-opting government employees. 

Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2024. 6p.

By The International Crisis Group

What’s new? With its “total peace” policy, the Colombian government aims to engage all the country’s armed groups in talks, but it has no dialogue underway with the largest armed criminal outfit, the Gaitanista Self-Defence Force. This gap is significant, given the Gaitanistas’ deep pockets and their drive to expand. Why does it matter?From their Atlantic coast stronghold, where they run some of the country’s main drug trafficking routes as well as migrant smuggling rackets, the Gaitanistas exercise coercive control of numerous communities. If they remain outside peace talks, they could undermine negotiations with other groups or capitalise on their demobilisation. What should be done?Bogotá should start down a path of progressively more substantive discussions with the Gaitanistas aiming, first, to reduce violence against civilians and, secondly, to discuss legal conditions for laying down arms. In parallel, the police and military should continue operations to protect civilians and press the group toward talks. Latin America Report N°105

Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group 2024. 52p.

By Glenn Farley & Kamryn Brunner

CSI estimates that the costs of the epidemic in Arizona reached an all-time high last year: $58 billion. This staggering figure includes not only hospital, law enforcement, and other public service costs of dealing with this crisis, but also loss of quality of life and productivity amongst those suffering with addiction.

The costs of this crisis have continued rising due to ongoing medical and other price inflation, law enforcement strains, the severity of fentanyl relative to other opioids, and the continued crisis on Arizona’s southern border enabling the primary pathway for fentanyl into America.

While the roots of the opioid crisis go back to the mid-90’s, its severity in terms of both human and social costs didn’t really take off until after 2015. This surge is attributable to the particular severity of fentanyl abuse, its low cost, and its relatively high availability. An unfortunate fact of three independent but concurrent policy changes whose roots can be traced to the late-2010’s – the overprescribing and subsequent crackdown on prescription drugs, the relaxation of criminal enforcement of America’s drug laws, and the collapse in security along the border with Mexico – has been to enable both supply and demand for fentanyl and other illegal opioids. This experiment in hindsight was clearly a failure.

Over the last decade, fatal opioid overdoses in Arizona have more than doubled. Seizures of fentanyl and other opioids inside Arizona remain at record levels. The DEA has identified the greater Phoenix area – whose violent crime is up about 50% over the past decade – as a central distribution hub for fentanyl into the greater United States.

This update to CSI’s  2022 study of what led to this crisis, and how it has continued evolving over the past two years, continues to be about not repeating the mistakes of the past and better-informing policy going forward.

Key Findings

• CSI estimates that the cost of the fentanyl crisis to Arizona’s economy today is $58 billion – for context, the annual GDP of the state of Arizona is $521 billion. In 2017, the CDC estimated the national opioid epidemic cost nearly $1 trillion – or $22 billion in Arizona alone. But since then, the problem has only gotten worse.

• While opioid-related fatal overdoses appear to have peaked, they remain near all-time highs; declines have been modest and it is premature to assume success in dealing with this crisis. In fact, despite opioid-related deaths in Arizona falling last year, CSI estimates the cost of this epidemic reached a new high.

• Total seizures of feal to the current crisis.

• In 2015, Arizona’s Department of Health Services reported 41,400 opioid-related encounters by Arizona hospitals, resulting in $305 million in encounter costs. By 2019, though, encounters had risen to 56,600 (+372019[i] to more than 29,200 pounds today[ii] – a 320% increase. Given that as little as 2 mg of pure fentanyl can be fatal, DEA seizures in Arizona alone lntanyl in the United States by the DEA have increased from approximately 6,800 pounds in ast year were enough to kill every Arizonan 14 times over. Because it is a border state, Arizona is centr%) but encounter costs had increased a staggering 120% (to $676 million).

Phoenix: Common Sense Institute Arizona, 2024. 18p.

 By Susan L. Stewart a, Rose M.C. Kagawa b, Shani A.L. Buggs b, Mona A. Wright b, Garen J. Wintemute 

  Background: There is evidence linking use of controlled substances with perpetration of interpersonal violence. While the United States constitution protects the right to own a firearm, federal law prohibits firearm purchase and possession by persons believed to be at high risk for violence, including those who use controlled substances unlawfully. Methods: We report here the results of a 13-year prospective observational study on the risk of violent crime associated with a history of criminal drug charges in a cohort of 79,678 legal purchasers of handguns in Cali fornia in 2001. The main outcomes were post-purchase charges for any violent crime, violent Crime Index crimes (murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault), and firearm-related violent crimes. The main exposure of interest was a history of pre-purchase charge(s) for drug-related offenses; we examined as a secondary exposure a history of marijuana-related charges. We estimated adjusted hazard ratios (aHR) with 95 % confidence intervals (CI) using Cox proportional hazards multiple events models. Results: We found that legal handgun purchasers in California with a history of drug-related charges, even those with marijuana charges only, had triple the risk of a post-purchase violent crime charge compared to purchasers with no criminal charges (drug charges only: aHR=2.9, 95 % CI 2.2–3.8; marijuana charges only: aHR=3.3, 95 % CI 1.8–6.0). In addition, a criminal history of drug charges only vs. no criminal history was associated with increased risk of one or more violent crime charges after the first post-purchase arrest event (aHR=1.6, 95 % CI 1.2–2.3). Conclusion: It is incumbent on researchers and policy makers to understand the nature and causes of this risk in order to take effective steps towards mitigation.

