By Christopher Blattman, Benjamin Lessing, and Santiago Tobón

Organised crime poses one of the greatest threats to national security and development in the 21st century. Despite this, most policy, data collection, and scholarly research focuses on individuals and disorganised violence. Our work addresses several critical gaps in knowledge:

• What are the incentives for gangs to engage in violence and socially costly behaviour?

• Which are the trade-offs that practitioners face when deciding how to engage with organised violence?

• What type of information do relevant decision-makers need to inform their policies?

• Which are the most relevant tools for tracking down gang behaviour and use of violence?

We address these questions in the context of Medellín, Colombia’s second largest and most important city. Over the past six years, our work has covered a broad methodological spectrum, including:

• qualitative data collection through interviews with dozens of criminals and criminal justice experts;

• quantitative data collection from thousands of citizens in surveys representative at highly localised levels;

• active collaboration with local relevant stakeholders such as the city administration and the local police department;

• quasi-experimental evaluations of long-running policies dating back to the 1980s; and

• experimental evaluations of marginal improvements in state presence in violent and gang controlled areas.

Our preliminary findings point to terrible trade-offs, where authorities face plausibly impossible questions when balancing short-term gains in violence reduction and sacrifices in state legitimacy, with long-term uncertainty concerning both violence and state legitimacy. We highlight preliminary recommendations for guiding policy decisions.

Birmingham, UK: The Serious Organised Crime & Anti-Corruption Evidence (SOC ACE) 2022. 9p.

By: Arantza Alonso Berbotto and Spencer Chainey

The theft of refined oil products provides criminal groups with significant financial resources that threaten the environment and socio-economic stability of countries where it occurs. Violence is also associated with this criminal activity. Using crime script analysis, a detailed interpretation of the theft of oil via the illegal tapping of pipelines in Mexico was constructed. The analysis revealed the roles performed by members of criminal groups, the recruitment of individuals outside of the criminal group to provide information about the pipelines and perform technical activities, and the supporting role of citizens and businesses from local communities. The analysis also revealed the decision-making necessary for the successful commission of oil theft via the illegal tapping of pipelines. The use of situational crime prevention measures and improvements in the use of deterrence are identified as offering opportunities for preventing this criminal activity.

GLOBAL CRIME 2021, VOL. 22, NO. 4, 265–287https://doi.org/10.1080/17440572.2021.1925552© 2021

By: Steven Teutsch, Yasmin Hurd, and Elizabeth Boyle

The landscape of cannabis legalization in the United States has been changing dramatically. Cannabis is now available throughout the United States, with policies that vary significantly in terms of public health protection. In most states, legalization occurred through ballot initiatives and public ad campaigns often financed by wealthy donors. Voters acknowledged cannabis’s widespread use, its large illegal market, the criminalization of seemingly minor infractions, and discrimination in enforcement. Today, changes in the classification of cannabis under the federal Controlled Substances Act are pending, as is a possible change in the definition of “hemp.” These sweeping changes are occurring when many of the health consequences of cannabinoids remain quite uncertain. And those changes are coupled with a disturbing legacy of discrimination during the “war on drugs,” with associated devastating consequences for individuals and communities of color in particular. The legalization of an increasingly powerful intoxicating drug has necessitated a greater fusion of public health and drug policy in the states.

In the face of this complexity, how, then, is one to assess the consequences of the changes in cannabis policy for public health and social equity? This was the charge to the Committee on the Public Health Consequences of Changes in the Cannabis Landscape. The 2017 report of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, The Health Effects of Cannabis and Cannabinoids: The Current State of Evidence and Recommendations for Research, focuses on the health effects and potential therapeutic benefits of cannabis, noting the paucity of high-quality studies on its health effects. Regrettably, little has changed in this regard since that report was published, and scant to no research exists on the explosion of new cannabis and cannabinoid products. The present report focuses on the public health consequences of cannabis policies that have not been examined by the National Academies.

States have received little federal guidance on how to proceed regarding the health impact of cannabis on the public and communities. Other than two memoranda deferring to states, the federal government has been noticeably missing from this dialogue. Yet cannabis can cause real harms, as multiple investigators, families, and various groups attested to our committee. The tools of public health—assessment, policy development, and assurance—can provide the critical health information decision-makers need to protect the public health and make amends for past cannabis-related inequities, but those tools are only slowly being applied.

With legalization by states now widespread, it is time to ask about its impact, especially given the large variation in state policies. These natural experiments provide a rich but very complex set of experiences for analysis, but these policies are all of relatively recent vintage. Consequently, available products, use patterns, and markets have not yet stabilized. Facing these challenges, the committee reviewed what is known about these policies, formulated recommendations where possible, and delineated a path forward. With a strong commitment to policy research and the application of traditional public health tools, we fully anticipate that better and more consistent policies will unfold.

This report would not have been possible without the deep expertise, wide range of perspectives, and strong commitment of all the committee members. Elizabeth Boyle, study director, and her National Academies colleagues, Khala Hurst-Beatty, Alexandra McKay, and Mia Saltrelli, labored long and hard to tie together all the disparate pieces of this report. We are deeply grateful to all of them. Lastly, we want to express our appreciation to our sponsors, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the National Institutes of Health, without whose vision this study would not have been possible.

The National Academies Press 2024

By Renato Molina, Juan Carlos Villaseñor-Derbez, Gavin McDonald, Grant McDermott

Maritime transport has been historically susceptible to piracy. While broad assessments suggest the impact of modern piracy causes large economic losses, the literature lacks quantification of the magnitude of the costs and the behavioral responses that underpin them. Here, we combine theory and a unique geospatial dataset combining more than 25 million shipping voyages and thousands of pirate encounters across the globe to find that pirate encounters lead to significant and costly avoidance measures. Shippers modify their path along a route to avoid locations with known pirate encounters. This increases voyage distance and duration, which lead to significant increases in fuel and labor costs estimated to be over US$1.5 billion/year. Additionally, emission of CO2, NOx, and SOx due to increased fuel consumption results in environmental damages valued at US$5.1 billion per year. Together, our results provide the first global estimates linking the presence of pirates to individual behaviour and aggregate transportation cost, as well as its environmental impact, with major implications for the shipping industry and maritime security at a global scale.

CESifo Working Paper No. 11077, Munich: Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research - CESifo , 2024. 72p.

By Beau Kilmer, Michelle Priest, Rajeev Ramchand, Rhianna C. Rogers, Ben Senator, Keytin Palmer

Psychedelic substances, such as psilocybin mushrooms and LSD, have long been touted as holding promise for treating various mental health conditions, and the past decade has seen another round of enthusiasm for this hope. Although the clinical research and associated media reports on these substances continue to grow, what receives less attention is the changing policy landscape for some psychedelics in the United States. Despite the federal prohibition on supply and possession — outside approved clinical research, the Food and Drug Administration’s Expanded Access program, and some religious exemptions — some state and local governments are loosening their approaches to some psychedelics. In fact, some states are implementing or considering approaches that legalize some forms of supply to adults for any reason. It seems likely that more jurisdictions will consider and implement alternative policies to prohibit the nonclinical supply of some psychedelics, possibly including retail sales. The primary goal of this mixed-methods report is to present new data and analysis to help inform policymakers participating in these discussions in the United States, but much of this report should also be useful to decision-makers in other countries. These insights should also be useful to anyone interested in learning more about these substances and the public policy issues surrounding them.

Key Findings

• Unlike people who use cannabis and many other drugs, infrequent users of psychedelics account for most of the total days of use.

• The total number of use days for psychedelics — a proxy for the size of the market — is two orders of magnitude smaller than it is for cannabis.

• Within the class of drugs generally classified as psychedelics, psilocybin has the highest past-year and past-month prevalence rates among U.S. adults. Of those ages 18 and older, 3.1 percent — or approximately 8 million people — used psilocybin in 2023.

• Among those reporting the use of psilocybin in the past year, nearly half reported microdosing the last time they used it.

• Scientific literature is limited in its understanding of the consequences of using psychedelics and preventing and mitigating adverse events.

• Most of the policy changes at the state and local levels focus on supporting research and deprioritizing the enforcement of certain laws about psychedelics, but a few states have legalized some forms of supply and others are considering it.

• There are many supply policy options between prohibition and legalizing production and sales by for-profit companies.

• The role of price as a regulatory tool may matter less for psychedelics compared with many other drugs.

  Recommendations

• Those participating in psychedelics policy debates and analyses should be specific about the changes being considered, implemented, or evaluated.

• Meaningful policy discussions should include Indigenous Peoples who are community-authorized to speak on these matters.

• Policymakers need to be thoughtful about the role of supervision and facilitators when considering changes to psychedelics policies.

• It is critical to improve the data infrastructure on psychedelics to better support policy analyses.