International Journal of Drug Policy 127 (2024) 104413 

By Kennedy Kipkoech Mutai , Jack Stone , Andrew Scheibe , Hannah Fraser , Leigh F. Johnson , Peter Vickerman 

  Background: Illicit drug use results in considerable global morbidity, but there is little data on its trends and factors associated with it in sub-Saharan Africa. We consider these questions using national data from South Africa for 2002–2017. Methods: We analysed data among individuals aged 15 years or older from five national population-based household surveys in South Africa (2002–2017; n = 89,113). Recent drug use was defined as the last three- months use of illicit drugs, i.e., any use of cannabis, cocaine, amphetamine, inhalants, sedatives, hallucinogens, opioids, and/or other illicit drugs. Time trends in recent drug use were assessed using logistic regression. Multivariable logistic regression assessed the association between recent drug use and socio-demographic factors and between drug use and sexual risk behaviours, HIV-related and other well-being variables. Results: The prevalence of recent drug use increased from 1⋅5% to 10⋅0% from 2002 to 2017, driven by increases in cannabis use (1⋅5% to 7⋅8%) and use of opioids (0⋅01% to 1⋅6%), cocaine (0⋅02% to 1⋅8%), or amphetamines (0⋅1% to 1⋅5%). In adjusted analyses, male gender, younger age, living in urban areas, mixed-ancestry or white ethnicity (compared to black-African), and unemployment were positively associated with recent drug use. Recent drug use was associated with: multiple sexual partners (adjusted odds ratio [aOR] 2⋅13, 95% confidence interval [CI]: 1⋅80–2⋅51); sexual debut before 15 years old (aOR 1⋅70, 95%CI: 1⋅29–2⋅23); hazardous/harmful alcohol use (aOR 2⋅50, 95%CI: 2⋅14–2⋅93) or alcohol dependence (aOR 3⋅33, 95%CI 2⋅92–3⋅80); ever experiencing intimate partner violence (aOR 1⋅56, 95%CI 1⋅12–2⋅17); psychological distress (aOR 1⋅53, 95%CI: 1⋅28–1⋅82); and lower chance of ever testing for HIV (aOR 0⋅89, 95%CI 0⋅80–1⋅00). Recent drug use was not associated with HIV positivity, condom use or being on antiretroviral therapy. Conclusion: Illicit drug use has increased substantially in South Africa and is associated with numerous socio- demographic characteristics, higher sexual risk behaviours and other well-being variables.

www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0955395924000379  

  International Journal of Drug Policy 125 (2024) 104352

By Sarh Clifford, Cassandra J.C. Wright, Peter G. Miller, Kerri Coomberd, Kalinda E. Griffiths, James A. Smitha, Michael Livingston

Background: - During 2017-18, the Northern Territory (NT) introduced a Banned Drinker Register (BDR) and Minimum Unit Price (MUP) NT-wide; Police Auxiliary Liquor Inspectors (PALIs) in three regional towns; and restrictions on daily purchases/opening hours (DPOH) in one regional town. The BDR is an individual-level alcohol ban; MUP is a pricing policy; and PALIs enforce bans on restricted areas at takeaway outlets. This study examines the impact of these policies on adult domestic and family violence (DFV). Methods: We examined DFV assaults and breaches of violence orders from January 2014 – February 2020 using interrupted time series models for NT, Greater Darwin, Katherine, Tennant Creek, and Alice Springs. To account for increasing numbers of individuals on the BDR we tested two timepoints (Sept 2017, March 2018). Findings: Following DPOH, assaults (78 %) and alcohol-involved assaults (92 %) decreased in Tennant Creek. After PALIs, assaults (79 %) in Tennant Creek, and breaches (39 %) and alcohol-involved breaches (58 %) in Katherine decreased. After MUP, assaults (11 %), alcohol-involved assaults (21 %) and alcohol-involved breaches (21%) decreased NT wide. After MUP/PALIs in Alice Springs, alcohol-involved assaults (33 %), breaches (42 %), and alcohol-involved breaches (57 %) decreased. BDR (Sept 2017) found increases in assaults (44 %) and alcohol-involved assaults (39 %) in Katherine and assaults (10%) and alcohol-involved assaults NT-wide (17 %). There were increases of 21 %-45 % in breaches NT-wide, in Darwin, Katherine, and Alice Springs. Following March 2018 found increases in assaults (33 %) and alcohol-involved assaults (48 %) in Katherine. There were increases - from 20 % to 56 % - in breaches in NT-wide, Katherine, and Alice Springs. Conclusion: PALIs and DPOH were associated with some reductions in DFV; the BDR was associated with some increases. The upward trend commences prior to the BDR, so it is also plausible that the BDR had no effect on DFV outcomes. Although MUP was associated with reductions in the NT-wide model, there were no changes in sites without cooccurring PALIs. 

International Journal of Drug Policy

Volume 127, May 2024, 104426

By the UK Ministry of Justice and HM Courts & Tribunals Service

  1 The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) is headed by the Lord Chancellor and is accountable to Parliament for the efficient and effective functioning of the courts. Its three priorities are: to protect the public from serious offenders and improve the safety and security of our prisons; reduce reoffending; and deliver swift access to justice. HM Courts & Tribunals Service (HMCTS), an executive agency of the MoJ, reports jointly to the Lord Chancellor, Lord Chief Justice and to the Senior President of Tribunals. It is responsible for supporting the independent judiciary in the administration of criminal courts, civil courts, family courts and tribunals in England and Wales, and non-devolved tribunals in Scotland and Northern Ireland. The judiciary, headed by the Lady Chief Justice, is constitutionally independent from the government. 2 Criminal cases are heard in magistrates’ courts and the Crown Court. Cases enter the criminal justice system when a defendant is charged with an offence. The case is allocated a court date through the judicial process of listing. Cases generally go to magistrates’ courts first, where over 90% of criminal cases are dealt with. The remaining cases, usually more serious and complex offences, transfer to the Crown Court. 3 The MoJ and HMCTS measure and report on the outstanding caseload in the Crown Court, including the number of cases awaiting trial and being tried, and those awaiting sentencing. The caseload is determined by the respective rates of cases coming to the Crown Court (receipts) and completed cases (disposals). When the rate of receipts exceeds the rate of disposals, the outstanding caseload increases. The MoJ and HMCTS do not specify a minimum or optimal caseload at which the Crown Court functions most efficiently – below which there is a risk that judges and courtrooms are available but do not have enough cases to try, and above which cases on average take longer from listing to completion – because the optimal level is dependent on the nature of cases and the capacity available to hear them, both of which vary. Therefore, the MoJ does not distinguish between cases that form part of the expected caseload and additional cases that constitute a backlog. Because the MoJ has not quantified its expected caseload, we cannot quantify the backlog separately. When we are presenting data, we refer to the total number of cases as the ‘outstanding caseload’. Otherwise, we refer to it as the ‘backlog’.

4 In April 2021, the MoJ produced the Criminal Justice Action Plan that recognised a need for a whole-system approach to responding to systemic issues within the criminal justice system. It brought together work already underway across the system, focusing on three priority areas: improving timeliness, improving victim engagement and reducing backlogs. In the October 2021 Spending Review, the MoJ was provided with £477 million over 2022-23 to 2024-25 for the criminal justice system’s recovery from COVID-19, including reducing court backlogs, and a total budget settlement of £34.5 billion over the same period. 5 In October 2021, we published Reducing the backlog in criminal courts, which examined the reasons for the growth in the backlog in magistrates’ courts and the Crown Court, both before and during the early phases of the COVID-19 pandemic.1 We reported that HMCTS had responded quickly to the impact of the pandemic, launching a recovery programme in May 2020, and successfully increasing court capacity. We concluded that, while the backlog in magistrates’ courts was expected to return to pre-pandemic levels swiftly, significant risks to reducing the backlog in the Crown Court remained, which were likely to persist beyond 2024. Scope of this work 6 We undertook this investigation in response to the Crown Court backlog reaching its highest ever level. This report describes what action the MoJ, HMCTS and other parts of the criminal justice system have taken to address the backlog of cases in the Crown Court. It examines: • the scale, nature and impact of the Crown Court backlog; • the MoJ’s and HMCTS’s understanding of the impact of actions to reduce the Crown Court backlog; and • how the MoJ and HMCTS are attempting to manage the Crown Court backlog. 7 We refer to, but did not examine in detail, the work of other parts of the criminal justice system, such as the judiciary, police, magistrates’ courts and HM Prison and Probation Service, that are relevant to managing the Crown Court backlog. We do not comment on the wider reform programmes in the system such as the court reform programme, which is the focus of our 2023 report Progress on the courts and tribunals reform programme. 2 We do not comment on other major projects unless directly relevant to the Crown Court backlog. We do not seek to examine and report on value for money of the MoJ’s and HMCTS’s work to date to reduce the backlog.   

London: The National Audit Office (NAO) , 2024. 54p.