• Now is the time for U.S. federal policymakers to decide whether they want psilocybin and other psychedelic substances to follow in the footsteps of the for-profit cannabis model.

Psychedelic substances, such as psilocybin and LSD, have long been touted as holding promise for treating some mental health conditions. An increasing number of U.S. state and local governments are implementing or considering alternative policies to prohibit some of these substances for nonclinical purposes (i.e., adults can use them for any reason). The authors of this report present new data and analysis to inform these discussions.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2024. 161p.

UNITED STATES. OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY

From the document: "America is facing the deadliest drug threat in our history. Over the last 25 years, drug overdose deaths in the United States from synthetic opioids, including fentanyl, have risen to more than 100 times their 1999 levels. The rate of fatal overdoses from other drugs, including cocaine and methamphetamine, has also surged. The overdose crisis calls for bold action. The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) has outlined vital steps for attacking two drivers of this crisis. [...] ONDCP's 2024 '[National Drug Control] Strategy' looks to the future this Nation needs. That future is one with greater access to prevention, treatment, harm reduction and recovery support services; with a focus on equity and equal justice; with support for incarcerated individuals, as well as post-incarceration reentry assistance; with a SUD [substance use disorder] and health care workforce that meets our Nation's needs; with a payment system that sufficiently funds care; and with a concerted transnational effort to hold drug traffickers, their enablers, and facilitators accountable. [...] The 2024 'Strategy' is aimed at addressing the overdose crisis from multiple angles. This includes preventing youth substance use, expanding access to life-saving medications like naloxone, expanding access to evidence-based treatment, building a recovery-ready Nation, and ramping up efforts to disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking."

UNITED STATES. WHITE HOUSE OFFICE; UNITED STATES. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; . MAY, 2024. 124p.

FREEMAN, BEN; CLEVELAND-STOUT, NICK

From the document: "This brief takes a deep dive into a newly available tranche of data tracking foreign influence in the U.S. political process. The new data was released in early 2024 following reforms to the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), which made access to all foreign registrants' political activities and campaign contributions publicly available. The brief unearths a complex web of foreign influence in the United States -- with countries like Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Azerbaijan reaping the benefits of massive political influence campaigns."

QUINCY INSTITUTE FOR RESPONSIBLE STATECRAFT. Quincy Brief No. 59. 2024.

By Sarah Pedersen,  Natascha Mueller-Hirth, Leia Miller

COVID-19 exacerbated challenges that already existed in the policing of Gender-Based Violence (GBV) in remote and rural northern Scotland. Victims’ direct access to the police and third-sector organisations was impeded by social distancing while the pandemic exacerbated extant issues relating to staffing, particularly in relation to female police officers. On the positive side, the flexibility that already characterised rural and remote policing continued, and police officers and third-sector organisations worked together to support victims. The move to videoconferencing was hailed as a positive move in an area where travel to meetings or court can be difficult and expensive. A lack of training for officers with no specific GBV role was identified as particularly problematic during the pandemic when officers on the ground in rural and remote Scotland had to take over work usually undertaken by specialist task forces.

Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 2023. 12p.

 By Virginia Comolli   

Building and expanding on the analysis in the Global Organized Crime Index, the GI-TOC has undertaken to map trends in organized criminality in the Pacific (Oceania). The resulting papers contribute to filling some of the gaps in a region where crime-related data can be scarce. In turn, these analyses allow us to identify vulnerabilities as well as opportunities for intervention and mitigation. The Pacific islands now occupy a more prominent place on the international strategic chessboard as a result of the proliferation of trade, diplomatic and security engagements in the region in the 21st century.  This is due to greater foreign presence and influence in Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia, and intensifying geopolitical competition among external partners. This reality, alongside greater connectivity and market trends, is also drastically  transforming the criminal landscape. Pacific islands have traditionally been considered as mostly immune from high levels of criminality due to their geographic remoteness.  However, highly pernicious illicit markets are taking hold, and the islands are becoming increasingly vulnerable to new threats in the form of cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent crimes and the introduction of new narcotics, to mention just two examples. Who is behind these activities? There are multiple criminal actors present and active in the Pacific islands, but the most pervasive are foreign actors.  And within the foreign actor sub-set, there are a diverse array of nationalities and sectors. The one thing they have in common is their pivotal role vis a vis evolving crime dynamics. Across the series of papers, we map their different typologies. The emerging pictures suggest that, possibly contrary to expectations, business operators are often responsible for the bulk of organized criminality. This is particularly evident in the extractive industries, but also in sectors such as real estate and financial services. Yet, more ‘obvious’ criminal actors such as cartels and triads have also made their way to the islands and intensified their operations.

Geneva, SWIT:  Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2024. 29p.

By Jeanne Batalova, Andriy Shymonyak, and Michelle Mittelstadt

  Although international migrants account for just 3.5 percent of the world’s population, their number—almost 272 million people as of 2019—is far from insubstantial. Current and historical research shows that immigration brings significant and long-lasting benefits to countries of destination and origin and to migrants and their families alike. But it also shows that immigration often comes with tremendous challenges for individuals, communities, and institutions. In the United States, a country with a long and complex immigration history, public and political debates that started well back into the 18th century about the size and type of immigration, as well as its socioeconomic impacts, show no sign of abating. And as other countries around the world become migrant-sending, receiving, or transit places (or frequently a combination), migration—whether voluntary or forced—has arguably earned a prime and enduring spot on national and international policy agendas. It also continues to capture significant public and media attention. What is often missing from these conversations is accurate, complete data about who these immigrants are, why they come and leave, and what places they occupy in the socioeconomic hierarchies of their sending and destination countries. In this edition, Immigration Data Matters, which updates an earlier Population Reference Bureau - Migration Policy Institute guide, we have significantly expanded a list of online resources that provide authoritative migration-related data and statistics to help inform understanding of this phenomenon in the United States and globally. As before, our main guiding principle is to offer data from population censuses and surveys, administrative datasets, and new analyses that can help our audience understand the size of immigrant populations and inflows and outflows, enforcement actions, public opinion, historical trends, citizenship acquisition, and many other aspects. Here we list and describe more than 250 data resources, half U.S., half international. These resources are collected or compiled by a wide range of sources, including government statistical agencies, international organizations such as the World Bank and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and reputable research organizations. We use these resources in our own research, and while the list is by no means exhaustive, our goal is to share the most accurate, relevant, publicly available migration-related data, in one user-friendly and accessible guide. We hope this guide helps bring more knowledge to an issue area where the facts are often missing  

Migration Policy Institute and The   Population Reference Bureau , 2020. 49p.

By María Calderón

 When it comes to an understanding of political violence in Mexico, there is a risk of solely equating it with criminal groups' activities or exclusively attributing it to such groups. However, the political violence phenomenon in Mexico is complex and diverse, with a particular nexus to locally based illicit economies, for which an all-containing approach is insufficient. About half of the political violence that occurred in Mexico during the 2018 elections was directly attributed to organized crime. During such time, political figures were killed at a rate of one per week. These numbers support the growing concern about criminal groups' involvement in Mexican politics. Criminal groups have used political violence in several ways: directly manipulating and influencing elections, protecting incumbent candidates with whom they have struck an agreement, killing candidates who are perceived as a threat to their interests, intimidating poll workers, and attacking and stealing voting booths, among others. The decrease in the profitability of trafficking heroin and cannabis, the legalization of marijuana in many US states, and increased fentanyl usage have forced cartels to recalibrate strategies and markets. Nowadays, criminal groups have partially shifted towards locally based illicit economies, such as oil theft, extortion, kidnapping, and other illegal activities that require control of local territories. All these variables come into play when understanding that criminalized electoral politics is a predominantly local phenomenon in Mexico. Political violence by criminal groups in Mexico is motivated by multiple factors, including economic interests, political objectives, and vendettas. Criminal organizations often avoid open confrontation when attacking politicians or political candidates, opting for other less visible techniques to minimize the impacts on police and law enforcement agencies, such as corruption. Installing or co-opting candidates at the municipal level has afforded criminal groups direct influence over the actions of local and state police. Access to intelligence on pending arrests or other operations has also proven beneficial for criminal organizations. Political influence has allowed criminal groups to employ local security forces as appendages of their organizations to detain or kill targets and to protect the transportation of illicit goods. Moreover, criminal organizations have tapped into state finances by co-opting government employees. 

Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2024. 6p.