By Virginia Comolli | Martin Thorley

  Pacific island countries (PICs) and territories increasingly play host to transnational criminal activities, with direct and indirect implications for Pacific communities and beyond. Ignoring these issues in favour of other diplomatic priorities or economic agendas risks exacerbating local fragility and creating safe havens from which foreign criminals can operate unhindered. The cocaine, synthetic drugs and heroin trades are what draws organized criminals to the Pacific (for the most part). Traditionally, the Pacific islands have been used as transit points for narcotics originating in Asia and Latin America and destined for high-value consumer markets in Australia and New Zealand. PICs, however, are now also developing their own domestic markets. In terms of provenance, three groups stand out: Triads and Asian syndicates: Compared to the other organized crime groups active in the Pacific, Asian syndicates have a wider portfolio of activities, which straddle the licit and illicit. In fact, alongside their engagement in drugs and human trafficking, cyber scams and various financial crimes, some Asian groups, and Chinese triads such as 14K in particular, enjoy connections with senior establishment figures, which they may be able to leverage for political influence. Central and South American cartels: Mexican and Colombian groups are key actors in the drug trade, especially cocaine and methamphetamines. The Sinaloa cartel in Mexico appears to be the most prominent in the arena, even though it lacks any permanent bases in the Pacific islands. Trafficking methods include the use of planes, yachts, bodily concealment and dropping drugs in the ocean for later retrieval. These groups are also able to rely on North American connections to facilitate illicit flows. Outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMCGs): OMCGs from Australia and New Zealand are involved in several criminal activities in the region, especially drug trafficking. They have established chapters in the Pacific islands and are able to exploit the presence of criminal deportees there to facilitate the trafficking of narcotics, as well as money laundering, extortion and other illicit activities. Minor actors: The Pacific has also attracted a diverse range of criminal actors from eastern and south-eastern Europe, the Middle East and other regions. They have been involved in various criminal activities, such as ATM scams and drug shipments. Opportunists from different countries have also collaborated with established criminal groups in the region.  

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , 2024. 23p.  

By Earth League International

The report highlights 5 case studies covering 10 transnational criminal networks operating from Latin America to Asia, 33 Persons of Interest, including some of the most important shark fin international traffickers, and dozens of smuggling routes identified by ELI that illustrate the convergence of environmental and wildlife crime, specifically shark fin trafficking, with other serious crimes and expose the severity of the issue at a global scale. This report utilizes ELI’s revolutionary 4-Type Environmental Crime Convergence paradigm in our 2023 Environmental Convergence Report with John Jay College of Criminal Justice to comprehensively understand and combat the intricate web of transnational organized crime operations behind shark fin trafficking and the criminal exploitation of nature.

“The extensive field and analytical work invested in Operation STELLA MARIS underscores our commitment to unmasking the complexities of shark fin trafficking and environmental crime convergence. We hope that the findings will serve as a valuable resource to support the efforts of diverse stakeholders, from government agencies and policymakers to international bodies, the media, and other NGOs, in their ongoing fight against environmental crime“, says Andrea Crosta, Executive Director of Earth League International.

Environmental crime is breaking down critical ecosystems and accelerating climate change, fueling Earth’s extinction crisis and there’s a great need for high-quality detailed intelligence about the transnational trafficking networks and organized crime behind this criminal exploitation. 

Shark populations, especially those targeted by the international fin trade, are crashing, and over one-third of shark species are listed by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) as Vulnerable or Endangered. Not only is the practice of shark finning cruel, but a lack of sharks in marine ecosystems can lead to imbalances in species below them in the food chain that damage populations of coral reefs. 

Operation STELLA MARIS uncovers how the shark fin trade in Latin America extends far beyond shark fin trafficking, encompassing multiple types of wildlife and environmental crime, different forms of trafficking, human smuggling, fraud, and related financial and corruption-related crimes. Our intelligence-led field operations are essential to information gaps and provide evidence-based knowledge to various stakeholders, from government agencies to policymakers, the media, and the public. Our intelligence-led field operations are essential to information gaps and provide evidence-based knowledge to various stakeholders, from government agencies to policymakers, the media, and the public.  

Los Angeles: Earth League International, 2024. 107p.

By The Asian Development Bank

This report highlights how sexual and gender minorities in countries across Asia and the Pacific face discrimination and violence, assesses the legal barriers impacting their lives, and shows how policy reforms can increase inclusion and economic opportunities.

It exposes regional disparities, outlines how laws and regulations reduce access to education, jobs, and public services, and shows how they restrict people expressing their identity and getting legal gender recognition. The report recommends a range of measures including taking legal and policy action to target hate crimes, improving law enforcement training, and preventing so-called “conversion therapies” to help reduce damaging exclusion and inequity.

Mandaluyong City, 1550 Metro Manila, Philippines: Asian Development Bank, 2024. 66p.

By Australia Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement

Australian consumers are willing to pay some of the highest prices globally for illicit drugs, and data sources such as the National Wastewater Drug Analysis Program, the National Drug Strategy Household Survey and the Illicit Drug Data Report reveal that consumption within Australia continues to grow, returning to pre-COVID-19 levels.