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME

From the webpage description: "A global reference on drug markets, trends and policy developments, the World Drug Report offers a wealth of data and analysis and in 2024 comprises several elements tailored to different audiences. The web-based Drug market patterns and trends [hyperlink] module contains the latest analysis of global, regional and subregional estimates of and trends in drug demand and supply in a user-friendly, interactive format supported by graphs, infographics and maps. The Key findings and conclusions booklet [hyperlink] provides an overview of selected findings from the analysis presented in the Drug market patterns and trends module and the thematic Contemporary issues on drugs booklet, while the Special points of interest [hyperlink] fascicle offers a framework for the main takeaways and policy implications that can be drawn from those findings. As well as providing an in-depth analysis of key developments and emerging trends in selected drug markets, the Contemporary issues on drugs booklet [hyperlink] looks at several other developments of policy relevance. [...] The World Drug Report 2024 is aimed not only at fostering greater international cooperation to counter the impact of the world drug problem on health, governance and security, but also at assisting Member States in anticipating and addressing threats posed by drug markets and mitigating their consequences."

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME. 2024

By David Bruce

The South African per-capita murder rate has steadily escalated since 2011/12, when it was at its lowest since 1994. The 2022/23 rate of 45 per 100 000 is the highest in 20 years. But focusing on national murder trends is misleading as trends vary greatly across the nine provinces. The current high per-capita murder rate is driven by high rates in the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, the Western Cape and Gauteng. Key findings: South African murder trends vary considerably across provinces. The Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, the Western Cape and Gauteng have the highest per-capita murder rates. In 2022/23, the Eastern Cape had the highest murder rate (71 per 100 000), followed by KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape, both with annual murder rates of 56. The four provinces with the most murders have also recorded the highest per-capita murder rate increases in the last 10 years. Since 2011/12, rates have increased most dramatically in KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape. The increase has been greatest from 2017/18 to 2022/23. The per-capita murder rate in the Western Cape decreased over the last five years. Recommendations The government and society must prioritise reducing murder rates, which are high and increasing. The collection of data about murder, and the analysis thereof, must be improved. ‘One-size-fits-all’ approaches to addressing murder are unlikely to be effective. Responses should be adapted to respond to the drivers of murder focusing on high-murder localities. Priority should be given to understanding and addressing murder in the four provinces with the highest per-capita murder rates. KwaZulu-Natal and, to a lesser degree, Gauteng experienced major surges in murder in 2021/22, with increases continuing in 2022/23. These have taken them well above their rates in the year before the COVID-19 pandemic and national lockdown. Deaths during the July 2021 unrest were not a major contributor to the increases in murder in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng in 2021/22. Many experts believe that the entrenchment and growth of organised crime has played a major role in the increasing number of murders. More in-depth provincially focused research and analysis is required to better understand the factors and circumstances driving murder trends. 

Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2023. 12p.

By Göran Adamson

In 2005, the Swedish Crime Prevention Agency published a report about the link between immigration and crime. Since then, no comprehensive study has been conducted even though Sweden has experienced a large influx of migrants in combination with a rising crime rate. This study conducted by Göran Adamson and Tino Sanandaji is the first purely descriptive scientific investigation on the matter in fifteen years. The investigation (from 2002 to 2017) covers seven distinct categories of crime, and distinguishes between seven regions of origin. Based on 33 percent of the population (2017), 58 percent of those suspect for total crime on reasonable grounds are migrants. Regarding murder, manslaughter and attempted murder, the figures are 73 per cent, while the proportion of robbery is 70 percent. Non-registered migrants are linked to about 13 percent of total crime. Given the fact that this group is small, crime propensity among non-registered migrants is significant.

Sweden; Society, 2020. 13p.

By George Sternlieb and James W. Hughes

FROM THE FOREWORD: “The quest for a quick and painless, that is, politically popular, means of raising funds and stimulating economic development never ends. In the last decade, politicians seized on a number of seemingly ingenious devices, from lotteries to off-track betting, that promised benefits such as big increases in revenues and decreases in the role of so-called organized crime. The results have rarely measured up to the expectations-the only thing painless about lotteries and betting shops is the way in which they have parted their clients from their money, and the only real benefits have been to the relatively few individuals who have hit large jackpots and the politicians who have found a new and rich source of patronage.”

Harvard University Press Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England. 1983. 224p.

MAY CONTAIN MARKUP

UNITED STATES. CONGRESS. HOUSE. SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE STRATEGIC COMPETITION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

From the document: "The fentanyl crisis is one of the most horrific disasters that America has ever faced. On average, fentanyl kills over 200 Americans daily, the equivalent of a packed Boeing 737 crashing every single day. Fentanyl is the leading cause of death for Americans aged 18-45 and a leading cause in the historic drop in American life expectancy. It has led to millions more suffering from addiction and the destruction of countless families and communities. Beyond the United States, fentanyl and other mass-produced synthetic narcotics from the People's Republic of China (PRC) are devastating nations around the world. It is truly a global crisis. The PRC, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), is the ultimate geographic source of the fentanyl crisis. Companies in China produce nearly all of illicit fentanyl precursors, the key ingredients that drive the global illicit fentanyl trade. The House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party (Select Committee) launched an investigation to better understand the role of the CCP in the fentanyl crisis. This investigation involved delving deep into public PRC websites, analyzing PRC government documents, acquiring over 37,000 unique data points of PRC companies selling narcotics online through web scraping and data analytics, undercover communications with PRC drug trafficking companies, and consultations with experts in the public and private sectors, among other steps. [...] [T]he Select Committee found thousands of PRC companies openly selling [...] illicit materials on the Chinese internet--the most heavily surveilled country-wide network in the world. The CCP runs the most advanced techno-totalitarian state in human history that 'leave[s] criminals with nowhere to hide' and has the means to stop illicit fentanyl materials manufacturers, yet it has failed to pursue flagrant violations of its own laws."

UNITED STATES. CONGRESS. HOUSE. SELECT COMMITTEE. 16 APR, 2024. 64p.

By David C. Brotherton, and Follow Rafael Gude

Since 2007, the Ecuadorian approach to crime control has emphasized efforts to reach higher levels of social control based on policies of social inclusion and innovations in criminal justice and police reform. One innovative aspect of this approach was the decision to legalize a number of street gangs in 2007. The government claims the success of these policies can be seen in homicide rates that have fallen from 15.35 per 100,000 in 2011 to 5 per 100,000 in 2017. However, little is understood about the factors and their combination that have produced this outcome. To explore this phenomenon, we developed a research project focusing on the impact of street gangs involved in processes of social inclusion on violence reduction. From April to October 2017, we collected multiple data sets including 60 face-to-face interviews with members from four different street subcultures in several field sites, field observations and archival materials to answer two primary questions: How has the relationship between street groups and state agencies changed in the past 10 years? How has this changed relationship contributed to a hitherto unexamined role in the homicide reduction phenomenon of Ecuador? We found that legalization helped reduce violence and criminality drastically while providing a space, both culturally and legally, to transform the social capital of the gang into effective vehicles of behavioral change. In policy terms, we argue that the social inclusion approach to street gangs should be continued and highlighted as a model of best practices of the state.

Washington, DC: IDB, 2018.

By Mafalda Pardal, Elle Wadsworth, Beau Kilmer

Potent synthetic opioids, illegally produced, are starting to emerge in Europe. Considering the damaging harms caused by the opioid crisis in North America, which has led to a substantial surge in overdose deaths, it is crucial that European leaders understand the challenges associated with synthetic opioids. In this Perspective, we present and discuss the current situation in Europe concerning synthetic opioids, and draw on earlier and ongoing crises involving this group of substances to reflect on likely challenges ahead and ways to improve preparedness.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2024. 20p.

By Frances Thomson, Patrick Meehan & Jonathan Goodhand (02 Apr 2024):

his article and the forum it introduces examine illicit drug crop (IDC) economies from agrarian perspectives. Examining IDCs as a group implies analysing how prohibition distinguishes them from other (licit) crops. We identify seven mechanisms through which prohibition shapes the agrarian political economy of IDCs and explore how these mechanisms and their effects generate distinctive patterns of development and political action amongst ‘illicit peasantries’. We also examine connections between illicit and licit crops, including how licit crop crises and illicit crop booms intertwine. We argue that IDC economies provide a bulwark for smallholders but are by no means peasant idylls.

The Journal of Peasant Studies. 2024. 39p.

European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA)

Availability remains high across the main drugs used in Europe, evidenced by the large and in some cases increasing quantities that continue to be seized in the European Union. In addition, the market for illicit drugs is characterised by the diversification of consumer products and the widespread availability of a broader range of drugs, including new psychoactive substances, often of high potency or purity. Specialised equipment may be required to meet the detection and monitoring challenges posed by this diversification.

The recent emergence of highly potent opioids, particularly benzimidazoles (nitazenes), poses a particularly complex threat to public health due to their increased risk of life-threatening poisoning. The potential emergence of new patterns of consumption in Europe is also a key threat, due to the availability of cheap and highly potent or pure drugs. This is particularly the case for cocaine, which has seen unprecedented levels of availability

European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), 2024. 39p.