While the Committee understands that this is a multi-faceted issue requiring an integrated response from multiple sectors, this report pays particular attention to the role of police and its partner agencies in dealing with illicit drugs. Broader issues are considered with reference to their impact on law enforcement.

Strategies under the demand and harm reduction pillars target the behaviours and factors leading to, and the risks arising from, drug use. The regulation and policing of drug consumption is largely a matter for the states and territories, and demand and harm reduction strategies have been introduced to varying degrees around the country. A number of specific strategies were discussed, including decriminalization of personal use, as well as the establishment of drug checking and safe injecting facilities. The focus of the Committee, however, has been on outlining the challenges for law enforcement arising from the various policy settings.

This report consists of 6 chapters:

• Chapter 2 provides the context for the inquiry, outlines current trends in supply, seizures and consumption of illicit drugs and summarises some of the major harms arising from illicit drug use;

• Chapter 3 establishes the current policy settings in relation to illicit drugs and canvasses some of the major policy debates raised in evidence;

• Chapter 4 considers supply reduction strategies and investigates current law enforcement approaches, including responses to the trafficking of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals, as well as the impact of seizures on supply;

• Chapter 5 canvasses demand and harm reduction strategies, including decriminalisation, and discusses the interaction of these strategies with, and their impacts on, law enforcement; and

• Chapter 6 details the committee’s conclusions and recommendations.

Key recommendations:

• The Australian government should re-establish a governance structure under the National Cabinet architecture, bringing together representatives with responsibility for law enforcement and health across the Commonwealth, states and territories, to oversee the implementation of the National Drug Strategy.

• The Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission should undertake research to clarify what proportion of people arrested for possession of illicit drugs are concurrently charged with another criminal offence and would not have come to law enforcement attention but for the concurrent (non-drug related) offence.

• The Australian government should commission research to understand the impacts of decriminalisation in Australian and international jurisdictions where reforms have been implemented. Such research should, where possible, evaluate the longitudinal impacts on individuals, communities and law enforcement agencies to provide an evidence base to inform future policy decisions.

Commonwealth of Australia, 2024. 

By Stefania Chiappini

The article presents a systematic literature review on the use and the psychiatric implications of over-the-counter drugs (OTC), prescription-only-medications (POM), and new psychoactive substances (NPS) within custodial settings. The searches wer carried out on 2 November 2022 on PubMed, Scopus, and Web of Science in line with PRISMA guidelines. A total of 538 records were identified, of which 37 met the inclusion criteria. Findings showed the most prevalent NPS and OTC and POM classes reported in prisons were synthetic cannabinoids receptor agonists (SCRAs) and opioids, respectively. NPS markets were shown to be in constant evolution following the pace of legislations aimed to reduce their spread. The use of such substances heavily impacts the conditions and rehabilitation of persons in custody, with consequent physical and mental health risks. It is important to raise awareness of the use and misuse of such substances in prisons (i) from an early warning perspective for law enforcement and policy makers (ii) to prompt doctors to cautiously prescribe substances that may be misused (iii) to improve and increase access to treatment provided (iv) to add such substances to routine toxicological screening procedures (v) to improve harm reduction programmes. 

Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews

Volume 162, July 2024, 105691

By The European Parliament,  Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs,   Directorate-General for Internal Policies 

  Cross-border parental child abductions in the EU are governed by The 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and (except for Denmark) the Brussels II-ter Regulation. Countries outside of the EU may or may not be Contracting States to ‘the Convention’, but will not be bound by Brussels II-ter. Research has found that the often negative, long lasting impact of abduction may continue throughout the lifecycle of those who have been abducted. It may also affect future generations of society. This means that every effort to deter abduction should be made. Where that is not possible, the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention should be nurtured to support its application in contemporary society. Specialist mediation should be encouraged in relation to international child abduction generally, and specifically in relation to Third Countries which are not Contracting States to ‘the Convention’.   

Brussels:  European Parliament, Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs,   Directorate-General for Internal Policies , 2024. 57p.

By Jacqueline Tasca, Reza Ahmadi, Safiyah Husein, Justin McNeil

The current report is the second in a two-part series of research projects exploringthe effects of justice involvement on homelessness in Ontario. The first report, No Fixed Address: The Intersections of Justice Involvement and Homelessness was released in 2022. The report analyzed over 10 years of data on admissions to Ontario correctional facilities of individuals who had no fixed address - no stable, permanent address - at the time of admission to a correctional institution. Findings from the report highlighted that Ontario’s provincial correctional facilities are incarcerating a proportionally larger number of people experiencing homelessness now than at any other point in the last 15 years 

Toronto: John Howard Society of Ontario, Social Research and Demonstration Corporation, Canadian Observatory on Homelessness, 2024. 28p.

By The  Institute for Security Studies

Drawing on years of research, these priority measures can help the South African Police Service fulfil its constitutional mandate.

Many police members do good work and many criminals end up in prisons as a result. We applaud these successes. Nevertheless, since 2012, we have become increasingly concerned by evidence that the South African Police Service’s (SAPS) organisational performance and policing generally in South Africa are in a state of decline. After more than a decade of rising murder rates, improving public safety is critical for the country’s future. The government should prioritise a targeted programme of reform that measurably improves policing over the coming five years. Based on three decades of analysis of crime and policing in South Africa, this report provides recommendations in five strategic focus areas

Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 2024. 20p.

By Kars de Bruijne Clara Gehrling

  It is generally accepted that violent extremism is a problem in northern Benin. Currently, attention is overwhelmingly devoted to northern Alibori and western Atacora and this problem is viewed as a ‘spillover’ from the Sahel. But this is only part of the story. This report points to a number of disturbing signals which, in combination, point to a problem of violent extremism along Benin’s border with Nigeria. . 1. Suffocating canaries in coal mines indicate dangerous levels of carbon monoxide. A variety of strange signals in Northern Benin along the border with Nigeria are like these canaries: they point at dangerous liaisons between violent extremist groups. Closer relationships with bandit groups seem to facilitate this. This report makes the following observations: − Banditry is re-emerging in JNIM’s zones of operation in Benin. Those bandits seem to have Nigerian connections. − Violent extremists are present in Kainji Lake National Park (Nigeria) just across the border from the Borgou Department. Evidence suggests this involves Sahelian extremists (likely JNIM). Another group would be Darul Salam – a group linked to Boko Haram, if not fully affiliated – with an open attitude towards bandits. − There has been a strong increase in the movement of unidentified armed actors along the Borgou border with Niger State and in banditry-related incidents since March 2023. The evidence suggests that there is a direct link with those operating in Kainji Lake National Park. − Since March 2023, unidentified armed groups have had a concealed presence in the Forêt de Trois Rivières between southern Alibori and the Borgou Department. − Bandits and unidentified armed groups are known to move towards Kebbi State from Sokoto. It is alleged that these include various Darul Salam fighters with links to the Sahel. 

2. There are deep connections between North West Nigeria and North East Benin due to longstanding social, ethnic and religious connections, particularly in the former ‘cross-border’ Borgu Empire: − The northern-most border area (North East Alibori and Kebbi State) sees intra-ethnic cross-border connections between the Hausa and the Nigerian Zamfara Fulbe respectively. A risk in this area are ethnic tensions between the Hausa and the Fulbe. − The area of the former Borgu Empire (Borgou Department and Niger State) has a distinct cross-border political entity. On both sides of the border, people tend to identify as one Bariba/Boo community with shared customary institutions. There are high farmer-herder tensions involving autochthonous Fulbe. There is also a fear of kidnapping by Zamfara Fulbe. − Another risk in the former Borgu Empire concerns the Dambanga hunting groups. These groups operate cross-border in defiance of a Benin government ban but are pitched against extremists in Kainji and have been used by the Nigerian military. This discrepancy can generate tensions between the two countries. − Two non-violent reformist movements – the Yan Izala movement and the Jama'at Tabligh – are present along the border. Their reach has grown strongly in the border area of Northern Benin during the last ten years. 3. A well-developed cross-border trade system operates between the Nigerian and Beninese border. This system generates livelihoods for many people in the area. Livelihoods are at risk: − There is a variety of markets and crossings connecting North West Nigeria and Northern Benin. Unidentified armed groups and Darul Salam operate in these hubs. − People’s livelihoods are highly dependent on cross-border trade. Interviews revealed frustration and a strong sense of grievance towards both Nigerian and Beninese government policies that are perceived to put livelihoods under stress. − On the one hand, consistent problems reported are a ban on cereal exports and soybeans, and accompanying border restrictions. Both have a negative impact on livelihoods. − On the other hand, the end of fuel subsidies in Nigeria at the time of research for this report had a severe impact on people’s livelihoods (and on communities in general). 4. The above three main observations suggest that a very problematic situation is emerging along the Nigerian-Benin border. Not only are there numerous indications of extremist activities and a link between bandits and extremists along the border but also there are clear social links that facilitate cross border exchange and real livelihood needs that create vulnerabilities to recruitment. The governments of Benin and Nigeria urgently need to move into action. Three things could be done: − Coordinate and step up the military response by: revamping regional security cooperation within ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States); bilateral security cooperation for hot-pursuit, intelligence sharing and coordination; and a joint strategy for cross-border hunting groups. − Prioritise people’s livelihoods. This should involve cushioning livelihood effects of the ban on cereals (and cutting of fuel subsidies) to reduce vulnerability to recruitment. − Be more flexible and agile to respond to rapidly changing context by closely monitoring border markets for sudden vulnerabilities, and demanding more flexible donor programming and funding so that programming can be really flexible  

The Hague:  Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’., 2024. 81p..

by: The Ontario Drug Policy Research Network (ODPRN) Public Health Ontario (PHO)

Ontario is experiencing an ongoing opioid-related toxicity crisis, with 2,534 opioid-related toxicity deaths reported in the province in 2022, representing a 63% increase from 2019.1 Shelters provide short-term accommodation for individuals or families experiencing homelessness, with 7,767 emergency shelter beds reported in Ontario 2022.2 As evidence has suggested, people experiencing homelessness are disproportionately impacted by the current drug toxicity crisis.3 Understanding the prevalence of opioid-related harms occurring within shelters, how these have changed over time, and what interventions can be introduced to support the safety of people who use drugs who access these services is imperative. This is particularly important as recent data has demonstrated that the COVID-19 pandemic has led to rising opioid toxicity deaths within shelter and supportive housing settings in Ontario, with the number of deaths more than doubling (from 20 to 46 deaths) in the first 9 months of the pandemic.4 This trend has also been reported specifically in Toronto shelter settings, where opioid-related mortality more than tripled from 17 deaths in 2019 to 57 deaths in 2022,5 causing opioid toxicities to be identified as the presumed leading cause of death in shelter settings in Toronto.6 The observed increases in opioid-related toxicity deaths in shelter settings are likely attributable to pandemic-related factors that impacted the population as a whole (e.g., an increasingly toxic unregulated drug supply, increased social isolation and using drugs alone, and pandemic-related disruptions to harm reduction and treatment services) as well as specific changes that may have occurred within shelter settings.7 Specifically, COVID-19-related disruptions had far-reaching impacts on shelters, including the displacement of residents due to physical distancing measures which may have led to accessing an unfamiliar and potentially more dangerous drug supply, decreased staff support, potential changes in overdose response, and reduced harm reduction services for shelter residents, all of which likely exacerbated opioid-related harms in this setting. Importantly, opioid use and related harms among people accessing Ontario’s. shelter system are situated within the complex interplay of several factors including social-economic and housing instability, complex health needs, trauma, mental health, stigma, and various barriers to harm-reduction and treatment.8-11 Within the context of increasing calls to address the growing opioid toxicity crisis within Ontario shelters, including improving access to harm reduction services,12 there is an urgent need to better understand the circumstances surrounding opioid-related toxicity deaths in shelters to help improve evidence-based responses. Therefore, the objective of this report is to use linked coronial records and health administrative data capturing opioid-related toxicity deaths in shelters and health service use across Ontario to better understand the demographic characteristics, circumstances surrounding death, and types of healthcare encounters preceding opioid-related toxicity deaths within Ontario shelters. The goal of this work is to help support an evidence-informed expansion of services within the shelter system that will help to prevent avoidable deaths from substance use that have been observed in recent years 

Ontario:  The Network,  2024. 29p    

By  Faith Hornor Noa Tann Ellen Tyra

  As of early 2023, global elephant ivory and rhino horn seizure rates had not yet fully returned to pre-pandemic levels.1,2 Nevertheless, illicit elephant ivory and rhino horn trafficking endures as a threat to these iconic species. The illicit wildlife trade is not a static enterprise; it is constantly evolving in response to the barriers and opportunities that arise. Countertrafficking stakeholders require a nuanced and updated understanding of elephant ivory and rhino horn trafficking operations to effectively confront the criminal networks sustaining them. This report analyzes trends in publicly reported wildlife seizure data collected in the C4ADS Wildlife Seizure Database and is augmented with data from national-level reporting and representative case studies. In doing so, it identifies key areas for intervention and offers insights that can inform the development of targeted counter-trafficking strategies. Specifically, this report finds that:3 ܰ Geographic patterns of elephant ivory and rhino horn seizures continue to adhere to transcontinental Africa-to-Asia trafficking routes, confirming this trend persists after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.4 ܰ Southern African states play a key role as hubs for elephant ivory and rhino horn trafficking network operations. ܰ Vietnam continues to grow as a continental entry point and consumer location for both elephant ivory and rhino horn. ܰ Outside of land-based seizures, seized shipments of rhino horn are typically transported via the air sector, and elephant ivory through the maritime sector, although less frequently than before the COVID-19 pandemic. ܰ Global elephant ivory seizures have increased since 2021, as indicated by two key measures: total weight seized and average seizure weight. By contrast, rhino horn seizure statistics have fluctuated in recent years. Data-driven decision-making can help counter-wildlife trafficking stakeholders influence the economic and social factors that drive individuals to participate in the illegal wildlife trade, ultimately disrupting the illicit economy and ensuring the future of iconic species. With this impact framework in mind, this report outlines recommendations for law enforcement officials, prosecutors, and other counter-wildlife trafficking stakeholders on how to leverage a data-centric approach to combating illicit elephant ivory and rhino horn trafficking networks.

  Washington, DC:    C4ADS 2024, 34p.

By the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime  

A global reference on drug markets, trends and policy developments, the World Drug Report offers a wealth of data and analysis and in 2024 comprises several elements tailored to different audiences. The web-based Drug market patterns and trends module contains the latest analysis of global, regional and subregional estimates of and trends in drug demand and supply in a user-friendly, interactive format supported by graphs, infographics and maps. The Key findings and conclusions booklet provides an overview of selected findings from the analysis presented in the Drug market patterns and trends module and the thematic Contemporary issues on drugs booklet, while the Special points of interest fascicle offers a framework for the main takeaways and policy implications that can be drawn from those findings.
As well as providing an in-depth analysis of key developments and emerging trends in selected drug markets, the Contemporary issues on drugs booklet looks at several other developments of policy relevance. The booklet opens with a look at the 2022 Taliban ban on the cultivation and production of and trafficking in drugs in Afghanistan and its implications both within the country and in transit and destination markets elsewhere. This is followed by a chapter examining the convergence of drug trafficking and other activities and how they affect natural ecosystems and communities in the Golden Triangle in South-East Asia. The chapter also assesses the extent to which drug production and trafficking are linked with other illicit economies that challenge the rule of law and fuel conflict. Another chapter analyses how the dynamics of demand for and supply of synthetic drugs vary when the gender and age of market participants are considered. The booklet continues with an update on regulatory approaches to and the impact of legalization on the non-medical cannabis market in different countries, and a review of the enabling environment that provides broad access to the unsupervised, “quasi-therapeutic” and non-medical use of psychedelic substances. Finally, the booklet offers a multi-dimensional framework on the right to health in the context of drug use; these dimensions include availability, accessibility, acceptability, quality, non-discrimination, non-stigmatization and participation.

The World Drug Report 2024 is aimed not only at fostering greater international cooperation to counter the impact of the world drug problem on health, governance and security, but also at assisting Member States in anticipating and addressing threats posed by drug markets and mitigating their consequences.

The emergence of new synthetic opioids and a record supply and demand of other drugs has compounded the impacts of the world drug problem, leading to a rise in drug use disorders and environmental harms, according to the World Drug Report 2024 launched by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) today.

“Drug production, trafficking, and use continue to exacerbate instability and inequality, while causing untold harm to people’s health, safety and well-being,” said Ghada Waly, Executive Director of UNODC. “We need to provide evidence-based treatment and support to all people affected by drug use, while targeting the illicit drug market and investing much more in prevention.”

The number of people who use drugs has risen to 292 million in 2022, a 20 per cent increase over 10 years. Cannabis remains the most widely used drug worldwide (228 million users), followed by opioids (60 million users), amphetamines (30 million users), cocaine (23 million users), and ecstasy (20 million users).

Nitazenes – a group of synthetic opioids which can be even more potent than fentanyl – have recently emerged in several high-income countries, resulting in an increase in overdose deaths.  

Though an estimated 64 million people worldwide suffer from drug use disorders, only one in 11 is in treatment. Women receive less access to treatment than men, with only one in 18 women with drug use disorders in treatment versus one in seven men.

In 2022, an estimated 7 million people were in formal contact with the police (arrests, cautions, warnings) for drug offences, with about two-thirds of this total due to drug use or possession for use. In addition, 2.7 million people were prosecuted for drug offences and over 1.6 million were convicted globally in 2022, though there are significant differences across regions regarding the criminal justice response to drug offences.

The Report includes special chapters on the impact of the opium ban in Afghanistan; synthetic drugs and gender; the impacts of cannabis legalization and the psychedelic “renaissance”; the right to health in relation to drug use; and how drug trafficking in the Golden Triangle is linked with other illicit activities and their impacts.

Vienna:  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime UNODC, 

2024. 169p.

By Enzo Nussio,

Lynching remains a common form of collective punishment for alleged wrongdoers in Latin America, Africa, and Asia today. Unlike other kinds of collective violence, lynching is usually not carried out by standing organizations. How do lynch mobs overcome the high barriers to violent collective action? I argue that they draw on local community ties to compensate for a lack of centralized organization. Lynch mobs benefit from solidarity and peer pressure, which facilitate collective action. The study focuses on Mexico, where lynching is prevalent and often amounts to the collective beating of thieves. Based on original survey data from Mexico City and a novel lynching event dataset covering the whole of Mexico, I find that individuals with more ties in their communities participate more often in lynching, and municipalities with more highly integrated communities have higher lynching rates. As community ties and lynching may be endogenously related, I also examine the posited mechanisms and the causal direction. Findings reveal that municipalities exposed to a recent major earthquake—an event that tends to increase community ties—subsequently experienced increased levels of lynching. Importantly, I find that interpersonal trust is unrelated to lynching, thus showing that different aspects of social capital have diverging consequences for collective violence, with community ties revealing a “dark side.”

American Sociological ReviewVolume 0: Ahead of Print, June 2024.